By Dr Joseph E. Edmunds and Anton E. Edmunds
Heightened international attention has recently been given to the subject of food security and increasingly, Caribbean voices have joined the chorus. This while hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on food importation into the region. While the World Health Organization (WHO) states that agriculture remains the largest source of employment in developing countries, by all appearances, the Caribbean must either have graduated from developing nation status or economic policy decisions have downgraded the importance of agriculture. One cannot help but observe that in many Caribbean countries, acreages of land are underutilized, many with grass, shrubs, and trees in abundance, and with no planned use at all to fulfill human needs.
Clearly, Caribbean planners have failed to recognize and give priority to what is seen by some as a fundamental tenet of development -- land capability and its effective usage. As a result, what is seen in the broader region is large land acreages of valuable national assets that appear abandoned and categorized as wastelands, even while there are increased domestic food needs. The uncoordinated approach that allows land to remain undeveloped, underdeveloped or converted into different types of development unrelated to land capabilities appears to be the norm in the region.
Further, in some cases, lands ideally suited for agricultural development – plant and animal production -- are abandoned or are converted into industrial or tourism/hotel development sectors without any thought to a functional integrated national plan. While tourism is the recognized economic driver for many in the region, and it is clear that the development of new hotels and resorts may well require access to strategically located properties. Unfortunately, efforts to integrate surrounding lands or maximize the use of fertile soils into the tourism product appear to be an afterthought.
The time is now when countries in the region need to take a critical look at their development policies and seek to incorporate viable landmass into strategic sustainable plans to meet the local and regional needs, thus contributing to the Caribbean’s ability to survive and compete in the global marketplace. A concerted effort is also needed to integrate key plant and animal production as a food resource for our tourism industry. This would contribute to the cultural experience of the visitor and temper the increasingly rapid move away from the land, a social development that needs to be carefully monitored. A taste of the Caribbean that accentuates local and regional products and flavours should be an addition to the visitors’ experience. There are already best practices, of hotels and restaurants that have had success in sourcing local agricultural and fisheries products. This should not be ignored, but rather replicated.
The issue of investing in an energy mix that includes renewable energy is another area where larger so-called waste tracts can serve as spots for solar farms, and used to cultivate bio diesel. Effective land use in this area combined with agricultural production for local and regional consumption can make good sense and can even serve to “re-green” the tourism industry if integrated into the mix and marketed correctly.
Key to the development of linkages with the above-mentioned industries is the establishment of national land use/land capability councils consisting of members from the public and private sectors as well as local, regional, and international institutions. This strategy is in keeping with the basic elements of a participatory democracy, a necessary component of good governance, and could result in the articulation and formulation of enabling policies, and the improvement of policy planning and management of sustainable plans. Of course, access to capital is vital to the facilitation of this process and therefore requires the understanding and inputs from various financial and development institutions.
While it is argued by some that countries in the region are guided by the realities of geo-politics and geo-economics and the “the urgency of now” which dictate the survival of political parties, the importance of food security is of increasing concern to domestic populations, and with rising food prices, this could become a real threat to political longevity. What appears to be the blunt survival mode of some more developed countries, which provide enormous subsidies for their local products and take aggressive actions (sometimes to the detriment of the less developed countries), in order to sustain their vested interests at home and in the global marketplace, only exacerbates the situation.
For the region, the call for a redoubling of efforts to address low productively and lack of investment in research and development should become major priorities. Innovative approaches for the region require linking the agricultural industry to other productive sectors, the implementation of modern management systems, and the injection of appropriate technologies. Best practices have to be replicated and efforts to rebuild a torn social fabric that balances effective land use with land capability is critical to the region’s future.
Dr Joseph E. Edmunds is a former Senior Research Fellow, UWI St Augustine Campus, Trinidad, Director of Research and Development, of the banana industry of the Windward Islands, and Ambassador of St Lucia to the UN, OAS, and US. Senior Associate to The Edmunds Group International and The Caribbean Research and Policy Center in Washington.
Anton E. Edmunds is the president and CEO, The Edmunds Group International (www.theedmundsgroup.com), former CEO of Caribbean Central American Action (www.c-caa.org) and Senior Project Advisor to Halcrow. Member: Latin America Council on Renewable Energy, Caribbean Association of Industry & Commerce, Caribbean Shipping Association, Caribbean Tourism Organization and Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum.
September 7, 2011
caribbeannewsnow
An International Caribbean Online Log about the news and opinions in the Americas and World. This Caribbean Blog of global reach and appeal is maintained by Bahamian Blogger - Dennis Dames with all readers and subscribers in mind.
Thursday, September 8, 2011
Wednesday, September 7, 2011
Learn from your neighbour's mistakes Bahamas!
Reader warns: Learn from Jamaica's mistakes
tribune242 editorial
Nassau, The Bahamas
IN THIS column yesterday we commented on a proposal to Government by former Bahamian gangleaders to get crime under control by using them to create community jobs for the unemployed.
Having formed an alliance - United Against Crime (UAC) -- to mobilise resources and support for community based initiatives, the former gang leaders presented their proposal to National Security Minister Tommy Turnquest and senior members of the Police Force.
UAC's top priority is to create economic opportunities for the unemployed, who through lack of jobs are driven to crime.
"Whenever there is poverty there is crime. When people can't pay the bills they find other ways. The police can't do anything, with all due respect, until after the fact," said Valentino "Squaw" Josey, spokesman for the group. He said that community leaders - presumably himself and his fellow former gang members -- are the key to successful preventative measures.
He suggested that community leaders should be employed to do full time community work -- mediating conflicts, building side walks, cleaning the community, landscaping and performing other tasks. They proposed a partnership with the government and corporate society. He suggested that instead of giving government jobs to big contractors, the jobs should all be kept within the community. For example, he said, a $10,000 contract to paint a school could be given to a community leader, who could then employ other people in the community. And by working more closely with the community "we stand a chance to eliminate crime."
This could be a solution, but it is also the very kernel from which a serious problem could develop in the future.
This was partially the story of how the Tivoli Garden's saga started in Jamaica several years ago. It ended last year in the storming by Jamaican security forces of Tivoli Gardens, where it was believed that Tivoli's don, "Dudus" Coke, wanted on drug and gun running charges in the US, was hiding. Tivoli residents, whose very existence depended on the generosity of gangleader "Dudus," violently fought off government forces to protect their community leader. Seventy-three Jamaican's were killed in that clash.
Mr Turnquest told the leaders that government would not provide them with financial backing without "accountability and transparency."
We backed Mr Turnquest's stand, because we do not believe in arbitrarily cutting off an extended olive branch without a thorough hearing. However, for us there was a caveat and that was the case of Tivoli. We are certain that this is not the intent of our reformed Bahamian gangleaders, nor was it the intent of those of Tivoli Gardens when the political leaders got involved with the "community leaders." But in the end it was the unintended that eventually happened. Good intentions ended in tragedy.
A Mr Patrick Beersingh of Jamaica, having read this column on Tribune242.com, on Monday had the following comment. His interpretation of the proposal: "Community work translates to legitimizing gang control" -
"Editor,
"You seem to be supporting the idea, in spirit at least, that the so-called 'Community Leaders' should be employed to do 'full time community work'. That would be a huge mistake. I speak from personal knowledge of having experienced the very same idea implemented in Jamaica in the 1970's. You are so correct when you say that these ideas led to the Tivoli invasion. However, if you explore 'community work' closer you will see that the 'Community Leaders' are the Dons and Gang Leaders, who are attempting to get legitimacy to enforce their particular brand of law and order via intimidation and doling out scarce benefits within the community. This would see them grow in power until it takes a full scale assault on their neighbourhoods to dislodge them, when they eventually fall afoul of the supremacy of the organs of State, which they most certainly will.
"Look at the Crash Programme of the 1970's under PM Michael Manley. Now MP's are actually given monies to spend within their constituencies, which they use to influence their affiliated criminal organizations. Work is hardly done any more in exchange for this dole. Apart from the billions wasted on these programmes, what they do more than anything else, is to give legitimacy to the local criminals, making them into national and international dons of crime. What they become are state sponsored, Gang Controlled Neighbourhoods.
"Learn from your neighbour's mistakes!"
We are certain government will take a long and serious look at UAC's proposal.
Prime Minister Ingraham has launched another initiative aimed at the unemployed -- government's job readiness and training programme. The object is to prepare the unskilled for jobs as the economy rebounds. These are the programmes that these young men should be encouraged by their gang leaders to take advantage of.
September 06, 2011
tribune242 editorial
tribune242 editorial
Nassau, The Bahamas
IN THIS column yesterday we commented on a proposal to Government by former Bahamian gangleaders to get crime under control by using them to create community jobs for the unemployed.
Having formed an alliance - United Against Crime (UAC) -- to mobilise resources and support for community based initiatives, the former gang leaders presented their proposal to National Security Minister Tommy Turnquest and senior members of the Police Force.
UAC's top priority is to create economic opportunities for the unemployed, who through lack of jobs are driven to crime.
"Whenever there is poverty there is crime. When people can't pay the bills they find other ways. The police can't do anything, with all due respect, until after the fact," said Valentino "Squaw" Josey, spokesman for the group. He said that community leaders - presumably himself and his fellow former gang members -- are the key to successful preventative measures.
He suggested that community leaders should be employed to do full time community work -- mediating conflicts, building side walks, cleaning the community, landscaping and performing other tasks. They proposed a partnership with the government and corporate society. He suggested that instead of giving government jobs to big contractors, the jobs should all be kept within the community. For example, he said, a $10,000 contract to paint a school could be given to a community leader, who could then employ other people in the community. And by working more closely with the community "we stand a chance to eliminate crime."
This could be a solution, but it is also the very kernel from which a serious problem could develop in the future.
This was partially the story of how the Tivoli Garden's saga started in Jamaica several years ago. It ended last year in the storming by Jamaican security forces of Tivoli Gardens, where it was believed that Tivoli's don, "Dudus" Coke, wanted on drug and gun running charges in the US, was hiding. Tivoli residents, whose very existence depended on the generosity of gangleader "Dudus," violently fought off government forces to protect their community leader. Seventy-three Jamaican's were killed in that clash.
Mr Turnquest told the leaders that government would not provide them with financial backing without "accountability and transparency."
We backed Mr Turnquest's stand, because we do not believe in arbitrarily cutting off an extended olive branch without a thorough hearing. However, for us there was a caveat and that was the case of Tivoli. We are certain that this is not the intent of our reformed Bahamian gangleaders, nor was it the intent of those of Tivoli Gardens when the political leaders got involved with the "community leaders." But in the end it was the unintended that eventually happened. Good intentions ended in tragedy.
A Mr Patrick Beersingh of Jamaica, having read this column on Tribune242.com, on Monday had the following comment. His interpretation of the proposal: "Community work translates to legitimizing gang control" -
"Editor,
"You seem to be supporting the idea, in spirit at least, that the so-called 'Community Leaders' should be employed to do 'full time community work'. That would be a huge mistake. I speak from personal knowledge of having experienced the very same idea implemented in Jamaica in the 1970's. You are so correct when you say that these ideas led to the Tivoli invasion. However, if you explore 'community work' closer you will see that the 'Community Leaders' are the Dons and Gang Leaders, who are attempting to get legitimacy to enforce their particular brand of law and order via intimidation and doling out scarce benefits within the community. This would see them grow in power until it takes a full scale assault on their neighbourhoods to dislodge them, when they eventually fall afoul of the supremacy of the organs of State, which they most certainly will.
"Look at the Crash Programme of the 1970's under PM Michael Manley. Now MP's are actually given monies to spend within their constituencies, which they use to influence their affiliated criminal organizations. Work is hardly done any more in exchange for this dole. Apart from the billions wasted on these programmes, what they do more than anything else, is to give legitimacy to the local criminals, making them into national and international dons of crime. What they become are state sponsored, Gang Controlled Neighbourhoods.
"Learn from your neighbour's mistakes!"
We are certain government will take a long and serious look at UAC's proposal.
Prime Minister Ingraham has launched another initiative aimed at the unemployed -- government's job readiness and training programme. The object is to prepare the unskilled for jobs as the economy rebounds. These are the programmes that these young men should be encouraged by their gang leaders to take advantage of.
September 06, 2011
tribune242 editorial
Cuban Missile Crisis 1962: The Cuban Missile Crisis (known as the October Crisis in Cuba or Caribbean Crisis (Russian: Kарибский кризис) in the USSR)
Cuban Missile Crisis
At the beginning of September 1962, U-2 spy planes discovered that the Soviet Union was building surface-to-air missile (SAM) launch sites. There was also an increase in the number of Soviet ships arriving in Cuba which the United States government feared were carrying new supplies of weapons. President John F. Kennedy complained to the Soviet Union about these developments and warned them that the United States would not accept offensive weapons (SAMs were considered to be defensive) in Cuba.
As the Cubans now had SAM installations they were in a position to shoot down U-2 spy-planes. Kennedy was in a difficult situation. Elections were to take place for the United States Congress in two month's time. The public opinion polls showed that his own ratings had fallen to their lowest point since he became president.
In his first two years of office a combination of Republicans and conservative southern Democrats in Congress had blocked much of Kennedy's proposed legislation. The polls suggested that after the elections he would have even less support in Congress. Kennedy feared that any trouble over Cuba would lose the Democratic Party even more votes, as it would remind voters of the Bay of Pigs disaster where the CIA had tried to oustFidel Castro from power. One poll showed that over 62 per cent of the population were unhappy with his policies on Cuba. Understandably, the Republicans attempted to make Cuba the main issue in the campaign.
This was probably in Kennedy's mind when he decided to restrict the flights of the U-2 planes over Cuba. Pilots were also told to avoid flying the whole length of the island. Kennedy hoped this would ensure that a U-2 plane would not be shot down, and would prevent Cuba becoming a major issue during the election campaign.
On 27th September, a CIA agent in Cuba overheard Castro's personal pilot tell another man in a bar that Cuba now had nuclear weapons. U-2 spy-plane photographs also showed that unusual activity was taking place at San Cristobal. However, it was not until 15th October that photographs were taken that revealed that the Soviet Union was placing long range missiles in Cuba.
President Kennedy's first reaction to the information about the missiles in Cuba was to call a meeting to discuss what should be done. Robert S McNamara, Secretary of State for Defence, suggested the formation of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. Fourteen men attended the meeting and included military leaders, experts on Latin America, representatives of the CIA, cabinet ministers and personal friends whose advice Kennedy valued. Over the next few days they were to meet several times. During their discussions they considered several different strategies for dealing with the crisis. They included the following:
(1) Do nothing. The United States should ignore the missiles in Cuba. The United States had military bases in 127 different countries including Cuba. The United States also had nuclear missiles in several countries close to the Soviet Union. It was therefore only right that the Soviet Union should be allowed to place missiles in Cuba.
(2) Negotiate. The United States should offer the Soviet Union a deal. In return for the Soviet Union dismantling her missiles in Cuba, the United States would withdraw her nuclear missiles from Turkey and Italy.
(3) Invasion. Send United States troops to Cuba to overthrow Castro's government. The missiles could then be put out of action and the Soviet Union could no longer use Cuba as a military base.
(4) Blockade of Cuba. Use the United States Navy to stop military equipment reaching Cuba from the Soviet Union.
(5) Bomb Missile Bases. Carry out conventional air-strikes against missiles and other military targets in Cuba.
(6) Nuclear Weapons. Use nuclear weapons against Cuba and/or the Soviet Union.
When discussing these strategies. President Kennedy and his advisers had to take into consideration how the Soviet Union and Cuba would react to decisions made by the United States.
At the first meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, the CIA and other military advisers explained the situation. After hearing what they had to say, the general feeling of the meeting was for an air-attack on the missile sites. Remembering the poor advice the CIA had provided before the Bay of Pigs invasion, John F. Kennedy decided to wait and instead called for another meeting to take place that evening. By this time several of the men were having doubts about the wisdom of a bombing raid, fearing that it would lead to a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The committee was now so divided that a firm decision could not be made.
The Executive Committee of the National Security Council argued amongst themselves for the next two days. The CIA and the military were still in favour of a bombing raid and/or an invasion. However, the majority of the committee gradually began to favour a naval blockade of Cuba.
Kennedy accepted their decision and instructed Theodore Sorensen, a member of the committee, to write a speech in which Kennedy would explain to the world why it was necessary to impose a naval blockade of Cuba.
As well as imposing a naval blockade, Kennedy also told the air-force to prepare for attacks on Cuba and the Soviet Union. The army positioned 125,000 men in Florida and was told to wait for orders to invade Cuba. If the Soviet ships carrying weapons for Cuba did not turn back or refused to be searched, a war was likely to begin. Kennedy also promised his military advisers that if one of the U-2 spy planes were fired upon he would give orders for an attack on the Cuban SAM missile sites.
The world waited anxiously. A public opinion poll in the United States revealed that three out of five people expected fighting to break out between the two sides. There were angry demonstrations outside the American Embassy in London as people protested about the possibility of nuclear war. Demonstrations also took place in other cities in Europe. However, in the United States, polls suggested that the vast majority supported Kennedy's action.
On October 24, President John F. Kennedy was informed that Soviet ships had stopped just before they reached the United States ships blockading Cuba. That evening Nikita Khrushchev sent an angry note to Kennedy accusing him of creating a crisis to help the Democratic Partywin the forthcoming election.
On October 26, Khrushchev sent Kennedy another letter. In this he proposed that the Soviet Union would be willing to remove the missiles in Cuba in exchange for a promise by the United States that they would not invade Cuba. The next day a second letter from Khrushchev arrived demanding that the United States remove their nuclear bases in Turkey.
While the president and his advisers were analyzing Khrushchev's two letters, news came through that a U-2 plane had been shot down over Cuba. The leaders of the military, reminding Kennedy of the promise he had made, argued that he should now give orders for the bombing of Cuba. Kennedy refused and instead sent a letter to Khrushchev accepting the terms of his first letter.
Khrushchev agreed and gave orders for the missiles to be dismantled. Eight days later the elections for Congress took place. The Democrats increased their majority and it was estimated that Kennedy would now have an extra twelve supporters in Congress for his policies.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was the first and only nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The event appeared to frighten both sides and it marked a change in the development of the Cold War. Some of the direct consequences of the crisis include the following:
(1) The two sides established a direct communications link that became known as the Hot Line. It was hoped that this would help prevent dangerous confrontations such as the Cuban Missile Crisis arising again.
(2) Three months after the Cuban Missile Crisis the United States secretly removed all its nuclear missiles from Turkey and Italy.
(3) A Test Ban Treaty was signed between the two countries in August 1963. The treaty prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.
(4) The 1,113 prisoners captured during the Bay of Pigs invasion were exchanged by Castro for $60 million in food, drugs, medicine and cash.
(5) The Soviet Union became determined to have a nuclear capability that was equal to the United States. This was achieved by 1972.
(6) China accused the Soviet Union of being a 'paper-tiger' and claimed to be the true leader of the Communist movement. The split between theSoviet Union and China became wider.
(7) The United States became convinced that the Soviet Union would not go to war over another communist country. It has been argued that this encouraged the United States to help attempts to overthrow socialist and communist governments in Vietnam, Nicaragua and Grenada.
Tuesday, September 6, 2011
Costa Rica: An army-less nation in a problem-prone region
by Alex Sanchez, COHA Research Fellow
The Central American nation of Costa Rica is one of the few countries in the world that does not possess a standing military. Nevertheless, Costa Rica, like other Latin American countries, faces a variety of security threats that test the country’s security capacity. Major national security issues include border control, drug trafficking and the expansion of international criminal organizations into the country, like for example, the Mexican Sinaloa drug cartel. On the international front, Costa Rica is currently involved in a border dispute with Nicaragua, which includes the occupation by a contingent of Nicaraguan army troops of disputed territories along the San Juan River since last year. The river traditionally has served as a natural border between the two countries, but Nicaragua altered the river’s course last year, resulting in a newfound control of the disputed Calero Island, at least for the time being. In response, San José has created a new elite border unit. The combination of rising criminal activity and the current border dispute with a state that possesses a relatively strong standing military means that Costa Rica will have to develop a stronger defense capacity to tackle growing security-related issues.
The History
Costa Rica’s revered president, José Figueres Ferrer, abolished the country’s military on December 1, 1948. The following year, Article 12 of the new constitution codified the abolition of the military. The armed forces’ budget was then shifted to internal security goals by redirecting funds to the police force, education, environmental protection and cultural preservation.
As a result, the country became known as a ‘civilized nation’ -- a label that it could not have claimed before the abolition of the armed forces. Prior to Figueres’ landmark initiative, Costa Rica, had suffered from a series of unstable governments. From 1917 to 1919, the country was under the dictatorial grip of General Federico Tinoco Granados, until he was overthrown and forced into exile. Figueres himself came to power through an armed insurrection that pitted him against Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, a former president (1940-1944) who was trying to regain power through fraudulent elections and, ultimately, violence. Some 2,000 people died during the 44-day uprising, and it has been argued that Figueres abolished the military in order to avoid a future potential military coup against him. Today Costa Rica, considered by some, perhaps naively, as the “Switzerland” of Latin America, serves as the host for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the United Nations’ University for Peace, and is a member of other organizations related to international justice and human rights, including the International Criminal Court.
The Equipment and Organization of Costa Rica’s Police Force
Even though it does not possess a standing military, Costa Rica does have extensive security forces meant to tackle internal issues of law and order. With a population of around 4.5 million, the country has a police force of approximately 10,000 officers, as well as a Civil Guard consisting of 4,500 troops. Compared to other Central American police units, Costa Rica’s police establishment appears to be fairly well-equipped and trained. However, this comparison might be somewhat deceiving, since Costa Rica’s police reportedly have insufficient training, a shortage of service men, and a lack of resources (including vehicles, weaponry, etc).
Without a formal military force, Costa Rica had no need to regularly invest in naval vessels, warplanes, or tanks, which typically make up the heavy equipment of any traditional armed forces. Hence, in theory, the country could focus its financial resources on developing the best possible police force to maintain internal order, at the lowest cost. In fact, in early 2008, as reported by the Spanish defense-news agency, Infodefensa.com, the Spanish company, FEDUR S.A., was awarded a contract by the Costa Rican Ministry of Security to provide new equipment to the nation’s police force. The total bill for the upgrade was close to €2.1 million (almost USD 3 million). The contract included 5,000 bulletproof vests, 10,000 police sticks, 1,000 helmets and 1,000 shields. However, more acquisitions are badly needed, According to an April 2011 report in The Economist, the country has only two helicopters, and the Coast Guard has only a dozen World War II-era patrol boats to police Costa Rica’s two coasts. In an interview with COHA, Mr Kevin Casas-Zamora, former vice president of Costa Rica and now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that the country has not spent enough of its resources on security for the past forty years.
However, San José has made efforts to improve the training of its police force. For example, in November 2010, after the 12th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Mechanism of Tuxtla Dialogue and Agreement, Costa Rica and Colombia signed an agreement whereby Colombian authorities would train and advise the Costa Rican police in order to improve its capacity for fighting drug trafficking. Costa Rican president Laura Chinchilla insisted that the police force was not being militarized. She emphasized to the press that “the Colombian police are a civilian police; we are not asking for assistance from the Colombian Army, or from any Central American army.” In addition, the country has a special elite police unit known as Unidad Especial de Intervencion (Special Forces Unit).
In March 2011, President Chinchilla announced the creation of a special unit of the border guards. Several reports, including an article that appeared in the Nicaraguan daily El Nuevo Diario, reported that the elite guards would be financed by USD 1 million, and would soon be equipped with automatic rifles. The first unit will consist of 150 police officers and will be deployed along the country’s borders with Panama and Nicaragua. In statements made to the media, José María Tijerino, a former Minister of Public Security, explained that the elite guards will be provided with 18 “pickup” vehicles, speedboats, communication equipment and other high-tech gadgets.
In terms of political developments, this past February, President Chinchilla and the heads of the country’s judiciary and legislature agreed on a 10-year plan to tackle Costa Rica’s internal crime. The plan itself was created by the United Nations Development Program and other experts. According to reports, the goal is to improve the training of the police forces and the creation of new prison facilities. Opposition parties have criticized the plan, claiming that it offers generalized goals instead of concrete solutions. There are also concerns that, in order to carry out these objectives, the legislature will have to approve of new taxes. As part of its strategy, the Costa Rican government has created the position of Drug Czar (Comisionado Nacional Antidrogas), and appointed lawyer Mauricio Boraschi as its new head.
In spite of improvements in training and equipment, there are other problems that have yet to be tackled, including police corruption, alleged human rights abuses and low wages for police officers. In 2008, 11 officers in the city of Heredia were arrested for drug trafficking. At the time, local media reports explained that the salary of a national police officer was about USD 328 a month, a modest salary which barely allows for maintaining a family, but is not enough to protect an officer from the temptation of possibly accepting bribes. In addition, in 2009, there were also accusations that members of the Dirección de Inteligencia y Seguridad (Intelligence and Security Directorate – DIS), the police intelligence unit, had been spying on anti-government political groups.
The latest development regarding Costa Rica’s security situation was the mid-May approval of a USD 132 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank to improve the country’s security. According to a report by Associated Press reporter Luis Alfonso Lugo, the goal of the loan is to build 2,700 cells in Costa Rican prisons and hire new staff for the national police academy.
The Costa Rican Police: Better than its neighbors
With that said, the Costa Rican Fuerza Publica, is seen as being better trained and equipped than the police forces of other Central American states. In an interview with COHA, Dr. John Booth, a regents professor at the University of North Texas, said that “I’d rather be arrested in Costa Rica than anywhere else in Central America because the general human rights climate is much better– there is less abuse by the Fuerza Publica.” Former Vice President Casas-Zamora believes that, despite the bad image the Costa Rican security forces may be experiencing, they are not perceived as a threat by the local population; “they are not regarded as a predatory police,” he explained to COHA.
Other Latin American police forces do not enjoy such a positive perception. El Salvador, for example, carried out a major crackdown on gangs through an operation known as Mano Dura (Strong Hand), which has been widely condemned by human rights organizations as being too violent and ineffective. The Guatemalan police also suffers of a bad name, particularly after the country’s chief of national police and the country’s top anti-drugs official (Baltazar Gomez and Nelly Bonilla), were arrested in March 2010 over drug trafficking connections.
U.S. Offers Support to Costa Rica
The U.S. military has recently taken a keen interest in Costa Rica’s war on drugs. In July 2010, a fleet of U.S. warships and 7,000 servicemen arrived in Costa Rica. The American naval deployment included the carrier USS Making Island, several frigates, submarines and a hospital ship. Costa Rican opposition parties like Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC), Unidad Social Cristiana and the Frente Amplio objected to the port call, stating that “the destructive force of the ships, helicopters and marines is disproportionate to combating drug trafficking.” The Chinchilla administration was quick to respond that the U.S. forces would not be permanently deployed on Costa Rican territory or take part in security operations beyond traditional policing. However, it is worth mentioning that the close relations between Washington and San José have attracted criticism. In September 2010, outspoken Bolivian president Evo Morales quipped that Costa Rica does in fact have an army, referring to the U.S. military. The Andean president eventually issued an apology and retracted his comments.
In fact, Anne S. Andrew, U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, has asked that the Costa Rican legislature allow U.S. warships to make a port call. So far, the local legislative body has only allowed U.S. Coast Guard vessels to dock in Costa Rican ports. Juan Carlos Mendoza, an opposition deputy for the PAC, stated that his party opposes the docking of American naval warships because “it is not clear what other strategic military goals they have, besides combating drug trafficking.” In comments reproduced by Infodefensa.com, Paul Trivelli, a consultant for SOUTHCOM, stated that the Pentagon wants to repair Costa Rican patrol boats so they can be used in drug trafficking operations. Trivelli stated, “it is necessary to take into account that drug traffickers are now paying with cocaine and creating problems in many countries. Colombian and Mexican drug cartels are here and they must be combated [by the U.S.] as partners of Costa Rica.” San José signed a defense agreement with the U.S. in 1999, but many opposition factions would like to see it voided.
Internal Security Issues
Today, the Costa Rican police force faces several difficult dilemmas. Because of its geographical location, the country is part of a transit corridor (via land, air and sea) of drugs coming from South America to North America and, more indirectly, to Europe. In addition, an April 2011 article by Time reporter Tim Rogers explains that a booming tourism industry and immigration by Americans and Europeans have raised local consumer demand for drugs. Futhermore, there is a growing concern about the presence of Mexican cartels and even the possibility of the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) operating within the country, which in fact, had an earlier presence in the country in the 1990s.
The December 21, 2010 edition of the highly regarded defense e-newsletter Southern Pulse quotes a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) representative, Phillip Springer, as confirming that the Mexican Sinaloa cartel had established control over drug trafficking in Costa Rica. Springer also predicted that other organizations would expand their networks in the country because of Costa Rica’s lack of a standing army and its sub-par police force. For the Costa Ricans, the major fear is that other groups like the Zetas cartel will try to enter their country and begin a turf war with the Sinaloa cartel, bringing about major levels of inter-cartel violence. This has already happened in Guatemala and the fear is that the situation will repeat itself farther south.
In recent months, there have in fact been a number of indications of a growing presence of transnational criminal organizations in the Central American country. The accurate daily publication, Latin News, has reported that Costa Rican security forces carried out several major raids in late February 2011 in Alajuela, Cartago and San José. Three Mexican citizens were arrested and up to 319 kilograms of cocaine were seized. Costa Rican officials believe that the three foreigners are members of the Sinaloa Cartel. Also in February 2011, local police found the bodies of a couple known to be drug dealers in the neighborhood of El Progreso, in the Pacific port of Puntarenas. It is believed that they were killed over a debt owed to their Mexican bosses.
Security experts explain that the flow of drugs partially operates like this: the drugs originate in Panama, go up the Pan-American Highway through Costa Rica, and enter Nicaragua through a number of remote crossings. In addition, Puntarenas port has become a major stopover for drug shipments by sea.
External Security: The Border Dispute with Managua
Costa Rica’s border dispute with Nicaragua, in one sense, has been going on for over a century, although the present conflict erupted in October 2010 when Nicaraguan workers began a dredging operation in the bordering San Juan River. This resulted in the flooding of Costa Rican territory, which effectively moved the border into Managua’s hands. In addition, several Nicaraguan troops (reportedly less than two dozen) have been stationed on a narrow stretch of the disputed land near Calero Island, whose ownership is also in dispute. Meanwhile, San José has dispatched its police to the border and raised protests to the Organization of American States (OAS) as well as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. As the plaintiff, Costa Rica has a December 5 deadline to present its case to the ICJ, while Nicaragua will have until August 6, 2012 to present its counter-arguments.
Somewhat ironically, the Nicaraguan government has taken advantage of some errant Google Maps to justify its altering of the disputed border. While utilizing data from the U.S. State Department for its global mapping, the internet giant mistakenly transferred 2.7km of Costa Rican territory to Nicaraguan jurisdiction. In November 2010, Google apologized for the incorrect cartographic projections and has since corrected the original error. Nonetheless, in early February 2011, the Nicaraguan Institute of Territorial Studies published a new “official” map of the country, with the boundaries of the disputed territory reflecting its own cartographic interests.
In early March, in a preliminary ruling, the judges of the ICJ decided that neither country should send military or civilian personnel into the disputed zone until the ICJ gave a final ruling on who has jurisdiction. However, it allowed Costa Rica to send civilian personnel to “protect the environment.” Each country has claimed the interim ruling as a diplomatic victory. Although Costa Rica remains reluctant to give up any of the territory, President Chinchilla declared that she is willing to “normalize” relations with Nicaragua. Meanwhile, President Ortega stated that the resolution is positive and that there are no hard feelings towards the neighboring state. The resolution, from Nicaragua’s point of view, means that it can continue to divert some of the water of the San Juan River. Nevertheless, the presence of Nicaraguan troops on disputed soil remains an issue, as Costa Rica continues to demand that Nicaragua remove its troops. At the same time, Managua argues that its military is there to fight drug trafficking and organized crime. Both countries appear to want to normalize relations, but neither seems willing to give in to the other’s demands.
In early May, delegations from the two countries met in La Antigua Guatemala, Guatemala, to discuss inter-state police cooperation and how to combat drug trafficking across their borders. As reported by The Costa Rican News, the agreed protocol permits Costa Rican police boats to cross the maritime border while chasing drug-laden vessels without violating Nicaraguan sovereignty, and vice versa. The agreement states that the police forces on each side should notify the other side of pursuits across their common border. Such meetings and agreements are positive steps.
Not all of the developments for a peaceful solution have been positive, however. In early April, Nicaragua denied an international environmental commission (part of the Secretaria de la Convención sobre Humedales – Secretariat for the Convention on Wetlands) permission to assess potential environmental damage as a result of Nicaraguan dredging. As previously stated, the ICJ ruling said that Costa Rica could access the disputed area if it provided Managua with notification. Nicaragua argued that Costa Rica requested the authorization only two days in advance and did not sufficiently explain the reasons for the mission. Meanwhile, in Costa Rica, the PAC opposition party has complained to President Chinchilla about statements offered by now former Costa Rican Minister Tijerino, which insinuated that Nicaragua might resort to laying mines along its strategic delimitation and utilize its air force in order to more effectively secure the disputed territory. Such comments did not go over well with some Costa Rican politicians, as they did not help to improve relations between the two countries.
At the end of January, the results of a CID-Gallup poll showed that Costa Ricans were more worried about the incident than the citizens of Nicaragua were. According to Insidecostarica.com, 91 percent of Nicaraguans believed that the conflict was over nothing more than unclear border limits, while 73 percent of Costa Ricans were convinced that their neighbor wanted to invade the country. Interestingly, most Nicaraguans believe that Costa Rica has an army and it could invade their country, even though the “tico” security forces lack warplanes, tanks, or naval vessels to be a worthy foe.
A Regional Perspective
Costa Rica is trying to cope with several internal security issues in addition to the increased tensions with neighboring Nicaragua. It is important to consider that a state that has no military is by nature nonviolent. Simply put, it is hard to regard the country as aggressive, given its lack of traditional arsenal or weaponry and trained personnel. Should the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border dispute escalate (which is considered highly unlikely by most experts), it could be difficult for Nicaraguan President Ortega to not appear as an aggressor; considering that he has a relatively professional standing army behind his rhetoric. In December 2010, President Chinchilla declared that “I want to remind ‘esos señores del norte’ (the gentlemen of the north) that only ‘cobardes‘ (cowards) are courageous against the defenseless.”
A Costa Rican lawyer interviewed by COHA explained that the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan diferendum is very old and that he is confident that in no way is there any degree of realistic prospects for a violent confrontation to take place between the two countries. He explained that the border dispute is a historical one and both sides already know what diplomatic parlance to use without it affecting overall inter-state relations. This is particularly true for Nicaraguan President Ortega who is up for re-election and appears to be using the issue with Costa Rica to rally support for himself and divert attention from some of his unpopular domestic policies. Dr. Booth explained to COHA that, “the country that has most threatened Costa Rica in the past is, in fact, Nicaragua, but the incidents [were] in 1948, 1953, and again during the Nicaraguan insurrection in 1978-1979 when Somoza was still in power.” So far, for all the tensions in 2010 and the presence of Nicaraguan troops in the disputed territory, all experts interviewed by COHA agreed that the ongoing situation will be solved diplomatically.
The Costa Rican lawyer concluded by explaining that the Iraq War showed that in modern times, even a global power needs to provide the international community with justifications for going to war with another country. In any case, there is no justification for Nicaragua to invade an army-less state. By abolishing its military and carrying out a pacifist international role, San José has almost a bulletproof national security strategy at its disposal.
Conclusions
Synchronizing the country’s peaceful persona with its purportedly “friendly” diplomacy, helps portray Costa Rica as one of the countries least likely to act aggressively towards another neighboring state. Certainly, the Costa Rican security forces with their present armaments and training arrangements cannot be regarded as an army. So far, the Central American state has not considered re-instituting its military, although the creation of its special border guards does suggest that San José recognizes additional highly-trained security forces may be a necessity. While a re-militarization is generally not desired, it is clear that the police, border guard and other security departments of this de-militarized state have their work cut out for them.
The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org
September 6, 2011
caribbeannewsnow
The History
Costa Rica’s revered president, José Figueres Ferrer, abolished the country’s military on December 1, 1948. The following year, Article 12 of the new constitution codified the abolition of the military. The armed forces’ budget was then shifted to internal security goals by redirecting funds to the police force, education, environmental protection and cultural preservation.
As a result, the country became known as a ‘civilized nation’ -- a label that it could not have claimed before the abolition of the armed forces. Prior to Figueres’ landmark initiative, Costa Rica, had suffered from a series of unstable governments. From 1917 to 1919, the country was under the dictatorial grip of General Federico Tinoco Granados, until he was overthrown and forced into exile. Figueres himself came to power through an armed insurrection that pitted him against Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, a former president (1940-1944) who was trying to regain power through fraudulent elections and, ultimately, violence. Some 2,000 people died during the 44-day uprising, and it has been argued that Figueres abolished the military in order to avoid a future potential military coup against him. Today Costa Rica, considered by some, perhaps naively, as the “Switzerland” of Latin America, serves as the host for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the United Nations’ University for Peace, and is a member of other organizations related to international justice and human rights, including the International Criminal Court.
The Equipment and Organization of Costa Rica’s Police Force
Even though it does not possess a standing military, Costa Rica does have extensive security forces meant to tackle internal issues of law and order. With a population of around 4.5 million, the country has a police force of approximately 10,000 officers, as well as a Civil Guard consisting of 4,500 troops. Compared to other Central American police units, Costa Rica’s police establishment appears to be fairly well-equipped and trained. However, this comparison might be somewhat deceiving, since Costa Rica’s police reportedly have insufficient training, a shortage of service men, and a lack of resources (including vehicles, weaponry, etc).
Without a formal military force, Costa Rica had no need to regularly invest in naval vessels, warplanes, or tanks, which typically make up the heavy equipment of any traditional armed forces. Hence, in theory, the country could focus its financial resources on developing the best possible police force to maintain internal order, at the lowest cost. In fact, in early 2008, as reported by the Spanish defense-news agency, Infodefensa.com, the Spanish company, FEDUR S.A., was awarded a contract by the Costa Rican Ministry of Security to provide new equipment to the nation’s police force. The total bill for the upgrade was close to €2.1 million (almost USD 3 million). The contract included 5,000 bulletproof vests, 10,000 police sticks, 1,000 helmets and 1,000 shields. However, more acquisitions are badly needed, According to an April 2011 report in The Economist, the country has only two helicopters, and the Coast Guard has only a dozen World War II-era patrol boats to police Costa Rica’s two coasts. In an interview with COHA, Mr Kevin Casas-Zamora, former vice president of Costa Rica and now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that the country has not spent enough of its resources on security for the past forty years.
However, San José has made efforts to improve the training of its police force. For example, in November 2010, after the 12th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Mechanism of Tuxtla Dialogue and Agreement, Costa Rica and Colombia signed an agreement whereby Colombian authorities would train and advise the Costa Rican police in order to improve its capacity for fighting drug trafficking. Costa Rican president Laura Chinchilla insisted that the police force was not being militarized. She emphasized to the press that “the Colombian police are a civilian police; we are not asking for assistance from the Colombian Army, or from any Central American army.” In addition, the country has a special elite police unit known as Unidad Especial de Intervencion (Special Forces Unit).
In March 2011, President Chinchilla announced the creation of a special unit of the border guards. Several reports, including an article that appeared in the Nicaraguan daily El Nuevo Diario, reported that the elite guards would be financed by USD 1 million, and would soon be equipped with automatic rifles. The first unit will consist of 150 police officers and will be deployed along the country’s borders with Panama and Nicaragua. In statements made to the media, José María Tijerino, a former Minister of Public Security, explained that the elite guards will be provided with 18 “pickup” vehicles, speedboats, communication equipment and other high-tech gadgets.
In terms of political developments, this past February, President Chinchilla and the heads of the country’s judiciary and legislature agreed on a 10-year plan to tackle Costa Rica’s internal crime. The plan itself was created by the United Nations Development Program and other experts. According to reports, the goal is to improve the training of the police forces and the creation of new prison facilities. Opposition parties have criticized the plan, claiming that it offers generalized goals instead of concrete solutions. There are also concerns that, in order to carry out these objectives, the legislature will have to approve of new taxes. As part of its strategy, the Costa Rican government has created the position of Drug Czar (Comisionado Nacional Antidrogas), and appointed lawyer Mauricio Boraschi as its new head.
In spite of improvements in training and equipment, there are other problems that have yet to be tackled, including police corruption, alleged human rights abuses and low wages for police officers. In 2008, 11 officers in the city of Heredia were arrested for drug trafficking. At the time, local media reports explained that the salary of a national police officer was about USD 328 a month, a modest salary which barely allows for maintaining a family, but is not enough to protect an officer from the temptation of possibly accepting bribes. In addition, in 2009, there were also accusations that members of the Dirección de Inteligencia y Seguridad (Intelligence and Security Directorate – DIS), the police intelligence unit, had been spying on anti-government political groups.
The latest development regarding Costa Rica’s security situation was the mid-May approval of a USD 132 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank to improve the country’s security. According to a report by Associated Press reporter Luis Alfonso Lugo, the goal of the loan is to build 2,700 cells in Costa Rican prisons and hire new staff for the national police academy.
The Costa Rican Police: Better than its neighbors
With that said, the Costa Rican Fuerza Publica, is seen as being better trained and equipped than the police forces of other Central American states. In an interview with COHA, Dr. John Booth, a regents professor at the University of North Texas, said that “I’d rather be arrested in Costa Rica than anywhere else in Central America because the general human rights climate is much better– there is less abuse by the Fuerza Publica.” Former Vice President Casas-Zamora believes that, despite the bad image the Costa Rican security forces may be experiencing, they are not perceived as a threat by the local population; “they are not regarded as a predatory police,” he explained to COHA.
Other Latin American police forces do not enjoy such a positive perception. El Salvador, for example, carried out a major crackdown on gangs through an operation known as Mano Dura (Strong Hand), which has been widely condemned by human rights organizations as being too violent and ineffective. The Guatemalan police also suffers of a bad name, particularly after the country’s chief of national police and the country’s top anti-drugs official (Baltazar Gomez and Nelly Bonilla), were arrested in March 2010 over drug trafficking connections.
U.S. Offers Support to Costa Rica
The U.S. military has recently taken a keen interest in Costa Rica’s war on drugs. In July 2010, a fleet of U.S. warships and 7,000 servicemen arrived in Costa Rica. The American naval deployment included the carrier USS Making Island, several frigates, submarines and a hospital ship. Costa Rican opposition parties like Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC), Unidad Social Cristiana and the Frente Amplio objected to the port call, stating that “the destructive force of the ships, helicopters and marines is disproportionate to combating drug trafficking.” The Chinchilla administration was quick to respond that the U.S. forces would not be permanently deployed on Costa Rican territory or take part in security operations beyond traditional policing. However, it is worth mentioning that the close relations between Washington and San José have attracted criticism. In September 2010, outspoken Bolivian president Evo Morales quipped that Costa Rica does in fact have an army, referring to the U.S. military. The Andean president eventually issued an apology and retracted his comments.
In fact, Anne S. Andrew, U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, has asked that the Costa Rican legislature allow U.S. warships to make a port call. So far, the local legislative body has only allowed U.S. Coast Guard vessels to dock in Costa Rican ports. Juan Carlos Mendoza, an opposition deputy for the PAC, stated that his party opposes the docking of American naval warships because “it is not clear what other strategic military goals they have, besides combating drug trafficking.” In comments reproduced by Infodefensa.com, Paul Trivelli, a consultant for SOUTHCOM, stated that the Pentagon wants to repair Costa Rican patrol boats so they can be used in drug trafficking operations. Trivelli stated, “it is necessary to take into account that drug traffickers are now paying with cocaine and creating problems in many countries. Colombian and Mexican drug cartels are here and they must be combated [by the U.S.] as partners of Costa Rica.” San José signed a defense agreement with the U.S. in 1999, but many opposition factions would like to see it voided.
Internal Security Issues
Today, the Costa Rican police force faces several difficult dilemmas. Because of its geographical location, the country is part of a transit corridor (via land, air and sea) of drugs coming from South America to North America and, more indirectly, to Europe. In addition, an April 2011 article by Time reporter Tim Rogers explains that a booming tourism industry and immigration by Americans and Europeans have raised local consumer demand for drugs. Futhermore, there is a growing concern about the presence of Mexican cartels and even the possibility of the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) operating within the country, which in fact, had an earlier presence in the country in the 1990s.
The December 21, 2010 edition of the highly regarded defense e-newsletter Southern Pulse quotes a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) representative, Phillip Springer, as confirming that the Mexican Sinaloa cartel had established control over drug trafficking in Costa Rica. Springer also predicted that other organizations would expand their networks in the country because of Costa Rica’s lack of a standing army and its sub-par police force. For the Costa Ricans, the major fear is that other groups like the Zetas cartel will try to enter their country and begin a turf war with the Sinaloa cartel, bringing about major levels of inter-cartel violence. This has already happened in Guatemala and the fear is that the situation will repeat itself farther south.
In recent months, there have in fact been a number of indications of a growing presence of transnational criminal organizations in the Central American country. The accurate daily publication, Latin News, has reported that Costa Rican security forces carried out several major raids in late February 2011 in Alajuela, Cartago and San José. Three Mexican citizens were arrested and up to 319 kilograms of cocaine were seized. Costa Rican officials believe that the three foreigners are members of the Sinaloa Cartel. Also in February 2011, local police found the bodies of a couple known to be drug dealers in the neighborhood of El Progreso, in the Pacific port of Puntarenas. It is believed that they were killed over a debt owed to their Mexican bosses.
Security experts explain that the flow of drugs partially operates like this: the drugs originate in Panama, go up the Pan-American Highway through Costa Rica, and enter Nicaragua through a number of remote crossings. In addition, Puntarenas port has become a major stopover for drug shipments by sea.
External Security: The Border Dispute with Managua
Costa Rica’s border dispute with Nicaragua, in one sense, has been going on for over a century, although the present conflict erupted in October 2010 when Nicaraguan workers began a dredging operation in the bordering San Juan River. This resulted in the flooding of Costa Rican territory, which effectively moved the border into Managua’s hands. In addition, several Nicaraguan troops (reportedly less than two dozen) have been stationed on a narrow stretch of the disputed land near Calero Island, whose ownership is also in dispute. Meanwhile, San José has dispatched its police to the border and raised protests to the Organization of American States (OAS) as well as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. As the plaintiff, Costa Rica has a December 5 deadline to present its case to the ICJ, while Nicaragua will have until August 6, 2012 to present its counter-arguments.
Somewhat ironically, the Nicaraguan government has taken advantage of some errant Google Maps to justify its altering of the disputed border. While utilizing data from the U.S. State Department for its global mapping, the internet giant mistakenly transferred 2.7km of Costa Rican territory to Nicaraguan jurisdiction. In November 2010, Google apologized for the incorrect cartographic projections and has since corrected the original error. Nonetheless, in early February 2011, the Nicaraguan Institute of Territorial Studies published a new “official” map of the country, with the boundaries of the disputed territory reflecting its own cartographic interests.
In early March, in a preliminary ruling, the judges of the ICJ decided that neither country should send military or civilian personnel into the disputed zone until the ICJ gave a final ruling on who has jurisdiction. However, it allowed Costa Rica to send civilian personnel to “protect the environment.” Each country has claimed the interim ruling as a diplomatic victory. Although Costa Rica remains reluctant to give up any of the territory, President Chinchilla declared that she is willing to “normalize” relations with Nicaragua. Meanwhile, President Ortega stated that the resolution is positive and that there are no hard feelings towards the neighboring state. The resolution, from Nicaragua’s point of view, means that it can continue to divert some of the water of the San Juan River. Nevertheless, the presence of Nicaraguan troops on disputed soil remains an issue, as Costa Rica continues to demand that Nicaragua remove its troops. At the same time, Managua argues that its military is there to fight drug trafficking and organized crime. Both countries appear to want to normalize relations, but neither seems willing to give in to the other’s demands.
In early May, delegations from the two countries met in La Antigua Guatemala, Guatemala, to discuss inter-state police cooperation and how to combat drug trafficking across their borders. As reported by The Costa Rican News, the agreed protocol permits Costa Rican police boats to cross the maritime border while chasing drug-laden vessels without violating Nicaraguan sovereignty, and vice versa. The agreement states that the police forces on each side should notify the other side of pursuits across their common border. Such meetings and agreements are positive steps.
Not all of the developments for a peaceful solution have been positive, however. In early April, Nicaragua denied an international environmental commission (part of the Secretaria de la Convención sobre Humedales – Secretariat for the Convention on Wetlands) permission to assess potential environmental damage as a result of Nicaraguan dredging. As previously stated, the ICJ ruling said that Costa Rica could access the disputed area if it provided Managua with notification. Nicaragua argued that Costa Rica requested the authorization only two days in advance and did not sufficiently explain the reasons for the mission. Meanwhile, in Costa Rica, the PAC opposition party has complained to President Chinchilla about statements offered by now former Costa Rican Minister Tijerino, which insinuated that Nicaragua might resort to laying mines along its strategic delimitation and utilize its air force in order to more effectively secure the disputed territory. Such comments did not go over well with some Costa Rican politicians, as they did not help to improve relations between the two countries.
At the end of January, the results of a CID-Gallup poll showed that Costa Ricans were more worried about the incident than the citizens of Nicaragua were. According to Insidecostarica.com, 91 percent of Nicaraguans believed that the conflict was over nothing more than unclear border limits, while 73 percent of Costa Ricans were convinced that their neighbor wanted to invade the country. Interestingly, most Nicaraguans believe that Costa Rica has an army and it could invade their country, even though the “tico” security forces lack warplanes, tanks, or naval vessels to be a worthy foe.
A Regional Perspective
Costa Rica is trying to cope with several internal security issues in addition to the increased tensions with neighboring Nicaragua. It is important to consider that a state that has no military is by nature nonviolent. Simply put, it is hard to regard the country as aggressive, given its lack of traditional arsenal or weaponry and trained personnel. Should the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border dispute escalate (which is considered highly unlikely by most experts), it could be difficult for Nicaraguan President Ortega to not appear as an aggressor; considering that he has a relatively professional standing army behind his rhetoric. In December 2010, President Chinchilla declared that “I want to remind ‘esos señores del norte’ (the gentlemen of the north) that only ‘cobardes‘ (cowards) are courageous against the defenseless.”
A Costa Rican lawyer interviewed by COHA explained that the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan diferendum is very old and that he is confident that in no way is there any degree of realistic prospects for a violent confrontation to take place between the two countries. He explained that the border dispute is a historical one and both sides already know what diplomatic parlance to use without it affecting overall inter-state relations. This is particularly true for Nicaraguan President Ortega who is up for re-election and appears to be using the issue with Costa Rica to rally support for himself and divert attention from some of his unpopular domestic policies. Dr. Booth explained to COHA that, “the country that has most threatened Costa Rica in the past is, in fact, Nicaragua, but the incidents [were] in 1948, 1953, and again during the Nicaraguan insurrection in 1978-1979 when Somoza was still in power.” So far, for all the tensions in 2010 and the presence of Nicaraguan troops in the disputed territory, all experts interviewed by COHA agreed that the ongoing situation will be solved diplomatically.
The Costa Rican lawyer concluded by explaining that the Iraq War showed that in modern times, even a global power needs to provide the international community with justifications for going to war with another country. In any case, there is no justification for Nicaragua to invade an army-less state. By abolishing its military and carrying out a pacifist international role, San José has almost a bulletproof national security strategy at its disposal.
Conclusions
Synchronizing the country’s peaceful persona with its purportedly “friendly” diplomacy, helps portray Costa Rica as one of the countries least likely to act aggressively towards another neighboring state. Certainly, the Costa Rican security forces with their present armaments and training arrangements cannot be regarded as an army. So far, the Central American state has not considered re-instituting its military, although the creation of its special border guards does suggest that San José recognizes additional highly-trained security forces may be a necessity. While a re-militarization is generally not desired, it is clear that the police, border guard and other security departments of this de-militarized state have their work cut out for them.
The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org
September 6, 2011
caribbeannewsnow
Monday, September 5, 2011
250,000 WikiLeaks cables made public on WikiLeaks.org
250,000 WikiLeaks cables made public
By Candia Dames
Guardian News Editor
candia@nasguard.com
thenassauguardian
Nassau, The Bahamas
Bahamians now have full access to the entire batch of WikiLeaks diplomatic cables on The Bahamas that have been in The Nassau Guardian’s possession since earlier this year.
The WikiLeaks Bahamas cache includes 415 cables, many of which formed the basis of our ‘Decoding Diplomacy’ series, which ran for several weeks, beginning May 23.
But not all the cables were published by The Nassau Guardian for various reasons: Some provided information entirely already in the public domain or that was not particularly interesting, and others raised potentially troublesome legal issues.
As we previously pointed out, our libel laws pose some special burdens on newspaper publishers.
With the more than 250,000 cables obtained by WikiLeaks now being published, any interested person could now read the diplomatic documents from U.S. embassies around the world.
The documents have not been redacted and that has raised international criticism that the whistleblower organization has put at risk the lives of some informants and others mentioned in the cables.
WikiLeaks says on its website — WikiLeaks.org — the documents will give people around the world an unprecedented insight into US government foreign activities.
The cables, which date from 1966 up until the end of February 2010, contain confidential communications between 274 embassies in countries throughout the world and the State Department in Washington, DC. Nearly 16,000 of the cables are classified secret, the website says.
The subject matter of these cables is of such importance, and the geographical spread so broad, that to not release them in their entirety would not do this material justice.
The cables show the extent of U.S. spying on its allies and the United Nations; turning a blind eye to corruption and human rights abuse in "client states"; back room deals with supposedly neutral countries; lobbying for U.S. corporations; and the measures U.S. diplomats take to advance those who have access to them, WikiLeaks said.
While we did not produce an article based on each of the more than 400 Bahamas cables, The Nassau Guardian wrote extensively on many different matters addressed in the cables.
On deciding what to publish, we chose subject matters that we considered of public and national interest. In some cases, we redacted information as we did not publish anything that may have compromised national security or an individual’s safety.
As we previously noted, the focus on certain events, personalities and political issues were dictated simply by the dates of the Bahamas cables — 2003-2010.
All of the cables — those we made public and those we did not — are now available on WikiLeaks.org.
Sep 05, 2011
Sunday, September 4, 2011
Racist killings in Libya's 'regime change' and Caricom's mixed signals
By Rickey Singh
WHILE the warplanes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) continue to facilitate the anti-Moammar Gadhafi rebel forces to take full control of Libya, there are increasing reports of racist killings and torture against black Africans accused of being mercenaries of the deposed Libyan president.
The atrocities had become widespread enough by early last week for the African Union (AU) to officially refuse to recognise the NATO-backed National Transitional Council (NTC), currently in the process of transforming itself into the "new government" of Libya, functioning from the capital, Tripoli.
Last Tuesday, The Guardian (UK) posted an articled by Richard Seymour titled 'Libya's spectacular revolution has been disgraced by racism' in which he lamented that "the murder of black men in the aftermath of the rebellion speaks of a society deeply divided for decades by Gadhafi..."
By last Friday, the well-known Caribbean thinker and economist, Professor Norman Girvan, was noting on his respected website the disturbing concern that "we do not know what is Caricom" in reference to the racist-fuelled killings of black Africans in Libya, a nation in North Africa.
But nine days earlier, on August 23, the Caribbean Media Corporation (CMC) was reporting Caricom's current chairman, Prime Minister Dr Denzil Douglas of St Kitts and Nevis, as observing that the "international community also welcomed the rebels' dramatic advance after six months of fighting" and (he) urged Gadhafi to surrender and avoid a bloodbath.
"The situation in Libya," said Dr Douglas, "provides a lesson in democracy for the Caribbean. We have seen in countries where democracy has been absent, where people have been yearning for full freedom of expression from the Government that they would want to represent them, and eventually this has led to bloodshed as we have seen over the last six months in various Arab countries."
PM Douglas on 'democracy'
It is a challenging observation from Prime Minister Douglas, and it is to be wondered whether there had been any prior consultation with his fellow Heads of Government, given the controversial circumstances of NATO's involvement in "regime change" in Tripoli following the subsequently established abuse of a so-called "no-fly zone" resolution approved by the UN Security Council by majority vote.
Dr Douglas, who hosted the 32nd annual summit of Caricom Heads of Government last July in Basseterre, would have been fully conscious of the community's general sentiment on the Libyan crisis as briefly summarised in a single paragraph in the official communiqué.
Under the title 'The Situation in Libya', the communiqué stated: "Heads of Government deplored the increasing loss of innocent life as the conflict in Libya becomes drawn-out. They called for a ceasefire as well as the early convening of negotiations. In this regard, they expressed support for the African Union in the search for a peaceful resolution of the dispute."
It is not known whether this stated position was formally drawn to the attention of the UN secretary general, or was simply done for the record. The reality, however, is that NONE of the governments that chose to make use of NATO's military power to achieve regime change in Tripoli — under the fig-leaf explanation of "protecting civilians" — had shown ANY interest in a ceasefire to give "peaceful resolution" a chance. Instead, in the face of the "war" rhetoric of the governments in London and Paris in particular — where, incidentally, racism against black immigrants has become a more controversial issue — total contempt has been demonstrated by the western powers for any idea of "peaceful negotiations" in preference for "regime change", even if it meant taking out Gadhafi dead or alive.
Caricom, after all, includes member governments that have diplomatic relations with Libya under Gadhafi. It also has a collective institutional relationship with the AU. Consequently, there seems to be a moral obligation on Caricom's part to now also speak out against the racist killings and atrocities against black Africans in Libya — even if our community does not wish to side with the AU in withholding recognition of the NATO-backed Transitional Council as the new government in Tripoli.
Black at bad time
According to media reports (some with graphic images), many of the murdered and wounded victims — going by their physical appearance — have been savaged. And there has been NO proof of being, as claimed, "mercenaries" fighting to maintain Gadhafi's already 42 years of dictatorial power.
As reported by the Guardian's Seymour, "this is a bad time to be a black man in Libya". He was quoting a report by Channel 4 News last Sunday, even as Ken Sengupta of The Independent newspaper was commenting on some 30 bodies lying decomposed in Tripoli, the majority of them black, allegedly "mercenaries of Gadhafi".
For his part, Chika Onyeani, publisher and editor-in-chief of the African Sun Times, in analysing why the African Union "is right not to recognise the Libyan rebels", declared that "the rebels need to account for the killings of black Africans, not for the pretensions of 'confusing them as mercenaries hired by Gadhafi', but because of the anti-black, racist and innate hatred of black Africans, even though there are a million dark Africans who are Libyan citizens and are maltreated as well.
None of this may be of interest to Caricom governments if they do not take time to properly inform themselves of some of the harsh, unpleasant realities of the NATO-backed Transitional Council and foreign armed rebels that have spent the past six months pursuing a very costly, bloody "regime change" in Libya.
The community's latest position as articulated by its chairman, Dr Douglas, appears quite flawed and ought to be revisited.
September 04, 2011
jamaicaobserver
WHILE the warplanes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) continue to facilitate the anti-Moammar Gadhafi rebel forces to take full control of Libya, there are increasing reports of racist killings and torture against black Africans accused of being mercenaries of the deposed Libyan president.
The atrocities had become widespread enough by early last week for the African Union (AU) to officially refuse to recognise the NATO-backed National Transitional Council (NTC), currently in the process of transforming itself into the "new government" of Libya, functioning from the capital, Tripoli.
Last Tuesday, The Guardian (UK) posted an articled by Richard Seymour titled 'Libya's spectacular revolution has been disgraced by racism' in which he lamented that "the murder of black men in the aftermath of the rebellion speaks of a society deeply divided for decades by Gadhafi..."
By last Friday, the well-known Caribbean thinker and economist, Professor Norman Girvan, was noting on his respected website the disturbing concern that "we do not know what is Caricom" in reference to the racist-fuelled killings of black Africans in Libya, a nation in North Africa.
But nine days earlier, on August 23, the Caribbean Media Corporation (CMC) was reporting Caricom's current chairman, Prime Minister Dr Denzil Douglas of St Kitts and Nevis, as observing that the "international community also welcomed the rebels' dramatic advance after six months of fighting" and (he) urged Gadhafi to surrender and avoid a bloodbath.
"The situation in Libya," said Dr Douglas, "provides a lesson in democracy for the Caribbean. We have seen in countries where democracy has been absent, where people have been yearning for full freedom of expression from the Government that they would want to represent them, and eventually this has led to bloodshed as we have seen over the last six months in various Arab countries."
PM Douglas on 'democracy'
It is a challenging observation from Prime Minister Douglas, and it is to be wondered whether there had been any prior consultation with his fellow Heads of Government, given the controversial circumstances of NATO's involvement in "regime change" in Tripoli following the subsequently established abuse of a so-called "no-fly zone" resolution approved by the UN Security Council by majority vote.
Dr Douglas, who hosted the 32nd annual summit of Caricom Heads of Government last July in Basseterre, would have been fully conscious of the community's general sentiment on the Libyan crisis as briefly summarised in a single paragraph in the official communiqué.
Under the title 'The Situation in Libya', the communiqué stated: "Heads of Government deplored the increasing loss of innocent life as the conflict in Libya becomes drawn-out. They called for a ceasefire as well as the early convening of negotiations. In this regard, they expressed support for the African Union in the search for a peaceful resolution of the dispute."
It is not known whether this stated position was formally drawn to the attention of the UN secretary general, or was simply done for the record. The reality, however, is that NONE of the governments that chose to make use of NATO's military power to achieve regime change in Tripoli — under the fig-leaf explanation of "protecting civilians" — had shown ANY interest in a ceasefire to give "peaceful resolution" a chance. Instead, in the face of the "war" rhetoric of the governments in London and Paris in particular — where, incidentally, racism against black immigrants has become a more controversial issue — total contempt has been demonstrated by the western powers for any idea of "peaceful negotiations" in preference for "regime change", even if it meant taking out Gadhafi dead or alive.
Caricom, after all, includes member governments that have diplomatic relations with Libya under Gadhafi. It also has a collective institutional relationship with the AU. Consequently, there seems to be a moral obligation on Caricom's part to now also speak out against the racist killings and atrocities against black Africans in Libya — even if our community does not wish to side with the AU in withholding recognition of the NATO-backed Transitional Council as the new government in Tripoli.
Black at bad time
According to media reports (some with graphic images), many of the murdered and wounded victims — going by their physical appearance — have been savaged. And there has been NO proof of being, as claimed, "mercenaries" fighting to maintain Gadhafi's already 42 years of dictatorial power.
As reported by the Guardian's Seymour, "this is a bad time to be a black man in Libya". He was quoting a report by Channel 4 News last Sunday, even as Ken Sengupta of The Independent newspaper was commenting on some 30 bodies lying decomposed in Tripoli, the majority of them black, allegedly "mercenaries of Gadhafi".
For his part, Chika Onyeani, publisher and editor-in-chief of the African Sun Times, in analysing why the African Union "is right not to recognise the Libyan rebels", declared that "the rebels need to account for the killings of black Africans, not for the pretensions of 'confusing them as mercenaries hired by Gadhafi', but because of the anti-black, racist and innate hatred of black Africans, even though there are a million dark Africans who are Libyan citizens and are maltreated as well.
None of this may be of interest to Caricom governments if they do not take time to properly inform themselves of some of the harsh, unpleasant realities of the NATO-backed Transitional Council and foreign armed rebels that have spent the past six months pursuing a very costly, bloody "regime change" in Libya.
The community's latest position as articulated by its chairman, Dr Douglas, appears quite flawed and ought to be revisited.
September 04, 2011
jamaicaobserver
Saturday, September 3, 2011
Drug trafficking: Central America's dark shadow
by Lauren Mathae, COHA Research Associate
For years, Central America has served as a one-way transit route for drugs traveling north toward the United States. Now, with increasingly frequent crackdowns on drug trafficking in Mexico and continued U.S. demand, Central America has become a pivotal route; an astonishing 84 percent of illegal cocaine that reaches the U.S. passes through Central America.[i] Colombia and Mexico are the predominant producers of narcotics, and the resulting drug trafficking throughout Central America cannot be ignored. As Francisco Campbell, the Nicaraguan Ambassador to the U.S., remarked to a COHA audience, “Unlike the imaginary threats of the past, this one is real. This is the first time we can talk about an honest hemispheric threat.”[ii] Central America needs to implement integrated and viable security strategies to ensure hemispheric security, while the U.S. must refocus its efforts and assume greater responsibility as the largest consumer of Latin American drugs.
Abundant Evidence
Since 1997, the Coast Guard has seized an extraordinary 806,469 pounds of cocaine and 333,285 pounds of marijuana in transit from South America through the Caribbean, the primary drug route prior to the 1990s.[iii] As the Coast Guard’s increased surveillance and policing of the corridors significantly limited the flow of drugs through the Caribbean, the drug trade simply shifted from the Caribbean to Mexico, with Central America serving as a critical transit route.
Militarized enforcement strategies in Colombia and Mexico also contribute to the shift of drug traffic to Central America. In 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama wrote, “As Mexico and Colombia continue to apply pressure on drug traffickers, the countries of Central America are increasingly targeted for trafficking of cocaine and other drugs primarily destined for the United States.”[iv] Central America is no longer merely a transcontinental passageway for an illegal economy totaling USD 34 billion.[v] This shift in drug trafficking routes has brought about profound national security threats and unprecedented levels of violence and organized crime throughout the region.
The “northern triangle” of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador has become greatly destabilized, and appears to be undergoing a rapid transformation into the new frontier for dangerous Mexican cartels. Guatemala now transports 60 percent of drugs in transit from South American-drug producing countries to the U.S., and reports reveal murder rates twice as high as those found in Mexico.[vi] Guatemala’s largely ungoverned border with Mexico makes the country a prime location for the thriving drug trade and the encroachment and proliferation of Mexican cartels, namely Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel. The Guatemalan security forces lack adequate weapons to confront traffickers, and the judicial system is essentially unable to enforce the law, as only one of every 20 murders is ever solved and prosecuted.[vii]
In addition to the influx of violent crime, the “northern triangle” has also emerged as a potential producer of narcotics. It was previously believed that Honduras served merely as a transfer point for narcotic shipments between South America and the U.S. However, in March 2011, police encountered the nation’s first cocaine processing lab on a coffee farm north of the capital, Tegucigalpa, which reportedly had been run by Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel for the past two to three years and was capable of producing approximately one ton of cocaine per month.[viii]
Drug-related corruption has thoroughly infiltrated Central American governments and business elites. Cartels have penetrated key state institutions throughout Central America, including the police, army, executive branches, and judicial systems. Drug-related violence and costly law enforcement also impact Central American economies by reducing the availability of already limited resources. According to the World Bank, “dealing with crime and violence costs Central America around 8% of its GDP.”[ix] Consequently, combating drug trafficking has become an inherently daunting challenge.
The changes in drug trafficking patterns, combined with the accompanying spike in violent crime has led to the Obama administration to officially include Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica on the “Majors List”, a compilation of “major drug transit or major illicit drug-producing countries” already occupied by other Central American, South American, Caribbean, and Middle Eastern countries.[x] The increase in violence, corruption, and production illustrate the alarming spread of cartel activity in Central America. Crackdowns in Mexico and South America continue to put pressure on cartels, forcing them into Central America’s most vulnerable states.
Central American Recognition and Cooperation
The drug trafficking crisis, once an isolated concern, now affects the entire Central American region. While partial solutions can come from individual nations, a more integrated approach must be implemented regionally with cooperation from South America and the U.S. Historically, widespread cooperation and integration have been lacking in Central America. Developing a coordinated strategy is, therefore, no easy task; corruption, mistrust, and a plethora of domestic objectives make synchronizing goals and resources difficult.
Despite these snares, the Central American Integration System (SICA) was partially designed “to set up a new model of regional security based on the reasonable balance of forces, the strengthening of civilian authority, the overcoming of extreme poverty, the promotion of sustainable development, the protection of the environment, and the eradication of violence, corruption, terrorism, and drug and arms trafficking.”[xi] At a SICA summit this June, leaders from seven member nations committed to develop and implement a joint security strategy. With these unmistakable efforts for cooperation and integration against drug traffickers, SICA has become an expression of Central America’s united political will to resolve this crucial security issue.
Clearly, Central American nations are acknowledging the harrowing reality of the situation. One proposed model to combat drugs being used in Nicaragua actively encourages the development of isolated and vulnerable communities, which may easily fall prey to powerful and wealthy drug cartels.[xii] Given that crime is “both the cause and consequence of poverty, insecurity and underdevelopment,” according to Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, this approach has the potential to be the most effective method to deal with drug control and crime prevention.[xiii]
Not only would these measures reduce susceptibility to infiltration by providing communities with a direct connection and sense of support from the state, they are far more affordable and effective than large, expensive militarized programs. Federico Arce, attaché to Ambassador Campbell maintains that “Community programs are not expensive – helicopters are expensive.”[xiv] Options exist, even with budget constraints. Other goals that have been proposed and, in some cases, adopted include the creation of consistent legislation concerning drug trafficking, border agreements and border security policies to prevent drug criminals from escaping to other Central American states, and a more thorough process of purifying law enforcement sectors. These alternative development models must take priority. However, such initiatives have traditionally been second to other measures, such as interdiction, and face a steep upward battle without significant international support.
The U.S. Factor
The U.S. tends to attribute Central America’s drug problems to the region’s weaknesses: small size, limited resources, corruption, poverty, lack of integration, weak governments, ineffective law enforcement, and unstable economies. Many local inhabitants agree that these areas need improvement; however, they also argue that the roots of the problem extend much deeper.
According to the 2011 UN World Drug Report, the largest hemispheric and global cocaine market “continues to be that of the United States, with an estimated consumption of 157 mt [metric tons] of cocaine, equivalent to 36% of global consumption.”[xv] It is this demand that sustains the Latin American drug industry and forces Central America to assume the position of middleman.
It is far too convenient for the U.S. to simply sweep aside its own role in the crisis and focus on Central America’s weaknesses. The U.S. must stop ignoring its consistently destructive role in the war on drugs and translate the idea of co-responsibility into action. A congressional aide with experience on Latin America suggests, “The U.S. Government should do more to understand how the cartels operate in the United States and U.S. officials should use the resulting intelligence and analysis to more aggressively confront the cartels in the United States.”[xvi] As long as a demand exists, drugs will be produced and transported, thereby exacerbating drug violence problems in Central America.[xvii]
Washington’s solution has been to pour billions into counter-narcotic efforts, such as the costly and criticized Mérida Initiative, which provides “equipment and training in support of law enforcement operations and technical assistance to promote the long-term reform, oversight and professionalization of [Latin America’s] security agencies.”[xviii] As of 2010, Congress had appropriated USD 1.3 billion for Mérida programs in Mexico, while only USD 248 million was allocated to Central America.[xix] The U.S. must re-appropriate these funds in order to sufficiently support Central America’s battle against its greatest threat.
Ultimately, however, the U.S. must enact policies that will reduce the high domestic demand for cocaine. Otherwise, any counter-narcotic efforts throughout the rest of the hemisphere will be meaningless. Reforming and introducing new drug policy represents a long-term commitment, and is something of a recurring nightmare for Washington policymakers. But as Arce suggests, “Even if policy takes a long time, there is maneuverability” and the possibility of pursuing other options.[xx]
As history has revealed, the drug war is capable of changing fronts. Efforts must keep up with the emergence of new trafficking routes, instead of focusing on previous threats. Without proper policy adjustments, corruption, violence, and organized crime will continue to flourish in Central America.
Final Thoughts
Previous strategies in the war on drugs, such as expensive militarization programs, or controversial reforms, including legalization, are slow and relatively ineffective responses to a problem that is growing exponentially. Instead, the U.S. needs to support local and regional programs in Central America designed to fight the drug trade through improved education, rural development, and employment opportunities. The U.S. also needs to address domestic factors that influence the drug trade.
These dual objectives should be the focus of continued bilateral aid and regional cooperation. Only then will technical assistance to rectify the integrity of law enforcement and justice sectors—which will in turn better fight organized crime, violence, corruption, and protect human rights—have any chance of success.[xxi] Hemispheric communication, coordination of efforts, a new sense of urgency, and a long-term financial, social, and political commitment to the crisis must be the first steps for nations afflicted by the drug war.
References for this article can be found here.
The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org
September 3, 2011
caribbeannewsnow
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