by Courtney Frantz, COHA Research Associate
In a unanimous resolution, the United Nations (UN) Security Council decided on Friday, October 14, 2011 to renew the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for one year, reducing its numbers to “pre-earthquake levels.”[3] UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has declared that he “envisions a gradual withdrawal” over the upcoming years.[4] According to journalist Ansel Herz, many Haitians have been protesting MINUSTAH’s presence for at least a year. “There’s a [wide] range of demands,” he asserts, “Some people want MINUSTAH… to simply leave… Others are asking that they transform their mission from one of military so-called peacekeeping into development.”[5]
From an outsider’s perspective, it may seem unclear why many Haitians are indignant about the presence of UN peacekeeping troops in their country during such a tumultuous period. A vast number of news articles have reported that the protests are a response to recent accusations of severe misconduct and neglect by a relatively small number of UN troops. These include the collective rape of an eighteen-year-old man and the appearance of cholera, likely an inadvertent import from Nepalese peacekeepers.[6] These long-running reports tell the story of a supposed humanitarian group troubled by a series of isolated incidents of abuse and neglect. An in-depth overview of MINUSTAH’s history on the island, however, depicts a security force systematically serving foreign interests over those of the Haitians. Local residents are indignant because they see MINUSTAH as a tool of the United States’ self-interest in the region, and because the UN forces repeatedly have suppressed democracy, failed to address authentic humanitarian concerns, and have at times even perpetrated mass violence against Haitian citizens. By suppressing the Fanmi Lavalas party and other social and political movements, MINUSTAH has actively excluded Haiti’s poor majority from political participation, working against the interests of Haitians fighting for progressive economic and social reform. As President Martelly has observed, the recent alleged rape merely “‘put gas on the fire’ of relations between Haitians and the peacekeepers.”[7]
Recent Haitian History: the Aristide Affairs
To appreciate the context in which MINUSTAH’s troubled role is being played out, it is necessary to recount some recent aspects of Haitian history. In 1990, over two-thirds of voters elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide president of Haiti as the candidate of the Lavalas popular movement. Notably, he had the “overwhelming support of the poor.”[8] He worked to improve health care and education, raised the minimum wage, and changed trade policies to favor domestic agricultural production.[9]
After being overthrown by a military junta, Aristide was reelected in 2000 as part of the transformed Fanmi Lavalas party, which took a more leftist stance than its predecessor had. [10] On February 29, 2004, a contingent of US Navy Seals transported the President to exile in Africa, carrying out the calculated diplomacy of the UN, Canada, and France. The US and UN claim that rather than performing a coup d’état, they had rescued Aristide from growing armed conflict between supporters and detractors of the President, which supposedly posed a threat to international safety.[11] Aristide, however, insists that his “rescue” was involuntary.
Leaked diplomatic cables demonstrate that high-level US and UN officials worked aggressively to prevent Aristide’s return to Haiti. President Barack Obama (2009-present) and UN Secretaries General Kofi Annan (1997-2006) and Ban Ki-moon (2007-present) have all urged the government of South Africa to keep Aristide sequestered on that continent in an apparent attempt to quash the Fanmi Lavalas movement. [12] It was in the context of this political vacuum after the alleged coup was staged that MINUSTAH’s predecessor was created.
About MINUSTAH
MINUSTAH was originally formed to “succeed a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) authorized by the UN Security Council in February 2004, after President Bertrand Aristide departed Haiti for exile.”[13] It continues to operate under a mandate “to restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti’s Government institutions and rule-of-law structures, as well as to promote and to protect human rights.”[14] MINUSTAH is in Haiti under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, under which the “[Security] Council may impose measures on states that have obligatory legal force and therefore need not depend on the consent of the states involved. To do this, the Council must determine that the situation constitutes a threat or breach of the peace.”[15] The mission’s presence in the country is thus based on the proposition that since 2004, violence in Haiti has threatened the international community.
MINUSTAH includes both traditional “blue helmet” peacekeeping troops and police officers.[16] These troops are from many different countries, with very few of these forces speaking Haitian Creole, the language of the island’s poor.[17] The UN spent USD 5 billion on the institution even before the earthquake hit Haiti in January 2010, and USD 793,517,100 in the current year alone.[18] MINUSTAH, therefore, is a heavily funded multinational UN peacekeeping force directed to perform security functions, monitor elections, and assist human rights groups in order to prevent Haiti from breaching international peace.
The WikiLeaks Cables
Recent diplomatic cables supplied by WikiLeaks, however, provide some evidence that MINUSTAH has been acting to protect the security interests of the US government and the political ambitions of Brazil. According to a March 2008 US State Department cable, the Brazilian state, which supplies the largest contingent of UN forces, “has stayed the course as leader of MINUSTAH in Haiti despite a lack of domestic support for the PKO [peacekeeping operation]. The MRE [Ministry of External Relations] has remained committed to the initiative because it believes that the operation serves FM [Foreign Minister] Amorim’s obsessive international goal of qualifying Brazil for a seat on the UN Security Council.”[19] Even though the Brazilian population supports a withdrawal of its forces from MINUSTAH, then, the country’s government has not withdrawn its troops due to its ambitions of pleasing the UN and obtaining elusive Security Council membership.
In a 2008 cable, former US Ambassador to Haiti Janet Sanderson emphasizes that MINUSTAH “is an indispensable tool in realizing core USG [US government] policy interests in Haiti… A premature departure of MINUSTAH would leave the Preval [sic] government or his successor vulnerable to… resurgent populist and anti-market economy forces – reversing gains of the last two years… It is a financial and regional security bargain for the USG.”[20] Thus, Sanderson sees MINUSTAH as protecting US interests by preventing social and political movements from thwarting neoliberal policies and the post-earthquake influx of corporations in the country, which are working on a variety of development schemes on the island.
A 2006 cable also relates that policymakers from both the UN and the US held a meeting concerning how the “Aristide [m]ovement [m]ust [b]e [s]topped.”[21] Edmond Mulet, Head of Mission of MINUSTAH at the time, “urged US [sic] legal action against [forcibly exiled president] Aristide to prevent [him] from gaining more traction with the Haitian population and returning to Haiti.”[22] These cables demonstrate that the US government sees the poor pro-Fanmi Lavalas majority as “resurgent populist and anti-market economy forces” that “must be stopped,” and is prepared to use MINUSTAH to suppress their democratic participation.[23] Haiti’s poor majority has been actively involved in politics since the advent of the Fanmi Lavalas party, which has strenuously worked against the neoliberal policies of the time to achieve economic and social reforms.[24] Many poor Haitians are now engaging in so-called “resurgent populist and anti-market economy” politics via peaceful protest against the presence of MINUSTAH and in support of reforms such as an increase in the minimum wage.[25]
In the course of acting in the interests of the US by thwarting these popular “forces,” MINUSTAH has actively suppressed democracy. As Mark Schuller, an anthropologist specializing in the impact of international development aid, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and MINUSTAH on Haitian social and political life put it, MINUSTAH comprises the enforcers… Many say that they are responsible for keeping Haiti a ‘leta restavek’ – a child servant state, owned by the international community. To many Haitian commentators, the Preval [sic] government willingly gave up control [to MINUSTAH and other international bodies] in exchange for its continued survival. The protesters MINUSTAH suppressed could have destabilized Preval [sic][26] and his small base of support. The mission has blocked both electoral democracy and popular protest in order to prevent these so-called “populist and anti-market economy forces” from gaining political power.
Party-Banning, Eleksyon Zombi,[27] and Other Examples of Electoral Fraud
One of MINUSTAH’s most important mandates was to carry out the 2010 presidential and general elections “through the provision of technical, logistical, and administrative assistance as well as providing continued security.”[28] There were, however, several major problems with the elections, which were funded by both the US and the UN[29] Most notably, over twelve parties were banned, including Fanmi Lavalas, Haiti’s most popular party and one supported largely by the poor.[30]
The notoriously venal Haitian Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) originally banned Fanmi Lavalas in February 2009, claiming it could not “verify Aristide’s signature, sent while he was still in forced exile in South Africa, as head of the party.”[31] A leaked US Embassy cable dating back to 2009 revealed the US government’s opinion that the CEP had thus “emasculated the opposition,” “almost certainly in conjunction with President Preval [sic].”[32] Completely revoking the majority party’s right to compete in an election on such a technicality was indeed “emasculating,” removing all power held by the largely poor opposition to René Préval’s government (1996-2001 and 2006-2011). Despite US Ambassador to Haiti Kenneth H. Merten’s fear that the party would later appear to be “a martyr and Haitians [would]… believe (correctly) that Preval [sic] is manipulating the election,” US government officials strongly encouraged the continuation of the fraudulent election.[33] The Fanmi Lavalas party was once again banned in the 2010 elections. MINUSTAH was largely instrumental in the execution of the elections through logistical and security support, as specified in its mandate. The UN Mission thus worked against the political participation of the poor majority by trying to support these elections.
Other serious electoral problems abounded: long lines, incomplete voter registries, fraud, and violence, along with the general lack of an “infrastructure for holding a fair and representative vote.”[34] A practice called eleksyon zombi in Haitian Creole also persisted, in which surviving citizens’ names were absent from the registries, while those of neighbors who died in the 2010 earthquake were used to file fraudulent ballots.[35] Perhaps partially due to the ban on the Lavalas party, the voter turnout for the election, which was twenty-three percent, was the lowest in the Western hemisphere for over sixty years.[36] Because of this fraud and lack of infrastructure, the majority of candidates called for the annulment of the election. Soon after, Edmond Mulet, Head of Mission at MINUSTAH during the election, personally called two candidates telling them to withdraw these requests because they were in the lead.[37] They followed his advice, knowing that Mulet, as head of the body running the elections, would know the results. Mulet would see to it that the election results were exactly as the authorities wanted them; several months later, President Michel Martelly won the run-off election. Both Mulet’s dispensing of insider tips and the logistical support of the rank-and-file peacekeepers helped to push the fraudulent elections through as anticipated. As the body charged with logistical and security-related support for the election, the Mission helped to systematically deny electoral democracy to the people of Haiti, forcing the country to elect a pro-U.S/UN candidate and playing a major role in keeping the country as a leta restavek.
Suppressing Protest
In addition to the suppression of electoral democracy, well-known journalists and academics have denounced MINUSTAH for a number of incidents of violent repression of peaceful demonstrations. According to anthropologist Mark Schuller, they clamp down on citizen mobilization, most egregiously in 2009 during the campaign to increase Haiti’s minimum wage. They shot tear gas numerous times, preventing people from protesting and crippling the state university (especially the human sciences school). They also shot at the funeral for Aristide supporter Father [Gérard] Jean-Juste.[38]
This behavior is part of a clear pattern of suppressing protest among Haitians and preventing political organization, especially among pro-Aristide activists. During another peaceful demonstration against MINUSTAH’s renewed mandate, MINUSTAH peacekeepers “threatened [protesters] at gunpoint… Shots were fired, and a UN vehicle drove into the crowd and pushed several protesters and an international journalist into a ditch.”[39] At another protest, “MINUSTAH troops with riot shields arrived to reinforce the police, firing warning shots and dispersing the protesters.”[40] This suppression of social movements complements MINUSTAH’s suppression of electoral democracy. The same cross-section of poor Haitians who form the majority of the Fanmi Lavalas party, and of the country as a whole, had organized in support of the removal of MINUSTAH, supported Father Jean-Juste, and fought for an increase the minimum wage. These are the “populist and anti-market forces” about which the US State Department had occasion to speak.
Haitian Social Movements Continue Their Fight
Contrary to its mandate to protect the human rights of the Haitian people and promote democracy, MINUSTAH has suppressed democracy both by supporting fraudulent elections and by repressing peaceful protests. In each of these instances, the mission has taken on the role of “enforcers,” holding the Haitian people in check and helping to keep Haiti as a leta restavek. As analyst Beverly Bell asserts, however, “the country’s highly organized grassroots movement has never given up the battle its enslaved ancestors began…The mobilizations, protests, and advocacy have brought down dictators…and kept the population from ever fitting quietly into anyone else’s plans for them.”[41] Haitians, especially the poor majority, have been fighting for economic and social democracy and for the autonomy to rebuild their nation. To achieve these goals would require unseating both MINUSTAH and the interests of the US, as the WikiLeaks cables demonstrate. Haitians are protesting in large part because of this systematic suppression of their nation’s right to self-determination. The “fire” to which President Martelly refers had been raging years before the recent allegations of rape and other abuses, and it will not be doused until Haitians find justice in their own country and not just in their distant memory.
References for this article can be found here.
The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org
October 20, 2011
caribbeannewsnow
Google Ads
Showing posts with label WikiLeaks cables Haiti. Show all posts
Showing posts with label WikiLeaks cables Haiti. Show all posts
Thursday, October 20, 2011
Thursday, September 1, 2011
WikiLeaks cables show Haiti as pawn in US foreign policy
by Katie Soltis, COHA Research Associate
When WikiLeaks announced its plan to release tens of thousands of classified U.S. diplomatic cables to the public, the U.S. government feared a massive international backlash and threat to national security. Although WikiLeaks’ impact on Latin America does not severely jeopardize U.S. security, the diplomatic cables could nevertheless cause irreparable harm to U.S. relations with several Latin American nations. Information released by WikiLeaks points to a continuation of U.S. dominance and the application of “neo-imperialist” diplomacy in Latin America, and the cables regarding Haiti, the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, exemplify the persistence of U.S. interference.
Haiti’s history is one of brutal colonial exploitation followed by systematic neocolonial intervention, and today the country faces extreme poverty and political turmoil. According to the UN Development Program, 78 percent of Haitians live on less than USD 2 per day and 54 percent of the population, or around four and a half million people, currently live on less than USD 1 per day.[1] In light of the problems facing this troubled nation, the new information revealed by WikiLeaks concerning U.S. involvement in Haiti is particularly disconcerting. Janet Sanderson, the previous U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, once dubbed the U.S. “Haiti’s most important and reliable bi-lateral partner,” but the cables released by WikiLeaks show a much more one-sided relationship.[2] Instead of helping Haiti develop economically and politically, Washington’s foreign policy seems completely dominated by influential and well-connected U.S. economic interests.
Petrocaribe: Haiti and Venezuela
René Préval became president of Haiti in 2006 and immediately attempted to improve U.S.-Haiti relations. U.S. Ambassador Sanderson reported in a cable that Préval “wants to bury once and for all the suspicion in Haiti that the United States is wary of him. He is seeking to enhance his status domestically and internationally with a successful visit to the United States.”[3] Yet despite his desire to improve relations, newly elected President Préval unintentionally began alienating the United States on the very day of his inauguration. On this day, Préval signed a deal with Venezuela to join the Caribbean oil alliance, Petrocaribe, which allowed Haiti to buy subsidized oil from Venezuela. The government of Haiti would pay only 60 percent up front and then pay the rest at 1 percent interest over the next 25 years.[4] This payment schedule would save the Haitian government USD 100 million per year, with which the government planned to supply basic needs and services to 10 million Haitians and increase investment in social projects like hospitals and schools.[5] Additionally, the Petrocaribe deal would help lower and stabilize the cost of oil in Haiti after several years of high prices.
However, the new Haiti-Venezuela alliance unnerved Washington, and Ambassador Sanderson abetted U.S. interests in Haiti. Apparently determined to hold a tough stance against the oil deal, she wrote in a cable on April 19, 2006, that “Post [the Embassy] will continue to pressure Préval against joining Petrocaribe.”[6] For two years, the U.S. government worked with ExxonMobil and Chevron, the two U.S. oil companies operating in Haiti, to undermine the new deal between Petrocaribe and Venezuela. The U.S. oil companies feared that they would have to buy their oil directly from the government of Haiti and would lose their profit margins as a result. As Thomas C. Tighe, a U.S. official in Haiti, wrote in a cable, “Chevron country manager Patryck Peru Dumesnil confirmed his company’s anti-Petrocaribe position and said that ExxonMobil, the only other U.S. oil company operating in Haiti, has told the Government of Haiti that it will not import Petrocaribe products.”[7] Because Chevron and ExxonMobil controlled shipping and distribution channels, these two companies were able to prevent the Petrocaribe deal for two years simply by refusing to transport Petrocaribe oil and blocking their shipments. Throughout this time, Tighe said the Haitian government was “enraged that ‘an oil company which controls only 30% of Haiti’s petroleum products’ would have the audacity to try and elude an agreement that would benefit the Haitian population.”[8] Chevron eventually signed the agreement in 2008, but the two-year fight against the deal exemplifies Washington’s willingness to disregard Haiti’s interests for its own economic and political agenda.
The real problem for the United States in this arrangement appears to be not just the challenge to U.S. economic interests but also the development of a lasting Haiti-Venezuela relationship. The U.S. is inevitably skeptical of Haiti’s ties with Venezuela, a nation whose leader fiercely opposes the United States. Préval continued to develop Haiti’s relationship with Venezuela, first with the proposed Petrocaribe deal in 2006 and, subsequently, with Préval’s attendance of the ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) summit in Venezuela in 2007. At the summit, Préval received a deal for an energy aid package from Cuba and Venezuela. Yet despite the proposed benefits for the Haitian people with both the Petrocaribe agreement and the later energy package, U.S. officials fought against the deals because they did not trust Haiti’s possible close relationship with these two demonstrably anti-American governments.
However, the United States’ determination to undercut these agreements seems unwarranted. Although Venezuela and Cuba are outspoken in their opposition to the United States, Haiti does not participate in their leftist, anti-American rhetoric. In fact, Washington was cognizant of the fact that Haiti’s participation in these agreements did not reflect an alliance against the United States. Sanderson reported in one cable that “at no time has Préval given any indication that he is interested in associating Haiti with Chávez’s broader ‘revolutionary agenda.’”[9] Instead, Préval’s relations with these other governments stemmed from his desire for socioeconomic improvement. The U.S. government acknowledged this, as seen by Sanderson’s report that Préval “will manage relations with Cuba and Venezuela solely for the benefit of the Haitian people, and not based on any ideological affinity toward those governments.”[10] Despite this recognition, the U.S. government fought strongly against these agreements, evidencing the true priorities of U.S. policies towards Haiti. The U.S. earlier stated that it is “Haiti’s most important and reliable bi-lateral partner,” but these cables show the limits of Washington’s commitment to aid Haiti. Rather than supporting Haitian attempts at development, the U.S. was willing to undermine beneficial agreements in order to continue its anti-Chávez policies and to protect the interests of big oil companies.
Textiles: U.S. Interference in Wage Laws
In another instance of U.S. interference documented by WikiLeaks, the Obama administration tried to prevent minimum wages in Haiti from rising above 31 cents an hour. In 2009, Port-au-Prince passed a law that raised the minimum wage from an astonishingly low 24 cents to 61 cents an hour.[11] This law would have increased the minimum wage by 150 percent to about USD 5 a day, but, even with this large increase, the new measure would still have fallen short of the estimated USD 12.50 a day needed to provide for a family of four in Haiti.[12]
The proposed wage increase was of course enormously popular with Haitians, who argued that the increase was necessary because of the rising cost of living. However, U.S. textile companies with factories in Haiti, including Fruit of the Loom, Hanes, and Levi Strauss, fought the measure, while the U.S. State Department also exerted pressure on the government of Haiti. David E. Lindwall, a deputy chief of mission, said the minimum wage increase “did not take economic reality into account” and was a populist measure for “the unemployed and underpaid masses.”[13] U.S. plant owners argued that, should the cost of labor rise substantially, these U.S. companies would have to close their factories in Haiti and relocate. Based on the insistence of these U.S. textile companies and the U.S. embassy, the Haitian government agreed to limit the increase to only 7 cents, at 31 cents an hour.[14]
The recent fight over the proposed wage increase is merely the most recent instance where U.S. foreign companies have tried to keep wages low by threatening to close production facilities in the country. The Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development (PAPDA) argues that every time the government of Haiti has proposed a minimum wage increase, lead industries “cried wolf” and threatened to halt production in all major factories in the nation, further jeopardizing economic stability in the country. However, according to PAPDA, “in every case, it was a lie.”[15]
PAPDA implies that closing factories is an empty threat made by U.S. businesses to extort low wages. Based on the actual cost of the minimum wage increase relative to overall profits, this is likely the case. According to a U.S. embassy cable, it would cost Hanes USD 1.6 million a year to pay its workers an extra USD 2 a day. This cost is very low compared to the company’s registered profits of USD 211 million with sales of USD 4.3 billion.[16] Furthermore, Haiti already has some of the lowest paid workers in the world, so finding cheaper labor would be unlikely. Yet whether or not U.S. factories would actually pull out of Haiti, the cables are significant in pointing to the weight of U.S. influence in Haiti. The degree of power U.S. businesses exert over the government of Haiti is particularly alarming as it prioritizes U.S. financial gains over fundamental economic improvements for 25,000 poverty-stricken textile workers.
Elections: International Support for Non-Democratic Process
Leaked cables also provide further information about the international community’s support for Haiti’s 2009 elections. International election donors, including ambassadors, members of NGOs, and leaders from the UN, were charged with monitoring the election procedures and reporting instances of electoral fraud. Yet these donors ignored their responsibility to uphold democratic standards, as they supported these elections despite unfair electoral procedures.
Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), which was appointed by then-President Préval, decided to exclude the political party Fanmi Lavalas (FL) under the guise of not having proper documentation. FL, the party of exiled former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, is a leftist political party that is also very popular among the poor. However, its influence has waned since Aristide was overthrown in 2004 and exiled in a U.S.-supported coup. Since Aristide’s removal from office, Préval’s party has worked to curtail the FL’s influence and popularity, and the party has been excluded in several elections.
The FL’s exclusion caused concern among international donors charged with overseeing the electoral process. Canadian Ambassador Gilles Rivard questioned the impact that this exclusion would have on the elections: “If this is the kind of partnership we have with the CEP going into the elections, what kind of transparency can we expect from them as the process unfolds?”[17] Furthermore, leaked U.S. cables said the decision of the electoral council was “almost certainly in conjunction with President Préval,” as an attempt to rig the outcome of the election.[18] International donors recognized the dangers of supporting the elections: they would not only be undermining democratic procedures but also would be seen as supporting Préval.
Despite these initial concerns, the international community decided to support the elections. A cable sent by U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Merten recorded the views of a European Union representative, who said, “the international community has too much invested in Haiti’s democracy to walk away from the upcoming elections, despite its imperfections.”[19] Furthermore, Merten argued that the elections should proceed because “without donor support, the electoral timetable risks slipping dangerously, threatening a timely presidential succession.”[20] In total, international donors gave an estimated USD 12.5 million to finance the election—about 72 percent of the total cost—even though they knew that the election was not free or fair.[21]
The Organization of American States adjudicated the disputed first round results and decided that the run-off candidates would be Michel Martelly and Mirlande Manigat. Martelly proceeded to win the election, but, notably, only 23 percent of Haitians participated. This marks the lowest participation rate in the entire hemisphere since 1945. The lack of voter participation has been attributed to disappointment about the exclusion of the FL and dislike of the two candidates.[22]
The circumstances of the election reflect a difficult situation for the international community’s involvement in Haiti. Its disregard for standard democratic procedures, with open and fair elections, undermines a commitment to democratic ideals. On the other hand, if they had refused to support the elections, Haiti could once again fall into political turmoil. Such chaos would plague other international investments in the nation, while potentially further stalling the realization of stability and development in Haiti.
Conclusion
The repercussions of the WikiLeaks Haiti cables are a far cry from the massive national security breaches that the U.S. government originally feared. The cables detailing U.S. relations with Haiti do not contain the same devastating potential as other cables might have, and the information leaked here will not jeopardize national security. Whether or not WikiLeaks was justified in releasing this classified information, these cables shed valuable light on the hypocritical nature of U.S. foreign policy in one of the world’s most troubled nations. Based on these cables, we see a disturbing image where U.S. foreign policy is shaped by the interests of the rich and is geared toward underhanded interference in the affairs of other nations.
References for this article can be found here.
The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org
September 1, 2011
caribbeannewsnow
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)