Wikileaks demonstrates the need for improved foreign policy management within the Caribbean

By Ian Francis



I am not in consort with those who have glaringly breached United States security protocol. While it is enticing and encouraging to consume the leaked gossip, I still maintain the position that the leaked communications on Jamaica, St Vincent and Grenada are private conversations, grossly exaggerated and poor analyses by those who authored the reports.

A few weeks ago, this medium printed an article entitled “More Wikileaks to come”, following the revelations and publication of alleged conversations between Prime Minister Gonzales and Bridgetown based United States Embassy officials. Jamaica was also mentioned, which highlighted perceived rifts between Simpson-Miller and Dr Peter Phillips of the People’s National Party (PNP).

In recent days, Wikileaks has been able to shed some more light on the foreign policy and national security ineptness of the former Grenada administration under Dr Keith Mitchell with respect to Grenada-United States relations.

While there is very little that regional governments and their affiliated organizations can do to prevent further juicy leaks, the current release of such embarrassing information might get governments thinking more seriously about developing and sustaining effective foreign policy management practices that will guide how elected and appointed officials interact with foreign diplomatic personnel accredited to respective CARICOM governments.

To put it bluntly, personnel in our foreign affairs ministries need to equip themselves with knowledge and understanding about the operations of foreign accredited governments. If the acquisition of knowledge and understanding is acquired and applied effectively, there are strong possibilities that the current “unfettered policy access policy” that exposes our duly elected leaders to meeting with “foreign pipsqueak diplomatic representatives” will come to an immediate halt, resulting in a more streamlined policy of access.

The above access policy realignment will not bring an immediate halt to Wikileaks and political reporting by various accredited diplomatic personnel. However, the streamlining will ensure that those junior diplomatic representatives accredited to the region that bully local foreign ministry officials for access to our elected officials will decrease. As it is regularly said, these junior diplomatic officials cannot even get access to some of their senior officials in their own domain, why should they expect it in the region?

It is all the fault of the weak-kneed local foreign ministry officials and some of the inept elected officials that are engaged in the governance of various states in the region. The development and management of effective rules and procedures must be immediately brought to fruition.

I was extremely incensed about the Wikileaks report between Grenada and the United States. I felt that the juicy cables showed some ineptness on the Mitchell administration. Three observations are noted:

-- Reliance by the then administration on United States security support to quell any political uprising that could have resulted in a coup or the overthrow of the administration.

-- Poor quality of national security analysis by Ogilvie, James and De Gale who were charged with the responsibility of managing the national security process.

-- Mary Kramer, a George Bush Ambassadorial political appointee, who described the legitimate concerns of the then Grenada prime minister as “scaremongering”. It is understood, Mary Kramer has since returned to pedigree dog rearing somewhere in the United States.

-- The inability of various local national security officials to adequately brief and convince the administration on local national capacity security abilities that could delimit the United States involvement in the management of security in an independent CARICOM state.

While Wikileaks continues to be an embarrassing source to many governments and individuals within the CARICOM region, it is also an indicator or lesson to stakeholders about the need and sustainability for the management of foreign policy in the region.

Where can governments begin? Earlier in this article, suggestions were made for the need of local foreign ministry officials to embrace information and knowledge about the governance operations of various foreign countries that have established and maintain diplomatic relations with their respective government.

If such an approach was accepted and applied, local foreign ministry officials will quickly determine that ranks and titles are very important elements in the foreign relations community. Therefore, a third secretary from an accredited nation with ambition to see an elected prime minister should be told that he can only meet with a local counterpart who might be at the rank of an executive or senior executive officer.

Another area for consideration is control and monitoring of foreign accredited diplomats. Many of these accredited countries have diverse bilateral technical assistance in the receiving state that might involve various ministries and state corporations. As a result, meetings will be requested so the visiting diplomat can report back to his government on the progress of the project. When and if such meetings are held, the ministry of foreign affairs should always ensure that a foreign ministry official is present at that meeting.

Finally, another modus operandi of visiting foreign diplomats is to cultivate “corrupt and chatty” local public sector workers. The cultivation is often achieved by meals, alcohol, promise of a long term family visa and often other perks that these officials cannot refuse. To effectively control this cultivation tactic, the suggested guidelines should include that any public sector that engages in frequent contact and exchange of ideas and discussions with a foreign diplomat should be required to submit a written report through his/her immediate supervisor, who in turn will submit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for analysis and comments.

In conclusion, CARICOM independent nations might be described as small and poor, thus giving large nations the opportunity to run roughshod. However, a truly independent nation is expected to exert its own style and management capacity without anyone being offended.

I am remaining alert for more Wikileaks, which will reconfirm my assessment and observation of the current feeble leadership in the conduct and management of foreign policy in certain CARICOM nations.

September 10, 2011

caribbeannewsnow

Bahamas Blog International

The CARIBCAN trade agreement - what is the OECS strategy?

By Ian Francis


Within the next year, the much touted CARIBCAN trade agreement tinkering will be concluded. CARICOM, OECS and Canadian trade negotiators will take credit for a job well done after the signing ceremony.

It will be interesting to see where the signing ceremony takes place. If it is in the depth of winter, the Canadian negotiators are likely to push for a Georgetown or Bridgetown signing ceremony only to escape Canada’s brutal winter. On the other hand, irrespective of the cold and soggy winter in Canada, our Caribbean negotiators who are so embedded in the per diem culture will prefer an Ottawa signing ceremony in order to maximize their per diem incomes.

Once the revised agreement is signed, the burning question remains. How can the Caribbean trade and export sectors maximize opportunities in Canada through the CARIBCAN agreement?

It is not a new agreement and has been around since the Mulroney days. Unfortunately, its failure was well known when Caribbean governments took ownership and locked up the policies and tariffs in the cupboards of local ministries of trade and industry. Exporters and investors from some CARICOM states remained disengaged and could not seize the opportunity to penetrate and sustain markets within Canada because there was no information, no market intelligence and no encouragement of partnerships through joint ventures and other initiatives.

It is hoped that, this time around, Caribbean governments will understand that a successful trade and investment partnership must be realized through strong and effective institutional collaboration. To put it bluntly, the Caribbean and Canadian governments are not involved in trade exports. However, through the agreement and sensitizing of officials on both sides of the spectrum, it is quite likely that barriers will be minimized and officials will become more informed about the free movement of goods and tariffs that have been eliminated.

In objective and realistic terms, trade collaborative efforts and sustainability between CARICOM nations and Canada require more than dependency on the “tiny bob” consular missions established in Canada. With fairness, Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados and Guyana maintain very effective consular missions with a strong trade arm.

Therefore, if the OECS is serious and committed to a trade and investment strategy between Canada and member states, the current regional approach and strategies for market penetration cannot be successful in its current form. Caribbean trade and investment initiatives cannot be achieved through obscurity or ineffective marketing networks.

The OECS must recognize that they require planning assistance to formulate, implement and sustain an effective trade strategy in Canada. It is achievable but there must be a willingness to understand the need for planning and collaboration.

An effective trade and investment strategy between Canada and the Caribbean within the context of the CARIBCAN trade agreement must extend beyond rum and nice beaches. Certainly, Caribbean rum imports in Canada will continue to be very important. However, those responsible for such products reaching Canadian shelves must understand that it is a competitive environment, as Trinidad, Cuba, Guyana, Jamaica and Barbados have already saturated the products.

Therefore, while the Europeans continue to fund the OECS Dominica-based Trade Unit, staff at this unit must understand that the import tariff on Caribbean rum will be affected within the new agreement and OECS nations need to introduce more than rum and hot pepper sauce to the Canadian market.

A few years ago, Michael Astaphan of Dominica and some other OECS colleagues began the process of establishing a private sector export organization. The concept had merit and received much needed assistance from the Europeans. Unfortunately, the concept died and a very valuable opportunity was lost. It is hoped that the concept can be revived because such an organization is of necessity, since most Caribbean exporters and investors are private sector persons.

Both CARICOM and the OECS must recognize that trade and exports should be private sector driven and not given the appearance that it is state sector driven. It is time to support and assist the private sector in their quest for new markets.

Another perception that must be dispelled with is the belief that regional chambers of commerce are the prime export movers in the region. While some chamber members might be exporters, we need to ask why Guyana, Barbados and other MDC Caribbean nations have strong and effective export agencies. The OECS needs to adopt a learning chapter from these organizations and support a strong OECS private sector export agency.

Another issue on Caribbean trade initiatives seems to be the duplication of regional agencies that purport to promote Caribbean trade abroad. There is the Barbados-based, CARICOM-funded agency Caribbean Exports, which continues to find successful niches with only hot pepper sauce promotion. Frankly speaking, this is another serious area that CARICOM’s new secretary general must address.

Maybe it is time to eliminate this agency and find some form of new organizational accommodation with the OECS that will witness the following three concrete outcomes: 1) Development and sustainability of a strong OECS private sector exporting agency to maximize opportunities and success through the CARIBCAN trade agreement; 2) strong and sustainable trade partnerships between private sector institutions in Canada and the OECS; and 3) moving the OECS trade initiative in Canada beyond the Trade Facilitation Centre.

Finally, successful trade implementation initiatives by OECS exporters to Canada require reliability, effective communications, utilization of information technology tools and seriousness. Canadian importers are not interested in stories and excuses as to why a product did not arrive.

The CARIBCAN trade agreement will provide excellent opportunities but its success will only be realized if the regional export private sector players are allowed to play their role. Once the agreement is signed, both regional multilateral agencies need to delimit their involvement.

The trade and investment process between Canada and the Caribbean must be private sector driven.

August 22, 2011

caribbeannewsnow

Bahamas Blog International