WikiLeaks, foreign policy and OECS trade policy unit findings are too much for the Diaspora

By Ian Francis:



In the North American Diaspora, there is always a thirst for forward looking news from the Caribbean region. This thirst for progressive policy news is often bolstered when it is learnt that our regional governments are actively coordinating foreign policy management, searching for export markets and trade collaboration in Canada and, most important, attaining a factual and global understanding that the United States has lost its world policing status. Many new players have emerged and it is time to take cognizance.

WikiLeaks and the Comrade

My last article a few days ago on this medium addressed the ongoing WikiLeaks saga as the Bridgetown based US Embassy ramped up its poor and unqualitative analysis and observations about certain political leadership in the region. It was my intention in this article to refrain from further comments on WikiLeaks; however, I have been stalled due to the many unsubstantiated mischief or allegations allegedly being made against Prime Minister Gonsalves. Let me make it clear, although I have known Comrade Gonsalves for a long time, as a social commentator, I hold no biases but can only comment to what I perceive as wrong against a duly elected prime minister. It shows that the policy of hate, spite and mischief is evident and alive in St Vincent and no doubt in other CARICOM states.

It was my understanding three years ago that, when certain allegations of sexual misconduct against the prime minister surfaced, the allegations were dealt with in the necessary respective judicial jurisdiction where a final resolution was rendered. Further ill-founded and mischievous complaints emerged including one from Canada, which resulted in a rather quick retreat by the various complainants. Several other whining and concocted stories against the prime minister, a minister of government and senior officer of the Royal St Vincent Police Force bore no fruits and were described as mischief and speculative.

What is very interesting in this whole episode is the apparent weight and recognition given to three local mischief makers by the United States government. As I learned of the plots, cell phone conversations and begging requests made to the United States Embassy, I could not but helped ask myself, is St Vincent and the Grenadines an independent nation? Are the three mischief makers or character assassins against the prime minister considering themselves to be firm anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist? Lastly, how can any serious lawyer engaged in such an important issue not understand that DNA tests are conducted in a very specific manner and the possibility of contamination could play a very important role in advancing key evidence? I found it imperative to raise these important questions with the view of understanding that one of the three smarties who are destined to destroy the Comrade will see it fit and necessary to respond to my article.

CARICOM foreign policy coordination

It was only three weeks ago that great fanfare and hope was displayed in Georgetown, Guyana, when a respected and able Irwin La Rocque of Dominica assumed command of the CARICOM Secretariat. It was even more satisfying to me when I read excerpts of the welcome address accorded to the secretary general by Prime Minister Douglas of the Federation of St Kitts and Nevis. In his capacity as current chair of the Community, he heightened the need for more foreign policy coordination within the region by the Secretariat and entrusted Mr La Rocque with many other tasks to be pursued by the Secretariat.

In my view, Prime Minister Douglas’s remarks were appropriate, realistic and established a tone and supportive launching pad for the new secretary general. Unfortunately, as the date approaches for the next United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the varying lobbying efforts are in place by the United States to influence a note by CARICOM states on the Palestine resolution, there are now serious concerns about Prime Minister Douglas’s welcoming remarks about foreign policy coordination in the region. There are even stronger concerns on my part about which way St Kitts will vote on the resolution, as current media reports indicate that Grenada, St Kitts and St Lucia are likely to break ranks with the long standing CARICOM position on supporting the call for an independent Palestine state.

While the foreign policy conduct of St Lucia and Grenada will never be a surprise, I am a bit concerned about St Kitts for two reasons. My respect and observation of Dr Douglas as a deep thinker and no-nonsense leader, and Cuban trained medical doctor, Dr Assim Martin, who recently represented St Kitts in Israel on a recent fact finding mission.

I must add that I was not surprised at the comments attributed to Grenada’s Foreign Minister Karl Hood in the Jerusalem Post. His professed ignorance and lack of knowledge of the Palestine issue was not surprising and his eagerness to get media publicity in Israel further attest to this minister’s individual shallowness on foreign policy issues. Grenada has always been a strong supporter for the creation of a Palestine independent state. This is why, in 1979, Grenada gave formal diplomatic recognition to the PLO and at the same time maintained diplomatic relations with Israel, thus supporting the latter’s right to exist.

As the voting period becomes closer, the CARICOM Secretariat cannot shrug off its responsibilities for a foreign policy coordination strategy on the PLO. It was done before and it is important to allow this consistency to continue. If Grenada feels that it cannot support the resolution, it should immediately break diplomatic relations with the PLO, thus paving its way to vote no, given Bridgetown’s warning, Hood’s recent junket in Israel and foreign policy ignorance.

St Lucia’s behaviour is not surprising. Their approach to foreign policy management stalled four years ago when they booted out mainland China for a return of a renegade province known as Taiwan. In addition, in recent months when the St Lucia crime environment escalated, King’s only solution was to suggest assistance from Israel. Since nothing further was heard about this, it is not known whether Israeli agents are on St Lucia’s soil, thus making it mandatory for King and his hooligans to vote against the PLO resolution.

Therefore, there are still many unanswered questions to the current chair and secretary general of CARICOM.

1) Will the Secretariat be engaged in foreign policy coordination at the United Nations when the resolution is introduced calling for a Palestine state?

2) What is the current state of foreign policy coordination with respect to CARICOM states recognizing one China?

3) Is foreign policy coordination within the Secretariat selective, which leaves individual member states to do their own thing when it is in their interest?

The concept of foreign policy coordination is very confusing to me.

The OECS Trade Policy Unit

During the last year, I addressed many trade related issues related to Canada and the OECS within the context of the CARIBCAN trade agreement. My concerns have always stemmed from the fact and knowledge that that were deficiencies and much more work on an effective trade strategy was necessary if trade and investment opportunities are to be realized and sustained between Canada and the OECS. My concerns were often challenged by Trade Policy Unit personnel, as they felt that my comments and opinions were not fair. Their challenge to my articles increased after their successful rum tasting event and Quebec’s Liquor Board’s consent to grant provisional trial rights for alcohol products from St Lucia.

However, the recent Trade Policy Unit junket held in Antigua last month released transparent and long known information. The release of their technical study on trade between the OECS and Canada requires no further comments except to ask the Castries-based unit the following questions:

1) With the recent closure of the OECS diplomatic mission in Ottawa, what are the alternative plans to ensure an OECS trade enhancement presence in Canada?

2) Now that the OECS Trade Policy Unit has released a technical study that shows little or no trade development capacities between Canada and the OECS, what specific strategies will be advanced by the Unit to build and strengthen trade capacities?

3) Can the Trade Policy unit shed some more light about potential ICT products that can be exported from OECS countries to Canada?

4) In light of the results from your Unit’s technical study, will your unit continue to rely on the Trade Facilitation Organization (TFO) to build trade relations between the OECS and Canada or will be you are exploring the participation and involvement of real Canadian trade stakeholders in your anticipated trade capacity building initiatives?

5) What does the future hold for the development and sustainability of an effective trade strategy between Canada and the OECS that involve diverse sectors and stakeholders?

My articles and opinions are not designed to provoke or challenge the functionality of regional institutions. However, trade and investment impact on diverse interests and may be the time has reached when the Trade Policy Unit needs to embark upon new strategies that will engage a broader spectrum of individuals and institutions.

September 14, 2011

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Wikileaks demonstrates the need for improved foreign policy management within the Caribbean

By Ian Francis



I am not in consort with those who have glaringly breached United States security protocol. While it is enticing and encouraging to consume the leaked gossip, I still maintain the position that the leaked communications on Jamaica, St Vincent and Grenada are private conversations, grossly exaggerated and poor analyses by those who authored the reports.

A few weeks ago, this medium printed an article entitled “More Wikileaks to come”, following the revelations and publication of alleged conversations between Prime Minister Gonzales and Bridgetown based United States Embassy officials. Jamaica was also mentioned, which highlighted perceived rifts between Simpson-Miller and Dr Peter Phillips of the People’s National Party (PNP).

In recent days, Wikileaks has been able to shed some more light on the foreign policy and national security ineptness of the former Grenada administration under Dr Keith Mitchell with respect to Grenada-United States relations.

While there is very little that regional governments and their affiliated organizations can do to prevent further juicy leaks, the current release of such embarrassing information might get governments thinking more seriously about developing and sustaining effective foreign policy management practices that will guide how elected and appointed officials interact with foreign diplomatic personnel accredited to respective CARICOM governments.

To put it bluntly, personnel in our foreign affairs ministries need to equip themselves with knowledge and understanding about the operations of foreign accredited governments. If the acquisition of knowledge and understanding is acquired and applied effectively, there are strong possibilities that the current “unfettered policy access policy” that exposes our duly elected leaders to meeting with “foreign pipsqueak diplomatic representatives” will come to an immediate halt, resulting in a more streamlined policy of access.

The above access policy realignment will not bring an immediate halt to Wikileaks and political reporting by various accredited diplomatic personnel. However, the streamlining will ensure that those junior diplomatic representatives accredited to the region that bully local foreign ministry officials for access to our elected officials will decrease. As it is regularly said, these junior diplomatic officials cannot even get access to some of their senior officials in their own domain, why should they expect it in the region?

It is all the fault of the weak-kneed local foreign ministry officials and some of the inept elected officials that are engaged in the governance of various states in the region. The development and management of effective rules and procedures must be immediately brought to fruition.

I was extremely incensed about the Wikileaks report between Grenada and the United States. I felt that the juicy cables showed some ineptness on the Mitchell administration. Three observations are noted:

-- Reliance by the then administration on United States security support to quell any political uprising that could have resulted in a coup or the overthrow of the administration.

-- Poor quality of national security analysis by Ogilvie, James and De Gale who were charged with the responsibility of managing the national security process.

-- Mary Kramer, a George Bush Ambassadorial political appointee, who described the legitimate concerns of the then Grenada prime minister as “scaremongering”. It is understood, Mary Kramer has since returned to pedigree dog rearing somewhere in the United States.

-- The inability of various local national security officials to adequately brief and convince the administration on local national capacity security abilities that could delimit the United States involvement in the management of security in an independent CARICOM state.

While Wikileaks continues to be an embarrassing source to many governments and individuals within the CARICOM region, it is also an indicator or lesson to stakeholders about the need and sustainability for the management of foreign policy in the region.

Where can governments begin? Earlier in this article, suggestions were made for the need of local foreign ministry officials to embrace information and knowledge about the governance operations of various foreign countries that have established and maintain diplomatic relations with their respective government.

If such an approach was accepted and applied, local foreign ministry officials will quickly determine that ranks and titles are very important elements in the foreign relations community. Therefore, a third secretary from an accredited nation with ambition to see an elected prime minister should be told that he can only meet with a local counterpart who might be at the rank of an executive or senior executive officer.

Another area for consideration is control and monitoring of foreign accredited diplomats. Many of these accredited countries have diverse bilateral technical assistance in the receiving state that might involve various ministries and state corporations. As a result, meetings will be requested so the visiting diplomat can report back to his government on the progress of the project. When and if such meetings are held, the ministry of foreign affairs should always ensure that a foreign ministry official is present at that meeting.

Finally, another modus operandi of visiting foreign diplomats is to cultivate “corrupt and chatty” local public sector workers. The cultivation is often achieved by meals, alcohol, promise of a long term family visa and often other perks that these officials cannot refuse. To effectively control this cultivation tactic, the suggested guidelines should include that any public sector that engages in frequent contact and exchange of ideas and discussions with a foreign diplomat should be required to submit a written report through his/her immediate supervisor, who in turn will submit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for analysis and comments.

In conclusion, CARICOM independent nations might be described as small and poor, thus giving large nations the opportunity to run roughshod. However, a truly independent nation is expected to exert its own style and management capacity without anyone being offended.

I am remaining alert for more Wikileaks, which will reconfirm my assessment and observation of the current feeble leadership in the conduct and management of foreign policy in certain CARICOM nations.

September 10, 2011

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Caribbean narco-triangle: The US-Cuba-Jamaica connection

By Norman Girvan


Among the most fascinating documents to come out of the WikiLeaks revelations is a cable allegedly sent by the head of the US Interests Section in Havana, Jonathan Farrar, on August 11, 2009.

The document is a virtual diplomatic bombshell. It could prove a source of embarrassment to all three governments concerned—the US, the Cuban and the Jamaican.

The Americans are believed to have made determined efforts to keep the WikiLeaks cables out of the regional media, especially those originating in their Caribbean embassies. The content of the despatch, however, has been splashed all over the Jamaican media.

In Jamaica’s domestic politics, it will be another embarrassment for the Bruce Golding-led Administration, whose credibility in fighting narco-trafficking is already on the line. Earlier this year there was a huge uproar of the government’s reluctance to extradite to the US an alleged drug lord entrenched in the Prime Minister’s own political constituency, with strong ties to the ruling Jamaica Labour Party. The Opposition People’s National Party has already weighed in on this point.

The cable details a number of instances where the Cuban anti-drug police and Ministry of Interior officials report a less than enthusiastic response from the Jamaican authorities to their appeals for cooperation in stemming the use of Cuban airspace and territorial waters for shipments of narcotics -- notably marijuana -- from Jamaica.

Jamaica’s Minister of National Security has angrily denounced the accusations of non-cooperation. According to the published report, however, he did not deny that the specific incidents mentioned in the leaked cable actually took place.

For the US authorities, the implications of the content of the cable are intriguing.

Cuba has been consistently demonised by US government officials and media, to the point where it has been officially designated as a state that sponsors terrorism.

Yet the U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist assigned to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana is reported as having had multiple meetings and conversations with Cuban Ministry of Interior officials over a period up to August 2009.

The contact included a two-day trip to Camaguey, where the senior US official received a briefing on a Jamaican drug flight en route to the Bahamas which had to make an emergency landing. The crew of three were in detention by the Cubans.

US officials held individual and collective conversations with up to 15 officials of Cuba’s Interior Ministry, including on provincial trips outside of Havana. US officials appear to have been granted generous official and physical access to Cuba.

A recurring complaint of the Cubans was lack of Jamaican cooperation in information sharing. On one occasion a meeting was arranged between Cuban and Jamaican anti-narcotics officials. The meeting was reportedly arranged by the UK Defence Attaché and held on a British naval vessel assigned to drug interdiction duties, which was then in the Port of Havana. The cable says that at the meeting, the Jamaican officials “just sat there and didn’t say anything”.

On another occasion in May 2009, the Cuban Border Guard, acting on real-time information supplied by the Americans, intercepted a Jamaican go-fast vessel and seized 700 kg of Jamaican marijuana. This operation is actually referred to as a “joint-interdiction”.

Joint interdiction? The US and Cuba? Is this the terrorist state that poses a threat to the national security of the United States?

(A separately leaked memorandum recently published in the United States shows US military strategists expressing grave concern about US security should there be a ‘regime change’ in Cuba. One can now see why. To begin with, the kind of cooperation now taking place could not be counted on.)

Cuba, with one of longest coastlines in the island Caribbean, has probably the best system of coastal border security in the region.

The reason is straightforward. The island has lived for the past 50 years under constant threat of invasion from the United States. The Cubans never let their guard down.

There is considerable irony that it is this very system that is now proving to be an asset in protecting the security of the US against narco-trafficking.

As far as the Cubans are concerned, the revelations in the cable are a double-edged sword.

The Cuban government has always maintained that it is utterly opposed to narco-trafficking; and does everything in its power to prevent the use of Cuba for the trade and to cooperate with the US authorities.

The US does not deny this. But the extent and intimacy of the cooperation may surprise many in both countries. To that degree, the revelations are unlikely to harm Cuba.

There may be some, embarrassment, however, in its relations with the Jamaican government, which have in recent years been very cordial.

Just recently (December 8), Cuba-CARICOM day was simultaneously celebrated in Havana and in several CARICOM capitals with diplomatic receptions and speeches.

To be seen to be complaining to the US -- presumably in the hope that US pressure on Jamaica would succeed where Cuban pressure had not -- might not fit the image of friendship that Cuba has so carefully cultivated over the years.

Still, if the facts reported in the US cable are true, the Cuban frustration is understandable.

Why take the rap from the US for Jamaica’s inaction, especially when the stakes for Cuba are so high?

As for this coming to light, the Cubans have the perfect response.

Don’t blame us, blame WikiLeaks.

December 20, 2010

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Bahamas Blog International