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Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Doris Johnson and The Women’s Suffrage Movement in The Bahamas

Doris Johnson’s Role In The Suffrage Movement




Tribune242 Editorial
Nassau, The Bahamas




ON SUNDAY Prime Minister Perry Christie spoke at a special Bethel Baptist Church service to commemorate National Women’s Month and the 50th anniversary of the women’s suffrage movement in the Bahamas.
 
Doris Johnson
Lawyer Marion Bethel has worked long and hard on gathering information to put this movement into its historical context. She has produced a documentary for the record and has sent a letter to the Prime Minister suggesting that a woman representative from each of the two political parties in the House read Dr Doris Johnson’s speech to the House — a speech that Dr Johnson, being a “stranger” to the House — was not allowed to deliver by a UBP government.
 
If Mrs Bethel’s suggestion is accepted no rules of the House will be bent and no precedents set as the proposal is for women House members to read the Johnson speech. Many think that this is a vindication of Dr Johnson, who not being a member of the House, would have been setting a precedent if she were allowed to walk in and address the chamber. Added to which when she made her request the petition for a woman’s right to vote was already on the House agenda for first reading that day.
 
Dr Johnson’s plan was to have herself admitted to the floor of the House and in a speech launch the woman’s right to vote petition. Dr Johnson had just returned that week from university and, as she told several people at the time, was better educated than the women who had worked so hard over the years to push women’s rights. Dr Johnson felt that with her education she should be the one to take over the movement. Hence her suggestion to the suffragettes that she be allowed to address the House. The suffragettes agreed. In the House Lynden Pindling asked for the unanimous consent of members to agree to a petition from the suffragettes to allow Dr Johnson to address them.
 
Speaker Bobby Symonette said that the women’s petition would have to go to committee, the committee would have to report and the House could then adopt the report.
 
The debate went back and forth — there was a bit of tit-for-tat involved as earlier Sir Milo Butler had objected to Roy Solomon’s motion to spend £9,000 to entertain Prince Philip. It was now the turn of the UBP to object to the PLP’s petition, which is what they did in the case of the Johnson address.
 
However, in the end the matter was settled on precedent and the speech was delivered, but not in the House.
 
In reporting Mr Christie’s weekend address at Bethel our reporter wrote in yesterday’s Tribune:
 
“Doris Johnson’s 1959 address represented a turning point in the movement. It was delivered on the same day she and a group of suffragettes marched to the House of Assembly to present a petition to the government.
 
“The governing United Bahamian Party refused to have her address the House. To an audience of willing parliamentarians, led by Sir Lynden Pindling, Dame Doris delivered the petition and her address in a neighbouring magistrate’s court.”
 
If Mrs Mary Ingraham, one of the founders and chairman of the Movement, had been alive she would have been on the telephone to her good friend, the late Sir Etienne Dupuch, bristling with anger.
 
She would have been furious with The Tribune for “slanting the news” to make it seem that it was Sir Lynden and the PLP that had supported Bahamian women in their fight for human rights.
 
Mrs Ingraham, and her small band of women, had fought hard for many years to keep the movement out of politics, and here we were reporting in a way that gave the impression that it was a PLP fight on their behalf. Mrs Ingraham, a UBP did not go to her representative Sir Stafford Sands to present the petition in the House. Rather she selected Sir Gerald Cash to present the petition because he was an independent member.
 
Within the movement Doris Johnson, and the manner in which she elbowed the founders to the sidelines, was always a sore point within the movement — particularly with Mary Ingraham.
 
If Mrs Ingraham were alive today, she would have insisted that Sir Etienne reprint her 1975 letter “to keep the record straight and let the people know.”
 
In 1962 she presented a plaque to Sir Etienne on which these words were inscribed:
 
“To Sir Etienne Dupuch - In appreciation for his active part through the media of his newspaper in helping me and my colleagues in obtaining the vote for women.
 
“Sufferage Movement started 1952.
 
“Vote granted June 30, 1962.”
 
It was signed by Mary N. Ingraham, Mildred B Donaldson and Rev HW Brown.
 
And so, as she and Sir Etienne would have wished, “to keep the record straight” Mrs Ingraham’s 1975 letter follows:
 
“During this period (1951-52) meetings were held and signatures obtained. Dr Doris Johnson was away at school and had no activities involving this movement whatsoever.
 
“Signatures obtained were from Saint Hilda’s Chapter, Curfew Lodge, Star of the East Lodge of Samaritans.
 
“Active members were Mrs JK Symonette, vice president, Ms Eugenia Lockhart, secretary/treasurer, and Mrs Mary Ingraham, president.
 
“They were working together for many years until the announcement was made that the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Hon Lennox Boyd, was to arrive (April, 1958).
 
“Mary Ingraham made arrangements for an appointment with Mr Lennox-Boyd through Mr K M Wamsley, the then Colonial Secretary for the Colonies.
 
“The ladies that waited on Mr Lennox-Boyd to present him with the second petition was Mrs JK Symonette, Mrs Eugenia Lockhart, Mrs Mary Ingraham, president.
 
“After presenting the petition to him he assured us that it would be dealt with in the House of Commons, to which I have a receipt to prove where it was debated. After Mr Lennox-Boyd’s departure I was a member of the UBP party, but I never wished to force my will on anyone, even my children. I wouldn’t call on the late Sir Stafford Sands being my representative at that time.
 
“I, therefore, called on the Hon. Gerald Cash and asked him to present the petition to the House of Assembly for me because he was an independent member of the House.
 
“He accepted. I sent the petition to Mr Cash containing 9,500 signatures, which he presented to the House with notice to be read at the next meeting.
 
“In that week, Dr Doris Johnson arrived from school and Mrs JK Symonette brought her to the meeting and discussed the activities of the petition coming up for its first reading. Dr Johnson suggested we allow her to address the Assembly before the petition was read. It was a rough morning in the House. Sir Milo Butler objected to the motion by Mr Roy Solomon to spend £9,000 to entertain Prince Philip, therefore, when it was time for Dr Johnson to make her address, Mr Roy Solomon, therefore, objected to the ladies being allowed to address the Assembly.
 
“Sir Roland Symonette, then being Premier, went over to the Magistrate’s Court and got the Magistrate to vacate the courtroom, and brought the members of the House over to the Magistrate’s court to listen to the address of the ladies.
 
“Ladies and gentlemen, this is the only part Dr Johnson played in the vote for the women. And when the motion came for a vote in the House of Assembly not one member of the PLP government, including the Prime Minister (Pindling) voted for the women to vote. Instead every (PLP) member walked out.
 
“Therefore how can Women’s Week be celebrated by this PLP government.”
 
November 06, 2012
 
 

The Future Role of Drones in Latin America





From surveillance missions at altitudes exceeding 35,000 feet to long-range targeted attacks, the U.S. military’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), often referred to as a drone, is designed to overcome any obstacle. American military commanders are envisioning endless possibilities for drones and are now seeking to expand their areas of operation. Currently, a majority of the United States’ 7,500 drones are operated by Central Command in the Middle East, leaving other command centers without UAV capabilities.[1] However, it is expected that the U.S. military’s Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) will see an extreme increase in its active military UAV fleets in Latin America. Latin American countries throughout the region have also begun to expand their own drone capabilities. The use of drones in Latin America is still in early stages of execution, yet despite these shortcomings, drones are expected to play an increasingly important role in Latin America in the coming years.

Source: The Inquisitr

American Drones in the Western Hemisphere
 
Currently, U.S. military drone capabilities are very limited in the Western hemisphere. One of the few areas where military drones are being actively used is along the U.S.-Mexican border in drug and illegal migrant interdictory operations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has nine drones in operation along the border, which is not sufficient surveillance given the expansive boundary. With the consent of the Mexican government, the United States has also been launching drones in Mexico since 2009.[2] In 2011, the Mexican National Security Council stated that they “have been particularly useful in achieving various objectives of combating crime.” However, at the present time, UAVs can only be used for surveillance in the Western Hemisphere, which has proven to be a limiting factor.
 
The UAVs currently operating over the U.S.-Mexican border have been inadequate. To date the drones have had an insignificant impact on border security. In 2011, UAVs assisted in the arrest of less than two percent of the undocumented immigrants detained on the U.S. southwestern border. In that same year, drones operated by the DHS helped find 7,600 pounds of marijuana valued at $19.3 million USD, compared to the 4.5 million pounds intercepted in 2011.[3]
 
Source: The Global Post
 
Outside of Mexico, which falls under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), there are no other active U.S. drone sites in Latin America. However, this may soon change as the DHS and SOUTHCOM hope to use the devices to help locate the narco-submarines that drug cartels widely use to smuggle illegal narcotics through the Caribbean. In preparation for the usage of UAVs in the region, SOUTHCOM has been quietly testing them in the Bahamas for the past 18 months, but to the military’s chagrin, the UAVs have produced disappointing results.[4] During 1,260 hours of work in the Caribbean, drones only helped in a handful of prominent drug busts. These results are far less impressive when the operational costs are taken into account. Drones require hours of maintenance, cost $3,000 USD per flight hour, and demand dozens of staff to function properly. Moreover, alternative surveillance methods have produced more tangible, and cheaper, results.
 
High operational costs, low success rates, and more efficient alternatives indicate a relatively weak outlook for the drone program in Latin America. Despite this, the United States military has been expanding their drone fleet in the Americas for two possible reasons. First, regardless of initial results, improvements in technology could lead to drones becoming extremely beneficial. Latin America’s extensive territory is largely unpatrolled because of insufficient capabilities, allowing many criminals to evade the law.[5] The introduction of U.S. drones in Latin America could help locate criminals who have become experts at evading incarceration. Modern UAVs carry high-tech sensors and cameras that allow unprecedented surveillance capacities. This invaluable technology may prove useful in Latin America as drone operators could identify illegal activities throughout the vast expanses of territory.
 
The second and more likely reason is that the military is looking for alternative ways to project U.S. power and influence in the region. Lately, the United States has been pushed out of the picture in Latin America, as made evident by the recent creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which includes all of the American nations except for the United States and Canada. The overall drop in U.S. military presence in the past three decades is another indicator of the decline in power that the United States is seeing in the region.[6] American military commanders may come to see UAVs as a new way to restore American influence and power in the region. Drone utilization in Latin America would be a stark reminder of the U.S. interventionism seen after the Roosevelt Corollary, when the U.S. set forth to intervene militarily throughout the Americas.

Drone Usage by Latin American Nations
 
The United States is not the only country expanding its drone operations in Latin America. Countries all across Latin America are deploying unmanned aerial vehicles as high-tech solutions to a wide variety of problems, including drug trafficking, gang violence, illegal immigration, and other illicit activities. Currently Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay all have have drone programs. Nearly all of these countries operate Israeli-made UAVs, although Venezuela has purportedly begun to develop and produce its own drones with the help of Iran.[7]
 
Source: Strat Risks (Brazilian Drone)
 
Brazil has also recently expanded its drone program and plans to purchase fourteen more Israeli-made Heron drones by 2014 for $395 million USD.[8] Brazil currently operates UAVs to help patrol the 10,500-mile border that it shares with ten other nations. Ahead of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janiero, Brazil has begun to deploy them over the city in hopes of pacifying the crime-ridden favelas.[9]
 
Unfortunately, this surge of Latin American drones has had several setbacks. In late 2009, Venezuela accused Colombia of sending American-made UAVs to spy on its airspace.[10] Such incidents have led to requests for a code of conduct regarding Latin American UAVs, and although there have been some preliminary discussions, many nations have been hesitant to establish any specific rules. Johanna Medelson Forman, a Latin American specialist from Washington, says that the development of unmanned aerial vehicles in the Americas is a “maturation of Latin American defense systems.”  However, she cautions that the potential for armed drones in Latin America could turn into a “double-edged sword.” [11] While drones could offer advances in security for Latin America, they could also lead to new conflicts. The aforementioned argument led to increased tensions between two countries whose relations were already stressed. Thankfully, outright conflict never broke out.
 
The dangers of drones have not yet been brought into the Latin American public eye. That being said, great precaution should be taken up by the South American defense community when handling unmanned aerial vehicles. For now, drones in Latin America are unarmed, but there is a distinct possibility that in the years to come the thirst for further militarization will change such an approach.
Despite recent incidents and early unimpressive performances, this new technology has the ability to revolutionize military and police forces in the Americas and could very well lead to significant security advances in the region. However, Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Mexico expert at the Brookings Institution, cautions that these nations might become too dependent on drone usage and that UAVs should not replace traditional policing methods. Recently, she opined, “I don’t think [UAVs] have the potential at all to bring any crippling blow to any particular [criminal] organization.” Her point is understandable when one looks at UAVs operating on their own, but when this new technology is paired with manned aircrafts and units on the ground, the practicality of drones is apparent. Conventional police will still be needed to make arrests and get involved in firefights, but their job could be conducted much more efficiently and safely with constant aerial surveillance provided by UAVs.

Conclusion
 
The operation of drones by Latin American nations has both an optimistic and uneasy future. Drones have the potential to be used in a variety of scenarios, from crime fighting to environmental protection, yet many fear they will create more problems than solutions. However, steps are already being taken to prevent interstate conflicts, and there seems to be some consensus among Latin American countries regarding where the future of drone regulation is headed.
 
In recent years, the U.S. has lost much of its influence in the rest of the hemisphere. Drone expansion into Latin America could very well mean the beginning of a renewed interest in the region. SOUTHCOM’s planned drone program shows how Washington is seeking to expand its power to even more strategic regions of the world. In the upcoming years, drones can be expected to have an increased presence in Latin America. Their success will depend on how the drone programs will eventually be implemented and the degree of cooperation between the countries operating UAVs in the Americas.


Patricio Barnuevo, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs


Sources:

[1] Jeremiah Gertler, “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42136.pdf

[2] The Associated Press, “NORTHCOM reassures Mexico over drone flights,” http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/03/ap-uav-mexico-dug-surveillance-flight-031811/

[3] “Performance and Accountability Report,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/publications/admin/fy2011_par.ctt/fy2011_par.pdf

[4] “DHS’ expanded drone use in Caribbean targets drug runners,” GCN, http://gcn.com/articles/2012/06/25/agg-dhs-drone-use-caribbean-vs-drug-runners.aspx

[5] “Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Fiasco General Secretaria, http://www.flacso.org/uploads/media/Organized_Crime.pdf

[6] J. Samuel Fitch, “The Decline of U.S. Military Influence in Latin America,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs

[7] Robert Beckhusen, “Iranian Missile Engineer Oversees Chavez’s Drones,” Wired, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/06/mystery-cargo/

[8] “Brazil Comes to the Fore in Regional Secuirty,” InSightCrime, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/brazil-comes-to-the-fore-in-regional-security

[9] Victoria Rossi, “Brazil Tests Drones to Monitor Rio Favelas,” InsightCrime, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/brazil-tests-drones-to-monitor-rio-favelas

[10] “Colombia denies Venezuela’s claims of spy drones,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8425684.stm

[11] “Expert call for rules of the road for drone use in the Americas,” Homeland Security News Wire, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/experts-call-rules-road-drone-use-americas

November 06, 2012

COHA

 

Saturday, November 3, 2012

Oil drilling and exploration in The Bahamas:... ...The existing regulatory environment for oil exploitation in The Bahamas does not allow for rigorous oversight of potential negative impacts to our most precious resource – the environment ...which underpins the way of life of all Bahamians ...especially those engaged in tourism and fishing

Oil drilling and exploration in The Bahamas


By Earl Deveaux


Nassau, The Bahamas


Despite a long history of exploration in The Bahamas, the substantial risks of petroleum exploitation only gained prominence following the worst oil accident in history – the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.

That spill released more than five million barrels of oil before it was capped and sealed after 83 days.  The oil discharge threatened the Great Bahama Bank, Bimini, the west coast of Andros and western Grand Bahama.  Although a major ecological tragedy, this event forced the risks associated with oil drilling to become a much needed topic of debate in The Bahamas.  If the oil were to reach our shores the potential consequences would be enormous.

The 1971 Bahamas Petroleum Act requires holders of exploratory licences to spud a well after a specified number of  renewals.  The Bahamas Petroleum Company (BPC) had received permits from the government to explore for oil; and those permits had been renewed.  However, following the Deepwater Horizon blowout causing the spillage of millions of barrels of oil into waters contiguous to the waters of The Bahamas, the government declared a moratorium on exploration and suspended all further licenses and renewals.

At the same time, the government also initiated a process to modernize our outdated regulatory regime to properly manage the industry in the event that exploitation of hydrocarbons proved feasible in The Bahamas.

These events preceded the 2012 general election and were not linked to it.  However, oil exploration and the renewal of BPC’s license did become political issues during the election campaign.

Leaders of the current Christie administration had been closely involved in issuing the original licenses to BPC in 2005-2006, and they entered the heated debate during the election campaign; unfortunately during the course of the election campaign, the DNA tried to make political capital out of this issue, and during the process did great damage to sustaining a healthy debate, by ignoring fact, and bringing in allegations that had no basis in fact).

This was despite the fact that events in the Gulf had amply demonstrated the devastating potential consequences for Bahamian tourism, fishing and the environment, should commercial oil reserves be confirmed and exploited without adequate governance.  As a responsible government, the FNM, like most right-thinking Bahamians, had very serious concerns about this prospect.

The existing regulatory environment for oil exploitation in The Bahamas does not allow for rigorous oversight of potential negative impacts to our most precious resource – the environment which underpins the way of life of all Bahamians, especially those engaged in tourism and fishing.

The 1971 act and regulations provide for certain built-in obligations on the part of licensees in the event of a credible oil find.  Those obligations include the requirement to drill a well at a prescribed minimum depth.  The challenge for The Bahamas is that the act was written over 40 years ago; prior to Deepwater Horizon; prior to Cuba drilling for oil in neighboring waters; prior to the delimitation of maritime boundaries with Cuba, and prior to the discovery of oil in the offshore waters of Brazil and Mexico.

Without detailing all the issues inherent in something so materially significant, it is a clear responsibility of the government to prepare the country for oil and its likely consequences, should drilling proceed.  The regulatory, legislative, environmental and financial regimes, must all be comprehensively overhauled to deal with this complex industry.  In our view, Norway appeared to offer the best example of a modern regulatory system capable of managing all the competing interests.


What was done?

In seeking to prepare The Bahamas for a reasoned position on oil, we did a number of things:

1.  We mobilized international assistance through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and completed several pre-impact assessments on Cay Sal Bank.  (These are available to the government and interested members of the public).

2.  We identified gaps in the regulatory protocols and sought expert advice on ways to improve the legislation.

3.  We coordinated and hosted a meeting of technical stakeholders from neighboring countries to ensure a seamless response mechanism in the event of an oil spill.

4.  Provision was made for the engagement of an oil spill response expert at the Port Department, the agency responsible for coordinating initial emergency response.

5. We met with government and industry officials in Norway to obtain an in-depth overview of their petroleum industry and regulatory regime.

As well, there is the decision regarding a national approach to renewable energy, based on the body of work completed and on-going.  Should The Bahamas choose to become a petroleum producing country, it must balance that choice against its current economy and way of life.  And the principal underpinning of our economy and way of life is the natural environment, so this asset must be protected as far as possible.  There are models around the world that we can evaluate and adopt to achieve the most robust protocols and strategies for managing the prospect of oil.

In order to provide a basis for constructive discussion on this subject, I have summarized the main elements of the Norwegian regulatory regime.

Norway is considered among the world leaders in the petroleum industry.  It began oil production in the North Sea in 1971, and now produces almost two million barrels per day as well as large quantities of natural gas.  Norway has developed a strong regulatory and legal framework to govern this important industry.  We sought to get an understanding of this framework, of the environmental issues involved, and of the investment approach for oil revenues.

Norway established a sovereign wealth fund in 1985 to receive a significant portion of its oil and gas revenues.  This fund finances the national pension scheme.

In developing its petroleum industry, Norway was guided by the following principles, which were established before the start of production:

1. The rights to subsea petroleum deposits are vested in the state.

2. Hydrocarbon resources are managed for the benefit of Norwegian society as a whole.

3. International participation in the exploitation of Norwegian petroleum resources is encouraged, but Norwegians should be at the forefront of the industry.

Norwegian officials told us that the industry is both a blessing and a curse, and noted that the existence of resources does not guarantee successful development.  Several countries have discovered oil, but few have used the resulting revenues to advance national development or improve social conditions.

They insisted that before exploration and drilling activities begin, it is essential to have in place a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework that deals with every aspect of the industry including health and safety procedures, licensing procedures, joint ventures, environmental and transportation procedures, and most importantly transparent rules to deal with the huge sums of money that can be generated by this industry.

The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has principal responsibility for governance of the industry and managing the resources on the Norwegian continental shelf.  It ensures that activities are carried out in accordance with the law and government policy.  It also has responsibility for state-owned oil companies, as well as the partially state-owned company, Statoil.

The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate is the technical arm of the ministry and plays a key role in petroleum management.  It exercises administrative authority in connection with the exploration and production of petroleum deposits.

Other government agencies involved in the management of the petroleum industry include the Ministries of the Environment, Labour, Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, and Finance.

The sovereign fund is a construct based on the principle that petroleum resources belong to Norwegian society as a whole.  The state secures a large portion of the profits created through taxation and public ownership of a share of oil and gas fields, pipelines and shore facilities.  The state owns 67 per cent of Statoil, and receives annual dividends which amounted to $2.35 billion in 2011.

To ensure that revenues are used for the benefit of the Norwegian people, the total net cash flow from petroleum activities is transferred to the national pension fund, which also earns income from investments.  These receipts are gradually phased into the national budget by covering the non-oil deficit in the budget.  As a result, Norwegian workers are guaranteed a pension when they retire and enjoy universal healthcare.  Responsibility for management of the fund is delegated to the Central Bank.

The legal framework includes the Petroleum Act of 1996, which governs all petroleum activities, including prospecting and production licenses, development and operational plans, pipeline licenses and decommissioning procedures.  It includes robust environmental and safety regulations.

Petrad is an academic and technical institute that was established in 1989, to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and experience related to petroleum management.  This institute provides training for government officials from around the world based on the experience and expertise that Norway has developed to manage its petroleum resources in a safe, sustainable and environmentally responsible manner.

The Norwegians consider Petrad to be their contribution to international development aid.  The Bahamas was offered training opportunities at Petrad.  Oil producing countries use part of the proceeds to train their own people so that they can play a more active role in the industry, creating skills and jobs.  The Bahamas will have to do likewise.

A most instructive element was the exhaustive protocols put in place by Norway to de-commission expired wells.


Sustainable development

All these elements are an appropriate model for The Bahamas.  It is not just about immediate jobs or short-term revenues.  It is about safeguarding our national future.  The Bahamas must exploit its natural resources sustainably in order to conserve them for future generations.  A recent comprehensive study of the natural resources of Andros – a collaboration of the government, the United Nations and private conservation groups – demonstrated conclusively the extraordinary contribution these resources make to The Bahamian way of life.

Oil comes from nature.  However, the supply of oil is finite.  If The Bahamas chooses to become an oil-producing state, careful thought must be given to the proper management of whatever wealth that will bring to the nation before the resource is exhausted.  Such planning requires the same stewardship that should be applied to the sustainable use of resources such as aragonite, forests, water, arable land or fisheries.  They must be exploited and managed responsibly.

Norway is aware of the addictive quality of oil.  The disintegration of other industries and businesses (this cannot be overemphasized), the heightened levels of corruption, dishonesty and the reduction in the work ethic, which bring about tragic consequences for states and citizens the wealth is intended to serve.  The Bahamas must first prepare itself to avoid the potential adverse consequences so they are eliminated or minimized for our environment and our people.  There must be a full, accountable and transparent national debate on these issues.


• Earl Deveaux is a former member of Parliament and a former Cabinet minister in The Bahamas.

November 02, 2012

thenassauguardian

Thursday, October 25, 2012

It is clear that the enactment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights in Cuba is an ongoing struggle... ...Uncertainty still remains, and the government and society as a whole still display a certain level of uneasiness regarding homosexuality... ...Nonetheless, in comparison with pre-revolutionary times, the situation today has greatly improved... ...Penalties towards gay men have gradually been reduced, the government has expressed its support for gay rights ...and even gay civil unions have been seriously proposed and considered

From persecution to acceptance? The history of LGBT rights in Cuba





By Justin Halatyn
Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Since the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the island nation has received low scores in many human rights indices for reported assaults on freedom of speech, expression, religion, and basic due process. Outside of these violations, historians regard the 1960s as an even more repressive decade for one Cuban community in particular: the country’s homosexual population. Indeed this group has only recently witnessed an opening of civil liberties for them. While the record of their treatment today is certainly not perfect, there are clear signs of a gradual but serious shift from Cuba’s previously anti-LGBT policies to a modern tendency of equal treatment and respect for all sexual orientations.

Even in pre-Revolutionary Cuba, the island’s society relegated the homosexual community to the few LGBT-friendly bars in Cuban cities. Moreover, strict laws criminalized homosexuality and targeted gay men in particular for harassment. In the 1930s, Cuba enacted the Public Ostentation Law, which encouraged the harassment of LGBTs who refused to hide their orientation.1 At this time, Cuba’s legislation toward the LGBT community was essentially no different from what was being done in the rest of Latin America, nor the continent’s colonial ancestors, Spain and Portugal.2

Homosexuality in Cuba Under Castro
The Cuban Revolution seemed to present hope for improved living conditions for the many afflicted members of the community, and hope for a new outlook on old social mores quickly spread across the island. Many gay men were in favor of the Revolution and even supported longtime Cuban President Fidel Castro. However, despite professed egalitarianism, Castro’s government in reality was no kinder to the LGBT community than the pre-revolutionary governments. Castro and the other leading revolutionaries considered homosexuality a devious product of capitalism, which had to be rooted out entirely from society.3

For example, Che Guevara’s definition of the socialist “New Man” in part necessitated a strong and unambiguously heterosexual male.4 This view was not unique to the Castro regime, and could be found in the ideologies of many leaders from other communist countries. For example, the USSR and China routinely persecuted the LGBT community.5 As ironic as it may seem, communist thinking at the time consistently ignored the LGBT community.

The Castro government continued to enforce the Public Ostentation Law following the Revolution. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, gay men were routinely imprisoned for soliciting sex in public locations, government workers lost their jobs because of their homosexuality, and homosexual artists were censored. From 1965 to 1968, openly homosexual men were rounded up and incarcerated in UMAP (Military Units to Aid Production) camps designed to turn them into the heterosexual ideal.

Critics have since denounced UMAP camps as nothing less than military labor camps, which were described by some internees as brutal facilities, complete with physical and verbal mistreatment, dirt floors, and a chronic shortage of food.6 Though Castro himself has denied that they were forced labor camps, he recently acknowledged that gay men were mistreated in certain camps.7 In another case of historic persecution, the infamous Mariel Boat Lift of 1980, the Castro regime expelled thousands of homosexual Cubans he considered among other “undesirables.”8

Policies Begin to Change
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Havana’s policies toward its LGBT community began to change as communist leaders around the world began to lean toward a more tolerant policy regarding homosexuality. Some observers have pointed to the rise of the feminist movement in Cuba as a key component in the liberalization of social tolerance toward Cuba’s LGBT community.9

For example, in 1977 the Cuban National Center for Sex Education (CENESEX) was founded by the Cuban Women’s Federation, which “encouraged a more enlightened outlook on homosexuality and started to undermine traditional sexual prejudices and taboos.”10 Around this period, the Cuban government began to pass laws that broke down the sexual division of labor in the traditional family unit. In 1979 the Cuban government finally removed homosexual acts among consenting adults from the Penal Code as a criminal offense.11 Certainly the situation regarding this practice was much improved in just the course of a decade.

However, as with most countries’ early policies regarding homosexuality, changes in practice have occurred gradually. Despite the legislative reforms, the government continued to prohibit “ostentatious displays of homosexuality” along with “homosexual acts in public places.”12 Cuba also received criticism from the international community during this period for quarantining people with HIV.

Some have argued that another explanation for Havana’s homosexual policies is that Cuba’s continued dependence on the Soviet Union for trade and assistance led to a Stalinist-style intolerance of homosexuality throughout the earlier part of the decade.13 In other words, as in many cases, the LGBT population in Cuba had to wait for continued rights to be granted before discrimination was erased.

In 1986 however, a watershed shift against homophobia occurred in Cuba.14 The annulment of many of the remaining laws in the Penal Code that had prohibited homosexual conduct allowed authorities to release those who had been previously imprisoned for homosexual activity.15 During this period, the Cuban authorities began to show greater tolerance toward homosexuality in order to enforce safe sex and to gain political support for the regime from the LGBT community and from critical international observers. Finally, in 1993, the incarceration law for HIV patients was rescinded.

The Cuban government began to produce films and documentaries condemning discrimination against homosexuality, and the medical community in Cuba began to describe homosexuality as a natural minority condition rather than a perverse choice.16 This medical outlook was particularly crucial in the reevaluation of policies toward the LGBT population.

Homosexuality in Cuba Today
Today, official legal penalties for gay men continue to be eliminated. For instance, in 1988 the penal code imposed fines on those who “hassle others with homosexual demands.” However, in 1997, this language was modified to “hassling with sexual demands,” gradually removing the distinction between heterosexual and homosexual behavior. In addition, previous public scandal laws that penalized those who “publicly flaunted their homosexual condition” were later changed to those who engaged in “sexual insult,” indicating a more modest tone against homosexuality.17

Particularly progressive reforms have been made in the last few years under current President Raúl Castro, largely from the strong backing of his daughter Mariela Castro, who is also the director of CENESEX.18 The most revolutionary change occurred in June 2008, when the Cuban government permitted doctors to perform sex change operations.19 In the last year, the Cuban parliament proposed a law permitting same-sex unions.20 If this law does pass, it would signal a huge breakthrough in LGBT rights in Cuba.

Havana’s rhetoric regarding homosexuality has grown more tolerant as well. Raúl Castro has publicly declared his support for LGBT rights.21 Fidel also has changed his tone dramatically since the 1960s. Although he once vulgarly referred to homosexuals as “agents of imperialism,” and praised the Cuban countryside for supposedly being free of homosexuality, his recent declarations express a much more tolerant sentiment.22

In the last few years, Fidel has come to support LGBT rights, claiming he was distracted by other problems in the earlier period of the Revolution. Additionally, he now claims that the persecution of homosexuals in earlier years was “a great injustice.”23 Considering that even Fidel has changed his outlook, it is unlikely the Cuban government will shift back anytime soon to a less progressive position.

Despite the recent announcements by the Castro regime to move towards an LGBT friendly community, the government remains inconsistent with all of its promises. For example, gay men have long been considered unfit to join the Communist Party. Within the last 20 years, a few prominent gay bars and organizations have been raided and shut down by the government.24

Gay rights activists, both in Cuba and abroad, have accused the Cuban authorities of applying the crime of “pre-criminal dangerousness” unfairly to homosexuals, and ignoring complaints of those who have been beaten or fired from their jobs because of their sexual orientation.25 Other gay rights activists have criticized Mariela Castro for her inconsistency and hypocrisy when it comes to gay rights, arguing that gay rights activists continue to be imprisoned, beaten, or simply disappear while she provides little more than lip service to the issue.26

In addition, while Cuban society is gradually warming up toward homosexuality and LGBT rights, many homophobic elements remain. For example, in 2006, the Cuban state television released “The Dark Side of the Moon,” the first soap opera on Cuban television concerning issues of homosexuality. Although the soap opera was received favorably by many for bringing the issue into the public discourse, it also attracted enormous controversy, with many Cubans saying they were offended by the show’s release and refused to watch it. The most negative reviews conceded the belief that the show was important, but as a way to warn people of homosexuality’s consequences rather than a way to promote tolerance and acceptance toward it.27

Lastly, on October 16, the Cuban government announced it would end its exit visa requirements for its citizens to travel abroad.28 While the connection to gay rights is marginal at best, such an act does suggest yet another attempt by the Castro regime to modernize and adapt to the changing demands of its society. Whether this more lenient policy translates into greater rights for gays in the near future is unclear, but it certainly suggests a willingness to consider more progressive customs, which is another promising sign.

It is clear that the enactment of LGBT rights in Cuba is an ongoing struggle. Uncertainty still remains, and the government and society as a whole still display a certain level of uneasiness regarding homosexuality. Nonetheless, in comparison with pre-revolutionary times, the situation today has greatly improved. Penalties towards gay men have gradually been reduced, the government has expressed its support for gay rights, and even gay civil unions have been seriously proposed and considered.29

Citations:
1 Ellis, Jo. “Homosexuality in Cuba: Revolution Within the Revolution.” Greenleft.news, July 4, 1999.
2 Bjorklund, Eva. “Homosexuality is Not Illegal in Cuba, But Like Elsewhere, Homophobia Persists.” Angelfire.
3 Ellis, Jo. “Homosexuality in Cuba: Revolution Within the Revolution.” Greenleft.news, July 4, 1999.
4 Miroff, Nick. “Cuba: For Macho Island, a Shift on Civil Unions.” Global Post, July 28, 2011.
5 Bjorklund, Eva. “Homosexuality is Not Illegal in Cuba, But Like Elsewhere, Homophobia Persists.” Angelfire.
6 Ellis, Jo. “Homosexuality in Cuba: Revolution Within the Revolution.” Greenleft.news, July 4, 1999.
7 “LGBT Rights in Cuba.” Wikipedia, June 15, 2012.
8 Ibid.
9 Ellis, Jo. “Homosexuality in Cuba: Revolution Within the Revolution.” Greenleft.news, July 4, 1999. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43b/172.html
10 Bjorklund, Eva. “Homosexuality is Not Illegal in Cuba, But Like Elsewhere, Homophobia Persists.” Angelfire.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ellis, Jo. “Homosexuality in Cuba: Revolution Within the Revolution.” Greenleft.news, July 4, 1999. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43b/172.html
14 Ibid.
15 Bjorklund, Eva. “Homosexuality is Not Illegal in Cuba, But Like Elsewhere, Homophobia Persists.” Angelfire.
16 Tatchell, Peter. “The Defiant One.” The Guardian, June 7, 2001.
17 “LGBT Rights in Cuba.” Wikipedia, June 15, 2012.
18 Sweas, Megan. “Cuba’s Gay Rights Revolution.” Global Post, June 29, 2012.
19 “Cuba Approves Sex Change Operations.” Reuters, June 6, 2008.
20 Miroff, Nick. “Cuba: For Macho Island, a Shift on Civil Unions.” Global Post, July 28, 2011.
21 “Raul Castro’s Daughter Says Dad Supports Gay Rights.” Havana Times, May 14, 2012.
22 “LGBT Rights in Cuba.” Wikipedia, June 15, 2012.
23 “Fidel Castro Takes Blame for 1960s Gay Persecution.” Globe and Mail, August 31, 2010.
24 Tatchell, Peter. “The Defiant One.” The Guardian, June 7, 2001.
25 Tamayo, Juan O. “Gay Activists in Cuba Demand that Parliament Respect their Rights.” The Miami Herald, June 28, 2012.
26 Sweas, Megan. “Cuba’s Gay Rights Revolution.” Global Post, June 29, 2012.
27 Ravsberg, Fernando. “Controversial Gay Soap Opera Grips Cuba.” BBC News, May 3, 2006.
28 Orsi, Peter and Andrea Rodriguez. “Cuba Scraps Exit Visa Requirement, Eliminating Major Impediment for Travel Overseas.” Huffington Post, October 16, 2012.
29 Miroff, Nick. “Cuba: For Macho Island, a Shift on Civil Unions.” Global Post, July 28, 2011.

The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org

October 25, 2012

Caribbeannewsnow

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

The ABC newspaper in Spain reported that a Venezuelan doctor from an unknown location revealed that Castro had suffered a massive embolism in the right cerebral artery... "I can state that we are not going to see him again in public." ...The alleged doctor who, if he is, would first abandon his own compatriots, described Castro’s health as "very close to a neural-vegetative state."

Fidel Castro is dying

By Fidel Castro /Photos: Alex Castro





A message to the first graduating class from the Victoria de Girón Medical Sciences Institute was enough to prompt imperialist propaganda to go into overdrive and news agencies to voraciously launch themselves after the lie. Not only that but, in their cables, they attributed the most unheard of nonsense to the patient. 

Fidel Castro


The ABC newspaper in Spain reported that a Venezuelan doctor from an unknown location revealed that Castro had suffered a massive embolism in the right cerebral artery; "I can state that we are not going to see him again in public." The alleged doctor who, if he is, would first abandon his own compatriots, described Castro’s health as "very close to a neural-vegetative state."

While many persons in the world are deceived by information agencies which publish this nonsense - almost all in the hands of the privileged and rich - people believe less and less in them. Nobody likes to be deceived; even the most incorrigible liar expects to be told the truth. In April of 1961, everyone believed the information published in the news agencies that the mercenary invaders of Girón or Bay of Pigs, whatever one wants to call it, were approaching Havana, when in fact some of them were fruitlessly trying by boat to reach the yanki warships escorting them.

The peoples are learning and resistance is growing, faced with the crisis of capitalism which is recurring with greater frequency; no lies, repression or new weapons will be able to prevent the collapse of a production system which is increasingly unequal and unjust.

A few days ago, very close to the 50th anniversary of the October Crisis, news agencies pointed to three guilty parties: Kennedy, having recently become the leader of the empire, Khrushchev and Castro. Cuba did not have anything to do with nuclear weapons, nor with the unnecessary slaughter of Hiroshima and Nagasaki perpetrated by the president of the United States, Harry S. Truman, thus establishing the tyranny of nuclear weapons. Cuba was defending its right to independence and social justice.

When we accepted Soviet aid in weapons, oil, foodstuffs and other resources, it was to defend ourselves from yanki plans to invade our homeland, subjected to a dirty and bloody war which that capitalist country imposed on us from the very first months, which left thousands of Cubans dead and maimed.

When Khrushchev proposed the installation here of medium range missiles similar to those the United States had in Turkey – far closer to the USSR than Cuba to the United States – as a solidarity necessity, Cuba did not hesitate to agree to such a risk. Our conduct was ethically irreproachable. We will never apologize to anyone for what we did. The fact is that half a century has gone by, and here we still are with our heads held high.

I like to write and I am writing; I like to study and I am studying. There are many tasks in the area of knowledge. For example, never before have the sciences advanced at such an astounding speed.

I stopped publishing "Reflections" because it is definitely not my role to take up pages in our press, dedicated to other tasks which the country requires.

Birds of ill omen! I don’t even remember what a headache is. As evidence of what liars they are, I present them with the photos which accompany this article.



Fidel Castro Ruz
October 21, 2012
10:12 a.m.


- Elías Jaua: Fidel is very well, very lucid


Granma.cu 

Sunday, October 21, 2012

...the latest in the ongoing debate between the US and Latin America on drug legalization

Drug legalization in Latin America: Could it be the answer?


Drug Legalization Debate between Latin America and the U.S.

By Gene Bolton
Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Last March, Central American nations held a drug legalization summit in Antigua, Guatemala. As the host of the summit, Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina suggested that production, consumption, and sales of narcotics should be regulated and legalized. [1] In April, current strategies to fight the war on drugs received frequent criticism at the Summit of the Americas.

In fact, several other Latin American countries, namely Costa Rica, Colombia, and Uruguay suggested legalization and decriminalization approaches should be undertaken in an effort to reduce drug violence. Even US President Barack Obama acknowledged that the issue should be discussed but thought that legalization, “[was] not the answer.” [2]

The above events represent the latest in the ongoing debate between the US and Latin America on drug legalization. To one extent or another, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay have decriminalized various forms of consumption and possession, the current legalization rhetoric is still a substantial deviation from mainstream policy proposals. Furthermore, there is a substantial difference between legalization and decriminalization. Legalization transforms what was once an illegal black market into a legal industry. On the other hand, decriminalization only legalizes particular aspects of the industry such as consumption.

Washington’s hard-lined anti-legalization position is unlikely to waiver regardless of who wins the upcoming US presidential election. A more important question lies in Washington’s loss of influence within the region over the last ten years. As a result, the potential for legalization makes the overall political ramifications unpredictable for the region. This is especially true when it comes to Uruguay, a country that will soon be voting on the world’s first legalization legislation. Montevideo, however, is hardly the only country in the hemisphere entertaining such an option: officials from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Colombia, and Mexico have all publicly indicated openness to the possibility of ratifying legalization legislation. [3]

Keeping this in mind, the following analysis compares the potential benefits and shortcomings of drug legalization as a policy initiative to reduce overall drug crime. It becomes prudent to first debunk a common misconception regarding legalization: there is no country, province, state, or region that has ever legalized any type of narcotic, including the Netherlands. While there has been previous decriminalization legislation, legalization initiatives are, as of now, unprecedented.

Legalization Economics, Police Corruption, and Overcrowded Prisons
The drug trade mirrors the global economy as it involves a number of interdependent countries. It begins with drug producing countries (in this case, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru), and then travels through the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador), until it is trafficked through Mexico and into the US for consumption.

Legalization appeals to Latin American countries for a variety of reasons. First, the countries too often frequented by violence believe that legalization can be an effective deterrent to drug-related crime. Substantial drug profits incentivize violence for drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), leading them to fight over limited lucrative drug transit routes. According to Matthew S. Jenner, J.D., the current drug trade is similar to an oligopoly -- a market dominated by only a few firms. Prices are high because the drug trade is forced to avoid governmental authorities and because the few operating firms are driving the hemisphere’s drug prices.

In the context of basic economic principles, an increase in legal narcotics would reduce current prices, as legitimate producers and traffickers would be able to enter the market. [4] For many proponents, drug legalization is an effective way to affect the current market by diminishing the monetary incentives for DTOs in order to engage in violent tactics, if that is their mission.

Second, a reduction of DTO profits would also diminish the amount of contraband as well as other resources available to corrupt police forces. Mexico, along with the countries located in the Northern Triangle, are plagued with some of the highest rates of police corruption in all of Latin America. [5] These authorities are unable to compete financially with the drug cartels operating inside their borders when it comes to maintaining the ethic of public interest within their police forces. Although legalization would not address the corrupt police officer “culture,” at least DTOs would be unable to sustain their current levels of financial persuasion.

Third, legalization would almost certainly address the issue of overcrowded prisons across Latin America. A recent study in which the Transnational Institute (TNI) participated drew an important link between this issue and counter-narcotic policies through research conducted in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. (Bolivia, Peru and Colombia are among the world’s largest producers of cocaine). The study concluded that most drug-related arrests have been low-level distributors and street dealers -- with minimal arrests of “high-level players.” [6] Low-level dealers are easily replaced.

Within countries with decriminalization policies, users are regularly mistaken for dealers or traffickers, and, as a result, the prison systems are filled beyond operating capacity. [7] Furthermore, the study found that drug-related offenses are disproportionately high to other classifications of crimes and carry severe punishments. For example, in the same Transnational Institute study, “In Ecuador, a low-level drug transporter, or ‘mule’ may receive a longer prison sentence than a murderer.” [8] With legalization, the ambiguity of dealers versus users is nonexistent because the entire drug business becomes legal.

US Narco-appetites and Incubation

If Latin American countries pass legislation to legalize drugs while Washington retains its current policies, it is likely that the US drug demand and the resulting “incubation” effect will persist. The incubation effect is the redirection of criminal organizations into other forms of illegal activities as a result of residing inside a country for long periods of time. [9] In other words, the drug trade allows criminal organizations to expand as they nestle deep into social fabrics. By all accounts, the incubation period will continue as long as US drug demand finances profitable DTOs.

Los Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel, provides an interesting case study in illustrating this point. The Mexican DTO decided to venture into migrant smuggling in an effort to increase its profits. Today such smuggling is Los Zetas’ second most lucrative activity; its influence has spread all the way to Petén in northern Guatemala. According to the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, human smuggling was not a part of organized criminal networks before Los Zetas began targeting the industry. Instead, “coyotes,” independent human smugglers, would charge fees to smuggle groups of migrants through Mexico and into the United States.

Because of their substantial drug profits, Los Zetas completely transformed the human smuggling industry. While coyotes could only smuggle scarcely more than twenty migrants at a time, Los Zetas could smuggle hundreds of migrants in armored vehicles across the border. Ultimately, Los Zetas gained control of the Guatemalan human smuggling market, killing anyone attempting to travel beyond their control. [10] The estimated industry value of migrant smuggling in Latin America today is $6.6 billion USD according to the UN report on crime globalization, having grown in no small part from Los Zetas. [11]

Morris Panner, a former US federal crime prosecutor, suggests that the trend of DTOs exploring new “business” ventures is far more pervasive than their drug trade involvement. He goes on to imply that the entire business model for Latin American organized crime is in a transitional period, in which these organizations are diversifying ways to earn money, either as a growth or survival strategy. [12]

For example, PEMEX, the Mexican state-owned oil company, has reported that the local committee has lost approximately 40 percent of its production, or $750 million USD, to oil theft in cartel-controlled territory. [13] While other figures are difficult to estimate, kidnap ransoming is valued between $200 million and $500 million USD annually. [14] It appears that these industries are growing as a result of continuing U.S. drug demand and DTO incubation.

While Panner does not adequately address the potential impact of widespread drug legalization, he does conclude that criminal organizations are “pursuing a larger, more extensive agenda.” [15] It appears DTOs are able to expand into other illicit markets because of their substantial drug trade revenues.

Many variables, including the dissemination of accurate information, unpredictability, and other issues make the full effect of legalization on drug consumption within Latin America impossible to predict. In comparison to global consumption levels, Latin America has been historically low, most likely because a large part of the population has difficulty affording food, let alone expensive drugs. However, recent trends suggest consumption is on the rise. [16]

In the presence of a legalization drive, Latin American populations would be exposed to cheaper drugs, potentially causing demand to increase. Although this is only one possible scenario, it is doubtful that drug consumption in Latin America will decrease to any extent due to the fact it has been increasing in recent years despite current high prices.

Legalization as a Policy Recommendation?

The idealistic benefits of legalization make it an attractive policy choice for its potential to reduce cartel influence, unpack overcrowded prisons, and eradicate police corruption. However, the main problem with the Latin American legalization policies is that with all of these activities they would not alter US demand. If the US population could feed their drug habits domestically or their drug demand decreased, then it is possible that the current violent drug trade would not be able to continue as is.

Such uncomfortable data swirls around the current Washington-LAC line. On the one hand, Latin America is no longer afraid to move ahead with policies without Washington’s endorsement, as evidenced by Uruguay’s current marijuana legalization initiative. However, the volume of US drug demand makes Washington’s cooperation essential since it is the driving force behind the drug trade. It could still be argued that legalization has the potential to reduce the violence associated with the rising levels of Latin American drug consumption. Without a doubt, legalization would be more effective than decriminalization because the ambiguous definition of who is a “dealer” and who is a “user” would no longer be an issue.

Decriminalization policies that allow for various levels of consumption and possession have existed for years, most notably in Mexico, where homicide rates are among the highest in all of Latin America. Proponents still argue that legalization would at least help solve problems like overcrowded prisons throughout the region, even if Washington abstains from implementing such policies.

However, the incubation effect would continue to provide low-level street dealers with suddenly illegal employment opportunities. Therefore, it appears that only addressing the issue of Latin American consumption, without addressing US consumption, would be insufficient to stop the carnage of organized drug dealing in the region.

Conclusion

It is somewhat trite and simplistic to claim that drug initiatives are controversial and provocative initiatives. Certainly, many questions need to first appear on the table, much less answered, which include which drugs could be legalized. Here, cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and even methamphetamine are coupled, along with the public health implications of such a drastic response to warrant an answer. As drug consumption is on the rise in Latin America, it is difficult to predict which effects would be bequeathed upon populations suddenly introduced to a plethora of cheap legal narcotics.

As Washington’s political influence wanes in Latin America, leaders may use their position on the global stage as leverage against any US policy of pressuring Latin Americans to engage in any ongoing supply-side strategies. For example, some suggest that Guatemalan President Molina’s legalization rhetoric served as a front to serve as a means to provide for the resumption of military aid to Guatemala. [17] If true, it must be emphasized that any politicizing of legalization could serve as a means to incentivize other Latin American leaders to engage in similar tactics.

Regardless, legislative measures appear to be futile without US cooperation. While there are a wide variety of security issues that need to be addressed in Latin America, most appear to be tied to the drug trade along with the US profits that are associated with the demand for such drugs in the US. Although three states in the US are currently voting on marijuana legalization laws, and Washington has initiated demand-side strategies, it is clear that many more measures need to be taken to reduce the rampant drug-related violence that abounds throughout the Americas.

Sources:
[1] CNN U.S., “Guatemala’s President Makes Drug Legalization Pitch,” March 25, 2012.
[2] Jackie Calmes, “Obama Says Legalization Is Not the Answer on Drugs” The New York Times, April 14, 2012
[3] Mke McDonald, “Drug Legalization Gains Support in Central America” The Tuscon Sentinel, March 3, 2012
[4] Matthew S. Jenner, “International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a Domestic Solution,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (2011).
[5] NORIA, “Central America: The Downword Spiral of the Northern Triangle, July 12, 2012.
[6] BBC, “Latin American Drug Laws ‘Worsen Prison Overcrowding,’” December 9, 2010.
[7] IBID.
[8] IBID.
[9] Alejandro Madrazo, “Leglize Marjiuana? New Domestic and International Initiatives Challenge the Status Quo,” The Brookings Institution, October 3, 2012.
[10] Guatemala Human Rights Commission, “Los Zetas in Guatemala
[11] IBID.
[12] Morris Panner, “Latin American Oraganized Crime’s New Business Model,” ReVista: Harvard Reiew of Latin America, 2012
[13] IBID.
[14] IBID.
[15] IBID.
[16] John Lyons, “Drug Use Climbs in Poorer Nations,” The Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2012, .
[17] CNN U.S., “Guatemala’s President Makes Drug Legalization Pitch,” March 25, 2012.

The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org

October 17, 2012

Caribbeannewsnow

Saturday, October 20, 2012

Venezuela: ... ...Since Chavez has won the election, we now need to reflect on the main tasks of the Bolivarian Revolution... ...As Chavez says, we will never win as long as the economy of Venezuela maintains the characteristics of a capitalist rentier state... ...Socialism has barely started in our country ...we are starting to learn ...we are dependent on our people and the people of the world, to answer the question ...how we can start to construct this new model of production; the new productive model of socialism?

Socialist Transformation in an Oil-Dependent Economy: a Venezuelan Perspective



By Pablo Gimenez and Revolutionary Communist Group



[RCG 10.10.12] Since the beginning of the 20th century, Venezuela has been one of the world’s largest exporters of oil and a favoured destination for international investment. Oil exportation first began in 1917 and has defined – some would say distorted – the Venezuelan economy ever since.

Pablo Gimenez is a Professor of political economy at the Bolivarian University of Venezuela (UBV) in Caracas. He spoke to us both about the challenges posed by Venezuela’s oil-dependent economy and about the difficulties involved in trying to forge a new way of teaching political economy in the context of the Bolivarian Revolution.

"I am an economist at the central university of Venezuela and national co-ordinator of its programme of political economy for the Bolivarian University of Venezuela, which is a very specific programme. Our school of political economy is somewhat unique, in that it came about as the result of a big debate amongst professors at the university over the necessity of considering economic issues within the context of a revolution.

Our programme of political economy was born out of this great debate, with a view to shifting the paradigm and perspective of the school of traditional economics. In contrast to classic economics, we offer a programme that is very critical of it, and in fact sets out to deconstruct it. So we are not a school of political economy in the traditional sense. We are a school of political economy that is quite explicitly in open confrontation with economic orthodoxy.

Many people confuse the teaching of political economics with an adherence to the teaching of the economics of the Soviet Union. They think that political economics can only refer to the experience of the Soviet Union. But what we are doing is offering a critique of classical economics, in particular of liberal economic thought, and specifically, with a particular emphasis on a critique of political economy as set out by Karl Marx – the theoretical basis on which he explained capitalist society and which lays bare the reality of much of what is actually happening in the world.

The other major paradigms that make up our programme of study is the resurrection of what we can call a specific understanding of the economic critique of Venezuela in particular – economic thinking in Latin America overall, and specifically about Venezuela. That is to say, when we speak of understanding the economic situation of Venezuela, we need to study the writings of Venezuelans.

During the period of neoliberalism, these Venezuelan economic thinkers were ignored.

In the university where I was, the Central University of Venezuela, these writers were not studied. Political economy was not studied, the issues of an oil economy were not studied, the specific questions of the Venezuelan economy were not studied. We studied instead from textbooks published by international publishing houses which were founded on the neo-classical principles of political economy, that is to say neoliberalism, with the case studies being almost all based on the economy of the United States.

'Drowning in the Devil's Excrement' Pablo highlights some of the books that clarify his point
 
'Drowning in the Devil's Excrement' Pablo highlights some of the books that clarify his point


The economic model of the US was put forward as the model that Venezuela should aspire to, despite the fact that the Venezuelan economy was and remained in a state of macro-economic disequilibrium. So our school of economics sets out to critique that model and to re-establish critical thinkers from Latin America, critical thinkers from Venezuela, and to study classical economic thought in the context of the political critique of Karl Marx.

The point of this enormous effort to create a school of thought that is pluralistic and open to critical thinking is the context of the Bolivarian Revolution. From that perspective, we have engaged in an open debate about the content of this programme, but our specific concern has been over the economic content. And from that point of view we have wanted to consider in the first instance a theme put forward by a number of Venezuelan writers, which is a fundamental tenet of classical economics, that of a 'renta la tierra' economy (land rentierism). La renta de la tierra in Venezuela is mineral rentierism, a specific form of development which we can call renta petroleo, or an oil-rentier economy.

Between 1936 and 1979, or even up to 1983 according to some writers, the Venezuelan economy was characterised by the development of what has been described as a rentier capitalism. That is to say, what developed was a very particular form of capitalism in Venezuela inextricably linked to the influx of oil money. When we talk of oil rentierism, we are talking about an interest and flow of international investment that is the result not of productive labour by the Venezuelans but rather comes about as a product of exporting oil, seen as a rich resource by some.

There are liberal currents within the process who believe in state capitalism, who want a stable capitalism with less international exploitation, who follow the state capitalist model for example of Brazil, of Lula. In Venezuela we have witnessed the phenomenon whereby investment in social production has risen alongside salaries, yet we have not been able to raise the levels of production. It has led to more imports.

This is the phenomenon of the oil rentier state. We need to develop secondary industry and food production. We have been able to develop as fast as we have done due to the profits from petroleum, but this undermines the need and impulse to develop the forces of production.

It is one of the greatest problems faced by the Bolivarian Revolution, or at least one of its greatest challenges. How do we confront this challenge? Well, on the left, and especially in this programme we are developing, we have to ask, what is the real problem here – capitalism, or rentierism? Is the problem rentier capitalism, or rentierism, or capitalism itself? That is the big question we have to answer.

Neoliberalists propose the construction of a normal, stable capitalism, for example, the proposals of Capriles, who proposes 'popular capitalism' where the companies make profits, and the workers receive salaries, without having the distortion of petroleum deposits. They have resuscitated a theory of liberal thought - to take this oil-rentier state and turn it into industrialisation. This programme is not sufficient, as analysed by Chavez in his 'programa patria' who acknowledged that the character of the Venezuelan state is one of rentier capitalism.

The UBV and Chavez alike, argue the need to transcend the oil rentier economy, and also capitalism itself because socialism must be constructed fearlessly. This requires the development of the material bases of production, which guarantee the necessities of the majority of humanity. Socialism must be a system where everyone can satisfy their basic needs, and a system where the conditions to satisfy the necessities of one person involves satisfying the needs of everyone.

In the particular case of Venezuela, we have to take these oil deposits, take this rentier economy and transform it into social investments, but not only social investments, but investments into social production. What does this mean? This means converting petroleum rent into a form of socialist accumulation. And so, this leads to the alliances, that Chavez speaks about, strategic alliances with productive sectors of the economy, such as the business sectors, the bourgeois who adapt a progressive manner, for example the communal companies, the worker-controlled companies, the social property companies, the cooperatives.

This is why currently Chavez is proposing to develop strategic alliances, where the state owns 40% of private companies or cooperatives, in order to develop the forces of production necessary to progress to socialism.

Of course international development is necessary, with MERCOSUR, with ALBA with UNASUR, so the Venezuelan state is not only developing strategic alliances with private companies in Venezuela, but across Latin America. This is the first step towards transforming the rentier oil state in a way which is necessary for the construction of socialism.

First is the theme of strategic alliances to develop the forces of production, the second is developing an analysis of Venezuelan critical thought, on the theme of the connection between the basic industries and the light industries, between the cooperatives and the small self-employed business people, or the worker-controlled businesses, and the self-employed.

What does this mean? Well, the Venezuelan economy, which is still capitalist, needs to develop within specific conditions; The petroleum industry is the most developed and connected with the world market, compared to any other industry in Venezuela. The heavy industries of Guyana, aluminium, iron etc., are more developed for exportation of these resources, than for domestic production.

In order to develop socialism, we need to develop the interconnection between these basic industries, and petroleum production, such as plastic production from petrol. National production and national industry are needed for national development to transform the relations of social production. And so our school of thought, this programme we are developing has these concerns.

We are trying to develop both technical and political perspectives. Technical because we have to work concretely within the Bolivarian Revolution, where our needs involve technical knowledge that can be used for administration, innovation and development in the process of socialist industrialisation. Political, to ensure that this process remains firmly within a model of the socialist transformation of the bases of production. So these are the main themes of political education in the UBV.

When we look at Chavez's Progama Patria, we can see the important theme is about saving humanity, these are not lightweight proposals, such as the proposals of Capriles. Rather, concretely, Chavez develops the theme of national independence and sovereignty, how to construct Latin America as a power, developing the theme of ecology, important for humanity and the country. He sets out concrete tasks of the revolution.

Since Chavez has won the election, we now need to reflect on the main tasks of the Bolivarian Revolution. As Chavez says, we will never win as long as the economy of Venezuela maintains the characteristics of a capitalist rentier state. Socialism has barely started in our country, we are starting to learn, we are dependent on our people and the people of the world, to answer the question, how we can start to construct this new model of production; the new productive model of socialism?"

Translated by Cat Allison and Sam McGill

 
 
October 16, 2012