By David Jessop:
The announcement in mid-December by President Obama and President Castro
that Cuba and the US are moving to normalise relations has resulted in
speculation about what this may mean for the Caribbean’s tourism sector.
For the most part what has been said and written has failed to
understand the nature or complexity of what the US president has
proposed, the process involved, or the fact that Cuba has revealed very
little about what its detailed response will be.
That said, the news of a changed US-Cuba relationship is of course
welcome, long overdue and begins to end the US imposed isolation of a
Caribbean nation. It involves the full restoration of diplomatic
relations by both sides and includes a range of measures for which the
US president does not need the approval of Congress.
Although the US president made clear that, when it comes to US
travellers, more US citizens will be able to visit Cuba under what is
expected to be looser licensing arrangements, he was not freeing all
individual US travel to Cuba.
Instead, the implication is that the granting of licences to travel in
12 identified US Treasury permitted areas* will be made easier. He also
said that US credit and debit cards will be permitted for use by
travellers to Cuba, US companies will be able to improve infrastructure
linking the US and Cuba for commercial telecommunications and internet
services, and according to a fact sheet accompanying his statement,
foreign vessels will be able to enter the United States “after engaging
in certain humanitarian trade with Cuba”.
Sometime in the coming weeks the new US Treasury regulations on Cuba
will be published, which will spell out how these and other aspects of
the new US travel regime will work. However, the present consensus in
the US travel industry is that in future a general licensing system will
enable tour operators to develop programmes within identified
categories such as educational activities and US citizens will then be
able to freely buy and travel within such packages on the basis they are
giving the US government their word they are not simply engaging in
tourism.
How this will work in practice and the extent to which current draconian
US rules on the use of currency, or whether Cuba has the facilities or
is geared up to receive many more visitors on this basis, remains to be
seen.
Of more fundamental importance, although not directly related to
tourism, was the announcement that President Obama was authorising his
Secretary of State, John Kerry, to review, based on the facts, Cuba’s US
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. A change in this area
would not only enable companies in the tourism sector, but in every
other sector as well to be able to freely move funds in US dollars,
invest, trade, book hotels or flights on airline websites on US servers,
and much more.
The increasingly tough interpretation by the US Treasury in the last few
years of regulations that flow from this designation has severely
constrained all third country trade and services including from the
Caribbean, as many companies and international banks have withdrawn from
the Cuban market in order not to face huge fines in relation to the
transfer of funds.
What happens next in practical terms may be slow and uncertain. However,
it is clear that President Obama has initiated a process that he thinks
will be sustainable beyond any Democrat administration. Although not
spelt out, it would seem that he calculates that, in the case of Cuba,
freer US travel and the weight of US corporate interest may force an
unstoppable economic opening that a Republican dominated House and
Senate or any future Republican president will not wish to turn back.
For his part, President Castro has made clear that Cuba will work with
the US to improve relations but that that his country’s principal focus
will be on an improved economic relationship and functional
co-operation.
What this means is that, while US tourism (or more precisely the number
of non Cuban-American US visitors travelling to Cuba) will remain
constrained for the time being, there could be a quite sudden opening in
between two to four years time, but only if that is what Cuba wants.
In this context, the most likely changes in the short term related to
tourism are increasing pressure on the number of hotel rooms in Havana
and popular destinations, and an upward trend in Cuba’s presently low
room rates; increased investment in the hotel sector by foreign
companies particularly in conjunction with military controlled tourism
companies; pressure from US legacy carriers to fly scheduled services to
Cuba out of the US; the increased attraction of sailboats into the
newly completed marinas that Cuba has been constructing; an increasing
number of calls by non-US cruise ships and perhaps, in time, US cruise
ships if they home port in Cuba; and the rapid diversification and
decentralisation of Cuba’s already significant tourism product.
Speaking recently in Barbados about the opportunity, the Caribbean
Tourism Organisation’s secretary general, Hugh Riley, said that,
contrary to the fears in some parts of the region, the strengthening of
Cuba as a Caribbean tourism destination was good news, as it would
attract more visitors into the region and could prove a gold mine for
those willing to capitalise on it. The region, he said, needed to view
normalised relations from an entrepreneurial point-of-view to determine
how it could strike partnerships that would allow it to benefit.
The figures amplify Mr Riley’s point. While overall visitor arrivals
totalled 2.8 million in 2013 – the spend was US$2.3 billion – Cuban
official statistics record that only 92,000 US citizens visited Cuba
that year; a figure that does not include another 350,000 to 400,000
Cuban Americans who visit annually, as Cuba does not consider them as
visitors.
President Castro and President Obama both noted that the agreement to
normalise relations would be challenging and take time. The announcement
of an improved US-Cuba relationship is therefore best regarded in
tourism terms as the starting gun for all Caribbean tourism interests to
consider how, over time, they will respond to increasing competition
for the US market.
*These are family visits; official business of the US government,
foreign governments, and certain intergovernmental organizations;
journalistic activity; professional research and professional meetings;
educational activities; religious activities; public performances,
clinics, workshops, athletic and other competitions, and exhibitions;
support for the Cuban people; humanitarian projects; activities of
private foundations or research or educational institutes; exportation,
importation, or transmission of information or information materials;
and certain export transactions guidelines.
January 10, 2015
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Rapprochement Between the United States and Cuba and Sanctions Against Venezuela
By WILLIAM CAMACARO and FREDERICK B. MILLS:
In a historic address on December 17, 2014 on “Cuba policy changes”
President Barack Obama declared, “our shift in policy towards Cuba
comes at a moment of renewed leadership in the Americas.” This “renewed
leadership,” in our view, seeks to gradually undermine socialism in
Cuba, check waning U.S. influence in the region, and inhibit a growing
continental Bolivarian movement towards Latin American liberation,
integration, and sovereignty. To be sure, normalization of relations
with Cuba and the release of Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino and
Antonio Guerrero were long overdue, and the reunification of Alan Gross
with his family was an important and welcome gesture. The rapprochement
between the United States and Cuba and the simultaneous imposition of a
new round of sanctions by the U.S. against Venezuela, however, do not
signal a change in overall U.S. strategy but only a change in tactics.
As President of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro remarked in a letter to President Raul Castro
“there is still a long road to travel in order to arrive at the point
that Washington recognizes we are no longer its back yard…” (December
20, 2014).
From Embargo to Deployment of U.S. Soft Power in Cuba
The Obama gambit arguably seeks to move Cuba as far as possible towards market oriented economic reforms, help build the political community of dissidents on the island, and improve U.S. standing in the region, and indeed in the world. In a Miami Herald op-ed piece (December 22, 2014), John Kerry (Secretary of State), Penny Pritzker (Secretary of Commerce) and Jacob J. Lew (Treasury Secretary) wrote that normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba will “increase the ability of Americans to provide business training and other support for Cuba’s nascent private sector” and that this will “put American businesses on a more equal footing.” Presumably the op-ed is referring to “equal footing” with other nations that have been doing business for years with Cuba despite the embargo. The essay also indicates that the U.S. will continue its “strong support for improved human-rights conditions and democratic reforms in Cuba” by “empowering civil society and supporting the freedom of individuals to exercise their freedoms of speech and assembly.” Such a version of “empowering civil society” is probably consistent with decades of U.S. clandestine attempts to subvert the Cuban government, documented by Jon Elliston in Psy War on Cuba: The declassified history of U.S. anti-Castro propaganda (Ocean Press: 1999). It is also in line with more recent efforts, through USAID funded social media (phony Cuban Twitter) and a four year project to promote “Cuban rap music” both of which ended in 2012, designed to build dissident movements inside Cuba. In December 2014, Matt Herrick, spokesman for USAID, defended the latter unsuccessful covert program saying, “It seemed like a good idea to support civil society” and that “it’s not something we are embarrassed about in any way.” Moreover, a fact sheet on normalization published by the U.S. Department of State mentions that funding for “democracy programming” will continue and that “our efforts are aimed at promoting the independence of the Cuban people so they do not need to rely on the Cuban state” (December 17, 2014). The Cuban government, though, has a different take on the meaning of “independence of the Cuban people.” They emphasize “sovereign equality,” “national independence,” and “self determination.” In an address on normalization, Raul Castro insisted on maintaining Cuban sovereignty and stated “we have embarked on the task of updating our economic model in order to build a prosperous and sustainable Socialism” (December 17, 2014). Obviously the ideological differences between Washington and Havana will shape the course of economic and political engagement between these two nations in the months and years ahead.
Rapprochement Between the U.S. and U.S. Isolation in Latin America
Through normalization of relations with Cuba, the U.S. also seeks to end its increasing isolation in the region. Secretary of State John Kerry, in his Announcement of Cuba Policy Changes, remarked that “not only has this policy [embargo] failed to advance America’s goals, it has actually isolated the United States instead of isolating Cuba” (December 17, 2014). In October 2014, the United Nations General Assembly voted against the U.S. Cuba embargo for the 23rd year in a row, with only the U.S. and Israel voting in favor. The inclusion of Cuba in the political and, to a certain degree, economic life of Latin America, has also been part of a larger expression of Latin American solidarity that clearly repudiates regional subordination to Washington. Since the sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena (April 2012), the U.S. has been on very clear notice by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) that there will be no seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama in April without Cuba, a condition to which Washington has ceded.
The flip side of Washington’s growing “isolation” has been the critically important regional diversification of diplomatic and commercial relations between Latin America and the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the construction of alternative development banks and currency reserves to gradually replace the historically onerous terms of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The financial powerhouse of the BRICS nations is China. Over the past year, China has sent high level delegations to visit CELAC nations and in some cases these meetings have resulted in significant commercial agreements. As a follow up, there will be a CELAC–China forum in Beijing in January 2015 whose main objective, reports Prensa Latina, “is exchange and dialogue in politics, trade, economy and culture.” These ties with BRICS and other nations are consistent with the Chavista goal that the Patria Grande ought to contribute to building a multi-polar world and resist subordination to any power block on the planet. By bringing a halt to its growing isolation, Washington would be in a better position to increase its participation in regional commerce. The terms of economic engagement with most of Latin America, however, will no longer be determined by a Washington consensus, but by a North—South consensus. The Obama gambit, though, appears to be trading one source of alienation (embargo against Cuba) for another (sanctions against Venezuela).
Obama’s Gambit: Pushing Back the Bolivarian Cause at its Front Line–Venezuela
The Obama administration’s move to normalize relations with Cuba, while a welcome change of course, can be seen as a modification in tactics to advance the neoliberal agenda as far as possible in Havana while ending a policy that only serves to further erode U.S. influence in the region. Such diplomacy is in line with what appears to be a major U.S. policy objective of ultimately rolling back the ‘pink tide’, that is, the establishment, by democratic procedures, of left and center left regimes in two thirds of Latin American nations. It is this tide that has achieved some measure of progress in liberating much of Latin America from the structural inequality, social antagonism, and subordination to transnational corporate interests intrinsic to neoliberal politics and economics. And it is the continental Bolivarian emphasis on independence, integration, and sovereignty that has fortified the social movements behind this tide.
The Obama gambit, from a hemispheric point of view, constitutes a tactical shift away from the failed U.S. attempt to isolate and bring the Cuban revolution to its knees through coercion, to an intensification of its fifteen year effort to isolate and promote regime change in Venezuela. The reason for this tactical shift is that Venezuela, as the front line in the struggle for the Bolivarian cause of an increasingly integrated and sovereign Latin America, has become the biggest obstacle to the restoration of U.S. hegemony and the rehabilitation of the neoliberal regime in the Americas.
If this interpretation of U.S. hemispheric policy is near the mark, Obama’s grand executive gesture towards Cuba is immediately related to the context of Washington’s unrelenting antagonism towards Chavismo and, in particular, to the latest imposition of sanctions against Caracas. The reason for this is quite transparent. It has been Venezuela, more than Cuba, during the past fifteen years, that has played the leading role in the change of the balance of forces in the region on the side of sovereignty for the peoples of the Americas, especially through its leadership role in ALBA, CELAC, UNASUR and MERCOSUR, associations that do not include the U.S. and Canada. Argentine sociologist Atilio Boron, in an interview with Katu Arkonada of Rebelión (June 24, 2014), points out, “It is no accident…that Venezuela in particular is in the cross hairs of the empire, and for this reason we must be clear that the battle of Venezuela is our Stalingrad. If Venezuela succumbs before the brutal counter offensive of the United States…the rest of the processes of change underway on the continent, whether very radical or very moderate, will end with the same fate.” The latest U.S. sanctions against Venezuela can be viewed as one component of this counter offensive. It is to a closer look at the sanctions bill, signed into law by the president on December 18, 2014, that we now turn.
The “Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014” (S 2142) not only targets Venezuelan officials whom U.S. authorities accuse of being linked to human rights abuses by freezing their assets and revoking their travel visas (Sec. 5 (b) (1) (A) (B)), it also promises to step up U.S. political intervention in Venezuela by continuing “to support the development of democratic political processes and independent civil society in Venezuela” (section 4 (4)) and by reviewing the effectiveness of “broadcasting, information distribution, and circumvention technology distribution in Venezuela” (section 6). One of the instruments of this support for “democratic political processes” has been the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Sociologist Kim Scipes argues that, “the NED and its institutes are not active in Venezuela to help promote democracy, as they claim, but in fact, to act against popular democracy in an effort to restore the rule of the elite, top-down democracy” (February 28 – March 2, 2014). Independent journalist Garry Leech, in his article entitled “Agents of Destabilization: Washington Seeks Regime Change in Venezuela,” (March 4, 2014) examines Wikileaks cables that indicate similar efforts have been carried out in Venezuela by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) during the past decade. Hannah Dreier (July 18, 2014), reported that “the State Department and the National Endowment for Democracy, a government-funded nonprofit organization, together budgeted about $7.6 million to support Venezuelan groups last year alone, according to public documents reviewed by AP.” The sanctions bill (S 2142), then, in light of these precedents, contains provisions that suggest an imminent escalation in the use of soft power to support the political opposition to Chavismo in Venezuela, though such funding has been banned by Caracas.
The current U.S. sanctions against Caracas are consistent with fifteen years of U.S. antagonism against the Bolivarian revolution. The measures send a clear signal of increased support for a Venezuelan political opposition that has suffered division and discord in the aftermath of their failed “salida ya” (exit now) strategy of the first quarter of 2014. The sanctions also undermine any near term movement towards normalization of relations between the U.S. and Venezuela. It is no surprise that provisions of the law that targets Venezuelan officials accused of human rights violations have gotten some limited traction inside this South American nation, with the executive secretary of the Venezuelan opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), Jesús Torrealba, openly supporting this measure. This is probably not going to get the MUD a lot of votes. According to a Hinterlaces poll taken in May, a majority of Venezuelans are opposed to U.S. sanctions. There has also been a swift repudiation of sanctions by the Maduro administration and the popular sectors. On December 15, 2014, in one of the largest and most enthusiastic gatherings of Chavistas in the streets of Caracas since the death of Hugo Chavez, marchers celebrated the fifteenth year anniversary of the passage by referendum of a new constitution (December 15, 1999) and vigorously protested against U.S. intervention in their country. Even dissident Chavistas appear to be toning down their rhetoric and circling the wagons in the face of Washington’s bid to assert “renewed leadership” in the region.
There is no doubt that the Maduro administration is under tremendous pressure, from left Chavistas as well as from the right wing opposition, to reform and improve public security and deal effectively with an economic crisis that is being exacerbated by falling petroleum prices. What the government of Venezuela calls an “economic war” against the country has domestic and well as international dimensions. Although there is no smoking gun at this time that exposes a conspiracy, some analysts interpret the recent fall in oil prices as part of a campaign to put severe economic pressure on Iran, Russia and Venezuela, countries whose fiscal soundness relies a great deal on petroleum revenues. For example, Venezuelan independent journalist, Jesus Silva R., in his essay entitled “The Government of Saudi Arabia is the Worst Commercial Enemy of Venezuela,” argues that the Saudis and Washington are complicit in the “economic strangulation, planned from the outside, against Venezuela” (December 22, 2014). Whatever the cause of falling petroleum prices and despite the domestic challenges facing Caracas, it will most probably be the Venezuelan electorate that decides, through upcoming legislative elections, whether to give Chavismo a vote of confidence, not outside intervention or a fresh round of guarimbas and terrorist attacks perpetrated by the ultra right. For the large majority of Venezuelans reject violence and favor constitutional means of resolving political contests.
U.S. Sanctions Against Venezuela Evoke Latin American Solidarity with Caracas
The good will generated by rapprochement between the U.S. and Cuba has already been tempered by the almost simultaneous new round of sanctions imposed by Washington against Venezuela. It is important to recall, perhaps with some irony, that it was precisely the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s establishment of fraternal ties with a formerly isolated Cuba that drew, in particular, the ire of Washington and the virulent antagonism of the right wing Venezuelan opposition. Now it is Latin American and to a significant extent, international solidarity with Venezuela that may prove to be a thorn in Washington’s side. On December 12, 2014, ALBA issued a strong statement against the Senate passage of the sanctions bill, expressing its “most energetic rejection of these interventionist actions [sanctions] against the people and government of the Bolivarian Government of Venezuela.” The statement also warned “that the legislation constitutes an incitement towards the destabilization of…Venezuela and opens the doors to anticonstitutional actions against the legal government and legitimately elected President Nicolas Maduro Moros.” The communiqué also expressed solidarity with Venezuela adding that the countries of ALBA “desire to emphasize that they will not permit the use of old practices already applied to countries in the region, directed at bringing about political regime change, as has occurred in other regions of the world.” MERCOSUR issued a statement on December 17, 2014 that “the application of unilateral sanctions…violate the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and does not contribute to the stability, social peace and democracy in Venezuela.” On December 22, the G77 plus China countries expressed solidarity and support for the government of Venezuela in the face of “violations of international law that in no way contributes to the spirit of political and economic dialogue between the two countries.” On December 23, the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations stated that it “categorically rejects the decision of the United States Government to impose unilateral coercive measures against the Republic of Venezuela…with the purpose of weakening its sovereignty, political independence and its right to the self determination, in clear violation of International Law.” It is also important to recall that n October 16, 2014 the UN General Assembly elected Venezuela (by a vote of 181 out of 193 members) to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council with unanimous regional support, even crossing ideological lines. This UN vote came as a grave disappointment to opponents of the Bolivarian revolution and reinforced Venezuelan standing in CELAC. In yet another diplomatic victory, as of September 2015, Venezuela will assume the presidency of the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations for a three year term. Clearly, it is Washington, not Venezuela that has already become an outlier as the Obama administration launches its “renewed leadership in the Americas.” If these immediate expressions of solidarity with the first post-Chavez Bolivarian government in Venezuela are an indicator of a persistent and growing trend, then by the time of the upcoming seventh Summit of the Americas, April 10 – 11, 2015 in Panama, President Obama can expect approbation for Washington’s opening to Havana, but he will also face a united front against U.S. intervention in Venezuela and anywhere else in the region.
Note: Translations by the authors from Spanish to English of government documents are unofficial. Where citations are not present in the text, hyperlinks provide the source.
William Camacaro MFA. is a Senior Analyst at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and a member of the Bolivarian Circle of New York “Alberto Lovera.”
Frederick B. Mills, Ph.D. is Professor of Philosophy at Bowie State University and Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.
From Embargo to Deployment of U.S. Soft Power in Cuba
The Obama gambit arguably seeks to move Cuba as far as possible towards market oriented economic reforms, help build the political community of dissidents on the island, and improve U.S. standing in the region, and indeed in the world. In a Miami Herald op-ed piece (December 22, 2014), John Kerry (Secretary of State), Penny Pritzker (Secretary of Commerce) and Jacob J. Lew (Treasury Secretary) wrote that normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba will “increase the ability of Americans to provide business training and other support for Cuba’s nascent private sector” and that this will “put American businesses on a more equal footing.” Presumably the op-ed is referring to “equal footing” with other nations that have been doing business for years with Cuba despite the embargo. The essay also indicates that the U.S. will continue its “strong support for improved human-rights conditions and democratic reforms in Cuba” by “empowering civil society and supporting the freedom of individuals to exercise their freedoms of speech and assembly.” Such a version of “empowering civil society” is probably consistent with decades of U.S. clandestine attempts to subvert the Cuban government, documented by Jon Elliston in Psy War on Cuba: The declassified history of U.S. anti-Castro propaganda (Ocean Press: 1999). It is also in line with more recent efforts, through USAID funded social media (phony Cuban Twitter) and a four year project to promote “Cuban rap music” both of which ended in 2012, designed to build dissident movements inside Cuba. In December 2014, Matt Herrick, spokesman for USAID, defended the latter unsuccessful covert program saying, “It seemed like a good idea to support civil society” and that “it’s not something we are embarrassed about in any way.” Moreover, a fact sheet on normalization published by the U.S. Department of State mentions that funding for “democracy programming” will continue and that “our efforts are aimed at promoting the independence of the Cuban people so they do not need to rely on the Cuban state” (December 17, 2014). The Cuban government, though, has a different take on the meaning of “independence of the Cuban people.” They emphasize “sovereign equality,” “national independence,” and “self determination.” In an address on normalization, Raul Castro insisted on maintaining Cuban sovereignty and stated “we have embarked on the task of updating our economic model in order to build a prosperous and sustainable Socialism” (December 17, 2014). Obviously the ideological differences between Washington and Havana will shape the course of economic and political engagement between these two nations in the months and years ahead.
Rapprochement Between the U.S. and U.S. Isolation in Latin America
Through normalization of relations with Cuba, the U.S. also seeks to end its increasing isolation in the region. Secretary of State John Kerry, in his Announcement of Cuba Policy Changes, remarked that “not only has this policy [embargo] failed to advance America’s goals, it has actually isolated the United States instead of isolating Cuba” (December 17, 2014). In October 2014, the United Nations General Assembly voted against the U.S. Cuba embargo for the 23rd year in a row, with only the U.S. and Israel voting in favor. The inclusion of Cuba in the political and, to a certain degree, economic life of Latin America, has also been part of a larger expression of Latin American solidarity that clearly repudiates regional subordination to Washington. Since the sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena (April 2012), the U.S. has been on very clear notice by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) that there will be no seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama in April without Cuba, a condition to which Washington has ceded.
The flip side of Washington’s growing “isolation” has been the critically important regional diversification of diplomatic and commercial relations between Latin America and the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the construction of alternative development banks and currency reserves to gradually replace the historically onerous terms of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The financial powerhouse of the BRICS nations is China. Over the past year, China has sent high level delegations to visit CELAC nations and in some cases these meetings have resulted in significant commercial agreements. As a follow up, there will be a CELAC–China forum in Beijing in January 2015 whose main objective, reports Prensa Latina, “is exchange and dialogue in politics, trade, economy and culture.” These ties with BRICS and other nations are consistent with the Chavista goal that the Patria Grande ought to contribute to building a multi-polar world and resist subordination to any power block on the planet. By bringing a halt to its growing isolation, Washington would be in a better position to increase its participation in regional commerce. The terms of economic engagement with most of Latin America, however, will no longer be determined by a Washington consensus, but by a North—South consensus. The Obama gambit, though, appears to be trading one source of alienation (embargo against Cuba) for another (sanctions against Venezuela).
Obama’s Gambit: Pushing Back the Bolivarian Cause at its Front Line–Venezuela
The Obama administration’s move to normalize relations with Cuba, while a welcome change of course, can be seen as a modification in tactics to advance the neoliberal agenda as far as possible in Havana while ending a policy that only serves to further erode U.S. influence in the region. Such diplomacy is in line with what appears to be a major U.S. policy objective of ultimately rolling back the ‘pink tide’, that is, the establishment, by democratic procedures, of left and center left regimes in two thirds of Latin American nations. It is this tide that has achieved some measure of progress in liberating much of Latin America from the structural inequality, social antagonism, and subordination to transnational corporate interests intrinsic to neoliberal politics and economics. And it is the continental Bolivarian emphasis on independence, integration, and sovereignty that has fortified the social movements behind this tide.
The Obama gambit, from a hemispheric point of view, constitutes a tactical shift away from the failed U.S. attempt to isolate and bring the Cuban revolution to its knees through coercion, to an intensification of its fifteen year effort to isolate and promote regime change in Venezuela. The reason for this tactical shift is that Venezuela, as the front line in the struggle for the Bolivarian cause of an increasingly integrated and sovereign Latin America, has become the biggest obstacle to the restoration of U.S. hegemony and the rehabilitation of the neoliberal regime in the Americas.
If this interpretation of U.S. hemispheric policy is near the mark, Obama’s grand executive gesture towards Cuba is immediately related to the context of Washington’s unrelenting antagonism towards Chavismo and, in particular, to the latest imposition of sanctions against Caracas. The reason for this is quite transparent. It has been Venezuela, more than Cuba, during the past fifteen years, that has played the leading role in the change of the balance of forces in the region on the side of sovereignty for the peoples of the Americas, especially through its leadership role in ALBA, CELAC, UNASUR and MERCOSUR, associations that do not include the U.S. and Canada. Argentine sociologist Atilio Boron, in an interview with Katu Arkonada of Rebelión (June 24, 2014), points out, “It is no accident…that Venezuela in particular is in the cross hairs of the empire, and for this reason we must be clear that the battle of Venezuela is our Stalingrad. If Venezuela succumbs before the brutal counter offensive of the United States…the rest of the processes of change underway on the continent, whether very radical or very moderate, will end with the same fate.” The latest U.S. sanctions against Venezuela can be viewed as one component of this counter offensive. It is to a closer look at the sanctions bill, signed into law by the president on December 18, 2014, that we now turn.
The “Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014” (S 2142) not only targets Venezuelan officials whom U.S. authorities accuse of being linked to human rights abuses by freezing their assets and revoking their travel visas (Sec. 5 (b) (1) (A) (B)), it also promises to step up U.S. political intervention in Venezuela by continuing “to support the development of democratic political processes and independent civil society in Venezuela” (section 4 (4)) and by reviewing the effectiveness of “broadcasting, information distribution, and circumvention technology distribution in Venezuela” (section 6). One of the instruments of this support for “democratic political processes” has been the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Sociologist Kim Scipes argues that, “the NED and its institutes are not active in Venezuela to help promote democracy, as they claim, but in fact, to act against popular democracy in an effort to restore the rule of the elite, top-down democracy” (February 28 – March 2, 2014). Independent journalist Garry Leech, in his article entitled “Agents of Destabilization: Washington Seeks Regime Change in Venezuela,” (March 4, 2014) examines Wikileaks cables that indicate similar efforts have been carried out in Venezuela by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) during the past decade. Hannah Dreier (July 18, 2014), reported that “the State Department and the National Endowment for Democracy, a government-funded nonprofit organization, together budgeted about $7.6 million to support Venezuelan groups last year alone, according to public documents reviewed by AP.” The sanctions bill (S 2142), then, in light of these precedents, contains provisions that suggest an imminent escalation in the use of soft power to support the political opposition to Chavismo in Venezuela, though such funding has been banned by Caracas.
The current U.S. sanctions against Caracas are consistent with fifteen years of U.S. antagonism against the Bolivarian revolution. The measures send a clear signal of increased support for a Venezuelan political opposition that has suffered division and discord in the aftermath of their failed “salida ya” (exit now) strategy of the first quarter of 2014. The sanctions also undermine any near term movement towards normalization of relations between the U.S. and Venezuela. It is no surprise that provisions of the law that targets Venezuelan officials accused of human rights violations have gotten some limited traction inside this South American nation, with the executive secretary of the Venezuelan opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), Jesús Torrealba, openly supporting this measure. This is probably not going to get the MUD a lot of votes. According to a Hinterlaces poll taken in May, a majority of Venezuelans are opposed to U.S. sanctions. There has also been a swift repudiation of sanctions by the Maduro administration and the popular sectors. On December 15, 2014, in one of the largest and most enthusiastic gatherings of Chavistas in the streets of Caracas since the death of Hugo Chavez, marchers celebrated the fifteenth year anniversary of the passage by referendum of a new constitution (December 15, 1999) and vigorously protested against U.S. intervention in their country. Even dissident Chavistas appear to be toning down their rhetoric and circling the wagons in the face of Washington’s bid to assert “renewed leadership” in the region.
There is no doubt that the Maduro administration is under tremendous pressure, from left Chavistas as well as from the right wing opposition, to reform and improve public security and deal effectively with an economic crisis that is being exacerbated by falling petroleum prices. What the government of Venezuela calls an “economic war” against the country has domestic and well as international dimensions. Although there is no smoking gun at this time that exposes a conspiracy, some analysts interpret the recent fall in oil prices as part of a campaign to put severe economic pressure on Iran, Russia and Venezuela, countries whose fiscal soundness relies a great deal on petroleum revenues. For example, Venezuelan independent journalist, Jesus Silva R., in his essay entitled “The Government of Saudi Arabia is the Worst Commercial Enemy of Venezuela,” argues that the Saudis and Washington are complicit in the “economic strangulation, planned from the outside, against Venezuela” (December 22, 2014). Whatever the cause of falling petroleum prices and despite the domestic challenges facing Caracas, it will most probably be the Venezuelan electorate that decides, through upcoming legislative elections, whether to give Chavismo a vote of confidence, not outside intervention or a fresh round of guarimbas and terrorist attacks perpetrated by the ultra right. For the large majority of Venezuelans reject violence and favor constitutional means of resolving political contests.
U.S. Sanctions Against Venezuela Evoke Latin American Solidarity with Caracas
The good will generated by rapprochement between the U.S. and Cuba has already been tempered by the almost simultaneous new round of sanctions imposed by Washington against Venezuela. It is important to recall, perhaps with some irony, that it was precisely the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s establishment of fraternal ties with a formerly isolated Cuba that drew, in particular, the ire of Washington and the virulent antagonism of the right wing Venezuelan opposition. Now it is Latin American and to a significant extent, international solidarity with Venezuela that may prove to be a thorn in Washington’s side. On December 12, 2014, ALBA issued a strong statement against the Senate passage of the sanctions bill, expressing its “most energetic rejection of these interventionist actions [sanctions] against the people and government of the Bolivarian Government of Venezuela.” The statement also warned “that the legislation constitutes an incitement towards the destabilization of…Venezuela and opens the doors to anticonstitutional actions against the legal government and legitimately elected President Nicolas Maduro Moros.” The communiqué also expressed solidarity with Venezuela adding that the countries of ALBA “desire to emphasize that they will not permit the use of old practices already applied to countries in the region, directed at bringing about political regime change, as has occurred in other regions of the world.” MERCOSUR issued a statement on December 17, 2014 that “the application of unilateral sanctions…violate the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and does not contribute to the stability, social peace and democracy in Venezuela.” On December 22, the G77 plus China countries expressed solidarity and support for the government of Venezuela in the face of “violations of international law that in no way contributes to the spirit of political and economic dialogue between the two countries.” On December 23, the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations stated that it “categorically rejects the decision of the United States Government to impose unilateral coercive measures against the Republic of Venezuela…with the purpose of weakening its sovereignty, political independence and its right to the self determination, in clear violation of International Law.” It is also important to recall that n October 16, 2014 the UN General Assembly elected Venezuela (by a vote of 181 out of 193 members) to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council with unanimous regional support, even crossing ideological lines. This UN vote came as a grave disappointment to opponents of the Bolivarian revolution and reinforced Venezuelan standing in CELAC. In yet another diplomatic victory, as of September 2015, Venezuela will assume the presidency of the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations for a three year term. Clearly, it is Washington, not Venezuela that has already become an outlier as the Obama administration launches its “renewed leadership in the Americas.” If these immediate expressions of solidarity with the first post-Chavez Bolivarian government in Venezuela are an indicator of a persistent and growing trend, then by the time of the upcoming seventh Summit of the Americas, April 10 – 11, 2015 in Panama, President Obama can expect approbation for Washington’s opening to Havana, but he will also face a united front against U.S. intervention in Venezuela and anywhere else in the region.
Note: Translations by the authors from Spanish to English of government documents are unofficial. Where citations are not present in the text, hyperlinks provide the source.
William Camacaro MFA. is a Senior Analyst at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and a member of the Bolivarian Circle of New York “Alberto Lovera.”
Frederick B. Mills, Ph.D. is Professor of Philosophy at Bowie State University and Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.
Source: CounterPunch
January 06, 2015
Saturday, January 3, 2015
Victory for the Cuban Revolution!

Michael BURKE
TODAY is the 56th anniversary of the overthrow of the Fulgencio Batista regime in Cuba by Fidel Castro and his militant supporters on January 1, 1959. It signalled the end of the tyrannical Batista dictatorship. It also signalled the end of the days of exploitation that Cuba was subjected to from the United States for several decades.
Fidel Castro made it abundantly clear that he was implementing a socialist order in Cuba. He did not start out as a communist, but was forced to go that route following the fallout with the USA when they refused to trade with Cuba. Fidel Castro then turned to the Soviet Union for help, which they gave, but with several conditions. The main condition was that Cuba should go communist.
However, American journalists who interviewed Castro in the 1960s reported that what obtained in Cuba was not communism in the classical sense, but Castro-type socialism, later known as the Cuban model. And many who travelled to Cuba and the Soviet Union also said that there were distinct differences between the two countries. Even before that, in the early 1960s, local journalist Evon Blake had a story in his monthly Newday magazine entitled 'Castro: dictator but not communist'.
By the 1970s, the United Nations statistics revealed that Cuba had progressed way above the average Third-World country in terms of agricultural output, health care and education. The anti-communists countered that it was only possible because the equivalent of a million US dollars was being pumped into Cuba on a daily basis from the Soviet Union. It never occurred to any of these anti-communists that, by even saying that, they were revealing the progress of communism in the Soviet Union as they showed that the communist superpower was able to do that.
There was much local opposition to Jamaica's then prime minister, Michael Manley, expanding diplomatic relations with Cuba. But the anti-socialist rhetoric only helped the Manley cause and the Manley rhetoric. It could have helped the return of the People's National Party to government in 1976.
The Cuban Government gave Jamaica four schools, the first of which was the Jose Marti School at Twickenham Park in St Catherine. Then there were the Cuban doctors -- who left when the Jamaica Labour Party Government led by Edward Seaga broke diplomatic relations with Cuba on October 29 1981. All sorts of allegations had been made against Paul Burke being in league with wanted men who had reportedly fled to Cuba, none of which were ever proven. Yet that was the basis on which ties were cut with Cuba.
I represented St Michael's Roman Catholic Seminary (now renamed theological college) at an ecumenical consultation on evangelism in Trinidad in 1975, which was held on the St Augustine campus of the University of the West Indies. At that conference, at least one Cuban Protestant minister complained that only Roman Catholics counted in the eyes of Fidel Castro.
Socialism and Catholicism
But some will ask how do I reconcile my socialist position with the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. In the writings of the popes going back to the earliest days of communism, the church taught that no one could be a good Catholic and a good socialist at the same time. This was when the words communism and socialism were used interchangeably. There was not yet a distinction made between Scientific Socialism or communism and the several other forms of socialism. In any event, the other forms of socialism had not yet fully developed to have a separate classification.
Four decades ago, the Roman Catholic Church explained that the meaning of the word socialism had evolved to include even the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. But in fairness to Norman Washington Manley -- who was never Roman Catholic -- he understood the distinction between the two words long before many others.
When Norman Manley was criticised in Catholic Opinion for expounding socialism, he countered by saying that he could not understand the criticism since everything he ever said was in line with the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. This at least showed that Norman Manley was reading the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.
Jamaican-born Mon-signor Gladstone Wilson, a Roman Catholic priest who was arguably the seventh most learned man in the world, was part of the so-called Drumblair circle of intellectuals that met regularly at Norman Manley's home. Monsignor Wilson, who knew 14 languages and had four doctorates, might have been the one to introduce Norman Manley to Roman Catholic social teaching.
The anti-communism rhetoric cost the PNP three elections, that of 1944, 1962 and 1980. In 1944, the rhetoric spoke to what obtained in Russia. In 1962, it was the Russian ship in the harbour. In 1980, it was all about Michael Manley and Castro.
Indeed, it was a strange irony when Bruce Golding, as prime minister, visited Cuba. It was a further irony that when Barack Obama announced that the embargo against Cuba would be lifted the Opposition Jamaica Labour Party welcomed the decision. I invite readers to do their research on the position of the JLP on Cuba as late as the 1980s.
Pope John Paul II visited Cuba in the 1990s. One of the statements made by Fidel Castro was that he and the pope were ideological twins. Pope John Paul II called for a lifting of the embargo against Cuba. In recent times, Pope Francis has also called for this and worked tirelessly behind the scenes to bring this about.
Classical communism in the Soviet Union came to a final end on December 25, 1992. There was no longer a Soviet Union but Russia and 14 other states with their own independent governments. Cuba was left isolated but did not surrender to anyone -- least of all the powerful and mighty USA, whether under Fidel Castro or his brother Raul. Yet the USA has lifted the embargo. The former Soviet Union lost the cold war against the USA but Cuba has won theirs.
Happy New Year to everyone!
ekrubm765@yahoo.com
January 01, 2015
Jamaica Observer
Sunday, December 28, 2014
The un-revolutionary mending of US-Cuba relations

By David Roberts
The recently announced thaw in US-Cuba relations is a boon to all Latin America and to the region's ties with Washington. The issue of US sanctions against Cuba has dogged relations between Latin America and the US for decades, with even the more liberal, pro-market countries in the region calling for the embargo to be lifted.
Some have speculated that Venezuela, Cuba's closest ally in the region, will now be isolated as Havana looks more to the US, leaving Caracas as something of a lone wolf in its ranting and raving against Washington. That appears to be wishful thinking. Cuba and the US are not suddenly going to become the best of chums.
The decision to restore full diplomatic ties and loosen the economic and travel restrictions (including the ability of US citizens to travel to Cuba, a restriction that smacks of a totalitarian state) is highly significant, even historic as Barack Obama put it. But major change is not going to come overnight, and the likes of McDonalds and Starbucks are not suddenly going to pop up in Havana and Santiago de Cuba.
For a start, the US already has a large diplomatic mission in the Cuban capital, and economic restrictions have been partially lifted in recent years, while Cuba itself has been undergoing a process of gradual and very partial economic liberalization. What is more, to end the embargo altogether will require the approval of the US congress, where the Republicans will now control both houses and will surely not vote in favor.
But the hope and expectation is that, as relations improve during the last two years of the Obama administration, support for the embargo will fade with the benefits of closer political and economic ties becoming evident, and whoever succeeds him will have the backing to end the patently ineffective embargo. That, in turn, would mean the Cuban regime would no longer have an excuse – as the embargo has been for the last 50 years – for stifling democratic change and using it as a scapegoat (with some justification) for the country's economic woes.
At the same time, scrapping the embargo would be good for business in the US and elsewhere – given the dire economic straits that Cuba's oil benefactor Venezuela is in, and with crude prices in freefall, shouldn't US companies help Cuba develop its own hydrocarbon resources?
Finally, and almost as an aside, a big unknown in all this is the role of Fidel Castro. Did he approve of the secret talks with Washington and the agreement between his brother Raúl and Obama? Was he involved in the process? Could the agreement have been reached if he were still in charge? We've heard nothing from Fidel so far.
Whatever the case, many have said that real change could not happen in Cuba while the Castro brothers are still alive. It seems those people could, thankfully, be proved wrong, and that would be of benefit to the whole of the Americas.
December 23, 2014
BNAmericas
Labels:
Cuba,
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US Cuba relations,
US-Cuba relations
Wednesday, December 17, 2014
Bocchit Edmond, Haitian Abassador to the Organisation of American States (OAS) ...expresses concerns about xenophobia and mistreatment of Haitians in The Bahamas
Xenophobia In The Bahamas: Haitian Ambassador Addresses Fred Mitchell
By RASHAD ROLLE
Tribune Staff Reporter
rrolle@tribunemedia.net
Nassau, The BahamasTHE Haitian ambassador to the Organisation of American States raised concerns yesterday about xenophobia and mistreatment of Haitians in the Bahamas during a special OAS sitting in Washington, DC.
Addressing
Foreign Affairs and Immigration Minister Fred Mitchell, Ambassador
Bocchit Edmond called on the Bahamas government to consider launching a
public campaign designed to underscore the notion that “verbal abuse” of
Haitians is “unfair and unjust”.
Mr
Edmond frequently emphasised that he did not wish to “cast aspersions”
on the decisions of the Bahamian government, but he nonetheless raised
several concerns about the policy measures this country has taken to
deal with illegal immigration.
In
his response, Mr Mitchell rejected suggestions of widespread abuse of
Haitians and noted that the Bahamas government does not sanction
discrimination.
“...I
would like to raise the concern of my government as to the verbal abuse
to which Haitian immigrants have been exposed in the Bahamas,” Mr
Edmond said. “As you may know, sir, there are many great Haitians
presently in the Bahamas, but that indeed have been in line with the
immigration requirements for years…and yet too many of them are victims
of certain abuse and denigrating (remarks) and I should go as far as to
say frankly rankly discriminating behaviour simply because they are
Haitians.”
“Then
there are black Bahamians who are summarily interpreted as being
Haitian and who have been subjected to the same treatment for that
reason. I would very much hope that your government would take under
advisement to launch a campaign of information of some kind to really
underscore the fact that this is unfair and unjust. I believe the vast
majority of Bahamian citizens are very good, but when I read the press
or have seen a couple of video clips on the Internet or heard and read
for myself a number of these statements that have been made, I have to
say these are frankly inflammatory and cannot fail but to stir up
feelings that are not conducive to peaceful coexistence.
“So
I would implore you, sir, to, I won’t say so much to educate, but to
inform, to make it clear the measures are being taken, measures in the
public domain, measures that I have stated from the outset are
absolutely in the purview of Bahamian sovereign decisions, but we also
know that the Bahamas as do we all has the obligation to respect basic
human rights.”
In
his response, Mr Mitchell said much of what is represented in the press
about the treatment of Haitians in the Bahamas is false.
“To
speak for a moment about the question of prejudice and discrimination
and what is said in the press and social media,” he said, “part of the
reason we are here is because of the misinformation that was spun either
in the press or social media about what this is. The government of the
country is not responsible for what is in the press or what the people
say in the press, although it might in fact reflect in some instances
what public opinion is. But I think every Bahamian understands the
nature of prejudice and bigotry and discrimination and certainly the
government does not sanction any of these things and I want to separate
myself from any effort which is suggesting that one ought to
discriminate against any national group. This is a generic policy not
expressed in terms of any national group.”
Nonetheless,
Mr Mitchell acknowledged that many Bahamians are frustrated with the
country’s illegal immigration problem and with having to absorb
“hundreds and thousands” of illegal migrants.
“Our
prime minister, when he speaks, often recounts a story of the first
black member of parliament (who) was in fact a man named Stephen Dillet
who was born in Haiti, came with his mother after the revolution as a
child,” he said. “Our governor general who just retired, Sir Arthur
Foulkes, his mother was Haitian. Haitians and people of Haitian descent
are integrated in the country. And my view is that what you are seeing,
you say expressed in the press, does not represent the majority view in
our country. What is of concern to a small country is the question of
can you continue to absorb hundreds and thousands of illegal migrants
coming into a country undocumented knowing what your obligations are in
the international arena for the security of your border and also for the
future identity and safety of your own state. That is simply
unsustainable and so we have an obligation, both internationally and
within our own domestic borders to our own population to ensure, not
that migrant stops, but that those who come to the Bahamas are properly
documented to be in the Bahamas and come through the front door and not
through the back door. That is what this is aimed at correcting.”
December 17, 2014
Thursday, December 11, 2014
Elections on hold in Haiti: Stability versus democracy
By Clement Doleac
Research Associate for the Council On Hemispheric Affairs:
Democracy in Haiti is again at risk, as a fierce political battle has erupted, preventing the scheduling of new elections. The United Nations (UN), the Organization of American States (OAS), along with the US and French governments have all called for the adoption of a new electoral law, which would allow the elections to go forward. However, given the deeply flawed nature of the present Haitian political system, it is far from clear if just holding elections will accomplish much.
An Unsettled Past
Haiti’s political landscape is today comprised of poorly-organized and highly fluid coalitions of parties, a situation which grows out of the troubled nation’s tumultuous recent history. François “Papa Doc” Duvalier was democratically elected – after a fashion – in 1957, although he quickly came to believe that he was indispensable, declaring himself president for life. He delivered on this threat, ruling as a cruel and paranoid dictator until his death in 1971.
With the passing of Papa Doc power fell to his son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, who continued his father’s authoritarian regime. Opposition gathered and in 1986, Jean-Claude was finally forced to flee Haiti, one step ahead of an armed revolt against his repressive dictatorship.
In the years since 1986, democratically elected presidents have governed Haiti, most notably the charismatic Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1991, 1995-1996, and 2001-2004) and today the talented and handsome singer Michel “Sweet Micky” Martelly (2011-present).
Haiti’s Jumbled Party System
However all is not well in the Haitian democracy, where anarchy reigns in the nation’s fragmented political system. A bewildering array of parties are presently represented in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
Overall, a total of 18 parties are represented in the Chamber of Deputies and seven in the Senate. Because of their small size, most Haitian political parties tend to organize themselves into loose political groupings to build electoral alliances. For example, Inité (Unity), which dominates the current composition of Congress, was formed as a political grouping of several smaller parties to support former president René Préval.
The report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) correctly sums up the chaotic situation. The lack of “ideolog[ical] […] clarity leaves citizens unable […] to choose between clearly defined platforms” in this fragmented political landscape. “Over 100 parties and groups have produced the 5,000 signatures required for registration,” the report continues, and yet for all this diffusion of political input, actual power rests in the hands of only a few well-positioned party leaders. As it stands, the Haitian political parties fail at the most basic tasks, failing to articulate institutionalized policies and to effectively reach out to the citizens.
Citizenship Skepticism
The weak democratic institutions and the power vacuum provoked by the 2004 crisis led to the absence of strong parties. The ICG report stated that charismatic personalities and “shallow politicians are unfortunately filling this vacuum”. Rather than holding politicians accountable for not addressing Haiti’s economic and social troubles, these personalities have removed citizens from decision-making, who in turn have rendered public policy suspect because of a lack of confidence in the democratic system.
This political skepticism, as the myriad of small parties who have little organization, inconspicuous ideologies, and murky proposals consequently created a moldable alliance system and indecipherable political game. However, there are some stable identifiable structures in recent Haitian political history.
For example, former President Préval’s platform Inité (Unity, formerly referred to as Lespwa, Hope) counting with a majority in the Senate and partly representing the Fanmi Lavalas tendency (from former elected President Aristide); and the Convention of political parties which brings together 12 political parties and represents the Fanmi Lavalas political group.
Another notable party includes the Mouvement de l’Opposition Démocratique (“Democratic Opposition Movement,” MOPOD), an opposition platform led by Mirlande Manigat, former ex-first lady before 2011 and the unfortunate candidate for the 2011 elections.
To most Haitian citizens, politics seem to be little more than an unseemly scramble by opportunistic charlatans fighting over the spoils of office. To most people, their elected political officials seem to be utterly devoid of any guiding principal, faithlessly switching allegiances overnight, and accepting alliances with the very leaders they so convincingly denounced just the day before. The political effect of this is to remove ordinary voters from the decision-making process. Given the endlessly shifting positions of all politicians, no one have any real idea about what they might be voting for.
It is within this context that the long overdue elections for the Chamber of Deputies and a third of the Senate, along with local and municipal elections, were supposed to take place this year. Initially scheduled for 2012, then 2013, and finally October 26, 2014, the elections have now been delayed once again, this time indefinitely. It is anyone’s guess when, or if they might be held at all.
President Martelly’s Pressure Led to a Legislative Blockage
On September 24, the Haitian Prime Minister, Laurent Lamothe, tried to resolve the situation, promising that “we will continue working to ensure that the elections take place as soon as possible. There … [has been a pending] law in Parliament for more than 185 days,” Prime Minister Lamothe explained, “[but it is] awaiting ratification by the Senate, where there are six […] extremists who [are] block[ing] the vote, so that the elections are not [being] held.”
The six senators are from the opposition grouping, mostly from Inite such as Jean-Baptiste Bien-Aimé (elected in the department of the North-East), Jean-Charles Moïse (elected in the department of the North), Francky Exius (elected in the department of the South), John Joël Joseph (elected in the department of the West), Westner Polycarpe (from Altenativ party and elected in the department of the North), and Jean William Jeanty (from Konba party, elected in the department of Nippes).
In the opinion of this so-called “G-6” (group of six), the presidential draft of the Electoral Law was adopted without any respect for the Constitution or the legislative process. Legislators previously proposed a first draft in 2011, but it was never ratified by President Martelly. The G-6 criticize the way the executive power by decree imposed the members of the Conseil Electoral Provisoire (Provisional Electoral Council, CEP) to be in charge of ruling the electoral process.
As The Miami Herald pointed out, “[i]n addition to the senators, several large political parties in Haiti are also opposed to the agreement and were not part of the negotiations [the so-called El Rancho Accord]. In addition to raising constitutional issues, Martelly’s opponents have also raised questions about the formation of the CEP tasked with organizing the vote”. Many feel that it is currently being controlled by the President.”
International Support to an Authoritarian Electoral Process
The Permanent Council of the OAS, weighing in on the matter, blandly and predictably called for the prompt carrying out of the overdue elections. The Permanent Council expressed its, “deep concern for the lack of progress in the electoral process” in Haiti, and urged all political stakeholders to continue dialogue and to fulfill their obligations under the Constitution. The OAS depicted the six senators as the culprits in the electoral hold up.
“The Draft Electoral Act, an essential tool for organizing these elections,” the OAS noted, “was passed on April 1 2014 by Haiti’s Chamber of Deputies and immediately transmitted to the Senate for its consideration and approval.” However, the OAS, pointed out, “no action has been taken by the Senate” on this matter. Samantha Power, US Ambassador to the UN, has echoed this outlook, noting with dismay that “a group of six senators seems intent on holding elections hostage to partisan concerns, even going so far as to prevent a debate on the electoral law.”
However, Mirlande Manigat, Haitian constitutional scholar and runner up in the 2011 presidential elections, blames President Martelly: “for three years, he refused to call elections,” she said. “A large part of this is his fault,” she added, “[and it is therefore] unfair to accuse the six senators for the crisis.”
Last year, Sandra Honoré, the head of the UN Mission to Stabilize Haiti (MINUSTAH), explained what caused the G-6 senators to unite: “Despite the executive branch’s repeated public statements in favor of holding the elections as soon as possible […] [it] had intentionally delayed the process to ensure that Parliament would become non-functional.”
Despite this, problems are much deeper regarding political governance in Haiti. The principal opposition party, Fanmi Lavalas, was not allowed to participate in past presidential elections for questionable reasons, which later led to a boycott of legislative elections. Besides the boycott, some political actors of Fanmi Lavalas ran in the last electoral race and got elected thanks to the Lespwa political platform (and joined Inite), and represent now four senators of six who oppose the actual draft of the Electoral Law.
Even with no official representation in the official bodies of the State, Fanmi Lavalas is one of the strongest platforms in the country and should be able to participate in the electoral process. The CEP should also have the support of every political party in the country, in order to avoid future electoral disputes.
Why Hold a Flawed Election?
The Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) concluded last month how the United States and other countries involved in Haiti, having done no more than making speeches each year calling for fair elections, “are now willing to accept any sort of election”, even at the cost of violating the Constitution. One of the ICG’s principle recommendations in their February 2013 report was for Haiti to seek “to develop and promote more genuinely representative, better-structured parties capable of formulating and sustaining substantive platforms and playing a more effective role in the country’s development.”
Only this, the ICG stated, would allow Haiti to achieve “truly inclusive and competitive elections.” This seems accurate. Certainly Haiti needs to hold elections, but after the fiasco in2010, with massive fraud and less than a quarter of potential voters bothering to cast ballots, it is highly doubtful that simply holding an election will resolve the long-term problems of Haitian political life. It may be impossible to have democracy without elections, but, as Haiti is proving, it is all together possible to have elections and still not have anything close to resembling democracy. What Haiti needs is a real democracy, and elections alone will not accomplish that.
The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org
December 11, 2014
Caribbeannewsnow
Wednesday, December 10, 2014
CARICOM-CUBA SUMMIT: Toward the indispensable political, economic and social integration of Latin America and the Caribbean
• Key remarks by President Raúl Castro opening the Fifth CARICOM-Cuba Summit in Havana, December 8, 2014
Honourable Gaston Alphonse Brown, Prime Minister of
Antigua and Barbuda, and Chairman of CARICOM;
Honourable Heads of State or Government of CARICOM
member countries;
His
Excellency Irwin Larocque, Secretary General of
CARICOM;
His
Excellency Mr Didacus Jules, Director General of the
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States;
His
Excellency Mr Alfonso Múnera Cavadía, Secretary
General of the Association of Caribbean States;
Allow me to extend a warm welcome and to wish you
all a pleasant stay in our country.
It
gives us great pleasure to receive here the leaders
and representatives of the Caribbean family. We
share a common history of slavery, colonialism and
struggles for freedom, independence and development,
which is the melting pot where our cultures have
merged. We also face similar challenges that can
only be met through close unity and efficient
cooperation.

Photo: Juvenal Balán
Such
is the meaning and purpose of these summits held
every three years, and aimed at fostering and
strengthening our fraternal engagement in
cooperation, solidarity and coordination to move
towards the necessary Latin American and Caribbean
integration; a dream of the forefathers of our
independence deferred for more than 200 years, and
which is today crucial to our survival.
The
successful evolution of CARICOM, the involvement of
all its member states and Cuba with the Community of
Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the
Association of Caribbean States (ACS) as well as the
participation of some of us in the Bolivarian
Alliance of the Peoples of Our America (ALBA-TCP)
and Petrocarib have helped to advance regional
integration, and we should continue working for its
consolidation.
Esteemed Heads of State or Government;
Guests;
Every year on this day we celebrate the anniversary
of the establishment of diplomatic relations with
Cuba by the first four nations of the Caribbean
Community to accede to independence.
As
comrade Fidel Castro Ruz stated at the commemoration
of the 30th anniversary of that seminal event,
“Probably, the leaders of these countries, also
considered the founding fathers of the independence
of their nations and of Caribbean integration,
–Errol Barrow from Barbados, Forbes Burnham from
Guyana, Michael Manley from Jamaica and Eric
Williams from Trinidad and Tobago—realised that
their decision to establish diplomatic relations
with Cuba was paving the way for the future foreign
policy of the Caribbean Community, which to this day
stands on three major pillars: independence, courage
and concerted action.” This statement remains fully
valid.
Forty-two years after that brave decision, we take
pride in our excellent relations with every country
in the Caribbean, and keep diplomatic missions in
every capital. And you also have diplomatic missions
in Havana; the most recent from St. Kits and Nevis
was officially opened last June 25th with our dear
friend the Very Honourable Prime Minister Denzil
Douglas in attendance.
This
moment seems fit to reaffirm that despite our
economic difficulties, and the changes undertaken to
upgrade our socioeconomic system, we will honour our
pledge to cooperate and share our modest
achievements with our sister nations in the
Caribbean.
Currently, we have 1,806 collaborators working in
the CARICOM countries, 1,461 of them in the area of
healthcare. Likewise, 4,991 Caribbean youths have
graduated in Cuba while 1,055 remain studying in the
Island.
Additionally, we are cooperating with the Caribbean,
and shall continue to do so, in preventing and
fighting the Ebola pandemic. This we are doing
bilaterally as well as in the framework of ALBA and
CELAC, with the support of the World Health
Organisation (WHO) and the Pan American Health
Organisation (PAHO).
The
experts’ meeting held in Havana at the end of
October brought together specialists from the entire
hemisphere, including representatives of
non-independent Caribbean states. In the past few
weeks, 61 officials, physicians, experts in
healthcare and other areas from CARICOMN countries
have been training in Cuba. On the other hand, we
are answering the request of nine CARICOM States to
provide Cuban assistance in training their
countries’ medical staff.
As
small island states and developing nations we are
facing the challenge of surviving and making
progress in a world shaken by a global economic
crisis manifested in the financial and energy
sectors, the environment and the food sector, deadly
diseases and war conflicts. Today, I want to
reiterate Cuba’s unwavering decision to support,
under any circumstances, the right of the small and
vulnerable countries to be accorded a special and
differential treatment in terms of access to trade
and investments.
The
challenges of the 21st century are forcing us to
unite in order to face together the effects of
climate change and natural disasters, to coordinate
our approach to the post-2015 development agenda,
and particularly, to tackle together the domination
mechanisms imposed by the unfair international
financial system.
We
join our voice to those of the Caribbean Community
in demanding the immediate removal of our nations
from unilateral lists that jeopardize our economic
development and commercial exchanges with other
countries.
Special attention is warranted by cooperation in
confronting the effects of climate change. The rise
of the sea level is threatening the very existence
of many of our countries. The more frequent
hurricanes, intensive rains and other phenomena are
causing huge economic and human damages. We are left
with no choice but to reinforce our coordination in
order to confront this reality and reduce its major
impact on water resources, coastal areas and marine
species; biological diversity, agriculture and human
settlements.
Cuba
has conducted studies of dangers, vulnerabilities
and risks and is already implementing a
macro-project named “Coastal Dangers and
Vulnerabilities 2050-2100”. These include projects
on the health condition of the coastal dunes and
mangroves as well as an evaluation of the beaches,
coastal settlements and their infrastructure; we are
willing to share this experience with our sister
nations of CARICOM.
We
have lots of work to do. As we have indicated, in
the coming three- year period, with the modest
contribution of Cuba, a Regional Arts School will be
opened in Jamaica and the Centre for Development
Stimulation of children, teenagers and youths with
special educational needs will start operating in
Guyana.
On
the other hand, more Caribbean students will be
given the opportunity to pursue a college education
in our country, especially in the area of Medicine.
We will also help in the preparation of experts from
the CARICOM countries in topics related to
mitigation and confrontation of risks of natural
disasters, and the difficult stage of recovery in
the aftermath of such events.
Likewise, we shall continue offering our fraternal
assistance in the development of human resources and
in medical care. In the same token, doctors
graduated in Cuba and working in their respective
countries will be offered the possibility of
studying a second specialty free of charge.
The
development of trade and investments between our
countries is still an unresolved issue. The
difficulties with air and maritime transportation in
the sub-region and the deterioration of our
economies as a result of the international crisis
are having a negative effect on progress in these
areas. We should work toward creative and feasible
solutions of benefit to all. In this connection, we
welcome the joint efforts to update and review the
Bilateral Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which
will provide the free access with no customs duties
of 297 products from CARICOM countries and 47 from
Cuba.
I
want to take this opportunity to reaffirm our
steadfast support for the just demand of the CARICOM
countries to be compensated by the colonial powers
for the horrors of slavery, and for their equally
fair claim to receive cooperation according to their
real situation and necessities, and not on the basis
of statistics of their per capita income that simply
characterise them as middle-income countries and
prevent their access to indispensable flows of
financial resources.
It
is our inescapable duty to support the
reconstruction and development of the sister
republic of Haiti, the birthplace of the first
revolution in Latin America and the Caribbean fought
in pursuit of independence, for we all have a debt
of gratitude with that heroic and long-suffering
people.
As I
have said on previous occasions, Cubans are deeply
grateful to our brothers and sisters in the
Caribbean for your upright stance of respect for and
solidarity with our Homeland.
We
shall never forget your enduring support to the
resolution against the blockade nor your numerous
expressions of solidarity during the debates at the
UN General Assembly and other international fora,
rejecting the illegitimate inclusion of Cuba in the
List of States Sponsors of Terrorism.
Distinguished Heads of State or Government;
Guests;
I
would like to suggest that in this 5th CARICOM-Cuba
Summit we exchange viable ideas and proposals to
continue working together to increase our bilateral
cooperation; to expand and diversify our economic
and commercial relations; to confront the challenges
imposed by the globalized, unfair and unequal world
we live in fraught with grave problems that threaten
the very existence of humankind; and, above all, to
advance with steadier steps toward the indispensable
political, economic and social integration of Latin
America and the Caribbean.
We
owe it to our peoples and such duty cannot be
postponed.
With
no further delay I declare the 5th CARICOM-Cuba
Summit officially opened.
Thank you.
December 09, 2014
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