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Monday, July 6, 2026

The concurrence of Justice Brett Kavanaugh in Trump v. Barbara (2026)


Justice Brett Kavanaugh


JUSTICE BRETT KAVANAUGH’S TEASE: THE ILLUSION OF STATUTORY SUFFICIENCY

Justice Kavanaugh's Concurrence in Trump v. Barbara and the Structural Limits of Legislative Power Over the Citizenship Clause


By: Professor Gilbert N.M.O. Morris
Nassau, N.P., The Bahamas


Constitutional Jurisprudence Series


Abstract

This article examines the concurrence of Justice Brett Kavanaugh in Trump v. Barbara (2026), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 30, 2026, and the popular misreading of that concurrence as a legislative shortcut around the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause.(1)  The prevailing account, circulated widely in political commentary following the decision, holds that Congress may now, by ordinary statute, narrow birthright citizenship without recourse to Article V.  This article argues that such an account confuses three distinct constitutional operations, that Justice Kavanaugh's own language forecloses the reading given it, and that the arithmetic of the Court's five-justice constitutional majority renders any statute of the kind proposed presently unsustainable.


I. Axiom

A constitutional command operates as the ground upon which all statutes stands.  It is not one enactment among the many that Congress may set beside it, but the condition of their validity.  Where a statute contradicts a constitutional norm, the statute is void from its inception to the extent of the contradiction and its logical linguistic entrails, and no legislative majority, however durable, converts an ultra vires enactment into law by the mere act of passing it.

This axiom is not original to the present inquiry.  It is the axiom of Marbury v. Madison (1803), and it governs every subordinate question that follows.(2)


II. Definition

Three operations must be held apart, since the commentary surrounding Trump v. Barbara collapses them into a single undifferentiated act of "legislating on citizenship.

The first is the amending of a constitutional norm, reserved by Article V to two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and three-quarters of the states.

The second is the judicial construction of a norm's scope, which the Constitution commits to the courts alone (per Marbury aforementioned), and which the Supreme Court exercised in both the majority and the dissenting opinions of Trump v. Barbara.

The third is legislative implementation of a norm's non-self-executing particulars, exemplified by the citizenship statute Congress first codified in 1940 and carried into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, presently codified at 8 U.S.C. - 1401(a), which gives procedural body to a substantive guarantee already complete in the constitutional text.(3)  The distinction between the second and third operations is the axis on which the entire controversy turns, for a statute enacted under the third power remains at all times subject to testing under the second.


III. Proposition

The proposition advanced by the circulated commentary is that Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence supplies Congress with authority, exercised through ordinary statute, to establish exceptions to birthright citizenship for children of parents unlawfully or temporarily present, and that this authority requires no constitutional amendment.  This article's counter-proposition is narrower and, I submit, more faithful to the opinion itself.


Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that the executive order failed under 1401(a) rather than under the Fourteenth Amendment, and stated that Congress could amend the statute or enact new legislation establishing such exceptions.(4)  The qualifying condition attached to that proposal is decisive. The new legislation, in his own formulation, must remain consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.(4)

Whilst I have my own questions concerning Justice Kavanaugh’s jurisprudence, the opinion does not propose that ordinary statute may contradict the Amendment.  It proposes that the Amendment's own historical exceptions, the four exceptions recognized in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), ought not be treated as fixed at 1868, since treating them as a closed set is, in his words, inconsistent with the Court's longstanding approach to constitutional interpretation.(5)

A statute drafted on this theory does not override the Amendment. It attempts to occupy a category the Amendment, properly construed, is argued already to contain.


IV. Proof

The distinction bears immediately upon the arithmetic invoked by proponents of the legislative-shortcut reading.  The vote in Trump v. Barbara was six to three as to invalidating the executive order, and five to four as to the constitutional ground for doing so.(6)  The five justices sustaining the constitutional holding, Chief Justice Roberts writing for Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, Barrett, and Jackson, form a majority against any exception-expanding theory whatsoever.  Justice Jackson wrote separately for the express purpose of rejecting a race-limited construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments function as a civilisational reset rather than a race-specific remedy.(7)

Justice Kavanaugh's opinion, by contrast, stands alone in its structure, concurring in the judgment while dissenting from the constitutional reasoning.(8)  Justice Thomas, joined in part by Justice Gorsuch, argued a domicile theory holding that the Fourteenth Amendment extends citizenship only to those permanently domiciled within the United States, a broader and structurally distinct claim from Justice Kavanaugh's narrower test of exceptions relevantly similar to those already recognized.(9)  A future statute seeking constitutional sanction under Justice Kavanaugh's theory would therefore require the reconciliation of two dissenting positions that do not share a common doctrinal logic, and would require, further, the conversion of a single justice's concurrence into a majority holding, since a concurrence in judgment establishes no precedent binding a later panel.


V. Argument

What is noteworthy is the commentary under review - accusing Kavanaugh of holding a latch door open - performs the conflation the definitional section above was constructed to prevent.  It treats a single justice's hypothesis about a future controversy, a hypothesis contingent on litigation not yet filed and votes not yet secured, as an operative grant of legislative authority already completed.  This is a recognisable pattern in political rhetoric under conditions of urgency, wherein contingency is narrated in the grammar of accomplishment.  The declarative structure of the Citizenship Clause itself supplies the answer the commentary elides.  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, found no textual or historical warrant for reading a domicile limitation into the Clause's declarative grammar, observing that the Court's exhaustive review of the Clause's text and history identified no evidence that its ratifiers intended such a limitation.(10)  Justice Kavanaugh did not dispute this reading of the Clause's declarative force.  His disagreement is confined entirely to the closed-set question, a narrower terrain that leaves the sentence, ‘all persons born are citizens’, untouched as a governing rule, and contested only as to the outer boundary of its historical exceptions.


VI. Corollary

It follows that the phrase circulating in political commentary, that no constitutional amendment is necessary, is true only within the bounds of Justice Kavanaugh's own unadopted theory, and that theory has not commanded a Court.  It follows further that any statute enacted on the strength of this theory would arrive before the judiciary as an open constitutional question rather than as settled legislative territory, and would face, at minimum, the five-justice constitutional majority already on record against exception-expansion, together with the structural incompatibility between Justice Kavanaugh's relevantly-similar test and Justice Thomas' domicile theory, which cannot be harmonized into a single five-vote coalition without one side abandoning its own reasoning; a fear which seems to lie at the feet of Chief Justice Roberts…who has built a reputation of incongruent rulings, coming into coherence only after some unthinkable justice mischief has been done…such as gutting the Voting Rights Act or ceding disfiguring immunities to the Executive.


VII. Measured Restatement

Congress retains no power, under any opinion issued in Trump v. Barbara, to enact a statute directly contradicting the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of citizenship to persons born within the jurisdiction of the United States.  What Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence opens is a narrower and considerably more precarious avenue: legislation framed as an extension of the Wong Kim Ark exceptions, sustainable only if a future Court, differently constituted in its reasoning from the present one, adopts his characterisation of those exceptions as an open rather than closed category.

This is a wager upon future adjudication.  It is not a completed transfer of constitutional authority to the legislature.


VIII. Conclusion

Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence supplies a fourth analytical strand for the constitutional jurisprudence of Trump v. Barbara, distinct from Justice Thomas's domicile theory and Justice Jackson's genealogical method, and it exhibits, in miniature, the pattern this author has identified elsewhere in Chief Justice Roberts's jurisprudence this term: formal resolution of the judgment before the parties, joined to an unresolved structural lacuna, here the undefined boundary of the phrase relevantly similar, left open for future litigation to fill.  The lacuna is not a defect of careless draftsmanship.  It is the characteristic form by which this Roberts Court, term after term, resolves the case before it whilst declining to resolve the doctrine beneath it, a form worth naming; since a jurisprudence built upon the studied deferral of its own foundational questions is a jurisprudence that governs the present at the cost of cogency in the present and the coherence of the it’s constitutional future.


References

1. Trump v. Barbara, No. 25A-___ (U.S. June 30, 2026) (slip op.), as reported in "Trump v. Barbara," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trump_v._Barbara (accessed July 3, 2026)

2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

3. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163; Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137.

4. Scott Bomboy, "Supreme Court Strikes Down Trump's Birthright Citizenship Executive Order in Landmark Decision," National Constitution Center (June 2026), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/supreme-court-strikes-down-trumps-birthright-citizenship-executive-order-in-landmark-decision

5. "The Alarming Split in the Supreme Court's Birthright Citizenship Ruling," Salon (July 2, 2026), https://www.salon.com/2026/07/02/the-alarming-split-in-the-supreme-courts-birthright-citizenship-ruling/.

6. "Trump v. Barbara," supra note 1.

7. "Supreme Court Reaffirms Birthright Citizenship Under the 14th Amendment in Trump v. Barbara," FindLaw (June/July 2026), https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs/supreme-court/supreme-court-reaffirms-birthright-citizenship-under-the-14th-amendment-in-trump-v-barbara/.

8. "Trump v. Barbara," supra note 1; SCOTUSblog, "Breaking Down the Birthright-Citizenship Decision" (2026), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/breaking-down-the-birthright-citizenship-decision/.

9. FindLaw, supra note 7.

10.National Constitution Center-supranote 4

11.National Constitution Center, supra note 4 (reporting the decision's length at 194 pages).


Source / Comment

Saturday, July 4, 2026

Wrong, Justice Clarence Thomas!



Clarence Thomas


MR. JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS IS WRONG! 

By Professor Gilbert Morris
Nassau, The Bahamas


When ideologues read the law, they do not seek the law.  They seek confirmation of what they wish the law to be.  Take domicile: within Anglo-American jurisprudence, it has never named a fact of mere LOCATION; it has named an ACT OF WILL conjoined to a FACT OF PRESENCE.


Mr. Justice Story, in his “Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws”, designated the union of ‘factum’ and ‘animus manendi’, the bodily residing and the intention to remain.


Therefore, to possess domicile, in the technical sense Justice Thomas’ dissent invokes, is to be capable of an act of SELECTION, ELECTION, DIRECTION, VOLITION, DECISION…which is to say: AN ACT OF WILL and to be present. 


A juridical capacity to choose one’s place and to be recognized by law as having chosen it.  This capacity presupposes legal personhood: the standing, before the sovereign, to perform acts the sovereign will count as one’s own.


In context, the enslaved person, under the law that governed slavery in the United States before 1865, was precisely excluded from this capacity.  Slave codes throughout the South denied the enslaved person standing to contract, to sue, to marry with legal effect, to choose a place of abode against the will of an owner and domicile, being itself a species of legal election, cannot be exercised by one to whom the law denies the power of election.  The enslaved person’s location was assigned, as a wife’s or a minor child’s domicile was assigned under coverture, by the will of another; it was, in the vocabulary of the doctrine, a derivative domicile, never an acquired one.


One need not travel far for confirmation; the Court’s own decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857), rests on EXACTLY this denial: that the enslaved person and his descendants stood outside the category of persons inherently capable of the juridical acts, citizenship among them, that domicile presupposes.


The Reconstruction Congress - which Thomas mentions - did not legislate against an empty premise.  It legislated against a settled doctrine in which the very people the Fourteenth Amendment meant to enfranchise had been denied, by the law of slavery itself, the legal personhood from which domicile in the technical sense flows.


Here a transition from constitutional history to a question of logical form becomes necessary, and I mark it as such:


1. If a domicile-based test for citizenship requires antecedent legal personhood


2. If legal personhood is the very thing slavery withheld,


3. THEN….necessarily…a domicile-based test cannot, by its own internal logical criteria, secure citizenship for the freed slave without first smuggling in, by exception or by retroactive fiction, the personhood - the power of will - that the test elsewhere presupposes as already given.  The test would have to suspend itself in the one case it claims to have been written for.


Thomas’s own citizenship as an American is secured, not by an “act of will” as Dred Scott promulgated…it is secured by presence; which the Fourteenth Amendment secures to him by birth on American soil independent of any domicile inquiry whatever once jus soli is the governing rule, as the majority held.


It is rather a defect internal to the structure of the domicile theory itself: that the theory, applied with any rigor to the historical condition of the enslaved, dissolves the very class it was offered to protect.  This is the structural form of the objection Madam Justice Jackson raised in concurrence, when she noted the discord between Thomas’s professed colorblindness and a theory that requires racial particularity to do its remedial work.


The difficulty is not biographical but architectonic.  Rather, it belongs to the shape of the argument and not to the person of Justice Thomas.


Source / Comment


Sunday, May 31, 2026

Patois Ban in Jamaica



Jamaican Patois Banned


THE REST OF THE WORLD STRUGGLES TO UNDERSTAND WHY JAMAICA REFUSES ITS OWN CULTURE!


Jamaican Patwah


By Gilbert Morris

Why would the Jamaican parliament ban the world’s favourite vernacular patois?


Why?

In cultural linguistics there is something called “code switching”.  Our older politicians did it well.  No one in the current Jamaican parliament speaks English better than Michael Manley and yet Manley switched between English and patois beautifully.  Sir Lynden Pindling did the same between British university English and Bahamian dialect.

No one is saying come to Parliament and carry an entire debate in Patois (although, Patios and Jamaican Patti (before they started putting that green mucus into it), are amongst my favourite things in this world.

Jamaica has given more to the world than any country: Boukman Dutty…who inspired the Haitian Revolution; Marcus Garvey who is the father of all black freedom movements; Bob Marley, the greatest musician of all time; all my elementary school teachers in The Bahamas; Merline Otty…the most beautiful woman in the history of humanity; and Usain Bolt a star even amongst stars; Butch Stewart who taught the entire region to do business; Dr Nigel Clarke…the finest Minister of Finance in history; street slang and the language of cool…and just Jamaicaness…which is the world’s most vigorous spirit of self-expression:

Why the hell would one ban the language that expresses that?

Jamaica keeps doing this: Bob Marley is under appreciated.  Even Usain Bolt was mistreated trying to acquire a home and finally robbed by an institution meant to prefect his wealth!

Why does Jamaica fail at home to celebrate what the world loves most about Jamaica?

It’s ridiculous, shameful and sad!

Banning patios outright is not only self-hating, it’s banning folklore in the heart of an institution that’s supposed to be representative.

Nothing could be more beautiful than hearing after a long debate in plain English the Opposition rising and saying: “What-a gwan.

This ban should be lifted and code switching, using popular patois phrases should be welcomed.

I say always: Turks and Caicos is my mother, The Bahamas is my wife - but Jamaica is my sweetie: it shouldn’t take a TCI-Bahamian to remind Jamaica what’s beloved about it!

Saturday, May 23, 2026

Venezuela and the Perils of Ceding Sovereignty


US imperialism is “not to be trusted even a little bit,” much less considered a “partner” in a “cooperation agenda.” - Che Guevara


By Ricardo Vaz

 

The Overhauled Venezuelan Bolivarian Revolution

On January 3, the US bombed Venezuela’s capital region and kidnapped President NicolΓ‘s Maduro.  The unprecedented attack represented the culmination of a quarter-century of imperialist hybrid war, including devastating unilateral sanctions, mercenary incursions, “color revolution”-style insurrections, media disinformation, and NGO infiltration.

The four months since have brought a flurry of developments, from renewed diplomatic ties with the US to an overhaul of key legislative pillars of the Bolivarian Revolution.  Additionally, the Trump administration established semi-colonial control over Venezuelan oil revenues, with the amounts and timings of disbursements back to Caracas left entirely at US officials’ discretion.  The arrangement is similar to the one Washington has forced on Iraq since the 2003 invasion.

This compromised sovereignty is a catalyst for other issues.  On the one hand, it makes it tougher for the Venezuelan government to improve living standards without challenging business interests.  On the other, the burden of Venezuela’s external debt might see Washington attempt to impose an IMF loan that will bury the country in debt and dependency for decades.

The acting RodrΓ­guez government’s tenure has been marked by accelerated political and economic transformations.  On the international front, Caracas has restored diplomatic ties with Washington and recently resumed dealings with the US-controlled International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

Domestically, RodrΓ­guez has changed key cabinet and military posts, while pushing through the National Assembly a number of reforms with the explicit goal of making the country more attractive for private sector investment, especially from Western multinationals.

Plans to reform pension, tax, housing, and the landmark 2012 labor law are in motion.  Mining and hydrocarbons have already undergone pro-business overhauls, with slashed fiscal responsibilities, decreased oversight, and disputes subjected to international arbitration.  In contrast to ChΓ‘vez’s reassertion of oil sovereignty, which underpinned the massive sociopolitical achievements of the Bolivarian Revolution, the reformed energy law brings back the old concession model that puts operations and sales in the hands of private corporations.

In tandem, the Trump administration has issued licenses to pave the way for Western conglomerates to return to Venezuela, and several have already struck deals under the new highly favorable conditions.  The licenses maintain and even double down on US sanctions by barring dealings with China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia and mandating that all Venezuelan state revenues from oil and mining be deposited in US Treasury-run accounts.

The subordination to US impositions saw Venezuelan authorities extradite former diplomatic envoy and minister Alex Saab to face charges in the US with little to no explanation.  The move was shocking but not out of context.  In recent weeks, there has been a succession of ceremonies at Miraflores presidential palace where Trump officials get the red-carpet welcome and escort corporate executives to sign contracts under the new pro-business incentives.  Far-right tech moguls, including Palantir founder Peter Thiel, are already taking advantage of Trump’s leverage to establish a lucrative foothold in the country.  For his part, the US chargΓ© d’affaires holds regular publicized meetings with Venezuelan cabinet ministers. 

Caracas’ technocratic and pragmatic approach has dovetailed with a corresponding shift in discourse.  On foreign policy, the anti-imperialist rhetoric has all but vanished.  As Trump unleashes a savage war against Iran and threatens to “take over” Cuba, Venezuelan leaders have refrained from condemning the escalating imperialist aggression while emphasizing their desire to build good relations with Washington.  At the same time, references to Maduro have drastically decreased, as documented in a recent investigation.  Domestically, the central focus has become macroeconomic stability and attracting foreign investment.  Both Acting President RodrΓ­guez and her brother, National Assembly President Jorge RodrΓ­guez, acknowledged receiving “recommendations” and “suggestions” from oil majors amid the recent hydrocarbon overhaul. 

RodrΓ­guez and the Bolivarian leadership, under ongoing US pressure, are betting that the pro-business opening will lead to accelerated economic growth that will trickle down into improved living conditions, thus allowing the government to rebuild social legitimacy and political prospects.  However, this plan faces serious roadblocks.

The first issue is that the acting authorities may not have a lot of time to improve the living conditions of the Venezuelan people. 

Over the previous seven years, with the economy asphyxiated by the US economic blockade, the Maduro government prioritized macroeconomic stability and reduced inflation first and foremost, through a strict monetarist policy package.  While the approach, coupled with a modest oil industry recovery, did lead to slowed down inflation and modest economic growth, it came at a price of freezing wages, consumer credit, and public spending.  The minimum wage, last raised in 2022, is now worth less than US $1 per month, with further increases replaced by non-wage bonuses that cheapen labor costs for employers.

Though these bonuses have increased periodically (the income floor is now $240/month for public sector workers), they are still far from covering living costs.  On May 1, RodrΓ­guez ignored growing calls for a minimum wage hike, the conversion of bonuses to wages, and the restoration of collective bargaining rights, instead doubling down on the bonus policy.  With government officials announcing a labor reform soon, it is likely that the return of the minimum wage will come alongside a significant erosion of workers’ rights and employer responsibilities.

However, apart from its commitment to fiscal discipline, the RodrΓ­guez acting government has little room to maneuver because of its lack of direct management over oil revenues.  At the mercy of the Trump administration to return export earnings in the amount and timing of its choosing, Venezuelan authorities are unlikely to commit to anything that might unsettle the budget.  RodrΓ­guez herself warned that wage increases must be “responsible.”

There is a delicate balance to strike.  To implement the current pro-business agenda, not to mention the US rapprochement, the government needs social peace, and only improved material conditions for the working-class majority can ensure that in the short term.

It is not just the pressure for better living standards that looms large on Venezuela’s economic front.  There is a growing expectation that creditors will soon reengage with Venezuelan authorities to collect on a sizable external debt: a combination of defaulted bonds, unpaid loans, and arbitration awards that, with interest accrued over years, may amount to as much as $170 billion.  The Venezuelan government recently announced the launch of a debt restructuring process, while Washington issued a license allowing the hiring of financial and consulting services. 

Given the recent overtures to foreign capital, Venezuelan leaders will be hard-pressed to honor whatever commitments necessary to render the country a favorable investment climate.  Nevertheless, a major chunk of this debt is illegitimate.

On the one hand, debt ballooned in the mid-2010s as Venezuela’s credit rating was unjustifiably downgraded and borrowing costs went up, as Washington slapped its first rounds of sanctions on the Caribbean country.  The Maduro government made a strategic choice to prioritize debt service as the economy reeled following a collapse of global oil prices, hoping that this “discipline” would stave off a scenario where the country was shut out of financial markets.  It turned out differently.

Venezuela was gradually locked out of global finance after the Trump administration’s 2017 financial sanctions.  Bonds defaulted one after another and have been accruing interest ever since.  And the notoriously corrupt US-backed “interim government” also played its part in running up Venezuela’s liabilities and pilfering state assets abroad.

The diverse group of bondholders and corporations owed arbitration awards is sure to receive the backing of the White House, which holds the purse of Venezuela’s export proceeds.  This mechanism could be utilized to directly transfer Venezuelan state income to creditors in what would effectively amount to international wage garnishing.  Given how Venezuelan bonds have risen in recent months, investors are eagerly eyeing a significant windfall.

Venezuela’s unsustainable debt burden opens the door for further US imperial predations.  Even if there is an agreement to pay 50 cents on the dollar for Venezuela’s $170 billion debt for a period of 15 years, that comes to $5.6 billion a year, roughly a quarter of the present budget.  It is simply unpayable.

While Caracas may be able to settle with some creditors by privatizing Venezuelan state assets, it will not amount to much.  Venezuelan leaders will stress that, with the recent reforms and US opening, the economy will grow tremendously, and they will be able to honor all commitments.  But creditors are not willing to wait when they can cash in now, especially given Venezuela’s weak bargaining position.  The government cannot maintain a functioning country in the short term with a huge debt burden.  As a result, the US might take advantage of the crisis to impose a major loan from the IMF or some lending coalition.

An IMF or similar loan program is more than just an agreement to lend some amount under certain repayment conditions.  It is an opportunity to impose neocolonial arrangements on Global South countries.  In Venezuela’s case it is even more symbolic: it would mean exacting the proverbial pound of flesh for ChΓ‘vez’s revolutionary audacity to challenge US hegemony in the Western hemisphere.

An eventual long-term credit program would surely come alongside a structural adjustment package of mass privatizations, gutted social expenditure, and all-around liberalization of the economy.  Given the current leverage over Venezuela, US officials may attempt to further entrench the rollback of the Caribbean nation’s sovereignty.

Between the growing domestic demands for improved living conditions and the specter of debt renegotiation, the acting RodrΓ­guez government will find it increasingly difficult to walk the tightrope of maintaining social peace while continuing to make one concession after another to monopoly capital and the Trump White House. 

With the limits of US imperialism nakedly exposed in Iran, Trump needs a victory in Venezuela.  But that victory does not entail a buoyant economic recovery with social justice, let alone the survival of a sovereign and revolutionary project.  Victory for the US is a dependent country, mired in debt and underdevelopment, where Western corporations plunder natural resources and geopolitical rivals are kept at bay.

Ultimately, any long-term plan for sovereign development needs to start from the fact that US imperialism, to echo Che Guevara,  is “not to be trusted even a little bit,” much less considered a “partner” in a “cooperation agenda.”  It will undoubtedly be a major hill to climb.  But thankfully, even if it means starting over, the Bolivarian Revolution is not starting from scratch.

Source: Sovereign Media

Friday, May 22, 2026

The Council of State of the Republic of Cuba condemns the infamous accusation against leader of the Cuban Revolution, Army General RaΓΊl Castro Ruz, leader of the Cuban Revolution

The Cuban People want Peace


Cuban Army General RaΓΊl Castro Ruz

"The General of the Army is Cuba, and Cuba must be respected"



By The National Assembly of People's Power - Cuba


The Council of State of the Republic of Cuba, representing the National Assembly of People's Power, strongly condemns the recent infamous accusation by the United States Department of Justice against Army General RaΓΊl Castro Ruz, leader of the Cuban Revolution.

Likewise, it endorses the Declaration of the Revolutionary Government regarding this illegitimate and despicable act, a blatant act of dishonest and political manipulation, which distorts the facts that led to the downing, in February 1996, of two aircraft operated by the terrorist organization Brothers to the Rescue, based in Miami, over Cuban airspace.

The members of this body denounce the fact that the United States government uses legal institutions to orchestrate its genocidal policy against the Cuban Revolution.  In doing so, it disregards the principles of International Law and violates the sovereignty and dignity of our nation.

At the same time, the Council of State categorically repudiates the executive orders issued by the President of the United States and other unilateral coercive measures of the Trump Administration, including the recent mendacious and immoral accusations against high-ranking Cuban state and government officials; these have the perverse aim of intensifying the illegitimate blockade and its policy of suffocation against our heroic people.

The anti-Cuban rhetoric of hatred and aggression from the U.S. executive branch will once again be shattered by the unwavering conviction of Cubans to preserve our independence, certain that the Homeland and its Socialist Revolution will be defended.  Always onward to victory!

Cuba wants peace!

Havana, May 21, 2026.

"Year of the Centennial of Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro Ruz."


Thursday, April 9, 2026

Does The Haitian Constitution Trumps The Bahamian Constitution in The Bahamas



The Constitution of The Bahamas

DOES THE HAITIAN CONSTITUTION TRUMPS OUR BAHAMIAN CONSTITUTION?


From Speak Up Bahamas:

I’m trying to understand something… and maybe someone can explain it logically.  Why are some Bahamians now arguing that the Haitian Constitution is more powerful than the Bahamian Constitution?

The Haitian Constitution says that once you are born to a Haitian parent — whether mother or father — you are Haitian, and that citizenship cannot be renounced.

But let’s be very clear… We are in The Bahamas, governed by OUR Constitution.  The Bahamian Constitution clearly states that if a Bahamian married to a Haitian woman, and they have a child, that child is Bahamian — with the full rights of a Bahamian, including the right to vote, and it doesnt mattter how fluent they are in the English language.

So the real question is: Which Constitution governs The Bahamas?  Are we seriously saying that a foreign constitution can override our own laws, our own sovereignty, and our own identity as a nation?

That would mean we are no longer in control of our country — and that simply cannot be the case.

You cannot pick and choose when to respect the Bahamian Constitution and when to ignore it.

This is not about emotion, politics, or division — this is about law, sovereignty, and national identity.

Bahamians must decide:

πŸ‘‰ Do we stand on OUR Constitution?

πŸ‘‰ Or are we now allowing foreign laws to dictate who is Bahamian and who can vote?  Make it make sense.

Speak Up Bahamas. πŸ‡§πŸ‡Έ



Bahamian Constitutional Attorney - Craig Butler, Esq., Answers:


I’m answering the question and authoritatively so:

πŸ‘‰πŸ½ I’m the constitutional expert.
 
πŸ‘‰πŸ½ if you think you’re smart take me on Peter.

The Bahamian Constitution governs The Bahamas.  Full stop.

No foreign constitution overrides it, dictates it, or displaces it.

But that is not the real issue here.

The confusion is coming from a failure to understand how citizenship actually operates in law.

There are multiple pathways:

• Citizenship by descent (through a Bahamian parent)

• Citizenship by birth with entitlement to apply (e.g., persons born in The Bahamas to non-Bahamian parents applying at 18–19)

• Registration and naturalisation

So when people raise the Haitian Constitution, they are not saying it overrides Bahamian law.  They are pointing to the fact that another country may also recognize that person as its citizen.

That creates dual nationality issues, not constitutional supremacy issues.

And here is the key point many are missing:

A child born in The Bahamas to Haitian parents does not automatically become Bahamian.  They have a constitutional right to apply for citizenship between ages 18 and 19.

Many have exercised that right. Lawfully.

Once granted, they are Bahamian citizens—under our Constitution.

So let’s not distort this.

This is not about Haiti overriding The Bahamas.  This is about people misunderstanding:

• how citizenship is acquired,
• how dual nationality arises, and
• how our own Constitution actually works.

If there are concerns about abuse of the system, then address enforcement and administration.

But do not invent a constitutional conflict that does not exist.

Saturday, April 4, 2026

Political Issues in The Bahamas


Politics in The Bahamas



Bahamas Political Issues



THE BAHAMAS: ELECTORAL REALITY, HISTORICAL STRUGGLE, AND THE WORK AHEAD



Saturday, 4 April 2026
4:07 PM Eastern Standard Time
Nassau, The Bahamas

By Craig F. Butler, Esq.


Today marks 58 years since the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in Memphis, Tennessee — 4 April 1968.

He was killed standing on a balcony.

But what he represented was never killed.

Because the struggle he spoke to — dignity, justice, legitimacy, and the structure of power — did not end in Memphis.

It continues.

And we must be honest enough to say:

It continues here.

I. THE CONTINUITY OF STRUGGLE

We like to think of the African struggle as something external — something that happened “over there,” in America, in South Africa, in the streets of history.

But we are confronting our own version of that struggle right here in The Bahamas.

Not in the same form.
Not with the same violence.

But with the same underlying question:

πŸ‘‰ Who controls power?
πŸ‘‰ How is that power exercised?
πŸ‘‰ And who benefits from it?

II. THE PRESENT MOMENT — EMOTION VS LAW

Right now, the country is agitated.

People are speaking about:

• the voters’ register
• citizenship concerns
• passports
• electoral integrity
• governance and spending

And much of that concern is real.

But we must separate two things:

what is emotionally compelling
and, what is constitutionally possible.

III. THE LEGAL REALITYπŸ‡§πŸ‡ΈπŸ‡§πŸ‡Έ

Let me state this plainly and finally:

πŸ‘‰ The Prime Minister has exercised the prerogative to dissolve Parliament.
πŸ‘‰ The House is prorogued.
πŸ‘‰ The election is called.

That power is spent.

It is not reversible by public pressure.
It is not undone by commentary.
It is not halted by applications that do not meet constitutional threshold.

So let the Bahamian public understand clearly:

There is nothing — short of war, catastrophic disaster, or a true national emergency — that is going to stop the general election scheduled for 12 May 2026.

Not the courts.
Not politics.
Not outrage.

IV. THE HARD TRUTH

We have been talking about these issues for years.

Not one election.
Not two.

Multiple election cycles.

The voters’ register concerns are not new.  Citizenship questions are not new.  Administrative weaknesses are not new.

They are systemic.

So let us stop pretending that this moment created the problem.

It did not.

V. THE REAL ISSUEπŸ‡§πŸ‡ΈπŸ‡§πŸ‡Έ

This is where the country must mature.

The election is going forward.

πŸ‘‰ Votes will be cast
πŸ‘‰ Results will be declared
πŸ‘‰ A government will be sworn in

That is going to happen.

So the real question is no longer:  “Can we stop this election?”

The real question is:

πŸ‘‰ Why have we allowed this issue to persist for so long?

πŸ‘‰ And what are we going to do to fix it after the election?

VI. THE DANGER

Too many of our people are locked into budget politics:

- Who gets contracts
- Who controls spending
- Who distributes the billion dollars

That is not governance.  That is access to power disguised as democracy.

And until we confront that honestly, we will continue to recycle the same problems.

VII. THE WAY FORWARD

If we are serious, the work is clear:

• structural reform of the registration system
• modernization and digitization
• legal accountability where wrongdoing exists
• continuous audit — not election-time outrage
• and sustained national discipline beyond party politics

Because shouting at the moment of election will never fix a problem that has been growing for decades.

VIII. CLOSING

Dr. King fought for justice, but more importantly, he fought for structure — for a system that could sustain dignity, not just promise it.

That is the lesson.

Not emotion.  Not outrage.

Structure.

So let us be clear:

πŸ‘‰ This election is happening.
πŸ‘‰ These problems are not new.
πŸ‘‰ And the real work begins after the vote, not before it.

Because if we do not fix the system, we will be right back here again.


With Professional Respect AsΓ©
CRAIG F. BUTLER ESQ.
Constitutional Theorist
Pan-African Methodology
Commonwealth of The Bahamas