Costa Rica: An army-less nation in a problem-prone region

by Alex Sanchez, COHA Research Fellow

The Central American nation of Costa Rica is one of the few countries in the world that does not possess a standing military. Nevertheless, Costa Rica, like other Latin American countries, faces a variety of security threats that test the country’s security capacity. Major national security issues include border control, drug trafficking and the expansion of international criminal organizations into the country, like for example, the Mexican Sinaloa drug cartel. On the international front, Costa Rica is currently involved in a border dispute with Nicaragua, which includes the occupation by a contingent of Nicaraguan army troops of disputed territories along the San Juan River since last year. The river traditionally has served as a natural border between the two countries, but Nicaragua altered the river’s course last year, resulting in a newfound control of the disputed Calero Island, at least for the time being. In response, San José has created a new elite border unit. The combination of rising criminal activity and the current border dispute with a state that possesses a relatively strong standing military means that Costa Rica will have to develop a stronger defense capacity to tackle growing security-related issues.



The History



Costa Rica’s revered president, José Figueres Ferrer, abolished the country’s military on December 1, 1948. The following year, Article 12 of the new constitution codified the abolition of the military. The armed forces’ budget was then shifted to internal security goals by redirecting funds to the police force, education, environmental protection and cultural preservation.



As a result, the country became known as a ‘civilized nation’ -- a label that it could not have claimed before the abolition of the armed forces. Prior to Figueres’ landmark initiative, Costa Rica, had suffered from a series of unstable governments. From 1917 to 1919, the country was under the dictatorial grip of General Federico Tinoco Granados, until he was overthrown and forced into exile. Figueres himself came to power through an armed insurrection that pitted him against Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, a former president (1940-1944) who was trying to regain power through fraudulent elections and, ultimately, violence. Some 2,000 people died during the 44-day uprising, and it has been argued that Figueres abolished the military in order to avoid a future potential military coup against him. Today Costa Rica, considered by some, perhaps naively, as the “Switzerland” of Latin America, serves as the host for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the United Nations’ University for Peace, and is a member of other organizations related to international justice and human rights, including the International Criminal Court.



The Equipment and Organization of Costa Rica’s Police Force



Even though it does not possess a standing military, Costa Rica does have extensive security forces meant to tackle internal issues of law and order. With a population of around 4.5 million, the country has a police force of approximately 10,000 officers, as well as a Civil Guard consisting of 4,500 troops. Compared to other Central American police units, Costa Rica’s police establishment appears to be fairly well-equipped and trained. However, this comparison might be somewhat deceiving, since Costa Rica’s police reportedly have insufficient training, a shortage of service men, and a lack of resources (including vehicles, weaponry, etc).



Without a formal military force, Costa Rica had no need to regularly invest in naval vessels, warplanes, or tanks, which typically make up the heavy equipment of any traditional armed forces. Hence, in theory, the country could focus its financial resources on developing the best possible police force to maintain internal order, at the lowest cost. In fact, in early 2008, as reported by the Spanish defense-news agency, Infodefensa.com, the Spanish company, FEDUR S.A., was awarded a contract by the Costa Rican Ministry of Security to provide new equipment to the nation’s police force. The total bill for the upgrade was close to €2.1 million (almost USD 3 million). The contract included 5,000 bulletproof vests, 10,000 police sticks, 1,000 helmets and 1,000 shields. However, more acquisitions are badly needed, According to an April 2011 report in The Economist, the country has only two helicopters, and the Coast Guard has only a dozen World War II-era patrol boats to police Costa Rica’s two coasts. In an interview with COHA, Mr Kevin Casas-Zamora, former vice president of Costa Rica and now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that the country has not spent enough of its resources on security for the past forty years.



However, San José has made efforts to improve the training of its police force. For example, in November 2010, after the 12th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Mechanism of Tuxtla Dialogue and Agreement, Costa Rica and Colombia signed an agreement whereby Colombian authorities would train and advise the Costa Rican police in order to improve its capacity for fighting drug trafficking. Costa Rican president Laura Chinchilla insisted that the police force was not being militarized. She emphasized to the press that “the Colombian police are a civilian police; we are not asking for assistance from the Colombian Army, or from any Central American army.” In addition, the country has a special elite police unit known as Unidad Especial de Intervencion (Special Forces Unit).



In March 2011, President Chinchilla announced the creation of a special unit of the border guards. Several reports, including an article that appeared in the Nicaraguan daily El Nuevo Diario, reported that the elite guards would be financed by USD 1 million, and would soon be equipped with automatic rifles. The first unit will consist of 150 police officers and will be deployed along the country’s borders with Panama and Nicaragua. In statements made to the media, José María Tijerino, a former Minister of Public Security, explained that the elite guards will be provided with 18 “pickup” vehicles, speedboats, communication equipment and other high-tech gadgets.



In terms of political developments, this past February, President Chinchilla and the heads of the country’s judiciary and legislature agreed on a 10-year plan to tackle Costa Rica’s internal crime. The plan itself was created by the United Nations Development Program and other experts. According to reports, the goal is to improve the training of the police forces and the creation of new prison facilities. Opposition parties have criticized the plan, claiming that it offers generalized goals instead of concrete solutions. There are also concerns that, in order to carry out these objectives, the legislature will have to approve of new taxes. As part of its strategy, the Costa Rican government has created the position of Drug Czar (Comisionado Nacional Antidrogas), and appointed lawyer Mauricio Boraschi as its new head.



In spite of improvements in training and equipment, there are other problems that have yet to be tackled, including police corruption, alleged human rights abuses and low wages for police officers. In 2008, 11 officers in the city of Heredia were arrested for drug trafficking. At the time, local media reports explained that the salary of a national police officer was about USD 328 a month, a modest salary which barely allows for maintaining a family, but is not enough to protect an officer from the temptation of possibly accepting bribes. In addition, in 2009, there were also accusations that members of the Dirección de Inteligencia y Seguridad (Intelligence and Security Directorate – DIS), the police intelligence unit, had been spying on anti-government political groups.



The latest development regarding Costa Rica’s security situation was the mid-May approval of a USD 132 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank to improve the country’s security. According to a report by Associated Press reporter Luis Alfonso Lugo, the goal of the loan is to build 2,700 cells in Costa Rican prisons and hire new staff for the national police academy.



The Costa Rican Police: Better than its neighbors



With that said, the Costa Rican Fuerza Publica, is seen as being better trained and equipped than the police forces of other Central American states. In an interview with COHA, Dr. John Booth, a regents professor at the University of North Texas, said that “I’d rather be arrested in Costa Rica than anywhere else in Central America because the general human rights climate is much better– there is less abuse by the Fuerza Publica.” Former Vice President Casas-Zamora believes that, despite the bad image the Costa Rican security forces may be experiencing, they are not perceived as a threat by the local population; “they are not regarded as a predatory police,” he explained to COHA.



Other Latin American police forces do not enjoy such a positive perception. El Salvador, for example, carried out a major crackdown on gangs through an operation known as Mano Dura (Strong Hand), which has been widely condemned by human rights organizations as being too violent and ineffective. The Guatemalan police also suffers of a bad name, particularly after the country’s chief of national police and the country’s top anti-drugs official (Baltazar Gomez and Nelly Bonilla), were arrested in March 2010 over drug trafficking connections.



U.S. Offers Support to Costa Rica



The U.S. military has recently taken a keen interest in Costa Rica’s war on drugs. In July 2010, a fleet of U.S. warships and 7,000 servicemen arrived in Costa Rica. The American naval deployment included the carrier USS Making Island, several frigates, submarines and a hospital ship. Costa Rican opposition parties like Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC), Unidad Social Cristiana and the Frente Amplio objected to the port call, stating that “the destructive force of the ships, helicopters and marines is disproportionate to combating drug trafficking.” The Chinchilla administration was quick to respond that the U.S. forces would not be permanently deployed on Costa Rican territory or take part in security operations beyond traditional policing. However, it is worth mentioning that the close relations between Washington and San José have attracted criticism. In September 2010, outspoken Bolivian president Evo Morales quipped that Costa Rica does in fact have an army, referring to the U.S. military. The Andean president eventually issued an apology and retracted his comments.



In fact, Anne S. Andrew, U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, has asked that the Costa Rican legislature allow U.S. warships to make a port call. So far, the local legislative body has only allowed U.S. Coast Guard vessels to dock in Costa Rican ports. Juan Carlos Mendoza, an opposition deputy for the PAC, stated that his party opposes the docking of American naval warships because “it is not clear what other strategic military goals they have, besides combating drug trafficking.” In comments reproduced by Infodefensa.com, Paul Trivelli, a consultant for SOUTHCOM, stated that the Pentagon wants to repair Costa Rican patrol boats so they can be used in drug trafficking operations. Trivelli stated, “it is necessary to take into account that drug traffickers are now paying with cocaine and creating problems in many countries. Colombian and Mexican drug cartels are here and they must be combated [by the U.S.] as partners of Costa Rica.” San José signed a defense agreement with the U.S. in 1999, but many opposition factions would like to see it voided.



Internal Security Issues



Today, the Costa Rican police force faces several difficult dilemmas. Because of its geographical location, the country is part of a transit corridor (via land, air and sea) of drugs coming from South America to North America and, more indirectly, to Europe. In addition, an April 2011 article by Time reporter Tim Rogers explains that a booming tourism industry and immigration by Americans and Europeans have raised local consumer demand for drugs. Futhermore, there is a growing concern about the presence of Mexican cartels and even the possibility of the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) operating within the country, which in fact, had an earlier presence in the country in the 1990s.



The December 21, 2010 edition of the highly regarded defense e-newsletter Southern Pulse quotes a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) representative, Phillip Springer, as confirming that the Mexican Sinaloa cartel had established control over drug trafficking in Costa Rica. Springer also predicted that other organizations would expand their networks in the country because of Costa Rica’s lack of a standing army and its sub-par police force. For the Costa Ricans, the major fear is that other groups like the Zetas cartel will try to enter their country and begin a turf war with the Sinaloa cartel, bringing about major levels of inter-cartel violence. This has already happened in Guatemala and the fear is that the situation will repeat itself farther south.



In recent months, there have in fact been a number of indications of a growing presence of transnational criminal organizations in the Central American country. The accurate daily publication, Latin News, has reported that Costa Rican security forces carried out several major raids in late February 2011 in Alajuela, Cartago and San José. Three Mexican citizens were arrested and up to 319 kilograms of cocaine were seized. Costa Rican officials believe that the three foreigners are members of the Sinaloa Cartel. Also in February 2011, local police found the bodies of a couple known to be drug dealers in the neighborhood of El Progreso, in the Pacific port of Puntarenas. It is believed that they were killed over a debt owed to their Mexican bosses.



Security experts explain that the flow of drugs partially operates like this: the drugs originate in Panama, go up the Pan-American Highway through Costa Rica, and enter Nicaragua through a number of remote crossings. In addition, Puntarenas port has become a major stopover for drug shipments by sea.



External Security: The Border Dispute with Managua



Costa Rica’s border dispute with Nicaragua, in one sense, has been going on for over a century, although the present conflict erupted in October 2010 when Nicaraguan workers began a dredging operation in the bordering San Juan River. This resulted in the flooding of Costa Rican territory, which effectively moved the border into Managua’s hands. In addition, several Nicaraguan troops (reportedly less than two dozen) have been stationed on a narrow stretch of the disputed land near Calero Island, whose ownership is also in dispute. Meanwhile, San José has dispatched its police to the border and raised protests to the Organization of American States (OAS) as well as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. As the plaintiff, Costa Rica has a December 5 deadline to present its case to the ICJ, while Nicaragua will have until August 6, 2012 to present its counter-arguments.



Somewhat ironically, the Nicaraguan government has taken advantage of some errant Google Maps to justify its altering of the disputed border. While utilizing data from the U.S. State Department for its global mapping, the internet giant mistakenly transferred 2.7km of Costa Rican territory to Nicaraguan jurisdiction. In November 2010, Google apologized for the incorrect cartographic projections and has since corrected the original error. Nonetheless, in early February 2011, the Nicaraguan Institute of Territorial Studies published a new “official” map of the country, with the boundaries of the disputed territory reflecting its own cartographic interests.



In early March, in a preliminary ruling, the judges of the ICJ decided that neither country should send military or civilian personnel into the disputed zone until the ICJ gave a final ruling on who has jurisdiction. However, it allowed Costa Rica to send civilian personnel to “protect the environment.” Each country has claimed the interim ruling as a diplomatic victory. Although Costa Rica remains reluctant to give up any of the territory, President Chinchilla declared that she is willing to “normalize” relations with Nicaragua. Meanwhile, President Ortega stated that the resolution is positive and that there are no hard feelings towards the neighboring state. The resolution, from Nicaragua’s point of view, means that it can continue to divert some of the water of the San Juan River. Nevertheless, the presence of Nicaraguan troops on disputed soil remains an issue, as Costa Rica continues to demand that Nicaragua remove its troops. At the same time, Managua argues that its military is there to fight drug trafficking and organized crime. Both countries appear to want to normalize relations, but neither seems willing to give in to the other’s demands.



In early May, delegations from the two countries met in La Antigua Guatemala, Guatemala, to discuss inter-state police cooperation and how to combat drug trafficking across their borders. As reported by The Costa Rican News, the agreed protocol permits Costa Rican police boats to cross the maritime border while chasing drug-laden vessels without violating Nicaraguan sovereignty, and vice versa. The agreement states that the police forces on each side should notify the other side of pursuits across their common border. Such meetings and agreements are positive steps.



Not all of the developments for a peaceful solution have been positive, however. In early April, Nicaragua denied an international environmental commission (part of the Secretaria de la Convención sobre Humedales – Secretariat for the Convention on Wetlands) permission to assess potential environmental damage as a result of Nicaraguan dredging. As previously stated, the ICJ ruling said that Costa Rica could access the disputed area if it provided Managua with notification. Nicaragua argued that Costa Rica requested the authorization only two days in advance and did not sufficiently explain the reasons for the mission. Meanwhile, in Costa Rica, the PAC opposition party has complained to President Chinchilla about statements offered by now former Costa Rican Minister Tijerino, which insinuated that Nicaragua might resort to laying mines along its strategic delimitation and utilize its air force in order to more effectively secure the disputed territory. Such comments did not go over well with some Costa Rican politicians, as they did not help to improve relations between the two countries.



At the end of January, the results of a CID-Gallup poll showed that Costa Ricans were more worried about the incident than the citizens of Nicaragua were. According to Insidecostarica.com, 91 percent of Nicaraguans believed that the conflict was over nothing more than unclear border limits, while 73 percent of Costa Ricans were convinced that their neighbor wanted to invade the country. Interestingly, most Nicaraguans believe that Costa Rica has an army and it could invade their country, even though the “tico” security forces lack warplanes, tanks, or naval vessels to be a worthy foe.



A Regional Perspective



Costa Rica is trying to cope with several internal security issues in addition to the increased tensions with neighboring Nicaragua. It is important to consider that a state that has no military is by nature nonviolent. Simply put, it is hard to regard the country as aggressive, given its lack of traditional arsenal or weaponry and trained personnel. Should the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border dispute escalate (which is considered highly unlikely by most experts), it could be difficult for Nicaraguan President Ortega to not appear as an aggressor; considering that he has a relatively professional standing army behind his rhetoric. In December 2010, President Chinchilla declared that “I want to remind ‘esos señores del norte’ (the gentlemen of the north) that only ‘cobardes‘ (cowards) are courageous against the defenseless.”



A Costa Rican lawyer interviewed by COHA explained that the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan diferendum is very old and that he is confident that in no way is there any degree of realistic prospects for a violent confrontation to take place between the two countries. He explained that the border dispute is a historical one and both sides already know what diplomatic parlance to use without it affecting overall inter-state relations. This is particularly true for Nicaraguan President Ortega who is up for re-election and appears to be using the issue with Costa Rica to rally support for himself and divert attention from some of his unpopular domestic policies. Dr. Booth explained to COHA that, “the country that has most threatened Costa Rica in the past is, in fact, Nicaragua, but the incidents [were] in 1948, 1953, and again during the Nicaraguan insurrection in 1978-1979 when Somoza was still in power.” So far, for all the tensions in 2010 and the presence of Nicaraguan troops in the disputed territory, all experts interviewed by COHA agreed that the ongoing situation will be solved diplomatically.



The Costa Rican lawyer concluded by explaining that the Iraq War showed that in modern times, even a global power needs to provide the international community with justifications for going to war with another country. In any case, there is no justification for Nicaragua to invade an army-less state. By abolishing its military and carrying out a pacifist international role, San José has almost a bulletproof national security strategy at its disposal.



Conclusions



Synchronizing the country’s peaceful persona with its purportedly “friendly” diplomacy, helps portray Costa Rica as one of the countries least likely to act aggressively towards another neighboring state. Certainly, the Costa Rican security forces with their present armaments and training arrangements cannot be regarded as an army. So far, the Central American state has not considered re-instituting its military, although the creation of its special border guards does suggest that San José recognizes additional highly-trained security forces may be a necessity. While a re-militarization is generally not desired, it is clear that the police, border guard and other security departments of this de-militarized state have their work cut out for them.



The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org


September 6, 2011


caribbeannewsnow

250,000 WikiLeaks cables made public on WikiLeaks.org

250,000 WikiLeaks cables made public

By Candia Dames
Guardian News Editor
candia@nasguard.com

thenassauguardian

Nassau, The Bahamas

Bahamians now have full access to the entire batch of WikiLeaks diplomatic cables on The Bahamas that have been in The Nassau Guardian’s possession since earlier this year.

The WikiLeaks Bahamas cache includes 415 cables, many of which formed the basis of our ‘Decoding Diplomacy’ series, which ran for several weeks, beginning May 23.

But not all the cables were published by The Nassau Guardian for various reasons: Some provided information entirely already in the public domain or that was not particularly interesting, and    others raised potentially troublesome legal issues.

As we previously pointed out, our libel laws pose some special burdens on newspaper publishers.

With the more than 250,000 cables obtained by WikiLeaks now being published, any interested person could now read the diplomatic documents from U.S. embassies around the world.

The documents have not been redacted and that has raised international criticism that the whistleblower organization has put at risk the lives of some informants and others mentioned in the cables.

WikiLeaks says on its website — WikiLeaks.org — the documents will give people around the world an unprecedented insight into US government foreign activities.

The cables, which date from 1966 up until the end of February 2010, contain confidential communications between 274 embassies in countries throughout the world and the State Department in Washington, DC.  Nearly 16,000 of the cables are classified secret, the website says.

The subject matter of these cables is of such importance, and the geographical spread so broad, that to not release them in their entirety would not do this material justice.

The cables show the extent of U.S. spying on its allies and the United Nations; turning a blind eye to corruption and human rights abuse in "client states"; back room deals with supposedly neutral countries; lobbying for U.S. corporations; and the measures U.S. diplomats take to advance those who have access to them, WikiLeaks said.

While we did not produce an article based on each of the more than 400 Bahamas cables, The Nassau Guardian wrote extensively on many different matters addressed in the cables.

On deciding what to publish, we chose subject matters that we considered of public and national interest.  In some cases, we redacted information as we did not publish anything that may have compromised national security or an individual’s safety.

As we previously noted, the focus on certain events, personalities and political issues were dictated simply by the dates of the Bahamas cables — 2003-2010.

All of the cables — those we made public and those we did not — are now available on WikiLeaks.org.

Sep 05, 2011

thenassauguardian

Bahamas Blog International

Racist killings in Libya's 'regime change' and Caricom's mixed signals

By Rickey Singh





WHILE the warplanes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) continue to facilitate the anti-Moammar Gadhafi rebel forces to take full control of Libya, there are increasing reports of racist killings and torture against black Africans accused of being mercenaries of the deposed Libyan president.

The atrocities had become widespread enough by early last week for the African Union (AU) to officially refuse to recognise the NATO-backed National Transitional Council (NTC), currently in the process of transforming itself into the "new government" of Libya, functioning from the capital, Tripoli.

Last Tuesday, The Guardian (UK) posted an articled by Richard Seymour titled 'Libya's spectacular revolution has been disgraced by racism' in which he lamented that "the murder of black men in the aftermath of the rebellion speaks of a society deeply divided for decades by Gadhafi..."

By last Friday, the well-known Caribbean thinker and economist, Professor Norman Girvan, was noting on his respected website the disturbing concern that "we do not know what is Caricom" in reference to the racist-fuelled killings of black Africans in Libya, a nation in North Africa.

But nine days earlier, on August 23, the Caribbean Media Corporation (CMC) was reporting Caricom's current chairman, Prime Minister Dr Denzil Douglas of St Kitts and Nevis, as observing that the "international community also welcomed the rebels' dramatic advance after six months of fighting" and (he) urged Gadhafi to surrender and avoid a bloodbath.

"The situation in Libya," said Dr Douglas, "provides a lesson in democracy for the Caribbean. We have seen in countries where democracy has been absent, where people have been yearning for full freedom of expression from the Government that they would want to represent them, and eventually this has led to bloodshed as we have seen over the last six months in various Arab countries."

PM Douglas on 'democracy'

It is a challenging observation from Prime Minister Douglas, and it is to be wondered whether there had been any prior consultation with his fellow Heads of Government, given the controversial circumstances of NATO's involvement in "regime change" in Tripoli following the subsequently established abuse of a so-called "no-fly zone" resolution approved by the UN Security Council by majority vote.

Dr Douglas, who hosted the 32nd annual summit of Caricom Heads of Government last July in Basseterre, would have been fully conscious of the community's general sentiment on the Libyan crisis as briefly summarised in a single paragraph in the official communiqué.

Under the title 'The Situation in Libya', the communiqué stated: "Heads of Government deplored the increasing loss of innocent life as the conflict in Libya becomes drawn-out. They called for a ceasefire as well as the early convening of negotiations. In this regard, they expressed support for the African Union in the search for a peaceful resolution of the dispute."

It is not known whether this stated position was formally drawn to the attention of the UN secretary general, or was simply done for the record. The reality, however, is that NONE of the governments that chose to make use of NATO's military power to achieve regime change in Tripoli — under the fig-leaf explanation of "protecting civilians" — had shown ANY interest in a ceasefire to give "peaceful resolution" a chance. Instead, in the face of the "war" rhetoric of the governments in London and Paris in particular — where, incidentally, racism against black immigrants has become a more controversial issue — total contempt has been demonstrated by the western powers for any idea of "peaceful negotiations" in preference for "regime change", even if it meant taking out Gadhafi dead or alive.

Caricom, after all, includes member governments that have diplomatic relations with Libya under Gadhafi. It also has a collective institutional relationship with the AU. Consequently, there seems to be a moral obligation on Caricom's part to now also speak out against the racist killings and atrocities against black Africans in Libya — even if our community does not wish to side with the AU in withholding recognition of the NATO-backed Transitional Council as the new government in Tripoli.

Black at bad time

According to media reports (some with graphic images), many of the murdered and wounded victims — going by their physical appearance — have been savaged. And there has been NO proof of being, as claimed, "mercenaries" fighting to maintain Gadhafi's already 42 years of dictatorial power.
As reported by the Guardian's Seymour, "this is a bad time to be a black man in Libya". He was quoting a report by Channel 4 News last Sunday, even as Ken Sengupta of The Independent newspaper was commenting on some 30 bodies lying decomposed in Tripoli, the majority of them black, allegedly "mercenaries of Gadhafi".

For his part, Chika Onyeani, publisher and editor-in-chief of the African Sun Times, in analysing why the African Union "is right not to recognise the Libyan rebels", declared that "the rebels need to account for the killings of black Africans, not for the pretensions of 'confusing them as mercenaries hired by Gadhafi', but because of the anti-black, racist and innate hatred of black Africans, even though there are a million dark Africans who are Libyan citizens and are maltreated as well.

None of this may be of interest to Caricom governments if they do not take time to properly inform themselves of some of the harsh, unpleasant realities of the NATO-backed Transitional Council and foreign armed rebels that have spent the past six months pursuing a very costly, bloody "regime change" in Libya.

The community's latest position as articulated by its chairman, Dr Douglas, appears quite flawed and ought to be revisited.

September 04, 2011

jamaicaobserver

Bahamas Blog International

Drug trafficking: Central America's dark shadow

by Lauren Mathae, COHA Research Associate





For years, Central America has served as a one-way transit route for drugs traveling north toward the United States. Now, with increasingly frequent crackdowns on drug trafficking in Mexico and continued U.S. demand, Central America has become a pivotal route; an astonishing 84 percent of illegal cocaine that reaches the U.S. passes through Central America.[i] Colombia and Mexico are the predominant producers of narcotics, and the resulting drug trafficking throughout Central America cannot be ignored. As Francisco Campbell, the Nicaraguan Ambassador to the U.S., remarked to a COHA audience, “Unlike the imaginary threats of the past, this one is real. This is the first time we can talk about an honest hemispheric threat.”[ii] Central America needs to implement integrated and viable security strategies to ensure hemispheric security, while the U.S. must refocus its efforts and assume greater responsibility as the largest consumer of Latin American drugs.





Abundant Evidence





Since 1997, the Coast Guard has seized an extraordinary 806,469 pounds of cocaine and 333,285 pounds of marijuana in transit from South America through the Caribbean, the primary drug route prior to the 1990s.[iii] As the Coast Guard’s increased surveillance and policing of the corridors significantly limited the flow of drugs through the Caribbean, the drug trade simply shifted from the Caribbean to Mexico, with Central America serving as a critical transit route.





Militarized enforcement strategies in Colombia and Mexico also contribute to the shift of drug traffic to Central America. In 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama wrote, “As Mexico and Colombia continue to apply pressure on drug traffickers, the countries of Central America are increasingly targeted for trafficking of cocaine and other drugs primarily destined for the United States.”[iv] Central America is no longer merely a transcontinental passageway for an illegal economy totaling USD 34 billion.[v] This shift in drug trafficking routes has brought about profound national security threats and unprecedented levels of violence and organized crime throughout the region.





The “northern triangle” of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador has become greatly destabilized, and appears to be undergoing a rapid transformation into the new frontier for dangerous Mexican cartels. Guatemala now transports 60 percent of drugs in transit from South American-drug producing countries to the U.S., and reports reveal murder rates twice as high as those found in Mexico.[vi] Guatemala’s largely ungoverned border with Mexico makes the country a prime location for the thriving drug trade and the encroachment and proliferation of Mexican cartels, namely Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel. The Guatemalan security forces lack adequate weapons to confront traffickers, and the judicial system is essentially unable to enforce the law, as only one of every 20 murders is ever solved and prosecuted.[vii]





In addition to the influx of violent crime, the “northern triangle” has also emerged as a potential producer of narcotics. It was previously believed that Honduras served merely as a transfer point for narcotic shipments between South America and the U.S. However, in March 2011, police encountered the nation’s first cocaine processing lab on a coffee farm north of the capital, Tegucigalpa, which reportedly had been run by Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel for the past two to three years and was capable of producing approximately one ton of cocaine per month.[viii]





Drug-related corruption has thoroughly infiltrated Central American governments and business elites. Cartels have penetrated key state institutions throughout Central America, including the police, army, executive branches, and judicial systems. Drug-related violence and costly law enforcement also impact Central American economies by reducing the availability of already limited resources. According to the World Bank, “dealing with crime and violence costs Central America around 8% of its GDP.”[ix] Consequently, combating drug trafficking has become an inherently daunting challenge.





The changes in drug trafficking patterns, combined with the accompanying spike in violent crime has led to the Obama administration to officially include Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica on the “Majors List”, a compilation of “major drug transit or major illicit drug-producing countries” already occupied by other Central American, South American, Caribbean, and Middle Eastern countries.[x] The increase in violence, corruption, and production illustrate the alarming spread of cartel activity in Central America. Crackdowns in Mexico and South America continue to put pressure on cartels, forcing them into Central America’s most vulnerable states.





Central American Recognition and Cooperation





The drug trafficking crisis, once an isolated concern, now affects the entire Central American region. While partial solutions can come from individual nations, a more integrated approach must be implemented regionally with cooperation from South America and the U.S. Historically, widespread cooperation and integration have been lacking in Central America. Developing a coordinated strategy is, therefore, no easy task; corruption, mistrust, and a plethora of domestic objectives make synchronizing goals and resources difficult.





Despite these snares, the Central American Integration System (SICA) was partially designed “to set up a new model of regional security based on the reasonable balance of forces, the strengthening of civilian authority, the overcoming of extreme poverty, the promotion of sustainable development, the protection of the environment, and the eradication of violence, corruption, terrorism, and drug and arms trafficking.”[xi] At a SICA summit this June, leaders from seven member nations committed to develop and implement a joint security strategy. With these unmistakable efforts for cooperation and integration against drug traffickers, SICA has become an expression of Central America’s united political will to resolve this crucial security issue.





Clearly, Central American nations are acknowledging the harrowing reality of the situation. One proposed model to combat drugs being used in Nicaragua actively encourages the development of isolated and vulnerable communities, which may easily fall prey to powerful and wealthy drug cartels.[xii] Given that crime is “both the cause and consequence of poverty, insecurity and underdevelopment,” according to Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, this approach has the potential to be the most effective method to deal with drug control and crime prevention.[xiii]





Not only would these measures reduce susceptibility to infiltration by providing communities with a direct connection and sense of support from the state, they are far more affordable and effective than large, expensive militarized programs. Federico Arce, attaché to Ambassador Campbell maintains that “Community programs are not expensive – helicopters are expensive.”[xiv] Options exist, even with budget constraints. Other goals that have been proposed and, in some cases, adopted include the creation of consistent legislation concerning drug trafficking, border agreements and border security policies to prevent drug criminals from escaping to other Central American states, and a more thorough process of purifying law enforcement sectors. These alternative development models must take priority. However, such initiatives have traditionally been second to other measures, such as interdiction, and face a steep upward battle without significant international support.





The U.S. Factor





The U.S. tends to attribute Central America’s drug problems to the region’s weaknesses: small size, limited resources, corruption, poverty, lack of integration, weak governments, ineffective law enforcement, and unstable economies. Many local inhabitants agree that these areas need improvement; however, they also argue that the roots of the problem extend much deeper.





According to the 2011 UN World Drug Report, the largest hemispheric and global cocaine market “continues to be that of the United States, with an estimated consumption of 157 mt [metric tons] of cocaine, equivalent to 36% of global consumption.”[xv] It is this demand that sustains the Latin American drug industry and forces Central America to assume the position of middleman.





It is far too convenient for the U.S. to simply sweep aside its own role in the crisis and focus on Central America’s weaknesses. The U.S. must stop ignoring its consistently destructive role in the war on drugs and translate the idea of co-responsibility into action. A congressional aide with experience on Latin America suggests, “The U.S. Government should do more to understand how the cartels operate in the United States and U.S. officials should use the resulting intelligence and analysis to more aggressively confront the cartels in the United States.”[xvi] As long as a demand exists, drugs will be produced and transported, thereby exacerbating drug violence problems in Central America.[xvii]





Washington’s solution has been to pour billions into counter-narcotic efforts, such as the costly and criticized Mérida Initiative, which provides “equipment and training in support of law enforcement operations and technical assistance to promote the long-term reform, oversight and professionalization of [Latin America’s] security agencies.”[xviii] As of 2010, Congress had appropriated USD 1.3 billion for Mérida programs in Mexico, while only USD 248 million was allocated to Central America.[xix] The U.S. must re-appropriate these funds in order to sufficiently support Central America’s battle against its greatest threat.





Ultimately, however, the U.S. must enact policies that will reduce the high domestic demand for cocaine. Otherwise, any counter-narcotic efforts throughout the rest of the hemisphere will be meaningless. Reforming and introducing new drug policy represents a long-term commitment, and is something of a recurring nightmare for Washington policymakers. But as Arce suggests, “Even if policy takes a long time, there is maneuverability” and the possibility of pursuing other options.[xx]





As history has revealed, the drug war is capable of changing fronts. Efforts must keep up with the emergence of new trafficking routes, instead of focusing on previous threats. Without proper policy adjustments, corruption, violence, and organized crime will continue to flourish in Central America.





Final Thoughts





Previous strategies in the war on drugs, such as expensive militarization programs, or controversial reforms, including legalization, are slow and relatively ineffective responses to a problem that is growing exponentially. Instead, the U.S. needs to support local and regional programs in Central America designed to fight the drug trade through improved education, rural development, and employment opportunities. The U.S. also needs to address domestic factors that influence the drug trade.





These dual objectives should be the focus of continued bilateral aid and regional cooperation. Only then will technical assistance to rectify the integrity of law enforcement and justice sectors—which will in turn better fight organized crime, violence, corruption, and protect human rights—have any chance of success.[xxi] Hemispheric communication, coordination of efforts, a new sense of urgency, and a long-term financial, social, and political commitment to the crisis must be the first steps for nations afflicted by the drug war.





References for this article can be found here.





The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org


September 3, 2011


caribbeannewsnow

Bahamas Blog International

Jamaica in the wake of Christopher Coke

jamaica-gleaner editorial



Most Jamaicans will have mixed emotions over Christopher Coke's guilty plea in America on racketeering and conspiracy charges. Primarily, though, they will feel a measure of relief.

There will be a sense of vindication, for they were certain all along that Coke had done the things of which he was accused. Yet, many of us can't help but be disappointed, hurt, angry even. We were taken through all of that only for this.

All of that, of course, is the trauma Jamaica was caused to suffer, including to its international reputation, over the affair involving this international gangster, whose base was Tivoli Gardens, the 'garrison' in west Kingston where voters are fiercely loyal to the governing Jamaica Labour Party, and which is part of the parliamentary riding of Prime Minister Bruce Golding.

When the Americans sought to extradite Coke on charges that he exported narcotics to their country and imported guns into Jamaica, the Golding administration stalled for nine months. Jamaica argued that the Americans had breached the extradition treaty between the two countries and had abused Coke's constitutional rights in the way it got hold of wiretap evidence used in the indictment against the drug boss.

The ruling party then hired American lobbyists to intervene in the dispute between the two countries to try to soften Washington's stance on the Coke extradition. In what supposedly was a private party endeavour mingled with official diplomacy, government spokespersons - not excluding Prime Minister Golding - often sounded more like Coke's legal strategists than state officials.

When the Government finally bowed to public pressure to execute the extradition request and to allow the courts to decide if it was in concert with the law, Coke gathered his private militia into his Tivoli Gardens redoubt. Coke's supporters elsewhere attacked police stations and generally caused mayhem.

The larger context

The effort by the security forces to pacify Tivoli Gardens left more than 70 people dead and the Jamaican state badly rattled, its fragility patent. That, we feel, provides the larger context within which to consider the Coke matter.

Christopher Coke personifies the kind of threat to the security and democracy of small and vulnerable countries like Jamaica. Control of large amounts of resources, illicitly derived notwithstanding, endow gangsters with the capacity to corrupt the political process and to control many levers of the State by proxy. Indeed, Coke's activities - and the criminal machinations of others - were an open secret in Jamaica.

However, given Coke's political and community connections, underpinned by his ability to distribute largesse and corral votes, it is likely that he would not have been arrested and prosecuted in Jamaica. Such an eventuality would have been made more difficult by the political fault lines in Jamaica.

In that respect, and as grudgingly as we concede it, Jamaica ought to be thankful for America's move against Coke, particularly as murders and other serious crimes have plummeted since his ouster by the military. Hopefully, Coke's arrest and guilty plea mark the crossing of a Rubicon - and the end of impunity by such hard men of violence and crime.

September 2, 2011

jamaica-gleaner editorial

Bahamas Blog International

WikiLeaks cables show Haiti as pawn in US foreign policy

by Katie Soltis, COHA Research Associate



When WikiLeaks announced its plan to release tens of thousands of classified U.S. diplomatic cables to the public, the U.S. government feared a massive international backlash and threat to national security. Although WikiLeaks’ impact on Latin America does not severely jeopardize U.S. security, the diplomatic cables could nevertheless cause irreparable harm to U.S. relations with several Latin American nations. Information released by WikiLeaks points to a continuation of U.S. dominance and the application of “neo-imperialist” diplomacy in Latin America, and the cables regarding Haiti, the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, exemplify the persistence of U.S. interference.



Haiti’s history is one of brutal colonial exploitation followed by systematic neocolonial intervention, and today the country faces extreme poverty and political turmoil. According to the UN Development Program, 78 percent of Haitians live on less than USD 2 per day and 54 percent of the population, or around four and a half million people, currently live on less than USD 1 per day.[1] In light of the problems facing this troubled nation, the new information revealed by WikiLeaks concerning U.S. involvement in Haiti is particularly disconcerting. Janet Sanderson, the previous U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, once dubbed the U.S. “Haiti’s most important and reliable bi-lateral partner,” but the cables released by WikiLeaks show a much more one-sided relationship.[2] Instead of helping Haiti develop economically and politically, Washington’s foreign policy seems completely dominated by influential and well-connected U.S. economic interests.



Petrocaribe: Haiti and Venezuela



René Préval became president of Haiti in 2006 and immediately attempted to improve U.S.-Haiti relations. U.S. Ambassador Sanderson reported in a cable that Préval “wants to bury once and for all the suspicion in Haiti that the United States is wary of him. He is seeking to enhance his status domestically and internationally with a successful visit to the United States.”[3] Yet despite his desire to improve relations, newly elected President Préval unintentionally began alienating the United States on the very day of his inauguration. On this day, Préval signed a deal with Venezuela to join the Caribbean oil alliance, Petrocaribe, which allowed Haiti to buy subsidized oil from Venezuela. The government of Haiti would pay only 60 percent up front and then pay the rest at 1 percent interest over the next 25 years.[4] This payment schedule would save the Haitian government USD 100 million per year, with which the government planned to supply basic needs and services to 10 million Haitians and increase investment in social projects like hospitals and schools.[5] Additionally, the Petrocaribe deal would help lower and stabilize the cost of oil in Haiti after several years of high prices.



However, the new Haiti-Venezuela alliance unnerved Washington, and Ambassador Sanderson abetted U.S. interests in Haiti. Apparently determined to hold a tough stance against the oil deal, she wrote in a cable on April 19, 2006, that “Post [the Embassy] will continue to pressure Préval against joining Petrocaribe.”[6] For two years, the U.S. government worked with ExxonMobil and Chevron, the two U.S. oil companies operating in Haiti, to undermine the new deal between Petrocaribe and Venezuela. The U.S. oil companies feared that they would have to buy their oil directly from the government of Haiti and would lose their profit margins as a result. As Thomas C. Tighe, a U.S. official in Haiti, wrote in a cable, “Chevron country manager Patryck Peru Dumesnil confirmed his company’s anti-Petrocaribe position and said that ExxonMobil, the only other U.S. oil company operating in Haiti, has told the Government of Haiti that it will not import Petrocaribe products.”[7] Because Chevron and ExxonMobil controlled shipping and distribution channels, these two companies were able to prevent the Petrocaribe deal for two years simply by refusing to transport Petrocaribe oil and blocking their shipments. Throughout this time, Tighe said the Haitian government was “enraged that ‘an oil company which controls only 30% of Haiti’s petroleum products’ would have the audacity to try and elude an agreement that would benefit the Haitian population.”[8] Chevron eventually signed the agreement in 2008, but the two-year fight against the deal exemplifies Washington’s willingness to disregard Haiti’s interests for its own economic and political agenda.



The real problem for the United States in this arrangement appears to be not just the challenge to U.S. economic interests but also the development of a lasting Haiti-Venezuela relationship. The U.S. is inevitably skeptical of Haiti’s ties with Venezuela, a nation whose leader fiercely opposes the United States. Préval continued to develop Haiti’s relationship with Venezuela, first with the proposed Petrocaribe deal in 2006 and, subsequently, with Préval’s attendance of the ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) summit in Venezuela in 2007. At the summit, Préval received a deal for an energy aid package from Cuba and Venezuela. Yet despite the proposed benefits for the Haitian people with both the Petrocaribe agreement and the later energy package, U.S. officials fought against the deals because they did not trust Haiti’s possible close relationship with these two demonstrably anti-American governments.



However, the United States’ determination to undercut these agreements seems unwarranted. Although Venezuela and Cuba are outspoken in their opposition to the United States, Haiti does not participate in their leftist, anti-American rhetoric. In fact, Washington was cognizant of the fact that Haiti’s participation in these agreements did not reflect an alliance against the United States. Sanderson reported in one cable that “at no time has Préval given any indication that he is interested in associating Haiti with Chávez’s broader ‘revolutionary agenda.’”[9] Instead, Préval’s relations with these other governments stemmed from his desire for socioeconomic improvement. The U.S. government acknowledged this, as seen by Sanderson’s report that Préval “will manage relations with Cuba and Venezuela solely for the benefit of the Haitian people, and not based on any ideological affinity toward those governments.”[10] Despite this recognition, the U.S. government fought strongly against these agreements, evidencing the true priorities of U.S. policies towards Haiti. The U.S. earlier stated that it is “Haiti’s most important and reliable bi-lateral partner,” but these cables show the limits of Washington’s commitment to aid Haiti. Rather than supporting Haitian attempts at development, the U.S. was willing to undermine beneficial agreements in order to continue its anti-Chávez policies and to protect the interests of big oil companies.



Textiles: U.S. Interference in Wage Laws



In another instance of U.S. interference documented by WikiLeaks, the Obama administration tried to prevent minimum wages in Haiti from rising above 31 cents an hour. In 2009, Port-au-Prince passed a law that raised the minimum wage from an astonishingly low 24 cents to 61 cents an hour.[11] This law would have increased the minimum wage by 150 percent to about USD 5 a day, but, even with this large increase, the new measure would still have fallen short of the estimated USD 12.50 a day needed to provide for a family of four in Haiti.[12]



The proposed wage increase was of course enormously popular with Haitians, who argued that the increase was necessary because of the rising cost of living. However, U.S. textile companies with factories in Haiti, including Fruit of the Loom, Hanes, and Levi Strauss, fought the measure, while the U.S. State Department also exerted pressure on the government of Haiti. David E. Lindwall, a deputy chief of mission, said the minimum wage increase “did not take economic reality into account” and was a populist measure for “the unemployed and underpaid masses.”[13] U.S. plant owners argued that, should the cost of labor rise substantially, these U.S. companies would have to close their factories in Haiti and relocate. Based on the insistence of these U.S. textile companies and the U.S. embassy, the Haitian government agreed to limit the increase to only 7 cents, at 31 cents an hour.[14]



The recent fight over the proposed wage increase is merely the most recent instance where U.S. foreign companies have tried to keep wages low by threatening to close production facilities in the country. The Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development (PAPDA) argues that every time the government of Haiti has proposed a minimum wage increase, lead industries “cried wolf” and threatened to halt production in all major factories in the nation, further jeopardizing economic stability in the country. However, according to PAPDA, “in every case, it was a lie.”[15]



PAPDA implies that closing factories is an empty threat made by U.S. businesses to extort low wages. Based on the actual cost of the minimum wage increase relative to overall profits, this is likely the case. According to a U.S. embassy cable, it would cost Hanes USD 1.6 million a year to pay its workers an extra USD 2 a day. This cost is very low compared to the company’s registered profits of USD 211 million with sales of USD 4.3 billion.[16] Furthermore, Haiti already has some of the lowest paid workers in the world, so finding cheaper labor would be unlikely. Yet whether or not U.S. factories would actually pull out of Haiti, the cables are significant in pointing to the weight of U.S. influence in Haiti. The degree of power U.S. businesses exert over the government of Haiti is particularly alarming as it prioritizes U.S. financial gains over fundamental economic improvements for 25,000 poverty-stricken textile workers.



Elections: International Support for Non-Democratic Process



Leaked cables also provide further information about the international community’s support for Haiti’s 2009 elections. International election donors, including ambassadors, members of NGOs, and leaders from the UN, were charged with monitoring the election procedures and reporting instances of electoral fraud. Yet these donors ignored their responsibility to uphold democratic standards, as they supported these elections despite unfair electoral procedures.



Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), which was appointed by then-President Préval, decided to exclude the political party Fanmi Lavalas (FL) under the guise of not having proper documentation. FL, the party of exiled former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, is a leftist political party that is also very popular among the poor. However, its influence has waned since Aristide was overthrown in 2004 and exiled in a U.S.-supported coup. Since Aristide’s removal from office, Préval’s party has worked to curtail the FL’s influence and popularity, and the party has been excluded in several elections.



The FL’s exclusion caused concern among international donors charged with overseeing the electoral process. Canadian Ambassador Gilles Rivard questioned the impact that this exclusion would have on the elections: “If this is the kind of partnership we have with the CEP going into the elections, what kind of transparency can we expect from them as the process unfolds?”[17] Furthermore, leaked U.S. cables said the decision of the electoral council was “almost certainly in conjunction with President Préval,” as an attempt to rig the outcome of the election.[18] International donors recognized the dangers of supporting the elections: they would not only be undermining democratic procedures but also would be seen as supporting Préval.



Despite these initial concerns, the international community decided to support the elections. A cable sent by U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Merten recorded the views of a European Union representative, who said, “the international community has too much invested in Haiti’s democracy to walk away from the upcoming elections, despite its imperfections.”[19] Furthermore, Merten argued that the elections should proceed because “without donor support, the electoral timetable risks slipping dangerously, threatening a timely presidential succession.”[20] In total, international donors gave an estimated USD 12.5 million to finance the election—about 72 percent of the total cost—even though they knew that the election was not free or fair.[21]



The Organization of American States adjudicated the disputed first round results and decided that the run-off candidates would be Michel Martelly and Mirlande Manigat. Martelly proceeded to win the election, but, notably, only 23 percent of Haitians participated. This marks the lowest participation rate in the entire hemisphere since 1945. The lack of voter participation has been attributed to disappointment about the exclusion of the FL and dislike of the two candidates.[22]



The circumstances of the election reflect a difficult situation for the international community’s involvement in Haiti. Its disregard for standard democratic procedures, with open and fair elections, undermines a commitment to democratic ideals. On the other hand, if they had refused to support the elections, Haiti could once again fall into political turmoil. Such chaos would plague other international investments in the nation, while potentially further stalling the realization of stability and development in Haiti.



Conclusion



The repercussions of the WikiLeaks Haiti cables are a far cry from the massive national security breaches that the U.S. government originally feared. The cables detailing U.S. relations with Haiti do not contain the same devastating potential as other cables might have, and the information leaked here will not jeopardize national security. Whether or not WikiLeaks was justified in releasing this classified information, these cables shed valuable light on the hypocritical nature of U.S. foreign policy in one of the world’s most troubled nations. Based on these cables, we see a disturbing image where U.S. foreign policy is shaped by the interests of the rich and is geared toward underhanded interference in the affairs of other nations.



References for this article can be found here.



The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org


September 1, 2011


caribbeannewsnow

Bahamas Blog International

Bahamas: Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham said capital punishment will probably not be a reality in the Islands in the near future...

PM: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 'WILL PROBABLY NOT BE REALITY'

By SANCHESKA BROWN
tribune242

Nassau, The Bahamas


DESPITE calls for murderers to be executed, Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham said capital punishment will probably not be a reality in the near future.

Instead, the government is considering the possibility of a "life" sentence being changed to actually mean "for life."

The Prime Minister said he knows people are frustrated with the high level of crime in the Bahamas. He says this is a frustration shared by most of the Caribbean. However, Mr Ingraham said swift executions is something that probably will not be a reality anytime soon.

"This is a country about the rule of law, and we have to abide by decisions made by our courts, even if we don't agree with them. Sometimes to the extent where we have to swallow it and accept it as reality," he said.

"The government cannot execute someone without the court certifying that all things were done properly, otherwise the government itself is committing murder and unlawful killing. Even if we change the law, it will take some time for that law to be able to be applied to persons who are convicted, and so there are several other things the society ought to consider in the interim rather than to expect something that is not likely to happen."

One of the suggestions made by the Prime Minister is to change the current life sentence from 25 years to actual life imprisonment.

"We may have to determine that life imprisonment means life in prison, your natural life in prison, you won't come out anymore," he said.

"We will have to categorise murders to determine that some cases should warrant the death penalty, while others may warrant imprisonment for life, their natural life and others for a lesser period of time. So that's what we are seeking to do."

The government was scheduled to debate the death penalty bill before they adjourned for the summer. However, when the House adjourned the bill was still not ready for presentation.

The proposed legislation will outline specific categories of murder. It is still unclear if the government will bring the bill when Parliament resumes on October 5.

Opposition leader Perry Christie said in his national address if the Progressive Liberal Party is elected to government his party will carry out the law as it relates to hanging.

Mr Ingraham declined to comment on Mr Christie's statement but did say he was pleased Mr Christie was able to address the nation on national television.

"When I was in opposition it was not possible for me to do so. With one radio station I couldn't buy time to be able to address the nation. He has a right to do so and I applaud him for doing so. I also want to point out that while he was prime minister I found no record of a national address by him in his five years in office."

No hangings were carried out under the PLP administration. The last time a convicted murderer was hanged was on January 6, 2000.

August 30, 2011

tribune242

Bahamas Blog International