The media in today's Bahamas...is it fair and objective or does it display a bias which seems to favor one political party over another?

The media in The Bahamas

By Philip C. Galanis
Nassau, Bahamas



I have previously written about a series of "ideal institutions" to which we should aspire as a young nation. Those included articles on the ideal nation, the ideal electorate, the ideal prime minister and the ideal leader. Each of those articles sought to identify some of the features that would differentiate the empirical from the epitome, with a view to presenting characteristics of the ideal in each case. The last in that series was an examination of the role of the Fourth Estate in our nation and addressed some of the characteristics that we should expect and even demand of the ideal media.

Recently there has been considerable commentary from many quarters of civil society about the media in today's Bahamas which is why this week we would like you to Consider This... is the media in today's Bahamas fair and objective or does it appear that the media displays a bias which seems to favor one political party over another?

The answer to this question is critically important because, as the Washington Post’s Donald Graham once observed, journalism is the “first rough draft of history.” Here in our Bahamas, in the absence of the amount of written history that most other nations have, it is the print media especially that historians of today and the future depend upon for the stories of our times. The clarity and fairness of stories carried in the media become even more urgently important as we enter what has come to be referred to as "the silly season", that is the season during which we move toward general elections.

The media immensely impacts our impressions, ideas and insights about our world. Can we ever forget that old saying “if you hear it on ZNS, it must be true”? In fact, one of the first human impulses of the day is to turn on the TV or radio to learn what has what happened overnight. We often quench our insatiable thirst for news by purchasing the morning newspapers as soon as possible. Is it any wonder that all of the newspapers in The Bahamas, without exception, are now morning dailies? It is because, in perhaps the most unconscious way, the news that we hear on the radio or TV or that we read in the newspapers with our morning coffee sets the tone for our daily lives.

We often determine what we will do in our daily lives — and how we will think about an issue — after listening to or reading that day’s media reports. If that is not powerful in a very personal way, then that word should be redefined. We are constantly seeking stimuli that impact our existence and the most common method of receiving such incentives is by means of the news.

However, it is a widely held belief that the press in The Bahamas does not always seem to have the capacity or the will to deeply research all aspects of a topic and then present it in an informed way to the public. Sadly, the reason so many of the stories that we read in the papers or hear on the radio or television sound so similar is that many reporters rely on the “copy and paste” method of journalism, taking the press releases they get and simply regurgitating them verbatim with no additional in depth unearthing of other facts that could make the story richer and more complete. Our Fourth Estate, it is very sad to say, sometimes exhibits a kind of intellectual indolence that cannot — or will not — give the public the full story on many of today’s issues.

Then there is the “brotherhood” of our media that allows one reporter to use another’s information, instead of digging up their own facts and angles. Obviously, such sharing creates not only a similarity in what is reported but it often perpetuates one point of view, complete with mistakes and biases, as opposed to allowing the public access to varying viewpoints and diverse perspectives as regards a single story.

And then there is the overarching influence of the sensational. Oftentimes, our media prefers to offer — instead of solid, fact-filled chronicles of our time — the sensational sides of those same stories, reveling in the scandalous salaciousness of the events of the day and leaving out the more mundane particulars that hover far closer to the truth than those shocking bits of sip-sip that pass for the truth in our modern Bahamas. The average Bahamian would be surprised to learn how many of the “solid” news stories that form the headlines of the day originate not from the newsmakers but from those who hover on the periphery of those well known lives, people like a Minister’s driver or someone who passed along a tasty tidbit heard in a barber shop.

We recently read the Wikileaks disclosures which chronicled the sentiments that operatives in the United States Embassy here share about some of our politicians. The newspaper that printed those stories insists that they are only reporting on what was contained in "confidential missives" from the Embassy and that they have not distorted those views, although sometimes distortion can result from the simple decision of using one part of a story over another. While we accept that editorial position of the newspaper, it is equally important that the right balance is struck in the reporting of those stories.

We do not believe, as some do, that there is a pernicious conspiracy by that daily to undermine or to denigrate one particular political party. We are not so sure that the same can be said of some of the other newspapers. Nor do we ever believe that we should kill the messenger because of the message that is delivered. However, a discerning public demands and should demand that a balance should prevail in the reporting of such stories.

The question that really needs to be asked is why Wikileaks chose to disclose only these more recent cables when so much of our present day events were supposedly shaped by events that allegedly took place back in the 1980s and 1990s that deserve to come to light. Whose decision was it to access only these more recent cables, once again telling only a part of the story of the relationship of Bahamian officials with emissaries of the government of the United States.

As we approach another political campaign, one that will be undoubtedly fiercely fought, it is vitally important for the media to be balanced, to present the news in an uncensored, unadulterated manner. It is critically important that, because of the vital role that the media plays in shaping public opinion, all reporting be fair and balanced and, most important, inclusive of all sides and all facts, no matter the work involved in uncovering them. It is only in this way that the electorate will be able to objectively determine the truth of the matter, free of biased and skewed reporting, enabling Bahamians to make an informed decision about the merits or demerits of a story. Every member of the media should remember that a story with some of the facts left out is as damaging as a story with incorrect information.

The job of the media is not for the faint of heart. They are the men and women who wield what is probably the most powerful weapon ever invented, giving truth every day to the saying that the “pen is mightier than the sword.” As Adolf Hitler's Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels said: “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.” So, should that weapon spread lies or even half-truths, considerable and lasting harm can be done to people, to societies and to nations. But when members of the media do their job, live up to their calling, exercise discernment and freely tell every part of a story, the truth creates a free people and a great nation.

Philip C. Galanis is the managing partner of HLB Galanis & Co., Chartered Accountants, Forensic & Litigation Support Services. He served 15 years in Parliament. Please send your comments to pgalanis@gmail.com

Jun 06, 2011

thenassauguardian

Bahamas: An “underground prostitution ring” and homosexual relations between males present the biggest challenges in The Bahamas’ fight against HIV/AIDS...

Minnis: HIV/AIDS fight challenged by prositution, homosexuality

BY KRYSTEL ROLLE
Guardian Staff Reporter
thenassauguardian
krystel@nasguard.com



An “underground prostitution ring” and homosexual relations between males present the biggest challenges in the country’s fight against HIV/AIDS, according to Health Minister Dr. Hubert Minnis.

“The only challenge we find now is that there is the male to male sex relations - we have to deal with that,” Minnis said. “And there is the hidden or underground prostitution. Prostitution is illegal but there is an underground ring that occurs. Therefore we have to aggressively try to determine where they are and deal with those approximately. So education is key.”

According to the minister, up to December 31, 2010 The Bahamas had a total number of 12,095 HIV infections, of which 6,335 cases were AIDS and 5,760 were HIV positive.

“That’s the accumulative total. Of the 12,095 infections 4,333 occurred in young adults between the ages of 15 and 44 and the male-to-female ration with HIV is 1 to 1.1.”

“I also want to point out that at the end of December 2009, 2,152 were receiving antiviral medication at no cost to them,” said Minnis who did not have last year’s figures.

Minnis said while the fight against AIDS remains an uphill battle, the ministry has had some successes.

“When we look at mother-to-child transmission, there was a 30 percent transmission rate in 1995. In 2006 we brought that down to two percent. I’m happy to announce that in 2010 we had no cases of mother-to-child transmission. The treatment is working [well],” Dr. Minnis said.

He credited the hard-working staff of the HIV/AIDS associations across The Bahamas.

“I think they are doing an excellent job in combating and fighting AIDS,” said Minnis. “The staff is doing an excellent job and of course the goal going into the UN meeting next week is to move towards zero.”

Minnis added that the government received assistance from the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) agreement it has with United States.

The Bahamas is one of 12 Caribbean countries that receive monetary grants from the United States to fight the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. Under the agreements the countries share $25 million annually.

Jun 06, 2011

thenassauguardian

New WikiLeaked Cables Reveal How Washington and Big Oil Fought PetroCaribe in Haiti

By Haiti Liberti

René Préval, who passed Haiti’s presidential sash to Joseph Michel Martelly on May 14, was described by U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Janet Sanderson as “Haiti’s indispensable man” in a Jun. 1, 2009 Embassy cable released by WikiLeaks last December.

Sanderson judged him “still moderately popular, and likely the only politician capable of imposing his will on Haiti - if so inclined.” At the same time,“dealing with Préval is a challenge, occasionally frustrating and sometimes rewarding,” she continued. “He is wary of change and suspicious of outsiders, even those who seek his success.”

Préval’s suspicions about “outsiders” seeking his “success” turned out to be justified. In two rounds of presidential and legislative elections held in November and March, Washington aggressively intervened, pushing out of the presidential run-off Jude Célestin, the candidate of Préval’s party Inite (Unity), to replace him with Martelly, a neo-Duvalierist konpa singer who vocally supported the 1991 and 2004 coups d’état against former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Now the U.S. has even challenged the legislative races which would have given Inite virtual control of the Parliament, and hence approval of the President-designated Prime Minister, Haiti’s most powerful executive post. With U.S. support, challenges were brought against Inite victories in 17 Deputy and two Senate races. The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) ruled in favor of only 15 challenges, leaving four seats with the original Inite winners. The U.S. is not even letting this mild, partial impertinence go, yanking the U.S. travel visas of six of the CEP’s eight members.

How did Haiti’s “indispensable man” become so dispensable? Why has Washington so brazenly intervened in Haiti’s elections to limit the power of Préval’s party and oust Inite’s presidential candidate from the run-off?

Clues to the answer lie in secret U.S. Embassy cables which the transparency- advocacy group WikiLeaks has provided to Haïti Liberté. The cables reveal that the U.S. was primarily irked by Préval’s dealings with Cuba and Venezuela, where the former Haitian president was unable “to resist displaying some show of independence or contrariness in dealing with [Venezuelan president Hugo] Chavez,” as Sanderson griped in a 2007 cable.

U.S. dismay began when Préval signed – the very day of his inauguration – a deal to join Venezuela’s PetroCaribe alliance, under which Haiti would buy oil paying only 60% to Venezuela up front with the remainder payable over 25 years at 1% interest. The leaked U.S. Embassy cables provide a fascinating look at how Washington sought to discourage, scuttle and sabotage the PetroCaribe deal despite its unquestionable benefits, under which the Haitian government “ would save USD 100 million per year from the delayed payments,” as the Embassy itself recognized in a 2006 cable.

A review of PetroCaribe’s genesis and the Embassy’s response to it provides a window into understanding why the U.S. has been so forceful in backing the U.S.-centric Martelly team over Préval’s two-timing sector.

 Venezuelan Trial Balloon Shot Down

Venezuela first offered a Petro- Caribe deal to Haiti under the de facto government of Prime Minister Gérard Latortue, whom Washington installed in March 2004 after the Feb. 29 coup against Aristide.“The government of Venezuela planned to send a negotiating team to Haiti (exact time undetermined) to negotiate a deal to sell oil at a preferential rate via PetroCaribe,” Embassy Chargé d’affaires Timothy Carney (the Charge) reported in an Oct. 19, 2005 cable. “Upon returning from a recent trip to Venezuela, Minister of Culture and Communication, Magali Comeau Denis told the Charge she was bringing Venezuelan oil back to Haiti with her.”

Prior to that trip, Carney “and Econ Counselor [his economic counselor] had spoken to acting Prime Minister Henri Bazin who said that the Interim Government of Haiti [IGOH] was looking for concessional terms for oil purchases from Mexico and Nigeria --but not Venezuela, he was quick to emphasize,” Carney continued. “In a follow-up conversation, Charge reiterated the negatives of such a deal with Venezuela. Bazin listened and understood the message,” that Washington would be unhappy about any oil deal with Venezuela.

To drive the point home, “Econ Counselor met with a contact at the Finance Ministry October 13 who confirmed that the IGOH has no plans to participate in any PetroCaribe deal,” Carney explained. “He added that our message to Bazin had an impact: Bazin had seen a draft of comments to be made by Haiti’s representative to the IMF [International Monetary Fund] that included a vague reference to someday purchasing oil at concessional prices from Venezuela, and Bazin had the sentence deleted, the only change he made on the text.” This was the kind of ultra-servile response Washington expected from a puppet regime in Haiti.

But Carney understood that Venezuela had not really expected to strike a deal with Latortue’s de facto government.“We suspect that the recent efforts by Venezuela here are designed more to get the issue on the agenda, and that Chavez’s strongest efforts will come after the elections, when a new Haitian government is inaugurated in February 2006,” Carney concluded.

In a Nov. 7, 2005 cable, Carney noted that “the pressure is still on the IGOH to strike a deal with Venezuela” as“organizations that have organized demonstrations in the past against high prices in Haiti have publicly called on the IGOH to accept Venezuela’s offer to negotiate on a concessional deal.” However Bazin reassured the Embassy that “Haiti was far from any agreement with Venezuela” and “instead discussions were ongoing with the Government of Mexico to obtain a special deal from them on petroleum imports.” (Dominican Foreign Minister Morales Troncoso told the DR’s U.S. Ambassador and visiting Western Hemisphere Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary Patrick Duddy that “President Fox of Mexico was proposing a ‘Plan Puebla Panama’ to counter Chavez’s ‘Petrocaribe’,” reported a Jan. 23, 2006 cable from the Santo Domingo Embassy.)

As Préval Comes In, Troubles Emerge

Haiti’s presidential election did not take place until Feb. 7, 2006, and it was won by René Préval. Even before his May 14, 2006 inauguration, Préval clearly was anxious to allay Washington’s worries that he might lean towards its South American challengers. “He wants to bury once and for all the suspicion in Haiti that the United States is wary of him,” Ambassador Sanderson, then newly appointed, reported in a Mar. 26, 2006 cable. “He is seeking to enhance his status domestically and internationally with a successful visit to the United States.” This was so important that “Préval has declined invitations to visit France, Cuba, and Venezuela in order to visit Washington first,” Sanderson approvingly noted.

The new Haitian president went to great lengths to dispel the notion that he had any political sympathies for Latin America’s socialist regimes. “Préval has close personal ties to Cuba, having received prostate cancer treatment there, but has stressed to the Embassy that he will manage relations with Cuba and Venezuela solely for the benefit of the Haitian people, and not based on any ideological affinity toward those governments.”

But in April, shortly after his Washington visit, Préval traveled to Havana; the result confirmed Washington’s fears.“President-elect Préval announced to the press April 18 that Haiti will soon join Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s energy initiative, PetroCaribe,” Sanderson reported in an April 19, 2006 cable. “Préval made the announcement after returning from a five-day trip to Cuba, where he discussed the subject of Petrocaribe with the Venezuelan Ambassador to Cuba.” But Sanderson made clear that the Embassy – her Post – would not give up without a fight.

“Post will continue to pressure Préval against joining PetroCaribe,” she wrote. “Ambassador will see Préval’s senior advisor Bob Manuel today. In previous meetings, he has acknowledged our concerns and is aware that a deal with Chavez would cause problems with us.”

In a cable nine days later, Sanderson recognized that Préval was under “increasing pressure to produce immediate and tangible changes in Haiti’s desperate situation.” She also noted that “Préval has privately expressed some disdain toward Chavez with Emboffs [Embassy officials], and delayed accepting Chavez’ offer to visit Venezuela until after he had visited Washington and several other key Haitian partners. Nevertheless, the chance to score political points [with the Haitian people] and generate revenue he can control himself proved too good an opportunity to miss.”

Embassy cables always flag “independence” as this one decried Préval’s being able to “generate revenue he can control himself .” Sanderson went on to warn that Préval could “redirect the 40% that would have been spent on fuel to ‘special presidential’ development projects” and “we are wary of the creation of a special presidential fund.... We will encourage Préval to channel the money through existing programs,” meaning those which the State Department’s U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had funded and therefore controlled.

In April 2006 cable, we see Sanderson hint at an observation that she would make almost a year later, that “Préval and company may be overselling their irritation toward Chavez for our benefit, but Préval has consistently voiced wariness of Chavez in conversations with Emboffs going back to the early stages of the presidential campaign in 2005.”

On the surface, Préval feigned ignorance of the hemispheric conflict between the U.S. and Venezuela. “One journalist asked Préval when he returned from Caracas if there would be ‘consequences’ for Haiti building links with Venezuela, which Washington increasingly sees as a regional threat,” wrote the weekly Haïti Progrés in May 2006. “‘The problems between the United States and Venezuela are problems that those two countries have to resolve themselves,’ Préval responded. ‘It does not affect Haiti in any way.’”

This was obviously untrue. In a May 15, 2006 cable reviewing the now inaugurated president, Sanderson noted that “despite U.S. discomfort with his links to Cuba and Venezuela, Préval seems determined to mine those relationships for what he can obtain.” This “pragmatism,” as she called it, would become the nub of U.S. dissatisfaction with Préval.

Big Oil Fights PetroCaribe in Haiti

On May 14, 2006, immediately after his inauguration, Préval summoned the press to a room in the Palace where he ostensibly signed the Petro-Caribe agreement with Venezuelan Vice President Jose Vincente Rangel (“Apparently, the signing... at the inauguration on May 14 was ceremonial... and the first shipment was a grant, not a part of the loan agreement,” Sanderson wrote later in an August cable.)

But it would be almost two years before PetroCaribe oil would begin flowing into Haiti, due to a myriad of political and logistical obstacles. The first hurdle was that Venezuela needed to give the petroleum to a state-owned oil company, which Haiti doesn’t have. So it was proposed that the oil be given to Electricité d’Haïti (EDH), the state-owned power company.

Michel Guerrier, the director of Haiti’s only domestic oil distribution company, Dinasa or National (which is owned by Haiti’s richest man, Gilbert Bigio), told the Embassy’s Economic Officer “one possibility is that PetroCaribe will sell the oil to Haiti’s National Electricity Company ... which will then sell to the four oil companies operating in Haiti: Texaco, Esso (a.k.a. Exxon), National (formally Shell), and [French-owned] Total,” explains a May 12, 2006 cable. Guerrier also said that PetroCaribe “is a great deal for the Haitian government” and “speculated that the government, in order to retain total control over the supply of the oil market (they already control the price), may put an end to the non- PetroCaribe oil-bearing ship which arrives every three weeks.”

Sanderson predictably opposed to the idea, calling EDH “an inefficient and corrupt public entity” while recognizing that “filtering oil through EDH could ensure enough fuel to power the electricity plants, without relying on the oil companies as a costly back-up plan.” Not surprisingly, all three foreign oil companies also opposed the Haitian government’s plan. Sanderson reported in a May 17, 2006 cable that “Dinasa, which supplies to Haiti’s domestic oil company, National, is the only voice in the oil business to endorse Préval’s proposal to have EDH control the oil supply. The other international oil companies are increasingly concerned -- both Texaco and Esso will meet with the Ambassador in the near future -- that they will have to buy their oil from the GOH [Government of Haiti].” On behalf of the oil companies and against the obvious benefits for Haiti, Sanderson said “we will continue to raise our concerns about the Petro- Caribe deal with the highest levels of government...”

In a June 1 cable, Sanderson reported that “Haitians have noted... that electricity in Port-au-Prince has improved since Préval’s inauguration with 6 to 8 hours a day, usually late at night until morning in residential areas,” but the Embassy continued to oppose the Venezuelan oil delivery.

In a July 7 cable, she said that Dinasa President Edouard Baussan told her that “the three international oil companies in Haiti feel uninformed about Haiti’s PetroCaribe plan and are wary of how PetroCaribe will affect their operations.” Baussan did not know that “separately, the Ambassador met with representatives of ExxonMobil and Texaco [owned by Chevron],” as Sanderson explained to Washington. “Both companies were concerned and curious about how Préval planned to implement Petro- Caribe.” Sanderson finished with some wishful thinking: “PetroCaribe seems stalled indefinitely, and it is possible that Haiti will not move forward with the agreement. The first and so far only ship, which was a minor victory for Venezuela’s Caribbean campaign and a tangible sign from Préval to his constituents that he will bring change, may mark both the beginning and the end of PetroCaribe in Haiti.”

Venezuelan Oil Starts to Flow

However, it was not to be the end, as the Embassy was to quickly learn. Three weeks later, on July 28, Sanderson had to write that “the Petro- Caribe petroleum ... has finally hit the local market. The Haitian Government (GOH) is selling the entire shipment, including the diesel (initially intended as a donation to the national electricity company) and the gasoline, at the same price as petroleum from a July 14 [oil] industry ship. (Note: The industry shipment arrives about every two to three weeks. Due to regular arrivals, petroleum companies have not experienced fuel shortages in several months. End note.) So far Dinasa, Haiti's domestic petroleum company, and Total, the French petroleum company with which the GOH has close relations, have expressed an interest in purchasing the PetroCaribe petroleum from the GOH. The two U.S. companies, Esso (ExxonMobil) and Texaco (Chevron), have received the proposal but have not responded."

Three days later, Sanderson added an SBU: Sensitive but Unclassified Information. "The GOH continues to misconstrue the actual benefits of the PetroCaribe deal," she condescendingly complained. "Ambassador has personally addressed the issue of PetroCaribe with GOH officials at the highest level explaining the pitfalls of the agreement... they do not have a state-owned oil company; they lack adequate port and storage facilities, necessitating use of private storage; and poorly-maintained roads and theft make transportation from the port to the final destination point difficult. Post has also reminded GOH officials that the transportation of PetroCaribe petroleum is not insured by Venezuela, and is often transported in ships which do not meet international standards." But, with her usual desire to highlight Préval’s amenability, she concluded that "finally, the GOH has stated that the international oil companies operating in Haiti are vital to the economy and does not want to risk pushing them out of the local market."

One month later, on August 25, 2006, Embassy Chargé d'Affaires Thomas C. Tighe wrote a cable that the Haitian Parliament was studying and likely to ratify the PetroCaribe agreement "because of the seemingly huge benefit to Haiti" and "PetroCaribe provides easy access to extra cash." In the same cable, he provides an SBU that "Public Works Minister Frantz Verella confirmed the arrival of a Venezuelan shipment of 10,000 barrels of asphalt. The GOH is having the same problems with the asphalt that they had with first shipment of petroleum: they are not sure how to transport the asphalt to its final destination and have no place for its storage." Haiti, which has some of the world’s worst roads, ended up selling the asphalt to the Dominican Republic, according to a May 24, 2007 cable.

PetroCaribe Ratified Unanimously

In an August 30, 2006 cable, Tighe reported that "Parliament ratified the PetroCaribe agreement during a session of the national assembly [Aug. 29], which included 19 of 27 senators and 47 of 88 deputies. 53 voted in favor and 13 abstained; no parliamentarians voted against ratification." He also noted that "because Haiti has a relatively low petroleum demand -- around 11,000 barrels per day -- and PetroCaribe has offered to supply up to 6000 barrels per day, the agreement could have a considerable effect on the petroleum industry in Haiti."

After ratification, "the international oil companies were shocked" when "President René Préval and finance minister Daniel Dorsainvil informed the four oil companies operating in Haiti of intentions to meet 100% of Haiti's petroleum demand through its Petrocaribe agreement," we learn in an Oct. 4, 2006 cable. "They thought they would still have the right to import their own oil, with PetroCaribe supplying only part of Haiti's petroleum demand," Sanderson explained, and only Dinasa "was not surprised."

Christian Porter, ExxonMobil’s country manager, "speaking for both ExxonMobil and Chevron, stressed that they would not be willing to do this because they would lose their off-shore margins and because of Petrocaribe's unreliable reputation" for timely deliveries, Sanderson wrote. She concluded that it was a "dubious proposal that neither the U.S. oil companies in Haiti -- responsible for about 45 percent of Haiti's petroleum imports -- nor Venezuela, for that matter, is likely to agree to."

She was wrong about Venezuela, but right about the oil companies. An October 13 cable explains that ExxonMobil and Texaco/Chevron were "shocked " but hadn’t "informed the government of their concerns," to which Sanderson "encouraged the two companies to do so."

Sanderson reiterated that despite her "numerous attempts to discuss (and discourage) GOH intentions to move forward with the Petrocaribe agreement, the GOH insists the agreement, implemented in full, will result in a net gain for Haiti."

The U.S. Ambassador also detailed how the oil companies, with her encouragement, were sabotaging the agreement: "Following Préval's September 27 meeting with all four oil companies... the oil industry association (Association des Professionals du Pétrole -- APP) received an invitation to meet with representatives of the Venezuelan oil company who were in Haiti. All four companies refused to attend. Also, the companies received letters separately requesting information on importation and distribution from the GOH on October 9. So far, no one has responded."

The oil companies also complained "that a Cuban transport company, Transalba, will ship the petroleum from Venezuela to Haiti, and that as U.S. companies, they would not be allowed to work directly with the Cuban vessel."

Sanderson concluded the long October 13 cable by reminding that she had stressed "the larger negative message that [the PetroCaribe deal] would send to the international community [i.e. Washington and its allies] at a time when the GOH is trying to increase foreign investment" lamenting that "President Préval and his inner circle are seduced by [PetroCaribe’s] payment plan."

The Oil Companies and U.S. Embassy Dig In

With ratification and a state enterprise to receive the oil, Préval thought he now had everything in place to get PetroCaribe implemented in early 2007. But the oil companies still had ways to undermine the deal.

Préval appointed Michael Lecorps to head the government’s Monetization Office for Aid and Development Programs (formally known as the PL-480 office), which would handle PetroCaribe matters rather than EDH. Lecorps told the oil companies that they would have to purchase PetroCaribe oil from the Haitian government, but the U.S. companies said no. Quickly, there was a stand-off.

Lecorps, "apparently infuriated by Chevron's lack of cooperation with the GoH, stressed that Petrocaribe is no longer negotiable," Tighe reports in a Jan. 18, 2007 cable. He also learned that "ExxonMobil has made it clear that it will not cooperate with the current GoH proposal either."

"Chevron country manager Patryck Peru Dumesnil confirmed his company's anti-Petrocaribe position and said that ExxonMobil, the only other U.S. oil company operating in Haiti, has told the GoH that it will not import Petrocaribe products." Lecorps told the Embassy Political Officer that Chevron "refused to move forward with the discussions because ‘their representatives would rather import their own petroleum products.’" Tighe continued that "Lecorps was enraged that ‘an oil company which controls only 30% of Haiti's petroleum products’ would have the audacity to try and elude an agreement that would benefit the Haitian population. Ultimately Lecorps defended his position with the argument that the companies should want what is best for their local consumer, and be willing to make concessions to the GoH to this end. Lecorps stressed that the GoH would not be held hostage to ‘capitalist attitudes’ toward Petrocaribe and that if the GoH could not find a compromise with certain oil companies, the companies may have to leave Haiti." Needless to say, the Embassy took a dim view of Lecorps’ attitude.

Tighe reported that "according to Dumesnil, ExxonMobil and Chevron have told the GoH that neither company can work within the GoH's proposed framework to import 100% of petroleum products via Petrocaribe" and that "together, ExxonMobil and Chevron supply 49% of all oil products in Haiti." He explained that "the U.S. companies stand together in opposition to the current proposal" while the French concern "Total is discussing the agreement but has not promised cooperation; and the only local company, Dinasa, has pledged cooperation."

Tighe noted that Lecorps and other Haitian officials "focused primarily on the cost benefits (estimated to be USD 100 million per year) to the GoH, which would be used for social projects like schools and hospitals" and that in discussing the U.S. oil companies’ intransigence, "Lecorps' self-control wavered."

Enter Hugo Chavez

In a Feb. 7, 2007 cable, Ambassador Sanderson reports that the Embassy learned from the Haitian media on Feb. 2 "that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez planned to visit Haiti as early as the following week." She recalled that in March, 2006, prior to his inauguration, "President Préval told visiting [Western Hemisphere Affairs Assistant Secretary of State] WHA A/S Shannon that Chavez was pushing a visit to commemorate the bicentennial of Venezuelan flag day on March 12 in Jacmel" but that "Préval told A/S Shannon he would do his best to avoid Chavez, and the visit did not occur. Since Préval's inauguration, however, Haitian-Venezuelan relations have warmed considerably... Haitian officials report that Chavez continues to aggressively court Haiti."

Indeed, Hugo Chavez arrived in Haiti on Mar. 12, 2007 to an unorganized, spontaneous hero’s welcome by tens of thousands of Haitians, who jogged alongside his motorcade to the Palace from the airport. And the Venezuelan president came bearing many gifts.

First, Chavez pledged a $20 million grant, which he had announced in Venezuela a week earlier. "Reportedly, the money will serve as humanitarian reserve fund for Haiti in order to back social, infrastructure and power-supply programs," Sanderson noted in a Mar. 13 cable.

Next, Venezuelan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Rodolfo Sanz had in January "announced a Venezuelan donation of five garbage trucks and one tanker as part of ‘operation pure air for Haiti,’ which he attributed to Chavez' earlier remarks to GoH officials that Venezuela owed a ‘historic debt to Haiti,’"Sanderson had noted in a February cable. Chavez "re-announced his donations of garbage trucks to Haiti," Sanderson’s Mar. 13 cable reported.

Thirdly, "the Venezuela president said he would augment the amount of fuel Haiti will receive through PetroCaribe from 5,000 barrels [in reality, 6,000] a day to 14,000 barrels," Sanderson continued, surpassing Haiti’s daily fuel consumption of 11,000 barrels.

Finally, the icing on the cake: "Venezuela pledged funds for improvement to provincial Haitian airports and airport runways (also previously announced) and experts on economic planning to help identify development priorities. Other pledges include Cuban commitment to bring medical coverage to all Haitian communes, Cuban and Venezuelan electrical experts to improve energy generation, and a trilateral cooperation bureau in Port-au-Prince," Sanderson wrote.

Somehow, Sanderson had to give all this good news a negative spin. She did so with her SBU "Comment" at the cable’s end: "[Former long-time USAID employee and now presidential economic counselor] Gabriel Verret, one of Préval's closest advisors, told the Ambassador that the trip could have been worse. The GoH stopped a rally that was supposed to take place in favor of Chavez and tried to limit Chavez' speaking time at the press conference. While waiting at the airport, Verret had let the Ambassador know that he (and presumably the President) were frustrated with Chavez' late arrival. Overall, disorganization and last-minute planning were evident, and even the pledges of aid and assistance are either old news or vague. GoH officials have complained to post privately in the past that Venezuelan aid can be a burden [on] the GoH..."

But Sanderson’s real vitriol would come in her next cable on Mar. 16. She was beginning to suspect (and imply) that the Haitians were feeding her Embassy negative reports about Chavez disingenuously, but she wanted Washington to be the final judge. "To hear President Rene Préval tell it, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' visit to Haiti on March 12 was a logistical nightmare and an annoyance to the GoH," Sanderson begins the "Summary" of that cable. "Préval told Ambassador and others that he is skeptical of Chavez's promises, especially on delivery of gasoline through the Petrocaribe agreement. Secretary General of the Presidency Fritz Longchamps told Polcouns that the GoH viewed the Chavez visit as the price to pay for whatever assistance Venezuela provides to Haiti."

Sanderson highlighted the Haitian government’s negative feedback. "Préval told Ambassador the evening of March 13 that Chavez was a difficult guest" and "did not have a GOH invitation but insisted on coming to mark Venezuelan flag day." Préval then did his best to smooth Sanderson’s ruffled feathers. "Responding to Ambassador's observation that giving Chavez a platform to spout anti-American slogans here was hard to explain given our close relationship and support of Haiti and of Préval's government in particular, Préval stressed that he had worked hard to stop much of Chavez' proposed grandstanding," Sanderson wrote. "He vetoed a Chavez-led procession/demonstration from the airport to the Venezuelan Embassy (substituting a wreath laying at Port-au-Prince's monument to Bolivar) and limited the length of the press conference. Chavez, for his part, insisted that the press conference proceed as scheduled, thus cutting into bilateral meeting time. Préval added that he, Préval, is ‘just an independent petit bourgeoisie’ and doesn't go for the grand gestures that Chavez favors. Haiti needs aid from all its friends, Préval added, and he is sure that the US understands his difficult position."

Préval then addressed the massive show of support Chavez received. "He refused to get out of the car when Chavez insisted on greeting his demonstrators in the street on his way in from the airport," Sanderson relayed. "Préval and others in the government believe that the Venezuelan Charge d'Affaires orchestrated and paid for the demonstrations by Fanmi Lavalas militants at the airport, the Venezuelan Embassy, and the Palace, which numbered roughly 1,000 and also called for the return of former President Aristide." (This absurd account, whether concocted for Washington’s benefit or not, is scoffed at by several popular organization leaders who joined with thousands in the rapidly organized and largely spontaneous unpaid outpouring that day, similar to the human flood which greeted Aristide’s return to Haiti on Mar. 18, 2011.)

But despite the complaints of Haitian officials, Sanderson speculates that "Préval and company may be overselling their irritation toward Chavez for our benefit... It is clear that the visit has left a bad taste in our interlocutors' mouths and they are now into damage control."

So Sanderson felt compelled to read the Haitians the riot act. "The Ambassador and Polcouns have voiced concern to senior officials that Chavez had used his visit as a platform for an attack on Haiti's closest and steadiest bilateral ally, most recently with [Prime Minister Jacques Edouard] Alexis yesterday," she wrote, ending characteristically on a rationalizing note: "At no time has Préval given any indication that he is interested in associating Haiti with Chavez's broader ‘revolutionary agenda’" but "it is neither in his character -- nor in his calculation -- to repudiate Chavez, even as the Venezuelan abuses his hospitality at home."

Préval Continues to Play "Oblivious"...

Despite his hand-wringing and Sanderson’s scoldings, Préval kept angering the Americans. On April 26, 2007, Longchamps told the Embassy’s Political Counselor that "Préval will attend the ALBA [Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas] summit in Venezuela as a ‘special observer’ for the express purpose of finalizing a tri-lateral assistance agreement between Haiti, Venezuela, and Cuba, whereby Venezuela will finance the presence of Cuban doctors and other technicians in rural Haiti," wrote Sanderson in a cable the same day. "Longchamps expressed surprise that the USG [U.S. Government] would take issue with Préval's attendance at this meeting." Longchamps reminded the Polcouns "how President Préval had curtailed Chavez' activities during the visit and how uncomfortable Chavez' behavior had made everyone during his stay." Unimpressed, "Polcouns replied that though that may have been the case, for the USG, the net result was that President Préval gave Chavez another platform from which to attack the United States and then saw him off from the airport," and that Washington "did not understand why he continued to participate in fora where Chavez vilified Haiti's most important and reliable bi-lateral partner. USG officials would ask President Préval this question during his upcoming trip to Washington in May."

Sanderson said the meeting was "specifically to raise our displeasure with Préval's Venezuela trip" and that "Longchamps’ reaction probably reflects Préval's own obliviousness to the impact and consequences his accommodation of Chavez has on relations with us." Longchamps "betrayed a common trait among Haitian officials in misjudging the relative importance that U.S. policy makers attach to Haiti versus Venezuela and Chavez' regional impact." Sanderson suggested the U.S. "convey our discontent with Préval's actions at the highest possible level when he next visits Washington."

...While Getting More Aid from Venezuela

Préval returned from Caracas with "Chavez' promises to provide a combined total of 160 megawatts of electricity" to Haiti, after "parading with Chavez' rogues gallery of ALBA leaders," Sanderson fumes in a May 4, 2007 cable.

She outlined the essence of the Venezuelan/Cuban aid package: "The Cubans will replace two million light bulbs throughout Port-au-Prince with low-energy bulbs. The initiative will cost USD four million, but save the country 60 megawatts of electricity, which costs the country USD 70 million annually. Venezuela promised to repair the power plant in Carrefour, generating an additional 40 megawatts of electricity. Additionally, Venezuela will by December of this year build new power plants across the country to add 30 megawatts to Port-au-Prince's electrical grid and 15 additional megawatts each for Gonaïves and Cap-Haitian, all of which will use heavy Venezuelan fuel oil, a more efficient and less-expensive alternative to diesel." Venezuela did carry through on all these "extravagant promises and commitments," as Sanderson called them. Chavez also "promised to build a petrochemical complex, a natural gas plant, and an oil refinery to refine the crude sent from Venezuela." Those are still under construction but almost finished.

On May 4, Sanderson sent a second cable explaining that Lecorps "gave the four oil companies operating in Haiti until July 1 to sign the GoH contract on Petrocaribe," hoping that they "will sign the agreement voluntarily, instead of passing legislation obliging oil companies operating in Haiti to participate in the Petrocaribe agreement." After talking to ExxonMobil Caribbean Sales Manager Bill Eisner, the Embassy reported that Eisner "was shocked when he realized that Lecorps expected the oil industry to coordinate the PetroCaribe deal on behalf of the GoH" which would "make the oil industry prisoner to two incompetent governments," Haiti and Venezuela, in Sanderson’s words.

Meanwhile, Préval continued trying to bluff Sanderson that things were not so rosy with the Venezuelans, this time sending Senate President Joseph Lambert to deliver the spin. Lambert "described a ‘very tense’ atmosphere behind the scenes of the ALBA summit between President Préval and President Chavez in a meeting with Embassy staff on May 4," Sanderson’s Public Affairs Officer James Ellickson-Brown reported in a May 7 cable. "According to Lambert, Préval refused to join ALBA and told Chavez that if ALBA membership were a condition for Venezuelan aid, he would leave the summit," he wrote. "Lambert added that Préval and Chavez also clashed over drug-trafficking, diplomatic representation, what to wear to the summit's closing ceremony (Chavez wanted everyone in red), and the terms of the energy agreement Chavez offered Haiti." Lambert said that "Préval would never do anything to compromise relations with his ‘friends to the North’" and that Chavez "complained that for all the he gives to Haiti, the Haitians give nothing in return." Lambert trumpeted that "Préval's resistance to signing the ALBA accords so upset Chavez that the Cubans tried to get Préval to play along," but "Préval stood firm, in the end agreeing only to a ‘very general’ cooperation agreement."

The Americans clearly felt Lambert’s report was a little fishy, prompting the Political Counselor to ask "why Préval had not shared some of this with the Ambassador during their meeting," Ellickson-Brown wrote. "Lambert replied that Préval would be uncomfortable revealing details regarding such a sensitive subject."

Despite the Embassy’s misgivings, Sanderson chose to take Lambert at his word when reporting to Washington on May 24, just prior to Préval’s trip there to meet President Bush. She said that Préval "appears to be losing patience: Lambert told Emboffs [Embassy officers] that Préval took an anti-ALBA stance during private meetings with Chavez at the ALBA summit in April, telling Chavez he can keep his aid if ALBA membership is a condition."She judged that Préval was coming to the realization that "seeing is believing when it comes to promises from Venezuela, and Chavez' words are empty until he arrives with cash in hand."

Perhaps this generous appraisal explains why Bush administration officials were so nice to their wayward ally when Préval visited Washington a few days later. "Préval was very pleased with the reception he received from President Bush, Secretary Rice, other USG officials and members of Congress," Sanderson reported in a May 29 cable, and he "was neither surprised nor taken aback by President Bush's concerns regarding Haitian-Venezuelan relations." Nonetheless, "Préval's visit appears to have underlined for the delegation the importance of the Haiti-U.S. partnership and their need to cultivate Washington decision-makers," Sanderson reported, while expressing "hope that President Bush's clear message on Venezuela sank in, but only time will tell."

"Stonewalling" of PetroCaribe Continues

Two weeks after Préval’s return, a transport strike on June 12 and 13, 2007 "gripped Haiti's major cities and underscored a mounting crisis over fuel prices, which rose nearly 20% in just two weeks," the IPS reported. Many in Haiti believed that Haiti’s joining PetroCaribe "would alleviate high gasoline costs," and word was leaking out that "the two large US oil companies that export to Haiti are said to have stonewalled negotiations" for PetroCaribe’s implementation. The July 1 deadline for PetroCaribe compliance was fast approaching.

"Negotiations between the GOH and fuel vendors operating in Haiti to implement the PetroCaribe agreement with Venezuela remain stalled," Ambassador Sanderson begins a Jul. 20 cable. Oil company "representatives seem to accept that the government may eventually force them to accept PetroCaribe terms, but in the near term, they appear to hold most of the negotiating cards" because "in light of Haiti's weak infrastructure and precarious distribution system, the departure of any of the four companies from the market could severely disrupt the supply of gasoline throughout the country."

The stand-off over PetroCaribe would continue throughout the rest of 2007 with Chevron the most resistant to working within the PetroCaribe framework. But Haiti needed Chevron to ship the oil from Venezuela.

"It was ridiculous because they had been buying and shipping petroleum products from Venezuela for 25 years," said Michael Lecorps when asked by Haïti Liberté last week why Chevron put up such a fight. "And you know, Chevron is an American company, so maybe there were some politics behind that too, maybe because of Venezuela and Chavez. But they never said anything about that."

Indeed, the cables suggest that Lecorps’ suspicions that Chevron had a political beef are correct. After returning to Haiti on Dec. 22, 2007 from a PetroCaribe summit, Préval announced the negotiations with Chevron were nearing a close. "We're going to sign with Chevron and then we're going to start ordering oil," he said at the airport, reported the AP, adding that Venezuelan technicians would visit Haiti to consult on the project. But "Chevron management in the U.S. does not want to make a lot of ‘noise’ about the agreement because they do not want to appear to support PetroCaribe," Sanderson explained in a Feb. 15, 2008 cable. The AP also reported that "Chevron officials at the company’s San Ramon, California, headquarters did not respond to requests for comment."

Sanderson explained that the deal was sealed when "Chevron finally obtained its desired terms from the GOH" whereby the Venezuelan state-owned oil company Petroleum of Venezuela, Inc. or PDVSA "will sell to the GoH, which will then sell to private oil traders, who finally will sell to the oil companies in Haiti for distribution... Chevron also agreed to ship the refined petrol on one of its tankers. The GoH expects to receive a PetroCaribe shipment in late February or early March."

And PetroCaribe shipments, covering all of Haiti’s fuel needs, did begin on March 8, 2008, marking a victory for Venezuela and Haiti in surmounting the roadblocks thrown up by the U.S. Embassy and oil companies.

Préval strictly paid his oil bills, despite having to borrow money from the PetroCaribe fund following the disastrous events of September 2008, when four tropical storms slammed Haiti in as many weeks. "The Sixth PetroCaribe Summit in St. Kitts on June 12 [2009] congratulated Haiti as the ‘best payer’ out of [PetroCaribe’s] 13 countries, having paid approximately USD 220 million to Venezuela," reported Tighe in a June 19, 2009 cable. "As of April 30, Haiti's PetroCaribe account (after Haiti's withdrawal of USD 197 million for its emergency response to the 2008 hurricanes), had a balance of USD 58.5 million. On May 27, the Government of Haiti (GOH) announced that its total fuel imports under PetroCaribe, since the first shipment was received in March 2008, amounts to approximately USD 489 million. Haiti's long-term debt, payable over 17 to 25 years, amounts to approximately USD 240 million."

Tighe also reported that Chavez renewed his pledge, made at the July 2008 PetroCaribe Summit, to construct an oil refinery in Haiti. "Lecorps put its capacity at 20,000 bpd [barrels per day] and the cost at USD 400 million," Tighe wrote. He also noted that although Haiti was not an ALBA member, "a tripartite (Haiti-Venezuela-Cuba) energy cooperation agreement is waiting to be ratified by Parliament" whose "purpose is to decide how 10% of funds from Haiti's PetroCaribe revenue would be spent on social programs in Haiti."

Tighe continued: "Lecorps stated that PetroCaribe ‘...is very good for the country.’ He noted that Venezuelan-financed electricity generating plants are operating in Port-au-Prince [30 megawatts], Gonaïves and Cap Haïtien [15 megawatts each] and have led to longer hours of power in those areas. Haiti receives shipments of PetroCaribe fuel every two weeks... Lecorps asserted that Haiti is satisfied with the PetroCaribe agreement and that it should not be ‘politicized.’"

But politicized it was, and Tighe sounded the alarm, concluding: "In addition to three power plants already in operation and promises to modernize the airport in Cap Haïtien, Venezuela's oil refinery project... would expand Venezuelan and Cuban influence in Haiti."

Aftermath of a Struggle

Haiti’s Parliament did ratify the Tripartite agreement between Haiti, Venezuela and Cuba in late 2009, and in October 2009, Dinasa acquired Chevron’s assets and operations in Haiti, which included 58 service centers, the country’s largest gas station network. Shell Oil tankers now transport the PDVSA oil from Venezuela to Haiti, Lecorps toldHaïti Liberté.

Under the current PetroCaribe terms, Haiti pays up front 40% to 70% of the value of the petroleum products it imports from Venezuela – asphalt, 91 and 95 octane gas, heavy fuel oil (mazout), diesel and kerosene – with the remaining 60% to 30% paid over 25 years, with a two year grace period, at an annual interest rate of 1%.

The U.S. Embassy’s campaign against the South-South cooperation represented by PetroCaribe – which provides such obvious benefits for Haiti – reveal the ugly nature and true intentions of "Haiti's most important and reliable bi-lateral partner," as Sanderson calls the U.S.

Préval and his officials employed a preferred form of Haitian resistance, which dates back to slavery, known as "marronage," where one pretends to go along with something but then does the opposite surreptitiously. The U.S. got wise to this tactic and began to doubt Préval’s reliability. This is why Washington moved so forcefully to see that Martelly and his crew of pro-American Haitian businessmen were put in power.

So now we may see a marked shift in Haiti's political direction. Instead of Préval, who tried to walk the battle-line between Washington and the ALBA alliance, we find a pro-coup, long-time Miami resident in power who makes no secret of his antipathy towards Haiti's "stinking" masses, as he described them in a YouTube video.

"We have been on the wrong road for the past 25 years," Martelly recently declared, placing Haiti's wrong turn, in his opinion, at about the time of the U.S.-backed Duvalier dictatorship's fall and the emergence of the democratic nationalist movement that became know as the Lavalas. Martelly had a pre-inauguration meeting not with Venezuela's Foreign Minister, but with that of Colombia, whose development plan he has said he will emulate.

His reception by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, after his highly controversial and fraud-marred election, was exceedingly warm.

All of this augurs woe for Cuban and Venezuelan projects in Haiti, and possibly for the PetroCaribe agreement, despite its tremendous and evident contribution to the Haitian people's welfare.

June 2nd 2011

venezuelanalysis

Source: Haiti LIberti

Bahamas: Unemployed Bahamians are 'unwilling to take on "menial" jobs from other Bahamians... as this type of labour is deemed "sub-servient" - says Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration Brent Symonette

Unemployed Bahamians 'unwilling to do menial jobs'


By AVA TURNQUEST
Tribune Staff Reporter
tribune242
aturnquest@tribunemedia.net
Nassau, Bahamas



UNEMPLOYED Bahamians are unwilling to take on "menial" jobs from other Bahamians as this type of labour is deemed "sub-servient", according to Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration Brent Symonette.

Poor work ethic was said to be at the centre of complaints which - according to Mr Symonette - have "bombarded" the Department of Immigration and fuelled the appeal for foreign labour.

Mr Symonette said: "The complaints we often hear include, Bahamians refuse to stay on jobs for any length of time; Bahamians are not consistent workers; Bahamians' work ethics are poor - showing up to work late, leaving early.

"I wish to appeal to all Bahamians to give a day's work for a day's pay. I am not at all happy about giving work visas to non-Bahamians, but we must pull up our socks in the work field."

Mr Symonette concluded that the high demand placed on the Department of Immigration (DOI) for "maids, caregivers and handymen" is representative of an unwillingness by Bahamians to pursue this type of labour.

"What is strange is that more Bahamians are prepared to do this work in hotels and for private homes of wealthy expatriates, to a lesser degree."

Mr Symonette addressed work visa statistics during his contribution to the 2011/2012 Budget yesterday.

The DOI approved 1,714 work visa applications during the first three months of this year, 385 were denied and 50 were deferred.

"Oftentimes, the Board is criticised as approving too many work permits/visas," said Mr Symonette.

"Very little is said by the Department, or the public for that matter, with respect to the number of permits refused by the Immigration Board."

Mr Symonette added: "The Immigration Board only approves applications in instances where no suitably qualified Bahamians can be found."

Priority job areas approved for work visas included live-in help, handymen or labourers, maids, caregivers, gardeners and chefs or cooks.

Mr Symonette said: "The fact of the matter is Bahamians are not willing or prepared to work in the home of other Bahamians as maids, caregivers, and handymen. Bahamians see this as sub-servient."

Meanwhile, Mr Symonette noted that Bahamian workers continued to dominate the banking and hotel industries at all levels.

Unemployed persons were urged to register with the Ministry of Labour to ensure the data bank store by his department could compare with incoming job requests.

"This appeal is for all categories of occupation, including persons returning home with certificates, degrees, vocational specialists, etc," he said.

"Although a Labour Certificate is issued by the Department of Labour, I would very much like to give closer attention to all those unemployed or on a waiting list for employment."

The DOI is set to initiate the sole use of electronic identification (EID) cards next month. Approved applicants for immigration services such as work visas, residence permits, homeowner's cards, and spousal permits, will receive a machine readable card about the same size of a driver's licence. Biometric data can also be stored on the card where applicable.

More than 1,000 EIDs have already been issued as the officials anticipate the paperless system will improve efficiency and eliminate fraud.

"The EID system manages the application and issuance process from the moment an applicant applies for a permit or certificate until it is issued," Mr Symonette said.

"This allows for a more secured and systematic application and issuance process."

EID cards can be found in New Providence, Grand Bahama, Abaco and Exuma.

The second phase will include Eleuthera, Bimini and San Salvador.

June 02, 2011

tribune242

Bahamas: ...the attitudes of most Bahamians towards Haitians is one of resentment, suspicion or outright hostility

The Haitian problem

IAN G. STRACHAN
thenassauguardian
Nassau, Bahamas



On Friday May 20th , 2011 a group of Bahamian and Haitian-Bahamian artists, hosted an art exhibit and mini musical concert in Nassau at Jacaranda House, called “Nostrum Fabula” (Latin for “Our Story”). The event was under the patronage of the Bahamian Governor General and the Haitian Ambassador to The Bahamas; the Minister of Youth, Sport and Culture also attended. Leading broadcast journalist, Jerome Sawyer, served as the master of ceremonies. It featured Bahamian folk musical artists like the Region Bells and the disc jockey alternated between Kompa and Goombay music.

An untitled art piece by Bernard Petit-Homme, a 26 year old Bahamian born of Haitian immigrant parents, served as the cover art for invitations and promotional material for the event. The image features the Bahamian and Haitian flags. The flags make up the torso of a man who is both black and white; he is silhouetted by the orange and yellow sun; his arms stretch across blue waters of the sea. In the painting Petit-Homme seeks to reconcile his Haitian and Bahamian selves and acknowledge the mixed bloodlines of many as a consequence of slavery. He crafts a celebratory message of unity and brotherhood; a message that ran like a thread throughout the entire event, at which the Bahamian and Haitian national anthems were played.

However, the spirit of unity, tolerance, mutual understanding and respect expressed at the exhibit are not shared by everyone in The Bahamas. Indeed, it is safe to say, that despite their proximity, their many shared cultural practices and a long history of relations between Haiti and The Bahamas, the attitudes of most Bahamians towards Haitians is one of resentment, suspicion or outright hostility.

The Haitian “problem” in The Bahamas is shaped by a number of factors. Haitian migrants are a crucial source of cheap, reliable, motivated labor, particularly in the agricultural sector. Increasingly, however, as the middle class shrinks and the ranks of the Bahamian working poor swell, there is growing resentment toward Haitian immigrants and their children because they are now competing for jobs deemed above their social station. Where once a Haitain only worked as a gardener, farmer, grounds keeper or “handyman”—work young Bahamian men have looked down on for the past forty years—they are now working at gas stations, in hardware stores, and gaining employment as masons and carpenters, jobs Bahamian men have dominated. Many a Bahamian contractor prefers Haitian immigrant labor to Bahamian, not simply because it is cheaper, but because it is better.

There is also the real and perceived strain on national services, such as education and health care, created by the immigrant influx. And there are national security concerns, fed by the fear of Haitian immigrants “violent” people. Added to this are Bahamians’ fears of cultural erasure, and political/economic displacement due to the perception of Haitians as a lurking enemy intent on “taking over.” All of these factors make the Haitian-Bahamian encounter a vexed one; one that reveals class, color and ethnic fault lines.

The often bigoted public discourse in newspapers, on radio and television speak to the volatility of the situation. For a time I would cut out the more virulent letters to the editor I came across in the papers. One of the most memorable was entitled “Haitians Attract Flies.” The most recent was blaming the devastating quake in Haiti on devil worship. I grew up with certain received notions about the Haitian people; they have been the butt of jokes my whole life. There was no greater insult among us as children than to be called Highshun. There is a stigma attached to Haitian origins; a social/ethnic blemish that many young people try to hide because of the stinging ridicule and contempt heaped on them through no fault of their own. I remember a young man at COB who insisted on Anglicizing his name in my class and others who tolerated all sorts of mispronunciations because they at least didn’t sound French.

In this uneasy climate, many Bahamian artists attempt to resist the stereotyping of the Haitian people. Artists such as John Cox, John Beadle, Jackson Petit-Homme, Maxwell Taylor, and Eric Ellis, and writers such as myself, Telcine Turner-Rolle, Patricia Glinton-Meicholas, Keith Russell, Nicolette Bethel and others have attempted to prick the conscience of Bahamian society. My play “Diary of Souls” was a fictional treatment of a true event; the tragic death of Haitian refugees at sea in the Exumas in 1990. Sadly, these tragedies have been happening for a very, very long time and still happen.

At stake is the very notion of what it means to be a Bahamian. Haitian immigration challenges the core values/ideals of the Bahamian state, putting the people and the nation on trial, and calling international attention to the question of just how committed The Bahamas is to freedom, equality and justice for all.

But we are an itsy bitsy country. We cannot possibly be expected to have an open door policy. We have the right to protect our borders from illegal entry. We are not the continental United States or Canada; we are specs on the world map. And even in a nation the size of the US, illegal immigration from Mexico and further south is the source of heated debate and conflict.

But though we may protect our borders, Haitian immigrants and those of Haitian descent are here to stay. We may not all want them here but all need them here. We need them, as we have always needed immigrants, to help build our country by doing the things we can’t or won’t do. It makes no sense to drive a wedge between them and us, to create a hated, disenfranchised underclass.

The reality is that our citizenship laws ensure the imperilment, not the protection, of The Bahamas. Disenfranchising a person for 18 years or more, while they await entry into the exclusive club of Bahamian citizenship, creates frustration, shame, anger, alienation and bitterness in the hearts thousands of young people who know, have, and want no other home but this one. It’s simply inhumane, short sighted and stupid.

If we cannot bring ourselves to make citizenship automatic upon one’s birth for all those born here, we should at least amend the constitution to lower the eligibility date. Why not 10 years old instead of 18? Avoid creating frustrated stateless teens that can’t get scholarships, can’t fully participate in national life.

Of course, there’s always the other option. While picking up my son from school, a gentleman who was also waiting for a child, told me he had the solution to the Haitian problem. “I would blow their boats right out of the water when we find them.” And then he proceeded to carefully lovingly take a child’s hand and lead her out of the school yard.

IAN STRACHAN is Associate Professor at the College of The Bahamas.

Jun 02, 2011

thenassauguardian

Bahamas: Fred Mitchell, opposition Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) spokesman on foreign affairs questions the 'ethical standards' of The Nassau Guardian newspaper over Wikileaks reports on Bahamian political affairs

MP questions 'ethical standards' of newspaper over Wikileaks reports

tribune242
Nassau, Bahamas


FRED Mitchell, opposition spokesman on foreign affairs, questioned the "ethical standards" of The Nassau Guardian in its reporting of confidential US embassy cables on Bahamian political affairs.

During his presentation in the House of Assembly yesterday, Mr Mitchell said a Guardian reporter failed to declare her personal interests with respect to one of the subjects of the Wikileaks investigation. Mr Mitchell featured prominently this week in a Wikileak disclosure.

"I always envied my colleague the Member for North Andros that former lady friend of his who shall remain nameless who works at the Guardian and wrote that whole section about me this morning. As the song writer says: 'That Gal look good!' said Mr Mitchell.

"My only point is that journalism, the kind that the Nassau Guardian, The Tribune and the Bahama Journal are to practice carries with it certain ethical standards and it is unethical to write a story about one subject of which you had a close personal relationship as if you are a disinterested party. It can be seen as malicious. But neither she nor her employers seem to get the point," said Mr Mitchell.

He said ethical standards were important because the public relies on the media to "tell the Bahamian story; to tell it accurately, and without fear or favour."

Mr Mitchell said it "may be necessary" for the Embassy to disassociate itself from the attributed statements in the Wikileaks cables, so "they are not taken as an official view of events."

"It strains credibility to me that US professional diplomats, a person so high as a deputy chief of mission who was actually sitting in the seat of the ambassador, would accept and adopt uncritically propaganda lines from the Free National Movement. That is simply not a professional report," he said.

There is both "fascination and revulsion" at the disclosures, said Mr Mitchell. Revulsion that public officials "would be so open and callous" with information they share with "American diplomats." Mr Mitchell said Bahamians questioning whether Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham would "so loosely and callously spill all his guts to junior US officials."

"I can tell you also in connection with the public service, that the police commissioner was reeling yesterday. Again, that someone who this country trusted for our national security, a former Commissioner of Police could be quoted as spilling his guts out to junior U.S. officials. Again I say allegedly. We have to hope it is allegedly because no self-respecting Commissioner of Police would do any such thing. Perhaps we will see if the former Commissioner Mr. Ferguson will sue because most certainly he could not have sold his country out like that," said Mr Mitchell.

Putting the disclosures in perspective, Mr Mitchell said the country should understand the role of "public diplomacy and private diplomacy" in international affairs, said Mr Mitchell.

"There are many private ruminations and events which we know about US diplomats and their private activities in this country. But how would that serve the Bahamian interests for me to expose that. And that is what I admire about American diplomacy and about that country as a nation, it always pursues its interests," he said.

Describing his interaction with embassy officials during his tenure in government, Mr Mitchel said of the Wikileaks disclosures, "They are saying that I stood up for my country. I put Bahamians first."

He described a message sent by one of his former colleagues: "When I read the two page story about 'What the Americans Really Thought' of you in the Guardian, my chest swelled with pride, for the intended exposé turned out to be a public testimony to your diplomacy, tact and wisdom and to the fact that (unlike others of your colleagues) you are not in the least bit intimidated or in awe of any 'superpower'.

"The worst that could be said of you was that you are a Bahamian and a Black nationalist, whom they often times found to be aloof, close-mouthed and uncommunicative. If only that could have been said of Samson."

June 01, 2011

tribune242

[Jamaica-Gleaner] EDITORIAL - PM (Prime Minister Bruce Golding) On WikiLeaks

We commend Prime Minister Bruce Golding's engagement of this newspaper's ongoing publication of US diplomatic cables relating to Jamaica, even though the PM may have misapprehended the context of our action and the basis on which we have so far reported.

But while we would have preferred that the prime minister use a national platform, rather than a political party forum, from which to address the many critical matters raised in the communications to the State Department by America's envoys, we expect that Mr Golding will come to a clearer interpretation of the issues after fuller, sober consideration of the facts.

There are two points from Mr Golding's speech in Montego Bay on Sunday, however, that are easily attended and dispatched: that The Gleaner is wrong to publish stories from cables that may have been illegally acquired; and that we have "cherry-picked" our reports so as to harass his government and undermine those members of the two major political parties - the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People's National Party (PNP) - whom we do not favour. The selective-reporting claim also relates, supposedly, to what Mr Golding refers to as "power brokers" at The Gleaner Company and others in the private sector.

Trafigura memories

Unlike with the purloined bank accounts in the Trafigura scandal, made public by the JLP, this newspaper did not inveigle the leak of the cables obtained by the free-speech website, WikiLeaks. We are publishing information that WikiLeaks will itself have published and is of vital importance to Jamaica.

We have access to more than 1,200 cables. These have to be sifted for, in some cases, threats to national security, and for defamation. We have no immunity from libel.

In this regard, it would be easy, as we suggested to the information minister, Mr Daryl Vaz - who, unlike Mr Golding, wants the uncensored publication of the cables - for the Government to table them in Parliament, thus giving the public unrestricted access to the information as well as providing the media with protection from defamation suits.

Indeed, this matter strengthens the argument for a reform of Jamaica's restrictive defamation laws, which Mr Golding himself placed on the agenda and with which we urge him to proceed with dispatch.

More fundamental, though, is the rare insight that these cables provide into how America's representatives view, and interpret, the behaviour of Jamaican institutions and their leaders and what informs Washington's policies towards our country. Some of what these envoys see in Jamaica is far from flattering. Much of it is embarrassing not only to Mr Golding and his government, but also to Opposition Leader Portia Simpson Miller and the PNP.

attacking the messenger

But shame is no cause for ad hominem attacks on the messenger, especially by an administration that promulgated whistle-blower legislation to provide protection for persons who, in good faith, disclose information that might redound to the benefit of society. Indeed, rather than power broking - the effective power brokers are the readers of this newspaper and civil-society institutions that they shape - what The Gleaner has sought to do is provide a balanced view of the issues, which, we hope, informs analysis and decision-making. Readers will be aware that in reporting, we have to conform to the laws of libel and cannot expect the US government to come to our defence in court in the event that we face lawsuits.

As Mr Golding knows, the vast majority of Jamaicans want good relations with the United States, Jamaica's close neighbour and, historically, good friend.

What the prime minister must do in his next intervention on the matter is say how he proposes to improve US-Jamaica relations and to honour his obligation to root from Government corruption and other forms of misbehaviour, which he promised when he took his oath of office.

The opinions on this page, except for the above, do not necessarily reflect the views of The Gleaner. To respond to a Gleaner editorial, email us: editor@gleanerjm.com or fax: 922-6223. Responses should be no longer than 400 words. Not all responses will be published.

May 31, 2011

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