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Saturday, July 3, 2010

Apocalypse and oil

Franklin Johnston




Earth is the Lord's but a deep well opens Pandora's box!


April 20, 2010 is a date mankind may not forget. The day earth fought back! We had abused her; ravished forests, polluted waters, darkened her skies and on this day we pierced her mantle and oil gushed! She cried, "This is my blood, all the oil you desire!" BP replied, "No problem", but as it gushed even more, no man could staunch the flow and panic set it!

The earth confounded men of Congress, of business and science. But the men of oil had a solution - garbage! Let's plug the well with garbage! Garbage? "Yes, when in doubt try garbage!" This was Big Oil's best solution! And garbage it proved! The US was angry, the UK was miffed and said Obama should not blame them as BP was not British; shareholders bawled at lost dividends and we watched aghast as the world's wise men scurried about like headless cocks. We trusted them to dig a proper well; they did not! But, as this will not be the last deep well, can we trust them with the next one? God only knows!

The Macondo well is not the beginning of the end, but it may be the beginning of wisdom. Deepwater Horizon, a semi-submersible drill rig leased by BP Plc (a UK-registered company with offices in London) until 2013, at some US$500k a day, bored a hole six miles into the earth's crust - almost to the mantle, to find oil to feed our lust and their greed. The wreck now lies a mile down on the ocean floor. The insurance claim was settled, owners are happy, but three million gallons of crude oil still gush into the ocean each day and they can't stop it. Mother Earth is taking revenge! What will deeper wells bring?

For millennia man lived in harmony with earth and respected it as the sustainer of life. Jewish stories in the Bible say, "Be fruitful, multiply, replenish the earth..." The result? There are now seven billion mouths to feed! We multiply but we do not replenish, replant or restore; we harvest, but do not rest or restock the species and now we drill this bleeding wound in the Gulf of Mexico! When did we lose respect for Mother Earth?

In the last three centuries man has been an arrogant know-it-all! We know a bit about earth, gravity, our body; split the atom, went to the moon and mapped the human genome. We now have a cocky certainty about things where the ancients were cautious and respectful; we will soon programme our Sat Nav to locate God! Will Armageddon come from the sea? Not by demons, evil men, nuclear bombs, global warming, Bin Laden or poverty, but by simple businessmen. BP opened Pandora's box and a haemorrhage of oil can end life as we know it! Scary! It is so like God to confound prophets and priests. What if hell is our own earth saturated with oil and ignited by the spontaneous combustion of the sun? "No more water - the fire next time?" And why not? Who knows God's mind? God is God, consults no one, gives or destroys life at will! Those "not chosen" are also His and He used them to destroy His son, Jerusalem His city, and enslave His "chosen people". God makes rules and is not bound by them! You pray and expect God's help. Guess what? God answered your prayer, but not as you wished it; you are not in the picture or even part of the solution - tough! Do we limit God's end time to a Jewish story about beasts with four heads? Can the issue of oil be His Armageddon? Only God knows God's mind; this is why God is God! As humans, we must care for the earth and get on with living!

Some time ago, a small Australian undersea well gushed for two months and polluted waters as far as East Timor, so when the massive Macondo well blew I encouraged Jamaica to get involved. Why? We are all joined at the hip! Consider this scenario:

*The oceans are one body of water, given various names by Europe's explorers; if you urinate at Whitehouse beach it eventually reaches Europe, Africa and Asia thanks to the Gulf Stream, Benguela, Agulhas and Humboldt currents.

*Mankind is one, and Europe's proto scientists labelled people by phenotype (mainly colour) as so-called races, after characters (Ham, Shem) in Bible stories. Conclusion? One people breathe one air, live on one earth, beside one sea. If Apocalypse by oil continues, progressive pollution of the Caribbean, Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans means marine life will die. Pollution from the coast inland means as crops and potable water fail we all die! Extreme and not pretty, but species have died out before! So what are the less atavistic implications of Macondo and other deep wells to come?

* If oil gushes to year end the damage may be US$1t and life as we know it will not return to some areas. Who heard the last dinosaur scream? The full is hard to bear!

*The impact on land and marine ecosystems may mean loss of use, plant, animal, sealife, birds and micro-organisms we know so little about - all priceless!

* First, the economy, quality of life, tourism, etc, of Gulf states will be hard hit. In stage 2, Central, South America and the Caribbean will suffer, and stage 3 will kick in when the ocean currents circulate the crude oil globally - possible global disaster! The earth lived with Krakatoa, tsunami, earthquake, storm, Eyjafjoll, all natural disasters and it recovered. Bhopal was man-made, and thousands were killed and maimed with little global impact. BP's incision in the earth's mantle is different. It may affect all on earth!

But we are not yet at worst case; so what can we learn from Macondo?

*We do not know as much as we think we do; so we should respect earth and be cautious.

*God - however you conceive Him - may intervene in the world, but we can't predict the outcome for man as our agenda is not His and we may not be part of His solution.

*The environment must be our priority. We must apply pressure on ourselves, business and government to do right by our earth. We came, it was here and it's all we have!

*Truly "no man is an island". If the US and China pollute the air it is our air; if men dynamite fish and cut down our forests to burn coal, if Caricom accepts "payola" and votes to destroy whales, they threaten our earth! Let's oppose them all! The Gulf gusher may not be the Apocalypse, but "take sleep and mark death", my friend.

Dr Franklin Johnston is an international project manager with Teape-Johnston Consultants, currently on assignment in the UK.

franklinjohnston@hotmail.com


July 02, 2010

jamaicaobserver

Friday, July 2, 2010

Owen Arthur - the Caribbean Commissioner the region should have

By Sir Ronald Sanders:


Owen Arthur, the former Prime Minister of Barbados, is probably one of the best Commissioners of a Caribbean Commission that the region does not have but ought to have.

Indeed, had Caribbean Community and Common market (CARICOM) governments implemented the recommendation of the 1992 West Indian Commission to establish a Caribbean Commission, we may today have as its President, PJ Patterson the former Prime Minister of Jamaica, Owen Arthur as one of its Commissioners and someone from the OECS of the regional calibre of say, Ralph Gonsalves the present Prime Minister of St Vincent and the Grenadines, or Vaughan Lewis former Prime Minister of St Lucia, as the third Commissioner.

Sir Ronald Sanders is a business executive and former Caribbean diplomat who publishes widely on small states in the global community. Reponses to: www.sirronaldsanders.comHad such a Commission been in place and operating, CARICOM countries may have been dealing with their current financial and economic crises in a collective and cohesive fashion, and much better than they are currently.

As it is, each country has struggled to deal on an individual basis with the walloping effects not only of the global financial crisis, but also of the consequences of the collapse of CLICO and British American.

While it is true that in mid-June, the governments of the seven small members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) signed a Treaty to establish an Economic Union among themselves, that treaty is not yet operational and while, once it is operational, it will represent progress, it remains insufficient. It is the wider CARICOM region that has to deepen its integration arrangements and especially its machinery for joint decision-making and implementation.

Regrettably, Owen Arthur is not looking for a job as a Commissioner or even Head of a Caribbean Commission. Indeed, one interpretation of a comment he made recently in the Bahamas suggests that he may be interested in being Prime Minister of Barbados once again.

In a very important speech to the Institute of Chartered Accountants of the Caribbean at its annual meeting in the Bahamas on June 25, Arthur said: “You should allow me to begin by stating how very pleased I am to be able to share the same platform once again with Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham who until recently, like I do now, carried the title of Former Prime Minister. His presence fortifies my belief in the concept of the second coming”.

Whatever Arthur meant by that comment, the rest of his statement was a telling analysis of the present financial and economic condition of the Caribbean Community, and a blistering revelation of the lack of support from the International Financial Institutions (IFI’s).

It has to be said, however, that while the IFI’s have not been as responsive to the Caribbean as they could have been, and the IMF in particular has applied the usual prescriptions for providing Stand-By arrangements to Jamaica and Antigua and Barbuda, CARICOM countries failed to provide the IFI’s and major world economies with a clearly defined plan of what they need, for what, and how they plan to repay it.

It should be recalled that when the global financial crisis erupted, the world, and the Caribbean Region within it, faced an economic crisis of unprecedented proportions. Globalisation threatened to overwhelm the Caribbean with a world-wide recession, and indeed it did. Growth in every country except Guyana (according to the IMF) declined in 2008 and 2009. In some cases, there was negative growth. The ratio of debt to GDP escalated everywhere even in normally cautious Barbados. Tourism, on which the entire region (except Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago) now relies, declined everywhere if not in numbers, certainly in spending.

No State, no Government, no society within the region was immune from the economic consequences of the global financial crisis and the effects of the collapse of CLICO and British American. In that context, CARICOM societies expected their governments to come together to explore measures they could take in concert to enlarge the capacity of the region. Indeed, several regional commentators urged such action in very specific terms. As it turned out, CARICOM governments set up two separate task forces and both reported, but no joint plan was put to the IFI’s and none to the major world economies.

Owen Arthur reminded his audience in the Bahamas that “in April 2009, the G20 countries pledged provision of an additional $1.1 trillion to the IMF and the Multilateral Development Banks to enable them to carry out a programme to restore credit, growth and jobs to the world economy”, and he observed that “we have witnessed the carrying out of a rescue and recovery programme for the world’s developed economies, involving an unprecedented commitment of financial resources and the incurring of fiscal deficits on a scale that has hitherto been unimaginable”.

But, while the developed countries were bailing themselves out, they failed to deliver on the pledge “to make available an additional $850 billion of resources through the IMF and the multilateral development banks to support growth in emerging market and developing countries by helping to finance counter-cyclical spending, bank recapitalization, infrastructure, trade finance, balance of payments support, debt rollover and social support”.

Arthur pointed out that the IMF introduced a new Flexible Credit Line through which the bulk of additional IMF financing was to be channelled. As he said: “It was also especially intended to herald a fundamental change in the procedures for accessing IMF funds and meeting IMF programming tests”.

However, it could not be used by Caribbean countries and the facility into which $500 billion was pledged to support recovery in the developing world was used by countries in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia.

In the Caribbean, the IMF has agreed to two Stand-by Arrangements, one for $1.3 billion with Jamaica, and the other for almost $120 million with Antigua and Barbuda for which all the traditional IMF conditionalities apply.

As Arthur concludes: “It however cannot fairly be said that IMF response has or will assist in any major material way in achieving the grand overarching objectives stated on April 2nd, 2009 of fostering counter-cyclical stimulation, spurring employment creation nor attending to the needs of structural diversification in Caribbean economies”.

The space allowed in this commentary does not permit discussion of Arthur’s analysis of the lack of adequate response by other IFI’s to the Caribbean. But, his statement should be compulsory reading for all.

His conclusion is also extremely important. He said: “Where there is common threat, we must devise and pursue a common response. Should this global crisis engender such a common response to the common threats faced by the societies of the region, it will have served to usher in a better way of doing things in the Caribbean and will help to ensure that our best days are still ahead of us”.

In simple terms, Owen Arthur has made the case for a Caribbean Commission. If it were in existence, and if someone of his calibre – if not he himself – was Commissioner for the Community’s finance and trade negotiations, the region as whole might have got from the IFI’s a reasonable share of the resources it has been denied – largely because it failed to produce a clearly defined plan that could be effectively argued.

July 2, 2010

caribbeannetnews

Thursday, July 1, 2010

Bolivarian Venezuela at the Crossroads, Part 1: Nationalization and Workers’ Control


By Eric Toussaint - CADTM:


The economic, social and political situation in Venezuela has changed a lot since the failure of the constitutional reform in December 2007, which acted as a warning to the Chávez government.[1] This failure had the effect, however, of reviving the debate on the need to have a socialist perspective. The debate revolves around several key questions: further nationalization, workers’ control, the place of the PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela), and people’s participation.


On Sunday 15 February 2009, 54.36% of the country’s citizens voted ‘yes’ to the amendment to the Constitution that allows political representatives to stand for successive mandates without any time limit.[2] Up to then the Constitution had only allowed two successive mandates; there had to be a break before the candidate could apply again.[3] In 2013, at the end of his second mandate, Hugo Chávez will have the possibility to run again for president. If he is re-elected, his mandate will end in January 2019. This is why some Chavist activists are now concerned about what changes may occur by then that could consolidate the progress achieved since Chávez’s accession to power.


Nationalization and workers’ control: achievements and limitations


In April 2008, after 15,000 workers at the SIDOR steel plant, part of the Argentine group Techint, had been on strike for nearly two months, Hugo Chávez announced that the company was being nationalized. The workers’ main demand was for 9,000 temporary contracts to be converted into unlimited duration contracts. Given the employer’s refusal, nationalization was the best way for the government to guarantee that the workers’ demand was met — a decision workers perceived as a great victory.


SIDOR was founded as a State-owned company during the 1950s and then privatized and sold to foreign capital in 1997 under Rafael Caldera’s presidency. The April 2008 re-nationalization takes on particular significance since this modern and efficient company is a production tool that Argentinian capital, and Techint in particular, wished to hold on to.


It should be noted that the Chavista government of the state in which SIDOR is located had ordered the police to repress the strike as soon as it started. In addition, the minister of labour had done nothing to support workers’ demands. As a consequence Hugo Chávez’ decision to nationalize the company and to remove the minister was perceived as a shift in the workers’ favour. All the more so as, at about the same time, he announced an increase in interprofessional minimum wages and public sector salaries as well as the nationalization of the cement industry, which so far had been in the hands of three transnational corporaions (TNC) (Lafarge – France, Holcim – Switzerland, and Cemex – Mexico).


In the following months and during 2009 the government made further nationalizations in the food industry [4] (which affected both national capital – Lacteos Los Andes – and the grain TNC Cargill). The government justified these nationalizations as being essential for improving the population’s food supply. Finally the Bank of Venezuela, one of the largest private banks in the Santander group (one of the two leading banking groups in Spain) was also taken over by the State.


All these nationalizations, as well as those that had occurred earlier (in the electricity sector, telecommunications, the Orinoco oil fields, etc.), led to generous compensations for the former owners. Venezuela uses part of its oil revenue to regain control of certain strategic sectors of the economy. The main objective of such compensation is to avoid legal penalties for not abiding by bilateral treaties on investments signed by Venezuela. International law makes it possible for States to nationalize companies provided they give reasonable compensation to owners. Venezuela could proceed in a more radical way if it withdrew its signature from bilateral treaties on investments, left the ICSID (International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, the World Bank’s tribunal on investment issues), and secured its liquidities and other assets abroad so as to avoid seizure. This of course would further increase the hostility of the establishment in industrialized countries and of the TNCs within the country (all the major transnational oil companies are present in Venezuela as well as General Motors, Mitsubishi, Daimler-Chrysler, etc.).


The rather cautious way chosen by the government did not prevent a company like ExxonMobil from trying to have 12 billion dollars belonging to PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima) seized by Dutch and British courts in 2008. This is one good reason for Venezuela to enter into an alliance with other countries of the South so as to repudiate bilateral treaties on investments that include clauses that could be detrimental to the nation’s interests, to withdraw from the ICSID and WTO, and to set up a multilateral body in the South to settle disputes – in other words, an ICSID that would be a Southern alternative to the World Bank’s ICSID, which serves the interests of large private TNCs.


In 2009, further nationalizations again raised the issue of workers’ control. Left-wing trade unions and workers’ collectives are in fact demanding the implementation of control mechanisms through which workers can control the boards of nationalized companies. They want in this way to ensure that the original objectives of such nationalizations will be adhered to; they also want to prevent bad management, waste, embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of company assets by insisting on the opening of ledgers, transparent commercial and industrial strategies, and the periodic submission of balance sheets and accounts. They rightly voice their distrust of many of the private executives who stayed on after nationalization, but also of some new executives who look after their personal interests rather than seek what is good for the community. Achieving and indeed demanding control increases workers’ self-confidence and their capacity to collectively contribute to a socialistic kind of management and labour relations on the one hand, and, on the other, create a counter-weight within companies in the hands of private capital.


We see instances of workers occupying private companies and demanding their nationalization. Inevitably the issue of workers’ control will have to be raised again in the oil industry. It first flared up during the oil lockout (December 2002 - January 2003), when workers, who wanted to resume production, had called an oil conference. Later Hugo Chávez rejected the idea of workers’ control in this key industry because of its strategic importance, whereas of course it would be a good reason to go for it. The same applies to the production and distribution of electricity, which were also nationalized. Workers in this sector started demanding control in September 2009. Electricity supply in Venezuela is critical since over 50% of its production [5] is ‘lost’ or diverted (meaning stolen) during distribution. Losses are mainly due to the use of old equipment because before they were nationalized by the Chávez government, certain companies like Electricidad de Caracas (owned by AES, a U.S.-owned TNC) were almost systematically deprived of the necessary investments to buy new machines. On the other hand, large private industrial companies steal and squander large quantities of energy. There are also unauthorized electric hook-ups in residential areas but in the case of working class households, which are not big consumers, such piracy is limited. Workers in the electricity sector are in the best position to solve the issue of supply and to fight squandering and bad management by senior executives – and thus avoid power cuts. These are the arguments being developed by trade union leaders to demand workers’ control. Ángel Navas, president of the Electricity Sector Workers’ Federation (FETRAELEC), told the media during a demonstration by some 3,000 workers in Caracas on 25 September 2009: “We the workers are in touch with users in the neighbourhoods. We know how we can solve the crisis... We have to change the bureaucratic structures and the structures of capitalist management into structures with a socialist vision. We must change production relations and do away with all this bureaucracy which is killing the company.” [6]


During the first half of 2009 Hugo Chávez stated at a public meeting with worker managers that he was favourable to a law on the election of managers of nationalized companies [7], but nothing has happened since then to put this commitment into practice.


This struggle for workers’ control of company management is essential. Its outcome is decisive for the ongoing process in Venezuela. [8]


Notes


[1] On 2 December 2007 51% of voters said ‘No’ to Chávez’ constitutional referendum as against 49% voting ‘Yes’. This is Chávez’ only electoral setback between 1998 and 2009. See Éric Toussaint, “The failure of 2 December 2007 can be a powerful lever for improving the process currently unfolding in Hugo Chávez’ Venezuela”, December 2007, http://www.cadtm.org/The-failure-of...


[2] It should be remembered that article 72 provides for the possibility of citizens recalling the President of the Republic and all other elected officials half-way through the term of office.


[3] The campaign depicting Hugo Chávez as a “despot for life” played on the scandalous nature of unlimited re-election. Yet several European democracies work in the same way. This is the case in Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom for the post of Prime Minister, and in Germany for the post of Chancellor (in all 4 countries, it is the head of government who really holds the reins of power). In France, up to the adoption in July 2008 of the constitutional law on the modernization of institutions, there was no limit on the number of consecutive mandates. Since then, the number of consecutive mandates is limited to two.


[4] http://voixdusud.blogspot.com/2009/


[5] We should also note, however, a very positive structural feature in Venezuela: electricity is very largely produced from dams and rivers. Fossil fuels are only rarely used and there are no nuclear power plants.


[6] See a very interesting video of the demonstration with interviews of several TU leaders on the Marea Socialista website: http://mareasocialista.com/


[7] This was the case on 21 May 2009 during a meeting between Hugo Chávez and 400 delegates from the steel and aluminium industries held in the State of Guayana. A meeting to consolidate other commitments made during this important assembly took place on 21 August 2009 in the context of the “Plan Guayana socialista”. See Marea socialista, no.22, p. 3.


[8] To know more about initiatives or position statements on workers’ control in Venezuela, read issues 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the magazine Marea Socialista, July-August 2009, which discuss the situation at SIDOR, CorpoElec, Cadafe, cement works, Cafeaca, Alcasa, Carbonorca…See http://mareasocialista.com/


Translated by Christine Pagnoulle and Judith Harris, in collaboration with Francesca Denley and Stephanie Jacquemont. Next part: Debate and contradiction in the PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) (Part 2).


Eric Toussaint, Doctor in Political Science (University of Liege and University of Paris VIII), is president of CADTM Belgium (Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt, www.cadtm.org). He is the author of A diagnosis of emerging global crisis and alternatives, VAK, Mumbai, India, 2009, 139p; Bank of the South. An Alternative to the IMF-World Bank, VAK, Mumbai, India, 2007; The World Bank, A Critical Primer, Pluto Press, Between The Lines, David Philip, London-Toronto-Cape Town 2008; Your Money or Your Life, The Tyranny of Global Finance, Haymarket, Chicago, 2005.



Source: Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt



Bolivarian Venezuela at a Crossroads, Part 2: Debate and Contradiction in the PSUV




venezuelanalysis




June 30th 2010

Tuesday, June 29, 2010

Disparities in US immigration policy toward Haiti and Cuba: A legacy to be continued?

by Alice Barrett & Kelsey Cary, COHA Research Associates:



Many points of comparison exist between Haiti and Cuba, as Ruth Ellen Wasem contends in a Congressional Research Report: “Both nations have a history of repressive governments with documented human rights violations. Both countries have a history of sending asylum seekers to the United States by boats.” In spite of these similarities, several political and economic factors have spurred divergent U.S. directives in these two island nations.

The United States and Cuba have maintained a tenuous relationship since Fidel Castro assumed power in 1959. The Kennedy administration implemented a two-tier policy consisting of an economic embargo paired with diplomatic isolation, both of which continue to dictate U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba today. Although the U.S. has not sought to diplomatically and economically isolate Haiti in the same manner, relations between the former French colony and the U.S. have been shaped by the protection of national interests and subsequent military intervention. Haiti has been unable to achieve stability, becoming a headache in the backyard of the U.S. and, consequently, ties between the two states have been tumultuous. These contrasting histories and foreign policy approaches surpass domestic boundaries, as reflected in current U.S. immigration legislation. Ironically, the U.S. holds refugees escaping from communist Cuba to more lenient standards than any other foreign nationals. Migrants facing at least equally urgent circumstances, such as Haitians, suffer the ramifications of our broken policies. The January 12, 2010 earthquake provides an example of a pressing and devastating event calling for the Obama administration to address the needs of the increasing numbers of refugees fleeing Haiti.

First Steps toward Favorable Status: The Cuban Adjustment Act

Cuba ranks as the fifth largest immigrant-sending country to the United States. In 2008 alone, 49,500 Cubans became Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs). The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) is arguably the single most important piece of legislation that initiated a longstanding pattern of preferential treatment of Cuban migrants. The CAA guarantees that Cubans living in the U.S. after January 1, 1959 for a least one year may adjust to permanent residence status.

Following a 1996 amendment to this statute, the “wet foot/dry foot” practice evolved. This practice implies that the U.S. Coast Guard interdict Cubans found at sea and return them to Cuba unless they profess fears of persecution. However, Cubans who effectively reach the shore are inspected for entry by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and are by and large permitted to remain in the U.S. for the year following. Moreover, if a confirmed Cuban national attempts to enter the U.S. by land, usually through Mexico, Customs and Border Protections (CBP) personnel can inspect the would-be intruder and frequently deem them exempt from deportation. Illegal Haitian migrants do not benefit from any comparable advantages. If they cannot provide a reason for an asylum hearing upon arrival in the U.S., they are immediately repatriated or detained.

The Cuba-US Migration Agreement

In 1994, the number of Cuban refugees seeking asylum or immigrant visas to the United States became so great that the Clinton administration was persuaded to establish a policy to effectively decrease the amount of money being spent on refugee services and impose a fixed limit. Consequently, the U.S. and Cuba willingly reached a migration accord in which the U.S. agreed to allow at least twenty thousand immigrants each year to enter the United States, excluding in this count the relatives of U.S. citizens, who would also be eligible to enter. However, hardly any Cubans met the eligibility standards determined by the INS, meaning only a few qualified for visas as family-sponsored immigrants or as employment-based immigrants. Additionally, a stronger U.S. interdiction policy forced migrating Cubans found in U.S. waters to be repatriated back to Cuba. Such attempts, which seemed to hinder Cuban migrants trying to enter via the shores of Florida, ironically resulted in the Special Cuban Migration Lottery, or more simply a “visa lottery.” According to a 2009 Congressional Research Report, 541,000 Cubans qualified for the drawing in 1998 alone. The Castro government found this number frighteningly high and subsequently put an end to these lotteries. However, the United States continues to parole Cuban registrants from 1998. The number of Cubans who qualified for potential U.S. entry in a single year exceeds the figure of Haitians living in the U.S. today, estimated at 532,000.

Haitian Immigration Policy: An Unaddressed History

Although Haiti has seen some democratic progress since the election of René Preval in 2005, it remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. The wide-reaching foreign policy arm of the White House has largely contributed to Haiti’s plight. A nineteen-year U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 only exacerbated the dire economic and political situation in the country. Throughout this period, in which U.S. occupying forces continued to abuse their power, between 15,000 and 30,000 Haitian lives were taken. During its tenure, the U.S. failed to establish democratic traditions, but did find success in strengthening an already powerful institution: the Haitian military. Authoritarian regimes since then have predictably dominated the nation as only two leaders have voluntarily handed over power. An estimated 40,000 people were jailed, tortured or killed during the twenty-nine years (1957-1986) spanning the rule of Francois Duvalier (“Papa Doc) and his son Jean-Claude Duvalier (“Baby Doc”).

U.S. immigration policy towards Haitians originated during the dictatorship of Jean-Claude Duvalier with an aim of reducing the number of Haitian migrants seeking asylum or immigrant visas to the United States in the aftermath of the 1981 Mariel Boatlift. The boatlift was a seven-month time period when an influx of 125,000 Cubans and 25,000 Haitians seeking asylum in the United States arrived by boat to the shores of South Florida. As a result, Ronald Reagan negotiated with then Haitian Dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier to develop the policy of interdiction, a practice whereby the Coast Guard stops and searches boats on the high seas suspected of transporting undocumented immigrants. For instance, from 1981 to 1990, 22,940 Haitians were interdicted, yet only 11 of them were even considered qualified to apply for asylum in the United States. Washington claimed that Haitians seeking asylum in the U.S. during this time period could only be considered economic migrants and were therefore unqualified to remain in the country. However, this specious conclusion was stood on its head following the Presidential coup in 1991, which overthrew the constitutional Aristide government.

The Aftermath of the 1991 Coup

Jean-Bertrand Aristide had served as an embodiment of hope and prosperity for the poor, but the left-leaning policies he wanted to implement were deeply disturbing to both the Haitian army and elite. This frustration resulted in a coup that marked a continuation of Haitian military tyranny: Aristide had been the state’s first democratically elected leader and his ousting led to yet another oppressive military regime. The U.S. and the international community responded to the crisis by imposing an international trade embargo against Haiti, nominally calling for the reinstatement of Aristide. Additionally, nearly 40,000 Haitians boarded boats and departed for Florida’s shores, forcing the U.S. to re-evaluate the migrant status of Haitians.

The coup in 1991 challenged Washington’s assumption that Haitians were fleeing their country solely for economic reasons and were not eligible for asylum. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stipulates that a refugee can only stay in the U.S. if they “demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned home, they will be persecuted based upon one of the five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Although Haiti’s poverty suggests its citizens might only be seeking U.S. immigrant visas for economic purposes, a 1992 Amnesty International report contradicts this claim. It revealed that since the beginning of the coup, a minimum of 1,500 people had been killed and thousands more had been imprisoned and tortured for merely having a picture of Aristide hanging on the wall. Yet this created no changes in refugee policy, signaling that in reality, Washington was no more favorably oriented to Aristide than to the Haitian military.

The Bush administration ignored a basic tenant of a treaty on refugees to which Haiti and the U.S. had been parties since 1968. International refugee law forbids the return of refugees to their country of origin unless adequate assurances have been made that they will not be persecuted. Nevertheless, in November 1991, the Coast Guard sent home 538 Haitian escapees. This repatriation occurred in spite of an arrangement made between the U.S., the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) and other countries in the region to provide a safe-haven for these interdicted Haitian migrants. According to a 2005 Congressional Report, Washington returned these Haitians without interviewing them to determine whether they were at risk of persecution. In order for the interdicted Haitians to even be considered eligible for asylum, they would have had to attest to being in danger if repatriated. They were never granted the opportunity to do this, unlike their Cuban counterparts.

The Haiti Earthquake: an Amplification of Inconsistent Policy

The January 12, 2010 earthquake thrust Haitians into devastation: 230,000 died and 1.5 million are still left homeless. The immediate need for relocation remains evident: the temporary camps constructed for those dislocated on the island are rapidly turning into slums and are extremely vulnerable to approaching hurricanes. Although the United States’ capacity to accept immigrants has its limits, the continued disproportionate acceptance of Cubans over Haitians in light of Haiti’s latest crisis is unwarranted.

The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has focused on two short-term immigration solutions for Haitians in need of respite: the extension of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for those residing in the U.S. illegally prior to the earthquake and the limited acceptance of Humanitarian Parole applications. According to USCIS, Humanitarian Parole visas are to be “used sparingly to bring someone who is otherwise inadmissible into the United States for a temporary period of time due to a compelling emergency.”

Immigrants from Haiti: Visas and Detentions

By the end of last February, 31,000 people, including 7,200 foreign nationals, had been evacuated from Haiti to the United States. However, as of May, only approximately 1,700 Haitian citizens had received Humanitarian Parole. A series of restrictive practices stand in contrast to the open arms extended to Cubans, who continue to benefit under the CAA and from a high number of family connections. The U.S. government set the 2010 admissions ceiling for refugees from Latin America and the Caribbean at 5,000. So far, 3,351 out of 3,429 resettled have been Cuban refugees. Considering the deplorable conditions Haitians currently face, their comparatively low acceptance is disconcerting. Furthermore, it creates a looming gap between evacuation and immigrant reception that tends to be filled through existing loop holes and illegal smuggling networks. Instead of Humanitarian Parole, the remaining official number of Haitian evacuees have received tourist visas. The drawback of tourist visas is that they prohibit legal employment in the U.S., likely leading to extended illegal residence and labor. These prospects put tourist visa holders at higher risk of detention.

Furthermore, many Haitians have once again resorted to illegal means of immigration, boarding boats to reach U.S. shores. Some U.S. officials seem to negate the link between such unlawful processes and the government’s limited immigration response. In January 2010, immediately following the Haiti earthquake, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed, “Our ordinary and regular immigration laws will apply going forward, which means that we are not going to be accepting into the United States Haitians who are attempting to make it to our shores. They will be interdicted. They will be repatriated.” This approach seems simple, but there is one caveat: deportations to Haiti have been at a stand-still ever since the earthquake, and the U.S. government has yet to name a date for their reinstatement. To make matters worse, U.S. immigration law contains no restrictions on the amount of time that suspected illegal immigrants and asylum seekers may be held in detention.

Though U.S. detention policies have always been in place, they were strengthened following the September 11th terrorist attacks. On April 17, 2003, the Attorney General ruled that the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) judges should take national security into account when deciding on bonds for detained immigrants demanding release. The Bush Administration justified this claim on the basis that terrorists could pose as Haitians seeking asylum. Cuban migrants have not been singled out in the same manner and many critics believe the term “national security” is employed too arbitrarily as justification for this practice. Such ambiguity results in the unnecessary detention of many Haitian migrants without proof of their being a danger to this country. Moreover, prison-like conditions, such as physical restraint, lack of medical attention, and occasional physical and verbal abuse in these centers are not in line with ICE regulations or international human rights standards.

Several Haitian migrants were placed in detention centers following the earthquake. An April 1, 2010 New York Times article discusses a specific case where thirty Haitians had remained in detention for over two months at the Broward County Transitional Center, an immigration jail in Florida. Marines directed these detainees onto military planes amid the chaos that erupted following the earthquake. Advocates who fought for their release contended, “There is no reason to spend taxpayer dollars detaining traumatized earthquake survivors who cannot be deported and who have demonstrated that they are neither a flight risk nor danger to the community.”

TPS: Complications and Concerns

Detention is not a fear limited to would-be emigrating Haitians. The crackdown of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has been felt throughout the country’s immigrant community, preventing many eligible Haitians in the U.S. from applying for TPS. The U.S. government has granted TPS to Haitians in the U.S. until July 22, 2011. Technically, this option is open to all Haitian nationals who were already in the U.S. prior to the earthquake, regardless of their current immigration status. As of June 3, 2010, Alejandro Mayorkas, head of USCIS, received 52,000 Haitian TPS applications, lower than the expected number. Representatives of both University of Miami Law School and the law firm of Hunton and Williams requested that the agency issue a statement assuring Haitians they would not be referred to ICE or asked to appear in court due to their status. USCIS responded that laws of motions to appear in court (MTA) vary by state, making the issuance of such a statement impractical.

Lawyers also continue to face a number of hurdles in trying to help Haitians file TPS applications. For example, fees ranging from a total of $50 to $390 are difficult for many eligible applicants to provide. Birth certificates of applicants’ parents have also been required to verify Haitian nationality. These documents are often nearly impossible to obtain after the earthquake’s vast destruction. The current deadline for filing TPS applications is July 20, 2010. Due to complaints concerning the application process, the U.S. government is considering an extension of this deadline.

Why Preferential Treatment? Politics and Race

Arguably, Haitians receive a much colder welcome in the United States than Cubans. Cubans who are fleeing their island and breaking with a communist regime are in much better shape and generally considered deserving of asylum. If they reach U.S. territory successfully (either by boat or crossing the Mexican border) they receive refugee status and subsequently become LPRs. Critics argue that Washington rationalizes this immigration policy as serving a long-standing national political interest in accordance with the goals of the Cuban-American Lobby. Some suggest that Cubans’ special status serves as a purported blow against the Castro government.

Another explanation for this discriminatory treatment comes from Haiti’s lower average level of education. This initial disadvantage creates apprehension amongst Americans about Haitians’ ability to support themselves and contribute to U.S. society. Although Cuban immigrants still face some discrimination, they come from a nation with a 99.8% literacy rate and are thus perceived as less of a potential burden. Some critics even contend that preferential treatment bestowed upon Cuban refugees is an example of a double standard on the basis of race. TransAfrica, NAACP and the Congressional Black Caucus released an amicus curiae brief designating U.S. interdiction policy as discriminatory and further arguing that Haitians were subject to “separate and unequal” treatment.

The United States cannot continue to justify differences in immigration practices developed toward Haitians and Cubans. While the Cold War clearly ended twenty years ago, the Haiti earthquake has put the country in a state of emergency. Current U.S. policy, however, promotes dangerous travel attempts to enter the U.S. and continues to fuel an unproductive Cold War mentality that is the product of the Cuban-American lobby attempting to garner special treatment for its cause.

Looking Ahead: Environmental Reasons for Concern

Although the USCIS is considering an extension of the July 20th TPS deadline for Haitians, such small modifications emphasize the need for large-scale adjustments. Both TPS and Humanitarian Parole provided for Haitians are temporary emergency measures, while Cubans benefit from a standardized, annual quota set for refugees fearing persecution. Not only does the limited scope of these visas continue the U.S.’s long standing bias against Haitian immigrants; it also serves as an example of insufficient responses to natural disasters on a global scale. Tragic and unfair situations resembling the Haiti earthquake’s aftermath are becoming increasingly common in light of environmental dangers. In 2005, A United Nations group warned of the increasing number of “environmental refugees” that would soon need relocation around the world due to climate change. A 2009 article of the World Resources Institute points to the Carteret Islands as the first case of land deemed uninhabitable due to continuous flooding. Its residents are now relocating to nearby Papua New Guinea. Factual and scientific evidence points to rising sea levels and increased hurricanes. These are both migration drivers that transcend political and economic boundaries that have influenced Washington’s biased treatment of Haitians and Cubans. Further large-scale relocations due to natural disasters must be permanently accounted for in future immigration policy, both in the U.S. and around the world.

The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org

June 29, 2010

caribbeannetnews


Monday, June 28, 2010

Diaspora bonds - a compelling development opportunity for CARICOM nations

By Jerry Edwin:



The idea that Grenada may become the first CARICOM nation to follow the lead of Africa and Asia and issue a government guaranteed Diaspora Bond presents a compelling contract between the current government and the tens of thousands of its immigrants. Such an initiative could lead the way for Caribbean nations to find vast new sources of development funds.

While Grenada contemplates a Diaspora Bond, two other CARICOM nations, Jamaica and Guyana, appear better placed to issue these bonds, potentially receiving two billion dollars and two hundred and fifty million dollars respectively from their overseas nationals. Without question, the financial impact of a Diaspora Bond to these three economies will radically alter the trajectory of their national development plans.

Indeed, Grenada has progressed further in this regard than any other CARICOM member.

This past March, members of a research organization visited Grenada at the invitation of Prime Minister Tillman J. Thomas to address the Cabinet on their findings of the viability of using a Diaspora Bond to fund revenue-generating projects on the island. It is the first time that a CARICOM government has held a Cabinet-level discussion regarding the potential issuing of a Diaspora bond.

At a World Bank-sponsored conference on development finance held at New York University in December 2009, both Jamaica and Grenada were cited as viable candidates for Diaspora Bonds. Recently, the Bank also suggested that Haiti reach out to its vast Diaspora to issue a bond that can potentially raise up to two billion dollars.

According to the New York-based research organization, the Caribbean Development Policy Group, Inc. (formerly the Grenada Diaspora Organization), Grenada receives more than a third of its GDP from overseas remittances and has one of the largest annual out-migration rates globally. In its latest country report on Grenada, the International Monetary Fund further notes that remittances are the leading source of foreign exchange for the Spice Island as its construction and tourism sectors continue to lag.

So persuasive was the data compiled in support of the proposed Grenada Diaspora Bond by the New York research organization that the island’s leading newspaper, The New Today, said in an editorial that it fully supported the use of Diaspora Bonds as a leading alternative in the government’s toolbox of development options.

The organization also held high-level meetings with Opposition Leader, Dr Keith Mitchell, and opposition Members of Parliament, as well as stakeholders in the private sector and non-government organizations.

Bipartisanship and political cooperation are key elements to the success of a Diaspora Bond from any CARICOM nation including its governance, marketing and distribution. This approach is been fully embraced by both the Thomas Administration and Opposition Leader Mitchell and his MPs.

Moreover, Grenadian nationals have expressed their desire for separation of bond revenue from the government’s general budget. They also requested an oversight role for the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank or the Eastern Caribbean Securities Commission.

Although the Grenada government has yet to make a final decision on proceeding with a Diaspora Bond, several leading ministers have expressed full support and believe that this option could not have come at a better time for the island as it continues to experience a decline in tourism receipts and its export sectors.

From all accounts, stakeholder interest in and outside Grenada for a Diaspora Bond is highly animated. Grenada, renowned for the bold resolve of its past leaders like the Home Rule patron T.A. Marryshow and the revolutionary nationalist Maurice Bishop, appears ready for a government decision to issue a Diaspora bond that could dramatically alter the direction of its current and future economic and social development.

Some in Grenada’s Diaspora caution that, prior to issuing a Diaspora Bond, there must be careful planning, fiscal integrity and a transparent governance structure to secure the confidence of overseas investors.

“The Diaspora bond holds tremendous promise for CARICOM countries but its success requires leadership from experienced financial experts not from people with political alliances of one kind or another,” said Earle Brathwaite, a successful Silicon Valley financier and technologist, who is also the son of a former prime minister of Grenada.

Bernard Bourne, the research group’s Director of Community Relations, agrees with Brathwaite, adding that it is time Grenada changes its paradigm for seeking financing to develop the country. He stresses that with prominent nationals like race car superstar Lewis Hamilton, calypso icon Mighty Sparrow, former Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Canada, Julius Isaac, and scores of leaders in law, medicine, engineering and other professions, Grenada is more than capable of obtaining development finance from its own nationals once adequate protections are established.

Jerry Edwin, Executive Director of the Caribbean Development Policy Group, was a featured speaker on June 12, 2010, at the Annual Caribbean Private Sector Conference attended by CARICOM Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Trade. His topic was Diaspora Bonds: A Developmental Tool for Growth and Investment.

June 28, 2010

caribbeannetnews


Sunday, June 27, 2010

The Politics of Leadership: Guyana and its Presidency (Part 3)

Sir Ronald Sanders


Guyana's system of government and its electoral system are very different from the systems in place in the other 14 Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) countries. For a start, it has an Executive President whose powers under the Constitution are considerable. Understanding the system is important to appreciating the politics of winning the Government and the Presidency.

In 11 of the Caricom countries which, like Guyana, are former British colonies and Montserrat, which is a still a British colony, the electoral system divides the country into many constituencies. Each party wishing to contest a constituency puts forward one candidate to stand. Each voter in the constituency then casts one vote for the candidate of their choice. The candidate with the largest number of votes is elected as the Member of Parliament for that constituency, and the party whose elected members represent an overall majority then forms the Government.

The exception is where no party's elected members constitute an overall majority. In such a case, political parties then bargain with each other to form a coalition Government as happened recently in Britain where neither of the two largest political parties -- Labour and Conservative -- secured an overall majority of elected members. The Conservative Party and the smaller Liberal Democratic Party then struck a deal to form a coalition Government.

Among the Caricom countries that have a system similar to Britain's is Trinidad and Tobago where, at recent general elections, a number of political parties agreed to form an alliance to contest constituencies against the incumbent governing party but not against each other. At the end of the elections, having together secured an overall majority, they formed a coalition Government.

Guyana's system is different. Its system of elections is based on proportional representation. Each elector has one vote which is cast for a political party. The elector's vote is applied to the election of 65 members of parliament by proportional representation in two ways. First, the country is divided into 10 administrative regions (geographical constituencies) which elect 25 seats. Some of these regions are allocated more seats than others dependent on the size of their population. Second, the remaining 40 seats, called "top up" seats, are then apportioned to parties based on the proportion they received of the total valid votes cast nationally. A vote for a party in the geographical constituency is simultaneously a vote for that party's national "top up" seats.

Importantly, however, while the same single vote of an elector goes toward electing the President, the Constitution of Guyana states that a Presidential candidate shall be deemed to be elected President "if more votes are cast in favour of the list in which he is designated as Presidential candidate than in favour of any other list". In other words, the successful Presidential candidate requires only a plurality of the votes, not an overall majority.

So, given this electoral system, it is possible for a political party that secures the most votes (a plurality) to gain the Presidency outright.

What is not possible is for a coalition of parties after the election to gain the Presidency. Any coalition that wishes both to form the Government and get the Presidency must contest the election as a single entity with a single Presidential candidate whose name has to appear on its list as the Presidential candidate.

It is an interesting debate for lawyers versed in the intricacies of the Guyana Constitution as to whether a President, elected by a plurality of the vote, is obliged to call on a coalition of parties (that may together outnumber the votes cast for his party) to form a Government or could he simply call on his own minority party to form the Government.

The Guyana Constitution states that it is the President who "shall appoint an elected member of the National Assembly to be Prime Minister of Guyana", and the President who shall appoint "Vice Presidents and other Ministers from among persons who are elected members of the National Assembly". There is no stipulation that such appointments should or must be made from elected members of a party or coalition parties that have an overall majority in Parliament.

Therefore, it appears that a President who is elected by a plurality of votes can choose Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister and Ministers from his own party whether it has an overall majority or not.

While it is possible for the majority of elected members in Parliament to vote against legislation and budgets, creating havoc for a minority Government, it would not necessarily stop the Government from functioning. The classic case in point is Canada where the Conservative Party of Prime Minister Stephen Harper has been operating a minority Government since 2008.

This all serves to underscore two things if Guyana is to remain politically stable, build on its recent economic successes and take advantage of the enormous economic possibilities of successful oil exploration and minerals development.

First, it would be best if next year's general election is decisive in terms of a clear winner of both the Presidency and the overall majority in Parliament for one party. To this end, the ruling People's Progressive Party should ensure that both its Presidential candidate and its policies are broad enough to appeal to a wider cross section of the electorate than its core supporters. Similarly, the now disparate opposition parties (disunited internally and fragmented) should try to forge an alliance that also has a Presidential candidate and policies that are attractive across a wide swath of the Guyanese population.

Second, whoever wins the election, the problems of race, equal opportunity, bridging the increasing gap between rich and poor, and crime require tackling in an open, transparent and institutionalised way, or Guyana will always be a divided and weak society failing to be the cohesive and strong nation that it could be in its own interest, and the interest of its Caricom neighbours.

-- Sir Ronald Sanders is a consultant and former Caribbean diplomat
Responses and previous commentaries at: www.sirronaldsanders.com


June 27, 2010

Politics of Leadership - Guyana and its presidency (Part-1)

The Politics of Leadership: Part 2 of Guyana and its Presidency

jamaicaobserver

Saturday, June 26, 2010

Haiti, a transition from squalor to squalor; or from squalor to splendor

By Jean H Charles:


The story of Haiti is tragically the story of a wrong turn at each transition. Strangely this wrong turn has been micromanaged by a long hand with foreign gloves with good or bad intentions for the people of Haiti.

It all started in 1800 when Toussaint Louverture was at his apogee as the founding father of a possible nation that could be a model for a world where slavery was the order of the day.
Haiti - Caribbean

According to J Michael Dash in Culture and Customs of Haiti, Toussaint emerged in 1799 as “the absolute authority of the whole island of Espanola, where the violence and anarchy of earlier years ended and prosperity was restored.”

CLR James in the Black Jacobins completed the picture of Haiti at the beginning of the nineteenth century: “Personal industry, social morality, public education, religious toleration, free trade, civic pride, racial equality was the corner stone of the emerging nation. Success crowned his labors. Cultivation prospered and the new Santo/Domingo/ aka Haiti began to shape itself with astonishing quickness.”

One would have thought that this Haiti could have been left alone to grow into a flourishing nation for the benefit of the entire world. The long hand of Napoleon Bonaparte, the French Emperor, with the support of the third president of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, had other plans. A fleet of the best European soldiers was dispatched to Haiti to stop the nation building process.

Toussaint was captured and send to jail in France, where he died of pneumonia, but the roots of liberty were already too strong to wither. Still quoting Dash, “By the end of 1803, Napoleon had abandoned his now catastrophic New World adventure, his general, Rochambeau, gave up this futile struggle, retreating to the Mole St Nicholas, the same point at which Columbus had landed 300 years earlier, inaugurating European domination of Hispaniola.”

The transition of Haiti into a free, independent and prosperous nation was to last only the span of a blooming rose. Charles X, king of France, exacted a massive indemnity of 150 million francs, the equivalent 23 billion in today’s money, to compensate the French planters after 300 years of free labor. It took Haiti more than a century to complete the payment, forestalling crucial investment in education, agriculture and infrastructure.

In addition, France’s intervention in Haiti’s national politics facilitated the division of the country into two governments, the kingdom of Henry Christophe in the north, well organized and prosperous, and the republic of the west, disorganized, dysfunctional and bankrupt, run by Alexander Petion. Haiti has adopted the Petion model of governance.

His successor, Jean Pierre Boyer, continued the culture of ill governance throughout the island. At the death of Henry Christophe, the massive treasure of the kingdom was put into a kitty outside of the national budget, starting the process of corruption in place now with the Preval government -- the Petro-Caribe account is outside of the purview of the Finance Minister.

According to Dash, “The seeds of national disaster were planted in this period as politics increasingly became a game of rivalry among urban elites and marked by insurrection, economic failures and parasitism.”

It did not take long for the Americans to intervene, as Haiti was descending into chronic disorder. It was occupied from 1915 to 1934 by the American government. In the end, using Dash’s language, “The United States simply exacerbated a phenomenon that had plagued the Haitian economy since 1843, the extraction of surplus from the peasantry by a non productive state. Perhaps the greatest single lasting effect of the occupation was the centralizing of state power in Port au Prince.”

Dash put it best: “The occupation left Haiti with very much the same destructive socioeconomic problems that it inherited from its colonial past. Beneath the veneer of political stability lay the same old problems of a militarized society; the ostracism of the peasantry and an elite divided by class and color rivalry.”

The decade of the 70s ushered in a wrong turn for Haiti after the rather peaceful governance of Paul Eugene Magloire. On his return from an adulated visit to the United States, where he was received by both branches of Congress, hubris or unfortunate advice settled in. He tried to remain in power beyond the constitutional mandate, throwing the country into a social, economic and political crisis that has now lasted fifty years.

The transition from Duvalier pere to Duvalier fils, causing thirty-five years of failed growth under the dictatorial regimes, was orchestrated by the very American Ambassador in Haiti. It took all the courage and the bravura of the Haitian people to root out the Duvalier government from the grip of power.

The populism concept of governance in place since the 90s has completed the final descent of Haiti into the abyss. Jean Bertrand Aristide was returned to power from exile under the principle of constitutional stability by a 20,000 American army troops under the leadership of Bill Clinton as commander in chief.

Rene Preval, who succeeded Aristide, was returned for a second term into power by the strategic maneuvers of Edmund Mulet, the United Nations chief representative in Haiti. After five years of poor, ineffective leadership, the same Mulet is orchestrating the concept of Preval after Preval. He has perfected, after the earthquake, the concept of disaster profiteering. Vast pieces of land that belong to the State of Haiti are being now subleased to well-connected affiliates of the government, to be resold at inflated price to the Reconstruction authority.

Will the people of Haiti succeed in stopping the political, economic, social and environmental abyss through this transition? Or will a sector of the international community continue to have the upper hand in preserving and incubating the status quo?

“Have no fear!” should be the mantra for those who forecast doom for Haiti without Preval!

The Haitian Constitution foresees that the Chief of the Supreme Court shall take command in case of presidential vacancy. To help him govern, Haiti has a range of qualified experts to facilitate the international community to come to the rescue of the refugees and rekindle the recovery.

They range from veterans in rural development expertise as Pierre D Sam, formerly a FAO expert with stints in Burundi, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Togo, Senegal, Lesotho, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Haiti. Or Haiti has young lions such as Dore Guichard or Jean Erich Rene, economists and agronomists, who drafted, with the support of luminaries from the Diaspora and the mainland, a twenty-five-year plan for Haiti’s recovery.

A select committee of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the United States Senate has recently made a finding that “Haiti has made little progress in rebuilding in the five months since its earthquake because of an absence of leadership, disagreements among donors and general disorganization… the rebuilding has stalled since the January 12, disaster. President Rene Preval and his Prime Minister Jean Max Bellerive have not done an effective job of communicating to Haiti that it is in charge and ready to lead the rebuilding effort.”

Vent viré! The wind is turning in the right direction!

Marc Bazin, a Haitian political leader who has tried for the last thirty years, to change the culture of nihilism from inside, is an indication that the assault against the status quo from outside must regain strength until the dismantling of the squalor politics to usher in the politics of splendor.

In the spirit of full disclosure, I should have been in the Preval camp. His newlywed wife is like my little niece. Our family is entangled with strong bond spanning more than a century of close relationships. Her great-grandmother was the companion of my grandmother in business, social and family links, her late grandmother and my mother of ninety years old have continued these bonds, her mother is like an elder sister. Hopefully, the children will continue the tradition of friendship and support. as such this is not a personal vendetta.

Yet the cries and the anguish of 9 million people, including 1.5 refugees under tents at the eve of a pregnant hurricane season, demand a break from the past to usher in a government hospitable to the majority.

June 26, 2010

caribbeannetnews