What Wikileaks Teaches Us About Obama and Latin America

By Rebecca Ray - Common Dreams

President Obama has given little indication of the strategy for his upcoming trip through Chile, Brazil, and El Salvador. Will "the great listener" promote cooperation and understanding, or carry on the Bush administration’s approach of fighting against regional alliances?

Words of Wisdom from Past Leaders

Diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks show that last year Chilean President Bacheleturged the Obama administration to avoid separating South American nations into ideological pigeonholes:

President Bachelet emphasized the need to understand the nuances of Latin America’s leaders and their countries rather than lumping them into populist and pro-western camps … emphasizing that Morales was very different from Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez.

In prior years, Brazil has urged the US to establish direct dialogue with administrations that have clashed with the US.  In a 2009 visit:

…both [Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor] Garcia and [Foreign Minister] Amorim used the opportunity to encourage the United States to establish 'a direct channel of communication with President Chavez.' Amorim suggested that a good USG-GOV dialogue would have an impact on the domestic situation in Venezuela, as well, because much of the opposition to Chavez has ties to the United States.

And in a 2008 visit Brazil went so far as to offer help in establishing dialogue:

Garcia suggested that, "Maybe it is time (for the United States) to have a frank discussion with Bolivia" … Without wishing to be a mediator, he said, Brazil is willing to help in whatever it can, recalling a similar commitment he made to A/S Shannon two years earlier.

A Legacy of Division

If Obama takes either of these leaders' advice to heart, it will be a dramatic shift from the past.  The Wikileaks cables show us a detailed history of the Bush administration weakening cooperation between Latin American countries.  Not surprisingly, much of these efforts have been focused on separating Venezuela from its regional allies, but they also involved Brazil and Bolivia.

In a 2007 cable entitled "A Southern Cone Perspective on Countering Chavez and Reasserting U.S. Leadership," Santiago embassy staff develop a 6-point strategy to weaken Venezuela’s regional alliances:

1. "Know thy Enemy" (information sharing)
2. "Directly Engage" (more high-level US visits to other Latin American countries)
3. "Change the Political Landscape" (boosting Argentina’s and Brazil’s influence as counterweights)
4. "Play to Our Mil-Mil Advantage" (South American military training and peacekeeping operations)
5. "Stress Our Winning Formula" (aid and corporate social responsibility)
6. "Getting the Message Out" (public diplomacy)

An earlier cable from 2006 shows the US pushing for Brazil to work against Venezuela’s relationships with other countries:

Ambassador reiterated that the USG hopes more engagement by Brazil will serve to counterbalance Chavez' pernicious influence.

But the cables also focused on separating Brazil from the rest of the region.  In 2006, this entailed nipping in the bud a relationship between Lula and then-presidential candidate Evo Morales, as well as other leftist governments.  Embassy staff advised Ambassador Shannon:

… you can focus on the GOB’s outlook for what a Morales presidency means for regional integration, political stability and law enforcement. In particular, you can stress with all interlocutors our concerns about a possible dramatic expansion in cocaine production and export. … it will be interesting to press Garcia for explanations of statements by Lula last year that appeared to welcome Morales’ looming “populist” victory, and of how the GOB sees itself now in relation to the "Axis of Evo" (Morales, Chavez, Castro).

This strategy of division was far from successful for Bush. In spite of the Bush administrations' efforts, Brazil and Venezuela kept their alliance intact.

In 2005:

[Ambassador Danilovich] asked that FM Amorim consider institutionalizing a more intensive political engagement between the USG and GOB on Chavez, and standing up a dedicated intelligence-sharing arrangement. FM Amorim was clear in his response: "We do not see Chavez as a threat."

And later, in 2008:

Ministry of External Relations (MRE) contacts refuse to admit to us even in private that they are worried about Venezuelan interference in other countries.

And Brazilian diplomats insisted that they would continue their policy of cooperation, as Lula is a man who "believes deeply in South American unity."

In 2008:

…the USG encourages the GOB to assume greater leadership responsibilities, but the GOB is reluctant to take the controversial stances that go with leadership. Diaz replied that Brazil cannot assume leadership alone in the region, it must have partners, which would naturally be Argentina and Colombia, just as Germany and France are essential to each other in Europe. As a result, Brazil must continue to act in harmony with them and other regional players.

Has Obama Brought Change?

So far, the Obama State Department seems to have continued on the same path.

In 2009, several years after the US denied the intellectual property transfer necessary for Brazil to sell military aircraft to Venezuela, Brazilian diplomats explained to their US counterparts that it would be inconvenient if something similar blocked their sale to Bolivia.

If Bolivia wants Super Tucanos, Lula needs to be able to sell them. Brazil can’t afford the type of embarrassment caused by not being able to sell Super Tucanos to Venezuela.

The status quo appears to be continuing with isolating Venezuela, as well. For example, during the Venezuela-Colombia tensions of 2010 it chose a side rather than choosing to help ensure peace. While Brazil worked on de-escalating the conflict, the Obama administration reacted by agreeing to share intelligence with Colombia on any troop movements within Venezuela.

They did this even though they recognized Colombia’s concern about Venezuela to be "almost neuralgic." Moreover, they knew that Colombia had intentionally provoked Venezuela into the 2008 border dispute, and that Uribe held that the best reaction to any escalation in tension with Venezuela was "action – including use of the military."

Rebecca Ray is a Research Associate at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (www.cepr.net).

February 14th 2011

venezuelanalysis

Bahamas Blog International

Caribbean narco-triangle: The US-Cuba-Jamaica connection

By Norman Girvan


Among the most fascinating documents to come out of the WikiLeaks revelations is a cable allegedly sent by the head of the US Interests Section in Havana, Jonathan Farrar, on August 11, 2009.

The document is a virtual diplomatic bombshell. It could prove a source of embarrassment to all three governments concerned—the US, the Cuban and the Jamaican.

The Americans are believed to have made determined efforts to keep the WikiLeaks cables out of the regional media, especially those originating in their Caribbean embassies. The content of the despatch, however, has been splashed all over the Jamaican media.

In Jamaica’s domestic politics, it will be another embarrassment for the Bruce Golding-led Administration, whose credibility in fighting narco-trafficking is already on the line. Earlier this year there was a huge uproar of the government’s reluctance to extradite to the US an alleged drug lord entrenched in the Prime Minister’s own political constituency, with strong ties to the ruling Jamaica Labour Party. The Opposition People’s National Party has already weighed in on this point.

The cable details a number of instances where the Cuban anti-drug police and Ministry of Interior officials report a less than enthusiastic response from the Jamaican authorities to their appeals for cooperation in stemming the use of Cuban airspace and territorial waters for shipments of narcotics -- notably marijuana -- from Jamaica.

Jamaica’s Minister of National Security has angrily denounced the accusations of non-cooperation. According to the published report, however, he did not deny that the specific incidents mentioned in the leaked cable actually took place.

For the US authorities, the implications of the content of the cable are intriguing.

Cuba has been consistently demonised by US government officials and media, to the point where it has been officially designated as a state that sponsors terrorism.

Yet the U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist assigned to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana is reported as having had multiple meetings and conversations with Cuban Ministry of Interior officials over a period up to August 2009.

The contact included a two-day trip to Camaguey, where the senior US official received a briefing on a Jamaican drug flight en route to the Bahamas which had to make an emergency landing. The crew of three were in detention by the Cubans.

US officials held individual and collective conversations with up to 15 officials of Cuba’s Interior Ministry, including on provincial trips outside of Havana. US officials appear to have been granted generous official and physical access to Cuba.

A recurring complaint of the Cubans was lack of Jamaican cooperation in information sharing. On one occasion a meeting was arranged between Cuban and Jamaican anti-narcotics officials. The meeting was reportedly arranged by the UK Defence Attaché and held on a British naval vessel assigned to drug interdiction duties, which was then in the Port of Havana. The cable says that at the meeting, the Jamaican officials “just sat there and didn’t say anything”.

On another occasion in May 2009, the Cuban Border Guard, acting on real-time information supplied by the Americans, intercepted a Jamaican go-fast vessel and seized 700 kg of Jamaican marijuana. This operation is actually referred to as a “joint-interdiction”.

Joint interdiction? The US and Cuba? Is this the terrorist state that poses a threat to the national security of the United States?

(A separately leaked memorandum recently published in the United States shows US military strategists expressing grave concern about US security should there be a ‘regime change’ in Cuba. One can now see why. To begin with, the kind of cooperation now taking place could not be counted on.)

Cuba, with one of longest coastlines in the island Caribbean, has probably the best system of coastal border security in the region.

The reason is straightforward. The island has lived for the past 50 years under constant threat of invasion from the United States. The Cubans never let their guard down.

There is considerable irony that it is this very system that is now proving to be an asset in protecting the security of the US against narco-trafficking.

As far as the Cubans are concerned, the revelations in the cable are a double-edged sword.

The Cuban government has always maintained that it is utterly opposed to narco-trafficking; and does everything in its power to prevent the use of Cuba for the trade and to cooperate with the US authorities.

The US does not deny this. But the extent and intimacy of the cooperation may surprise many in both countries. To that degree, the revelations are unlikely to harm Cuba.

There may be some, embarrassment, however, in its relations with the Jamaican government, which have in recent years been very cordial.

Just recently (December 8), Cuba-CARICOM day was simultaneously celebrated in Havana and in several CARICOM capitals with diplomatic receptions and speeches.

To be seen to be complaining to the US -- presumably in the hope that US pressure on Jamaica would succeed where Cuban pressure had not -- might not fit the image of friendship that Cuba has so carefully cultivated over the years.

Still, if the facts reported in the US cable are true, the Cuban frustration is understandable.

Why take the rap from the US for Jamaica’s inaction, especially when the stakes for Cuba are so high?

As for this coming to light, the Cubans have the perfect response.

Don’t blame us, blame WikiLeaks.

December 20, 2010

caribbeannewsnow

Bahamas Blog International