The Summit of the Americas: A Cuban conundrum for Colombian President Santos

by COHA Staff

From April 9 to 15, 2012, the Organization of American States (OAS) and other multilateral bodies will host the Sixth Summit of the Americas, which will take place in Cartagena, Colombia. Bogota is absorbed by this major meeting of hemispheric heads of state; according to the Spanish website Infodefensa.com, Colombia will deploy up to five thousand police officers, six planes and helicopters and three unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), to ensure the event goes on without a hitch.[1]

Unfortunately, the Juan Manuel Santos administration has been deeply concerned that the event’s occurrence would be flawlessly staged, while at the same time it has had to face a diplomatic incident leading up to what Latin America correctly has conceptualized as an extremely important summit. Cuba, which is the only state in the Western Hemisphere that is not a de facto member of the OAS, declared its interest in attending what is certain to be a very substantive meeting of the heads of state.

This possibility became a concern for Washington, which has been at diplomatic odds with the Castro government (first Fidel and then Raul) for decades. Tensions regarding the OAS-led summit further flared up even more when Ecuador, a member of the ALBA bloc (Alianza Bolivariana para las Americas – Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas), let it be known that the ALBA bloc could possibly boycott the meeting if Havana was not allowed to participate.

This situation led to President Santos being placed in an untenable position (he would have to invite Castro to avoid an ALBA boycott but, in turn, this would have angered Washington, who would undoubtedly decide to boycott the meeting), so the Colombian head of state decided to travel to Havana to meet with the Cuban leadership. He met with Raul Castro closed doors and had the onerous chore of having to ask Castro to reconsider his intention to go to Cartagena, in order to avoid an incident with the US delegation. This incident, if it had progressed, would have presented Santos with a guaranteed diplomatic conundrum, but thankfully, this situation did not escalate. The ALBA bloc, including Venezuela, will attend the meeting in lieu of a boycott, and Castro won’t attend.[2]

Cuba, the OAS and the Santos Trip

Cuba and the OAS historically have had a troubled relationship. The island state, with its pre-revolution regime, was one of the original OAS members. The OAS was founded in 1948 as successor to the Pan American Union. After the Cuban 1959 revolution was staged, the John F. Kennedy administration pushed for the continent to politically and economically isolate Cuba after its military relationship with Soviet Moscow was acknowledged by Fidel.

The OAS suspended the Caribbean island from January 1962 until June 2009. It would take nearly five decades for there to be sufficient momentum on the continent for a major policy shift to be made regarding Cuba. In the end, even though Cuba’s membership was validated, Havana decided to dismiss its prospects for full participation and chose not to return to the OAS at this time.

This historical development occurred due to the rise of regimes in the region which have been vociferous in their criticism of US foreign policy (as can be found in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador), along with the rise of powerhouses like Brazil.

In 2002, Mexico held a major international conference on financing for development, called by then-United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan.[3] Then-US President George W. Bush was scheduled to attend, but a diplomatic impasse developed when Fidel Castro, the historical Cuban head of state, decided to attend as well. In order to avoid the embarrassment that was sure to follow, then-Mexican President Vicente Fox privately called Castro and asked him not to come, and the Cuban leader appeared to agree to this. However, even though the conversation between the two leaders was supposed to have been private, Castro actually taped their phone conversation and then made it public. In a famous line, Fox tells Castro that “puedes venir pero comes y te vas” (“you can come, but you eat and then you’ll leave”).[4]

Another causative Cuba-related diplomatic incident occurred in 2009, when Trinidad and Tobago hosted the Fifth Summit of the Americas, and there was a clash between Washington and Caracas over Havana. Even before the summit, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez declared that it would be clear that “we’re going to Trinidad and Tobago to put that issue on the table […] from the moment the curtain goes up, Cuba will appear on the stage.”[5] Throughout the Summit, there also was concern that Chavez and his allies would follow the final declaration at the end of the meeting with one of their own as a way to protest the US embargo against Cuba.

Ironically, in spite of the tension surrounding the meeting, Obama met with Chavez, which was immortalized in an iconic photograph.[6] The US leader also stated that “the US seeks a new beginning with Cuba […] I know there is a longer journey that must be traveled to overcome decades of mistrust, but there are critical steps we can take toward a new day.”[7]

As preparations for the Cartagena summit began to take shape, rumors began to circulate that Cuba would insist in attending the summit. At first, Bogota remained neutral on this development. For example, in early February, Colombian Foreign Minister Maria Angela Holguin stated to the press that “it is not up to Colombia to invite Cuba to the Summit of the Americas.”[8]

Bogota’s position was in response to declarations made by Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa, who said that “from now on I propose that if Cuba is not invited to the Summit of Americas, no member of ALBA is to attend the summit.”[9] Correa’s statements gained some momentum as fellow ALBA members like Venezuela and Bolivia also seemed to be considering a boycott of the summit if Castro was not invited. ALBA has 11 members, all of which are OAS members (which has 34), hence a boycott would have a significant impact on the summit as it would cut the number of attending heads of state by a third. Washington has made it clear that it will not attend the meeting if Castro is present.

William Ostick, a spokesman for the State Department, said that “today’s Cuba has in no way reached the threshold of participation […] there must be significant improvements in political liberties and democracy in Cuba before it can join the summit.”[10] If Washington carries out this threat, this will continue to diminish the multilateral and institutional ties it has with the rest of the continent, at a time when we are witnessing the creation of regional bodies to which US does not belong, like UNASUR (Union de Naciones Suramericanas – Union of South American Nations) and CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños -- Community of Latin American and Caribbean States).

To prevent the hemispheric rift from growing, in early March, President Santos traveled to Cuba to ask point blank Raul Castro not to travel to the Cartagena Summit. Given the 2002 precedent, it is understandable that Santos decided to travel to Havana instead of calling Raul Castro. As part of the aftermath, President Chavez stated that there seems to be a consensus among the ALBA bloc to attend the meeting. Nevertheless, he warned that, from the bloc’s point of view, this should be the last summit in which Cuba does not participate.[11]

Cuba and the US: No Breakthroughs On the Horizon?

In recent years there has been a rising momentum to improve relations between Washington and Havana. When President Obama was campaigning, he pledged that he would close down the detention center in the naval base in Guantanamo Bay, located in Cuba. Unfortunately he has yet to do so.

Other more ambitious initiatives included lifting the decades-old embargo on the island. Obama managed to gain enough support to lift some travel restrictions so Cuban Americans can more easily travel to the island or send money to their relatives there,[12] but the trade embargo relentlessly remains, and will continue to do so as long as the political weight in Miami continues.

Regarding the continued tensions between the two countries, in February of this year, Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont traveled to the island and privately met with Raul Castro to pledge for the release of US contractor Alan Gross, who is serving a 15 year sentence for espionage and “smuggling illegal communications equipment and attempting to set up an Internet network that could escape government detection.”[13]

On the other hand, the US has controversially imprisoned five Cuban citizens (known as the Cuban Five), for allegedly being spies for Havana. One of the Cubans, Rene Gonzalez, was released this past October 2011 after serving 13 years in prison.[14] The global negative reaction to this political trial further undermined U.S. stature in the region.

Summits of the Americas, a Historical Source of Criticism

If anything, the tensions over whether Cuba should or will attend the Summit of the Americas adds some flavor to a hemispheric gathering that is usually critiqued for its irrelevancy. The first Summit was carried out in Miami in 1994; at the time, the OAS had former Colombian President Cesar Gaviria as Secretary General. While the 1994 summit was an important milestone regarding the initiatives for hemispheric integration, it was critiqued by Latin American specialists as a simple gathering of heads of state without much substance.

Criticism of such high-level meetings and whether anything productive ever comes out of them has continued over the past two decades. In a recent interview between journalist Andres Oppenheimer and former Peruvian President Alan Garcia, the two-time head of state downplayed the importance of these Summits. The Peruvian politician stated that such high-level encounters “[are] a dialogue for the deaf,” and that each leader “goes with a prepared speech, to read it, and to blame someone else of [his country’s] problems, usually Uncle Sam or the ‘horrendous’ international financial system.”[15]

To be fair, it is noteworthy to state that such meetings have brought about important initiatives. For example, in April 2001, during the Third Summit of the Americas, held in Quebec City, the heads of state decided to push for a new pro-democracy treaty, which would become known as the Inter-American Democratic Charter. As the Charter states, the hemispheric leaders decided to create:

“A democracy clause which establishes that any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order in a state of the Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that state’s government in the Summits of the Americas process.”[16]

Washington has never been slow to point to this clause when it comes to promoting and protecting its interests in the Western Hemisphere.

The Agencies of the OAS: Working in Obscurity

At a time when the OAS continues to be critiqued regarding how it serves Washington’s interests, it is noteworthy to highlight how the OAS has fielded a number of autonomous agencies that carry out important and relevant work for hemispheric issues. When the OAS is criticized, this is usually targeted at the Secretariat and the General Assembly, but there are various agencies that operate under the OAS umbrella, like the Pan American Health Organization, Inter-American Commission of women,[17] Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Committee against Terrorism[18] and the Inter-American Defense Board[19] ( IADB; and its military educational wing, the Inter-American Defense College –IADC).

The IAD Board (created in 1942, which makes it older than the OAS), and the IAD College (created in 1962), throughout their existence, have been accused of being at best, irrelevant, and at worst, a “mooseclub.” In a Strategic Forum report entitled “Reforming the Inter-American Defense Board,”[20] John A. Cope, Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU), perfectly conceptualizes the issues with the IADB, explaining that:

“The reluctance of diplomats to tap the Board’s expertise, even when considering regional defense and security issues, and the IADB’s unwillingness to subordinate itself in practice to the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the OAS Permanent Council or the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, present a serious impasse.” (P.2)

Cope also adds that, beyond senior officials, most OAS staff members have little awareness of IADB activities (P.2) and that “the IADB structure evokes an earlier period in Latin American and Caribbean history when military institutions were largely autonomous and regularly played a significant role in politics. The legacy of civil-military tension still influences thinking and actions at both the OAS and IADB.” (P. 3)

Conclusions

It appears that Cuba will not attend the summit in Cartagena after all, and the Cuban government is blaming Washington for its likely absence. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez has stated that the US government has acted with “disdain and arrogance” over Havana’s intentions to participate in Cartagena.[21] The Cuban official also stated that:

“The exclusion of Cuba is probably the most notorious, most evident symbol that (these summits) are made in the image of the owner, which is the government of the United States, and they are instruments to exercise domination in a manner not at all democratic”

Indeed, the upcoming Cartagena summit has proved to be a big headache for President Santos. The Colombian leader successfully achieved a diplomatic solution for the Cuba question. At the end of the day, Santos did manage to avoid a humiliating personal defeat as he was put between a rock and a hard place by Hillary Clinton’s completely obdurate and senseless actions on Cartagena, all aimed at improving Obama’s political prospects in November. But its outcome hardly represented a brilliant victory for Santos’ image as a brave and principled new voice for Colombia and his own amazing hegira from being a defense ministry goon to earning the right to a completely renovated reputation.

After all, while Bogota no longer can be found on the wrong end of the leash regarding its diplomatic relationship with the US, the events leading up to the Cartagena summit so far are hardly a victory for him. By carrying out Washington’s wishes regarding Castro’s presence at this major gathering, the Santos presidency appears to continue being under Washington’s sphere of influence as it was during the Cold War. It seems that, when it comes to hemispheric gatherings, the US continues to reserve the right of determining who makes up the guest list. In 2012, it is correct for Latin American and Caribbean governments to advocate that they should no longer feel destined to be eternally under Washington’s narcotic policy spell.

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April 5, 2012

caribbeannewsnow

Losing Latin America

By Steve Ellner - In These Times:



In his State of the Union address in January, President Obama pressed for quick passage of a free trade agreement with Colombia, and since then has followed up on the proposal. In doing so he has delighted Republicans who had been accusing him of failing to prioritize the issue. In his January speech, Obama made no reference to his unequivocal concern over human rights violations which he had raised in his third presidential debate with McCain.

Since 2008, little has improved to justify Obama’s reversal. Human Rights Watch has reported a 41 percent increase in the number of victims in 2010 over the previous year, including the murder of 44 trade unionists. In the first six weeks of 2011, death squads assassinated three more labor activists.

In an attempt to assure members of U.S. Congress that progress is being made, on April 7 Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and Obama announced from the White House the approval of an “Action Plan,” whereby the Colombian government pledged to take stringent measures to curb abuses. Many Colombian trade union leaders, however, refused to buy into the arrangement and expressed skepticism about their government’s resolve. Tarsicio Mora, president of the Unitary Workers Confederation (CUT), objected by saying, “It just can’t be that respect for a basic right established in the constitution, such as the right to life, has to be required by a commercial transaction.”

Obama’s new stand has also failed to win over U.S. trade unionists. In January, Communications Workers of America President Larry Cohen argued against the agreement by pointing out that 15 million Colombians representing 82 percent of the working population are not recognized as workers and thus under the law “have no rights.”

Obama’s change—from opposition to the free trade agreement with Colombia, to lukewarm endorsement of it, to vigorous support—is just one example of his turnabout on Latin American policy. His modified stands distance Washington from an important bloc of Latin American governments and contribute to the decline of the U.S. leadership position in the hemisphere.

Up until his early months in office, Obama appeared to be following the path of liberal Democrats dating back to the 1930s. The liberal tradition on foreign policy toward Latin America was in many ways attractive. Key features included respect for the plurality of ideas – shown by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s acceptance of Mexican nationalism and its nationalization of oil in 1938; the Kennedy administration’s call to “complete the revolution of the Americas” through taxing the wealthy and land reform; and the suspension of aid by the Carter administration to several Latin American governments to protest human rights violation even though they were on the U.S. side in the Cold War.

During the presidential campaign, Obama not only stepped into this liberal tradition but defied the Democratic Party mainstream with positions different from those of his then-rival Hillary Clinton. Obama boldly proposed to meet with Fidel Castro, Hugo Chávez and other Washington adversaries. At the same time he declared “I think our foreign policy is all messed up” and promised a “new direction” in Latin American relations.

Under the Obama administration, the United States finds its historically unrivaled position in the continent challenged on a number of fronts. This July, a summit in Caracas will formally inaugurate the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) to group the 32 nations south of the Rio Grande and serve as a parallel organization to the traditionally U.S.-dominated Organization of American States (OAS).

Furthermore, in recent years of modest economic growth, Latin American nations have broadened commercial ties with nations outside of traditional spheres of U.S. influence, such as Russia, Iran and especially China. In 2010, China’s direct non-financial investments abroad increased 36 percent, most of which went to Asia and Latin America, while the Asian powerhouse displaced Europe as Latin America’s second largest trading partner (after the United States).

Obama, however, has failed to take bold moves to face the challenge. During his largely uneventful five-day tour of Latin America in March he did little to reverse the unfavorable trends. A statement of condemnation, or at least recognition, of the United States’ long and sorry record of intervention would have represented a good first step in treating Latin American nations as “equal partners” – a pledge made by the president that created great expectations.

Instead, when asked by a Chilean journalist about Washington’s role in the overthrow of Salvador Allende, Obama evaded the question. Furthermore, in Brazil, Obama failed to put forward concrete proposals to deal with the issue consistently raised by the Brazilians, namely U.S. agricultural subsidies and other practices that close the world’s largest market for Latin American goods.

Capitulation to the Right on Honduras
Obama’s abandonment of the liberal tradition in his stance on Latin America has been driven by the perceived need to placate rightist critics. Events following the overthrow of Honduran president José Manuel Zelaya in June 2009 put in evidence both the right’s clout and Obama’s failure to check the loss of U.S. influence. The Obama administration caved into pressure from Tea Partier Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina, who justified the coup on grounds that Zelaya — along with Hugo Chávez and Daniel Ortega — were “would-be tyrants and dictators.”

In response to DeMint’s threat to block ratification by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of two key State Department appointments for Latin America, the Obama administration did another about-face. In late 2009, it went from condemnation of the overthrow of Zelaya and support for his return to power to endorsement of the elections sponsored by the coup leaders. Council of the Americas Policy Director Christopher Sabatini gave the South Carolina senator major credit for the change of policy, adding “DeMint’s role has been disproportionate to his interest in Latin America.”

The Obama administration had other options. It could have bypassed the senate committee by attempting to muster 60 votes on the senate floor, or else make the appointments when Congress was out of session, as Bush had done with his selection of John Bolton as UN ambassador. But either move would have meant giving up Obama’s much preferred style of “consensus politics.”

Since then the United States has been locked in an impasse over the issue of the democratic credentials of the Honduran government. In spite of Secretary of State Clinton’s active diplomacy, she has made little headway in convincing a group of Latin American governments to accept Honduras into the community of nations. The latest slap in the face to Honduran President Porfirio Lobo occurred in January when he was the only Latin American head of state to be excluded from the inauguration of Brazil President Dilma Rousseff.

The current battleground is the Organization of American States, which had suspended Honduras following the coup. A bloc of moderate South American governments including Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay have joined the more leftist ones of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador in opposing Honduras’s re-admission. The moderates have conditioned their affirmative vote on allowing Zelaya to return to the country, restoring his political rights and lifting charges against him.

The State Department has pressured Honduran political players behind the scenes to meet these conditions, but the rightists in Honduras (although not Lobo himself) insist on Zelaya’s prosecution on charges of abuse of power. In attempting to break the impasse, the State Department is working at cross purposes with Republican hardliners. Florida Congressman David Rivera, for instance, stated in January: “The United States should be encouraging Honduras to embrace their democratic system, and not to absolve former President Manuel Zelaya of criminal charges or allow him to return to Honduras.”

U.S. efforts on behalf of Lobo ignore the evidence that violation of human rights has gone unabated under his rule (see “Campesinos Rising in Honduras” in In These Times’ March 2011 issue). In December, Human Rights Watch documented dozens of abuses in 2010, including the assassination of 18 journalists and human rights activists and called on the government to “finalize the impunity.” To date, nobody has been held criminally responsible for the atrocities committed since the coup.

Venezuelan rapprochement torpedoed
Another incident that demonstrated the ability of Republicans to set the agenda in Washington, as well as the vacillations of the Obama administration, was the appointment of Larry Palmer as ambassador to Venezuela. In August 2010, the nomination of Palmer appeared to be a routine matter until, upon the request of Republican Senator Richard Lugar, he agreed to answer questions from members of the Foreign Relations Committee in writing.

In his responses, Palmer affirmed that the morale of the Venezuelan armed forces was “considerably low” and that the Chávez government had “clear ties” with Colombian guerrillas. Palmer’s statements were then posted on Lugar’s website even though the questioning was presumed to be for internal use only.

Predictably, Chávez considered the remarks unacceptable and vetoed the appointment, as most governments would have undoubtedly done. Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy Research commented that Washington insiders considered the incident a “set up from the right.”

On January 1, Secretary of State Clinton had a brief amicable encounter with Chávez at Rousseff’s inauguration in Brasilia. Two days later, then-Assistant Secretary of State Philip Crowley announced that given the importance of relations with Venezuela, Washington would “have to renominate an ambassador candidate.” The hardliners reacted immediately, including the Washington Post, which wrote that the appointment of another ambassador would “hand the caudillo [Chávez] a considerable propaganda victory.” The same day, Crowley changed course again by making clear that the government would stand by Palmer. Chávez blamed the latest reversal on pressure from Republicans.

Washington hardliners with a Cold War mindset place the blame for the face-off entirely on the Venezuelan government. Jose R. Cardenas, a State Department veteran known for his hard-line positions, stated “No matter how hard the Obama Administration tries to ‘reset’ U.S. relations with Latin America, Hugo Chávez is there to spoil the fun.” Yet Chávez’s decision was predictable and consistent with his nationalist stance all along. The Obama administration’s behind-the-scenes maneuvering to attempt to convince Caracas that Palmer’s statement came from a low-level State Department official was at best naïve.

A new stage in hemispheric relations
In spite of convergences, Obama’s style and policies on Latin America are hardly indistinguishable from Republicans to his right. Obama’s all-smile encounter with Chávez in 2009 and Clinton’s in January of this year reinforced the president’s notion of engagement with enemies, quite different from George W. Bush’s “you’re with me or against me” approach. Furthermore, in January, Obama broke with hardliners by easing restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba.

Nevertheless, Obama stopped short of lifting the 50-year embargo, a proposition which he himself had supported prior to running for president and which Latin American governments unanimously endorse.

The new political environment in Latin America demands more than moderate measures and a change in style. Latin America has never been so united and independent of U.S. influence. In recent years, Latin American governments, without input from Washington, have acted collectively to help resolve major conflicts involving Bolivia’s nationalization of Brazilian oil and gas interests, a coup attempt in Ecuador and Colombia’s incursion on Ecuadorian territory.

CELAC, which will facilitate collective action on an ongoing basis, is not solely the initiative of countries like Venezuela and Bolivia. Even countries with centrist leadership such as Mexico, Chile and Colombia have wholeheartedly endorsed the plan. Chile, along with Venezuela, is currently drafting CELAC’s statutes and will host the organization in 2012.

“With CELAC, the OAS will be put to the test,” Venezuelan ambassador Jorge Valero told me. Whether or not it survives will depend on how much it really defends Latin American interests.”

But the biggest challenge to U.S. influence in Latin America is Brazil, an economic powerhouse. Over the recent past, the Brazilian government has pursued bold independent positions on foreign policy which it hopes will boost third-world support for its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Brazil went over the United States’ head in attempting to broker an agreement with Iran on nuclear energy and has criticized U.S. plans to install facilities at seven military bases in Colombia. In December it recognized the Palestinian state with its pre-1967 boundaries. Brazil’s increased political influence and its economic expansion go hand in hand. At the same time that President Lula defended the Palestinian cause on a trip to the West Bank, he pointed to a four-fold increase in Brazilian trade with the Middle East since 2002.

For U.S. hardliners, Lula strayed too far from acceptable diplomacy. During his last stretch in office, in the words of the Wall Street Journal, Lula pursued “an increasingly anti-American foreign policy.”

The time period following President Obama’s Latin American tour in March is an ideal moment for the administration to rethink its strategy for the continent. To check the loss of U.S. influence and prestige, the Obama administration needs to distance itself from Republican hardliners and reconnect with the best of the liberal tradition. Washington, for instance, should refrain from championing the cause of the Lobo government as long as it does little to break out of the banana republic mold. Furthermore, executive measures designed to eventually lift the trade embargo against Cuba would tear down one longstanding wall separating the United States from the rest of the continent — and the world.

Finally, Washington needs to cease equating the open-market economic policies it advocates with democracy. This line of thinking privileges nations like Colombia, Chile and Mexico as special allies simply because they accept International Monetary Fund-approved formulas and free trade with the United States. Such preferences divide the continent in half and distance America from countries like Argentina and Brazil, whose assertions of nationalism are not always to Washington’s liking. The hardliners will rant and rave about any type of renovation of U.S. foreign policy along these lines, but it may represent an important first step in regaining the respect and good will of what used to be called our backyard.

April 14th 2011

venezuelanalysis

Bahamas Blog International