Stop deporting Haitians to Haiti - says UN

The UN independent human rights experts requested States parties in the Americas to investigate all allegations of excessive use of force, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and racial profiling against Haitians

The experts also called for measures to prevent and combat xenophobic and racist violence and incitement to racial hatred against people of Haitian origin, and to publicly condemn racist hate speech, including those uttered by public figures and politicians

The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) sounded the alarm after 36,000 people of Haitian origin were deported during the first three months of the year, according to figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM).  Some 90 per cent were deported from the Dominican Republic.

Violations and abuses against Haitians

The experts expressed concern over collective expulsions which did not take into consideration individual circumstances and needs.

They also highlighted alleged human rights violations and abuses against Haitians on the move along migration routes, at borders and in detention centres in the Americas region, “as a result of strict migration control, the militarization of borders, systematic immigration detention policies and the obstacles to international protection” in some countries.

Such obstacles exposed these vulnerable migrants to “killings, disappearances, acts of sexual and gender-based violence, and trafficking by criminal networks”, the Committee warned.

Demanding protection for Haitian refugees

Caribbean countries, such as the Bahamas as well as the Turks and Caicos Islands, have announced measures against undocumented Haitian migrants.  The United States in January also made public new border policies to permit fast-tracked expulsions to Mexico of Haitian migrants and others, crossing the southern border of the US without documentation.

Considering the desperate situation in Haiti, which does not currently allow for the safe and dignified return of Haitians to the country, as pointed out by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Committee called for an end to the collective expulsions of Haitians on the move.

It also said assessments of each individual case needed to be carried out, to identify protection needs in accordance with international refugee and human rights law, with particular attention to the most vulnerable groups.

Combatting racism and xenophobia

The independent human rights experts requested States parties in the Americas to investigate all allegations of excessive use of force, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and racial profiling against Haitians.

They also demanded protection of refugees against other allegations of human rights violations and abuses committed by both State and non-state actors; including at borders, migrant detention centres and along migration routes, to punish those responsible and to provide rehabilitation and reparations to victims or their families.

The experts also called for measures to prevent and combat xenophobic and racist violence and incitement to racial hatred against people of Haitian origin, and to publicly condemn racist hate speech, including those uttered by public figures and politicians.

Independent human rights experts are appointed by the UN Human Rights Council, in Geneva.  They are mandated to monitor and report on specific thematic issues or country situations.  They are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work.

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Haiti’s security situation

Chronic instability in Haiti is contributing to rising food prices, surging hunger, dangerous cholera outbreaks, deepening poverty and the potential for a major migration exodus

Meanwhile, lawlessness is worsening across Haiti

From the brief of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Haiti’s prolonged security crisis took an alarming turn for the worse since 2021.  Even before the high-profile assassination of former President Jovenel Moïse by suspected foreign and domestic mercenaries in July 2021, Haiti’s cities and towns registered deteriorating economic conditions, rising social unrest, the targeting of human rights defenders, and the growing menace of heavily armed gangs and organized criminal organizations.

Today, violent gangs have effectively seized control of large swathes of the country, contributing to a deepening humanitarian crisis.  A recent assessment estimates that close to 100,000 Haitians have been physically displaced by insecurity in Port-au-Prince alone.  Chronic instability is contributing to rising food prices, surging hunger, dangerous cholera outbreaks, deepening poverty and the potential for a major migration exodus.

Confronted with escalating insecurity, Haiti’s Council of Ministers authorized the Prime Minister in late 2022 to take the unusual step of requesting the deployment of a “specialized armed force” by the international community.  For its part, the UN Security Council issued a sanctions regime freezing assets, establishing travel bans and embargoing arms flows targeting actors deemed responsible for, complicit in, or having engaged directly or indirectly in actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti.

Some Member States and prominent non-governmental organizations have called for more muscular intervention, including the deployment of a multinational police force.  The US, for example, has worked with partner Member States on a draft Security Council resolution to deploy a rapid action force, or a “non-UN international security assistance mission”.

And while Haitians have previously bristled at foreign intervention, a recent survey claimed that as much as 70 percent of the population currently supports external security assistance, particularly people residing in gang-controlled areas.  Meanwhile, lawlessness is worsening across Haiti.

It is also growing increasingly violent.  US law enforcement and intelligence authorities detected a sharp uptick in the quantity and calibre of firearms and ammunition destined for Haiti in 2022.  Haiti’s National Police (HNP), along with the international and domestic human rights groups, have also documented rising levels of killings, sexual violence, protest and kidnapping between 2020 and 2023.

Likewise, the US Coast Guard registered a fourfold increase in intercepted Haitian migrants between 2021 and 2022.  And 43,900 Haitians, including as many as 1,800 children, were reportedly deported on the border with the Dominican Republic between July and October 2022 alone.

Observers are especially concerned with the evolution, expansion, and intensification of gang activity across Haiti.  Many of the country’s estimated 150-200 gangs are deeply enmeshed in complex patronage networks aligned with a constellation of political and economic elites.

Opensource research and interviews with specialists in Haiti indicate that a small number of gang federations in and around the capital are expanding their territorial influence over urban neighbourhoods.  They are also targeting critical infrastructure, including access to sea ports, fuel terminals, airports and key roads in and out of major cities.

Gangs have blocked access to fuel reserves, triggering a “humanitarian catastrophe” according to the World Food Programme (WFP).  In the absence of an international security mission or equivalent, the practical focus of international support is on delivering humanitarian aid and bolstering the HNP’s capacities to deter and suppress armed gangs, including the trafficking of firearms.  There is also growing attention to border security, albeit not at a scale that can meaningfully deter and reduce the flow of weapons, drugs, and other contraband.

Throughout 2022 and early 2023, emboldened Haitian gangs steadily expanded their control over key access points to cities, including the capital Port-au-Prince.  Some have also focused on controlling key supply lines connected to public and private ports and international border crossings with the Dominican Republic.

Several gangs and gang coalitions, notably the G9, G-Pep, 400 Mawozo, Baz Galil, Vilaj de Dye, Vitelhomme, and Ti Mkak have targeted public and private institutions.  Many are also engaged in predatory behaviour in communities under their control contributing to rising levels of extortion, sexual violence, kidnapping and fatal violence.

Some UN Members States are determined to ramp-up pressure on the gangs and their backers, including in the wake of egregious acts of violence involving their citizens.  The US and Canada have also delivered “vital security equipment” including tactical and armoured vehicles to the HNP on at least two occasions, in October 2022 and January 2023.

The Security Council sanctions, which target individuals and entities engaging in or supporting criminal activities and violence involving armed groups and criminal networks, among other actions, have so far designated one person under the regime, namely Jimmy Cherizier, who the text identifies as one of Haiti’s most influential gang leaders and who leads an alliance of gangs known as the “G9 Family and Allies”.

The EU has further transposed the UN sanctions into legislation.  Unilateral sanctions, meanwhile, implicate at least eight former Haitian presidents, prime ministers, senators and businesspeople suspected of involvement in illegal activities such firearms and drug trafficking, among other crimes.

Haiti’s political system has been described by the World Bank as “driven by capture, rent-seeking and clientelism”, leading to widespread abuses of powers and corruption.  Elected and appointed officials at all levels of government and across multiple sectors have been implicated in illicit activities ranging from corruption, fraud and money laundering to supporting gangs to bolster their political power and capacity to influence elections.

As detailed in the unilateral sanctions announcements, several members of Haiti’s economic elite are suspected of involvement in criminal rackets, including influential Haitian families and members of the diaspora in the US and the Dominican Republic.  The announcements highlight the concentration of political and economic power in the country. 

A handful of Haitian family dynasties account for the vast majority of the country’s overall wealth.  Some of them are involved in the agricultural, manufacturing, shipping and logistics sectors, while others oversee import-export operations.

Several prominent Haitian businesspeople have also acquired honorific diplomatic titles conferring a level of immunity and reductions in import and export tax.  Individuals involved in industrial parks warehousing imports and private ports have typically encountered limited oversight from government authorities.

Due to mounting concerns with crime and insecurity, private security companies have expanded across Haiti in recent decades.  Many provide close protection services for the country’s political and economic elite as well as protection for public facilities, critical infrastructure and small and medium businesses.

Significant numbers of such companies also recruit directly from the HNP, with officers either moonlighting or leaving law enforcement altogether to work in the more lucrative private sector.  Some of these entities have been implicated in firearms trafficking.

The growth of private security in Haiti coincides with similar patterns of private security expansion across Latin America and the Caribbean, alongside a deepening security crisis following the 2010 earthquake and particularly since the departure of UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2017.

PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN HAITI

The suspects in the assassination of Haiti’s President Moïse inside his home in the early hours of 7 July, 2021 include a team of mercenaries connected to a small US firms, which reportedly offered close protection support, training in firearms, and access to military-style equipment.  This is not the first time US-owned private security companies have been implicated in murky ventures in Haiti.

In February 2019, for example, several US contractors were reportedly arrested in Port-au-Prince with a cache of weapons and military equipment.  They claimed to be providing security to both the government and private security details for local business elites.

According to accounts given to media, they were released by Haiti’s Justice Ministry following US intervention, repatriated and freed without charge.

Private security firms officially emerged in Haiti following the end of the Duvalier dictatorship in the late 1980s.  Haiti’s 1987 Constitution did not originally include provisions for such enterprises.

In fact, Article 263 specified that the armed forces and police were the only armed groups permitted to operate in the country.  However, a 1988 decree and 1989 amendment legalized private security companies.

In 1994, oversight passed from the disbanded armed forces to the HNP via a Presidential decree.  Today, private security companies are permitted to acquire and hold firearms in Haiti.

The 1988 and 1989 legislation permit firearm licences for up to half of the registered personnel of a private security firm.  Only certain categories of weapons – handguns and shotguns – are permitted.

All licence applications must be made to the Minister of the Interior and Territorial Collectives (MICT) and the HNP is responsible for delivery and oversight of firearms through a registry managed by the Central Department for Administrative Police (DCPA).  Although analysts believe that local private security companies oversee a far larger arsenal than what is legally permitted, information on the scope and scale of their arsenals is unavailable.

In 2012, the most recent year for which public records are available, the MICT reported just 40 separate private security companies licenced to operate in the country.  Firms reportedly varied in size from 50 to 2,000 personnel, with a total of 12,000 individuals in total.

Roughly half of their clients at the time were foreign embassies and non-governmental organizations and the remainder consisted of banks, businesses and schools.  While not possible to independently verify, specialists speculate that there could be 75,000 to 90,000 individuals working with roughly 100 private security companies across the country, at least five times the number of registered police officers.

US-based private security companies contracted by foreign governments such as Haiti to provide specialized services are subject to a range of domestic oversight mechanisms.  For example, when they are recruited to provide essential defence services, including military or law enforcement training, such companies must obtain arms exports licences from the US Department of State and undergo a review that also involves the US Department of Defense.  Although the State Department forbids combat services under International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), some private security companies have reportedly pursued unauthorized services.

The formation of the HNP in 1994 coincided with the disbanding of the country’s armed forces.  Police reform experts believe that the absence of a coherent framework for policing and the rushed formation, recruitment and training of new officers hobbled the force from the start.

Despite successive UN missions in Haiti and repeated efforts to exact security system reform, HNP performance has been hampered by mandate, leadership, capacity and budgetary constraints.  One persistent deficiency relates to the management and accountability over existing firearms holdings of law enforcement officers and stores of seized weapons.

Another long-standing impediment relates to the weak government coordination across agencies – including entities charged with addressing weapons and drug trafficking, customs, migration and anti-corruption efforts.  Arguably the most significant challenge facing the HNP is its limited force strength and modest resourcing.

As of late 2022, there were an estimated 14,161 HNP personnel, though BINUH assessed that its operational strength was closer to 13,000 and fewer than 9,000 are on active duty.  Specialized police units face chronic staffing shortages.  For example, the HNP’s border patrol (POLIFRONT) has just 294 officers, an order of magnitude fewer than the Dominican Republic.

Meanwhile, the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) has just 181 officers and a single operational vessel (since others are either undergoing repairs in the US or simply non-functioning).  Likewise, the country’s anti-narcotics brigade (BLTS) has just 317 personnel and is severely under-resourced and over-stretched.  These capacity shortfalls are contributing to weak chain of custody over seized contraband, including  drugs and firearms.

Another factor hampering the effectiveness of the HNP is its uneven operational presence across the country.  A sizeable share of officers within the HNP and its specialized units are stationed in the capital, Port-au-Prince, with the remainder sparsely distributed across Haiti’s cities, towns and border areas.

One reason for this is that many HNP officers are often placed on duties unrelated to their core responsibilities, including the provision of close protection for senior government officials.  The misallocation of police further degrades their effectiveness.

With the exception of a handful of staff stationed at Haiti’s two international airports and selected border crossings, there are virtually none policing key air, land and maritime entry and exit points.  The HNP also struggles to manage, share and analyse data within the organization, much less across government agencies.

Notwithstanding the controversial legacy of Haiti’s armed forces during the dictatorship era, there is a persistent chorus for it to be reconstituted.  Pressure to rebuild Haiti’s military has been applied since it was disbanded by former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1994.

For example, former President Rene Preval (1996-2001) established a commission to review the necessity of the armed forces, though faced with foreign and domestic opposition, opted to reinforce the HNP instead.  A decade later, former President Michel Martelly (2011-2016) advocated for the return of the armed forces, but ultimately also demurred.

The late President Moïse (2017-2021) took the decision early in his administration to reconstitute the armed forces, announcing the allocation of $8.5 million of defence spending in 2018 and appointment of a high command under the Ministry of Defence.  At the time, there was reportedly a plan to recruit 5,000 soldiers to expand national security and civil protection capacities.  Today, there are an estimated 500 members of the armed forces, several of whom have received training in Ecuador and Mexico.

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The Bahamas Immigration Minister Keith Bell resists United Nations - UN call to suspend deportations to Haiti as Haiti's crisis deepens

The Bahamas Immigration Minister Keith Bell resists UN call to suspend deportations to Haiti as situation spirals out of control

“Haiti has political instability, economic deprivation, and complete social collapse.  So you are talking about a myriad of challenges and problems.  That problem can only be addressed at the international level and so it isn’t a matter of frustration

DESPITE calls from United Nations officials to suspend deportations to Haiti, Immigration Minister Keith Bell said The Bahamas has “a job to do” to ensure that officials protect the country for Bahamians.

The Bahamas is facing an influx of Haitian migrants.  However, United Nations Secretary General António Gutierrez on Monday called on governments to consider halting deportations as the situation there spirals out of control

Speaking on the sideline of a Labour on the Campus event, Mr Bell recognised the duty of the secretary general, but made it clear what the government has to do.

“The United Nations obviously they seek to ensure that there is harmony, there’s unity among all nations, so obviously that is his job.  We in The Bahamas have a job to do to ensure that we protect The Bahamas for Bahamians.  It’s as simple as that.  The Bahamas as all governments have consistently said we cannot absorb these persons who come in The Bahamas illegally,” he said.

“If you want to come to The Bahamas as a tourist or want to work, then there is a process.  If you follow that process, you may be granted access to The Bahamas.

“If you come here illegally and unlawfully, then, of course, there has to be swift justice.  We will not tolerate, nor will we support reasonably anyone coming into The Bahamas from undocumented or illegal means you will stay in the jurisdiction you will be deported.”

He also shared doubts that The Bahamas would sign on to provisions allowing for free movement when asked about CARICOM’s freedom of movement or labour within the region.

“I know you’re talking about a treaty – I think the Treaty of Chaguaramas and the (free) movement of people through the Caribbean.  The government of The Bahamas, both PLP and FNM, has consistently not signed on to those specific provisions.  I do not foresee in the very far future that we’re going to support a free movement throughout this country of anyone.”

Prime Minister Philip “Brave” Davis said the crisis in Haiti poses a substantial threat to The Bahamas due to an increase in irregular migration.

He spoke earlier this week at the opening session of the heads of summit meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

During his remarks, Mr Davis stated: “With the support and leadership of Haiti, collectively, we can, through CELAC and other regional organisations, help Haitians build a path out of crisis.”

Asked if there was frustration with the international community over addressing Haiti’s issues, the labour minister listed some of the factors that needed to be considered when helping countries.

“I will not say it there is frustration and you would have seen all around the world where first world developed countries, superpowers go into these countries where they need help — where there is a genocide or there is this civil war and the like.  When you go into these countries you have to ensure first of all, what is your objective?  What are the objectives of you going in?  And what would be your exit strategy?

“Haiti has political instability, economic deprivation, and complete social collapse.  So you are talking about a myriad of challenges and problems.  That problem can only be addressed at the international level and so it isn’t a matter of frustration.

“It’s just a matter of how we’re going to address these issues and challenges and then determine how we can help, but Haiti has 12 million people, The Bahamas cannot under no circumstance, support any illegal and unlawful entry of persons from Haiti and that has extended to Cuba where we’ve had an exponential growth in illegal migrants coming from that country. We will not tolerate it.”

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Disparities in US immigration policy toward Haiti and Cuba: A legacy to be continued?

by Alice Barrett & Kelsey Cary, COHA Research Associates:



Many points of comparison exist between Haiti and Cuba, as Ruth Ellen Wasem contends in a Congressional Research Report: “Both nations have a history of repressive governments with documented human rights violations. Both countries have a history of sending asylum seekers to the United States by boats.” In spite of these similarities, several political and economic factors have spurred divergent U.S. directives in these two island nations.

The United States and Cuba have maintained a tenuous relationship since Fidel Castro assumed power in 1959. The Kennedy administration implemented a two-tier policy consisting of an economic embargo paired with diplomatic isolation, both of which continue to dictate U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba today. Although the U.S. has not sought to diplomatically and economically isolate Haiti in the same manner, relations between the former French colony and the U.S. have been shaped by the protection of national interests and subsequent military intervention. Haiti has been unable to achieve stability, becoming a headache in the backyard of the U.S. and, consequently, ties between the two states have been tumultuous. These contrasting histories and foreign policy approaches surpass domestic boundaries, as reflected in current U.S. immigration legislation. Ironically, the U.S. holds refugees escaping from communist Cuba to more lenient standards than any other foreign nationals. Migrants facing at least equally urgent circumstances, such as Haitians, suffer the ramifications of our broken policies. The January 12, 2010 earthquake provides an example of a pressing and devastating event calling for the Obama administration to address the needs of the increasing numbers of refugees fleeing Haiti.

First Steps toward Favorable Status: The Cuban Adjustment Act

Cuba ranks as the fifth largest immigrant-sending country to the United States. In 2008 alone, 49,500 Cubans became Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs). The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) is arguably the single most important piece of legislation that initiated a longstanding pattern of preferential treatment of Cuban migrants. The CAA guarantees that Cubans living in the U.S. after January 1, 1959 for a least one year may adjust to permanent residence status.

Following a 1996 amendment to this statute, the “wet foot/dry foot” practice evolved. This practice implies that the U.S. Coast Guard interdict Cubans found at sea and return them to Cuba unless they profess fears of persecution. However, Cubans who effectively reach the shore are inspected for entry by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and are by and large permitted to remain in the U.S. for the year following. Moreover, if a confirmed Cuban national attempts to enter the U.S. by land, usually through Mexico, Customs and Border Protections (CBP) personnel can inspect the would-be intruder and frequently deem them exempt from deportation. Illegal Haitian migrants do not benefit from any comparable advantages. If they cannot provide a reason for an asylum hearing upon arrival in the U.S., they are immediately repatriated or detained.

The Cuba-US Migration Agreement

In 1994, the number of Cuban refugees seeking asylum or immigrant visas to the United States became so great that the Clinton administration was persuaded to establish a policy to effectively decrease the amount of money being spent on refugee services and impose a fixed limit. Consequently, the U.S. and Cuba willingly reached a migration accord in which the U.S. agreed to allow at least twenty thousand immigrants each year to enter the United States, excluding in this count the relatives of U.S. citizens, who would also be eligible to enter. However, hardly any Cubans met the eligibility standards determined by the INS, meaning only a few qualified for visas as family-sponsored immigrants or as employment-based immigrants. Additionally, a stronger U.S. interdiction policy forced migrating Cubans found in U.S. waters to be repatriated back to Cuba. Such attempts, which seemed to hinder Cuban migrants trying to enter via the shores of Florida, ironically resulted in the Special Cuban Migration Lottery, or more simply a “visa lottery.” According to a 2009 Congressional Research Report, 541,000 Cubans qualified for the drawing in 1998 alone. The Castro government found this number frighteningly high and subsequently put an end to these lotteries. However, the United States continues to parole Cuban registrants from 1998. The number of Cubans who qualified for potential U.S. entry in a single year exceeds the figure of Haitians living in the U.S. today, estimated at 532,000.

Haitian Immigration Policy: An Unaddressed History

Although Haiti has seen some democratic progress since the election of René Preval in 2005, it remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. The wide-reaching foreign policy arm of the White House has largely contributed to Haiti’s plight. A nineteen-year U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 only exacerbated the dire economic and political situation in the country. Throughout this period, in which U.S. occupying forces continued to abuse their power, between 15,000 and 30,000 Haitian lives were taken. During its tenure, the U.S. failed to establish democratic traditions, but did find success in strengthening an already powerful institution: the Haitian military. Authoritarian regimes since then have predictably dominated the nation as only two leaders have voluntarily handed over power. An estimated 40,000 people were jailed, tortured or killed during the twenty-nine years (1957-1986) spanning the rule of Francois Duvalier (“Papa Doc) and his son Jean-Claude Duvalier (“Baby Doc”).

U.S. immigration policy towards Haitians originated during the dictatorship of Jean-Claude Duvalier with an aim of reducing the number of Haitian migrants seeking asylum or immigrant visas to the United States in the aftermath of the 1981 Mariel Boatlift. The boatlift was a seven-month time period when an influx of 125,000 Cubans and 25,000 Haitians seeking asylum in the United States arrived by boat to the shores of South Florida. As a result, Ronald Reagan negotiated with then Haitian Dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier to develop the policy of interdiction, a practice whereby the Coast Guard stops and searches boats on the high seas suspected of transporting undocumented immigrants. For instance, from 1981 to 1990, 22,940 Haitians were interdicted, yet only 11 of them were even considered qualified to apply for asylum in the United States. Washington claimed that Haitians seeking asylum in the U.S. during this time period could only be considered economic migrants and were therefore unqualified to remain in the country. However, this specious conclusion was stood on its head following the Presidential coup in 1991, which overthrew the constitutional Aristide government.

The Aftermath of the 1991 Coup

Jean-Bertrand Aristide had served as an embodiment of hope and prosperity for the poor, but the left-leaning policies he wanted to implement were deeply disturbing to both the Haitian army and elite. This frustration resulted in a coup that marked a continuation of Haitian military tyranny: Aristide had been the state’s first democratically elected leader and his ousting led to yet another oppressive military regime. The U.S. and the international community responded to the crisis by imposing an international trade embargo against Haiti, nominally calling for the reinstatement of Aristide. Additionally, nearly 40,000 Haitians boarded boats and departed for Florida’s shores, forcing the U.S. to re-evaluate the migrant status of Haitians.

The coup in 1991 challenged Washington’s assumption that Haitians were fleeing their country solely for economic reasons and were not eligible for asylum. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stipulates that a refugee can only stay in the U.S. if they “demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned home, they will be persecuted based upon one of the five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Although Haiti’s poverty suggests its citizens might only be seeking U.S. immigrant visas for economic purposes, a 1992 Amnesty International report contradicts this claim. It revealed that since the beginning of the coup, a minimum of 1,500 people had been killed and thousands more had been imprisoned and tortured for merely having a picture of Aristide hanging on the wall. Yet this created no changes in refugee policy, signaling that in reality, Washington was no more favorably oriented to Aristide than to the Haitian military.

The Bush administration ignored a basic tenant of a treaty on refugees to which Haiti and the U.S. had been parties since 1968. International refugee law forbids the return of refugees to their country of origin unless adequate assurances have been made that they will not be persecuted. Nevertheless, in November 1991, the Coast Guard sent home 538 Haitian escapees. This repatriation occurred in spite of an arrangement made between the U.S., the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) and other countries in the region to provide a safe-haven for these interdicted Haitian migrants. According to a 2005 Congressional Report, Washington returned these Haitians without interviewing them to determine whether they were at risk of persecution. In order for the interdicted Haitians to even be considered eligible for asylum, they would have had to attest to being in danger if repatriated. They were never granted the opportunity to do this, unlike their Cuban counterparts.

The Haiti Earthquake: an Amplification of Inconsistent Policy

The January 12, 2010 earthquake thrust Haitians into devastation: 230,000 died and 1.5 million are still left homeless. The immediate need for relocation remains evident: the temporary camps constructed for those dislocated on the island are rapidly turning into slums and are extremely vulnerable to approaching hurricanes. Although the United States’ capacity to accept immigrants has its limits, the continued disproportionate acceptance of Cubans over Haitians in light of Haiti’s latest crisis is unwarranted.

The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has focused on two short-term immigration solutions for Haitians in need of respite: the extension of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for those residing in the U.S. illegally prior to the earthquake and the limited acceptance of Humanitarian Parole applications. According to USCIS, Humanitarian Parole visas are to be “used sparingly to bring someone who is otherwise inadmissible into the United States for a temporary period of time due to a compelling emergency.”

Immigrants from Haiti: Visas and Detentions

By the end of last February, 31,000 people, including 7,200 foreign nationals, had been evacuated from Haiti to the United States. However, as of May, only approximately 1,700 Haitian citizens had received Humanitarian Parole. A series of restrictive practices stand in contrast to the open arms extended to Cubans, who continue to benefit under the CAA and from a high number of family connections. The U.S. government set the 2010 admissions ceiling for refugees from Latin America and the Caribbean at 5,000. So far, 3,351 out of 3,429 resettled have been Cuban refugees. Considering the deplorable conditions Haitians currently face, their comparatively low acceptance is disconcerting. Furthermore, it creates a looming gap between evacuation and immigrant reception that tends to be filled through existing loop holes and illegal smuggling networks. Instead of Humanitarian Parole, the remaining official number of Haitian evacuees have received tourist visas. The drawback of tourist visas is that they prohibit legal employment in the U.S., likely leading to extended illegal residence and labor. These prospects put tourist visa holders at higher risk of detention.

Furthermore, many Haitians have once again resorted to illegal means of immigration, boarding boats to reach U.S. shores. Some U.S. officials seem to negate the link between such unlawful processes and the government’s limited immigration response. In January 2010, immediately following the Haiti earthquake, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed, “Our ordinary and regular immigration laws will apply going forward, which means that we are not going to be accepting into the United States Haitians who are attempting to make it to our shores. They will be interdicted. They will be repatriated.” This approach seems simple, but there is one caveat: deportations to Haiti have been at a stand-still ever since the earthquake, and the U.S. government has yet to name a date for their reinstatement. To make matters worse, U.S. immigration law contains no restrictions on the amount of time that suspected illegal immigrants and asylum seekers may be held in detention.

Though U.S. detention policies have always been in place, they were strengthened following the September 11th terrorist attacks. On April 17, 2003, the Attorney General ruled that the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) judges should take national security into account when deciding on bonds for detained immigrants demanding release. The Bush Administration justified this claim on the basis that terrorists could pose as Haitians seeking asylum. Cuban migrants have not been singled out in the same manner and many critics believe the term “national security” is employed too arbitrarily as justification for this practice. Such ambiguity results in the unnecessary detention of many Haitian migrants without proof of their being a danger to this country. Moreover, prison-like conditions, such as physical restraint, lack of medical attention, and occasional physical and verbal abuse in these centers are not in line with ICE regulations or international human rights standards.

Several Haitian migrants were placed in detention centers following the earthquake. An April 1, 2010 New York Times article discusses a specific case where thirty Haitians had remained in detention for over two months at the Broward County Transitional Center, an immigration jail in Florida. Marines directed these detainees onto military planes amid the chaos that erupted following the earthquake. Advocates who fought for their release contended, “There is no reason to spend taxpayer dollars detaining traumatized earthquake survivors who cannot be deported and who have demonstrated that they are neither a flight risk nor danger to the community.”

TPS: Complications and Concerns

Detention is not a fear limited to would-be emigrating Haitians. The crackdown of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has been felt throughout the country’s immigrant community, preventing many eligible Haitians in the U.S. from applying for TPS. The U.S. government has granted TPS to Haitians in the U.S. until July 22, 2011. Technically, this option is open to all Haitian nationals who were already in the U.S. prior to the earthquake, regardless of their current immigration status. As of June 3, 2010, Alejandro Mayorkas, head of USCIS, received 52,000 Haitian TPS applications, lower than the expected number. Representatives of both University of Miami Law School and the law firm of Hunton and Williams requested that the agency issue a statement assuring Haitians they would not be referred to ICE or asked to appear in court due to their status. USCIS responded that laws of motions to appear in court (MTA) vary by state, making the issuance of such a statement impractical.

Lawyers also continue to face a number of hurdles in trying to help Haitians file TPS applications. For example, fees ranging from a total of $50 to $390 are difficult for many eligible applicants to provide. Birth certificates of applicants’ parents have also been required to verify Haitian nationality. These documents are often nearly impossible to obtain after the earthquake’s vast destruction. The current deadline for filing TPS applications is July 20, 2010. Due to complaints concerning the application process, the U.S. government is considering an extension of this deadline.

Why Preferential Treatment? Politics and Race

Arguably, Haitians receive a much colder welcome in the United States than Cubans. Cubans who are fleeing their island and breaking with a communist regime are in much better shape and generally considered deserving of asylum. If they reach U.S. territory successfully (either by boat or crossing the Mexican border) they receive refugee status and subsequently become LPRs. Critics argue that Washington rationalizes this immigration policy as serving a long-standing national political interest in accordance with the goals of the Cuban-American Lobby. Some suggest that Cubans’ special status serves as a purported blow against the Castro government.

Another explanation for this discriminatory treatment comes from Haiti’s lower average level of education. This initial disadvantage creates apprehension amongst Americans about Haitians’ ability to support themselves and contribute to U.S. society. Although Cuban immigrants still face some discrimination, they come from a nation with a 99.8% literacy rate and are thus perceived as less of a potential burden. Some critics even contend that preferential treatment bestowed upon Cuban refugees is an example of a double standard on the basis of race. TransAfrica, NAACP and the Congressional Black Caucus released an amicus curiae brief designating U.S. interdiction policy as discriminatory and further arguing that Haitians were subject to “separate and unequal” treatment.

The United States cannot continue to justify differences in immigration practices developed toward Haitians and Cubans. While the Cold War clearly ended twenty years ago, the Haiti earthquake has put the country in a state of emergency. Current U.S. policy, however, promotes dangerous travel attempts to enter the U.S. and continues to fuel an unproductive Cold War mentality that is the product of the Cuban-American lobby attempting to garner special treatment for its cause.

Looking Ahead: Environmental Reasons for Concern

Although the USCIS is considering an extension of the July 20th TPS deadline for Haitians, such small modifications emphasize the need for large-scale adjustments. Both TPS and Humanitarian Parole provided for Haitians are temporary emergency measures, while Cubans benefit from a standardized, annual quota set for refugees fearing persecution. Not only does the limited scope of these visas continue the U.S.’s long standing bias against Haitian immigrants; it also serves as an example of insufficient responses to natural disasters on a global scale. Tragic and unfair situations resembling the Haiti earthquake’s aftermath are becoming increasingly common in light of environmental dangers. In 2005, A United Nations group warned of the increasing number of “environmental refugees” that would soon need relocation around the world due to climate change. A 2009 article of the World Resources Institute points to the Carteret Islands as the first case of land deemed uninhabitable due to continuous flooding. Its residents are now relocating to nearby Papua New Guinea. Factual and scientific evidence points to rising sea levels and increased hurricanes. These are both migration drivers that transcend political and economic boundaries that have influenced Washington’s biased treatment of Haitians and Cubans. Further large-scale relocations due to natural disasters must be permanently accounted for in future immigration policy, both in the U.S. and around the world.

The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org

June 29, 2010

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