President Bharrat Jagdeo will bequeath to his country - Guyana: Stagnation, violence, corruption, arch-sectarianism, and unfettered crime

Guyana president leaves a tattered legacy

by Robert Cavooris and Elcin Chang, COHA Research Associates

Stagnation, violence, corruption, arch-sectarianism, and unfettered crime — this is the heritage that President Bharrat Jagdeo will bequeath to his country. Now that Jagdeo has announced that he will not seek a third term in the upcoming August election, he may well ask, as a New York mayor once did, “How did I do?” The answer, in this instance, must be: “terribly.”

Chosen by former President Janet Jagan to succeed her in office, and supposedly held in high esteem by Guyana’s founding father, the illustrious Cheddi Jagan, Jagdeo could only receive the lowest of marks from any independent evaluation. Through his tolerance of crime, racism, and dismal social progress, President Jagdeo has turned in a fifth-rate performance as president of one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere.



As the Guyanese use every strategy, legal and illegal, to flee the dysfunctional country, Jagdeo will go down in history as a man who did almost nothing for his nation while in office.



Jagdeo in Command?



As Guyana was wrestling with ever-present ethnic and political tensions, Jagdeo ascended to the presidency in 1999, not by election but rather through the anointment of his predecessor, Janet Jagan, thus taking the helm with no popular electoral mandate. To his credit, Jagdeo has led Guyana on a path of considerable economic growth in the last ten years despite a devastating flood in 2005.



The Guyanese economy, which is heavily dependent on the export of six main commodities -- rice, timber, gold, bauxite, shrimp and sugar -- has expanded at an average rate of 3 percent over the past decade. Sadly however, despite this incremental improvement in the Guyanese economy, government officials have been either unwilling or unable to share this modest prosperity with average Guyanese citizens.



Indicative of this trend is the fact that the allocation for education as a percentage of government spending is significantly lower than it was ten years ago. Public spending on education dropped to 6.1 percent of total GDP in 2007, down from 8.5 percent in 2000. Because of this lack of adequate spending on public education, the percentage of primary school entrance-age children enrolled in such schools dropped from 91.8 percent to 62.0 percent.



While it is difficult to speculate precisely what effect these substantive budget cuts on education have had on childhood literacy rates in the country (owing to a lack of data collected by Georgetown officials), there could be pernicious social consequences if education continues to take a back seat on the Guyanese agenda.



On healthcare, there have been some positive results including an increase in life expectancy and a notable decrease in infant mortality. Many exigencies however remain unaffected. For instance, about a fifth of the Guyanese population still lacks access to clean sanitation facilities. And the World Health Organization estimated that Guyana has one of the highest prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS in Latin America and the Caribbean.



Perpetual Violence



Jagdeo’s tenure will also be remembered for the spike in violent crimes experienced throughout Guyana, an issue exacerbated by repeated extrajudicial killings on the part of state authorities. Since 2001, “Phantom” death squads with alleged connections to government agencies -- also called the “Black Clothes Police” -- have been linked to some 400 murders. “A clear pattern is emerging,” said a member of the opposition People’s National Congress Reform (PNC). “The Black Clothes Police have constituted themselves accusers, judge, jury and executioners, and have been gunning down people with impunity.”



The Jagdeo administration shocked the region by rejecting a request by the United States, Britain, and Canada to do an independent probe of what amounted to repeated human rights violations. “We are very concerned about the allegations and we believe that the integrity of the government is something that is at question here,” said British High Commissioner Stephen Hiscock.



Amnesty International wrote an open letter to President Jagdeo in 2001 demanding prosecution of any officials involved in extrajudicial violence, and saying that the Guyanese government had “repeatedly failed to ensure the protection of the internationally recognized fundamental right to life -- and to take measures to prevent such killings.” Although several officers were indicted for their participation in extrajudicial killings in 2004, none were convicted.



Some have responded in kind to the state violence, such as in the notorious Rondell Rawlins case. Rawlins, who accused the government of kidnapping his girlfriend, waged a campaign of terror in Guyana seeking her return. This resulted in the shocking deaths of 23 people. Jagdeo’s tumultuous presidency was also beset by a series of fatal bombings over the past several years, including one attack on the Ministry of Health in 2009 and two additional assaults in 2011 -- one at the Stabroek Market and the other at the residence of Philomena Sahoye-Shury, a leading member of President Jagdeo’s People’s Progressive Party (PPP). As one editorial in Guyana’s Stabroek News put it, “The security situation grows murkier by the day and it is in this milieu that there has been a rash of dangerous events.”



Ethnicity and Frustration



The violence in Guyana is all the bitterer for the ethnic undertones that color it. Guyana’s motto -- ‘One People, One Nation, One Destiny,’ -- only seems a cruel joke in the face of the stark division that has long seized the country -- a division that Jagdeo has done almost nothing to address.



Party affiliation in Guyana falls almost directly along ethnic lines. Jagdeo’s PPP overwhelmingly receives the vote of the Guyanese of Indian descent, while the opposition PNC garners the support of the country’s African descendents. One study of the 2001 elections called the crossover votes between ethnic groups “insubstantial” and concluded that “[PPP] is still, for all practical purposes, an Indian-dominated party.”



Even after the 2006 election, Jagdeo’s efforts to diminish the trend were nowhere to be seen. One editorial in the Stabroek News in 2010 commented that the two main parties still remain within their ethnic platform. It said, “Both [the PPP and PNC] follow an unwritten rule that their leader must be from a particular ethnic group and both derive a high percentage of their support from a single ethnic group.”



Often, crimes in Guyana take on a racial dimension, reflecting the continued perception of the longstanding Afro-Guyanese exclusion under the PPP. In 2007, Andre Douglas, an alleged murderer of African descent who was eventually killed by police after escaping from jail, placed his own crimes in the context of social marginalization and inequality. He called himself a “freedom fighter,” and said, “Look into innocent black Guyanese problems or unrest will not finish.”



In other words, Douglas would keep terrorizing Guyana until the social problems of the Afro-Guyanese were alleviated. The large turnout at Douglas’ funeral showed that his frustration resonated with the country’s Afro-Guyanese community. Thus, ethnic division remains a challenge that disrupts quotidian life in Guyana, and that President Jagdeo has not effectively taken steps to resolve.



Conclusions



On balance, Jagdeo has failed during his presidency to advance the freedom and fairness of Guyanese public life, or the inequities of the Indo-Guyanese dominated society. Increased economic growth is futile if it does not translate into a greater sense of prosperity within the entirety of society. Jagdeo’s two-term presidency fell woefully short on that point. Social needs remain unmet due to inadequate spending on education and a lack of efforts to improve the quality of healthcare.



Furthermore the perpetual presence of criminal and ethnic violence threatens the fabric of Guyanese society, and, if anything, has been aggravated by the indiscriminate violence of public security forces in response.



It is not yet clear who the candidates will be in the upcoming presidential election, but whoever inherits Jagdeo’s position must work to tackle these persistent issues, and to clear the air of hopelessness when it comes to improving life in one of the hemisphere’s poorest and most forlorn countries.



The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, visit www.coha.org or email coha@coha.org


caribbeannewsnow

BBC Caribbean Service ends March 25, 2011

BBC Caribbean nears closure
nationnews




BBC Caribbean Service has only one month left in operation as it gets ready to end its broadcasts on March 25.

The decision by BBC World Service is part of cuts which will amount to over 600 jobs lost.

BBC said the closures were part of its response to a cut to its Grant-in-Aid funding from Britain’s Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO).

The final week of broadcasting by the Caribbean Service will include a regional call-in and discussion programme looking at the future of pan-Caribbean news and current affairs.

The last editions of the morning and evening drivetime editions of BBC Caribbean Report and BBC Caribbean Magazine will be aired on March 25.

Debbie Ransome, Head of BBC Caribbean Service said: “After one of our best years ever editorially, this has been a great blow for the team here.”

Controller, Languages at BBC World Service, Liliane Landor described BBC Caribbean as: “One of the oldest and most distinguished services that the BBC has provided in English.”

The Caribbean Service transmissions are used on 48 partner stations across the English, Spanish, and Dutch Caribbean and as part of the Caribbean stream on four FM relays in Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, and Antigua-Barbuda.

The early roots of the Caribbean Service began in 1939. (BBC)

February 25, 2011

nationnews

Bahamas Blog International

Have CARICOM governments surrendered foreign policy independence to the Secretariat?

By Ian Francis



The debates and concerns about regional independent sovereignty are very much alive in academic, communities and other concerned sectors in the Caribbean Commonwealth. Many questions are being asked by those debating the issue. Recently, I became involved in the debate through my participation in a meeting amongst many concerned Caribbean nationals now residing in Toronto but maintain a deep affinity to the state from where they originally immigrated.

-- Is the foreign policy management process of independent Caribbean sovereign states, republics and nations managed through agencies that are in receipt of multilateral grants and contributions?

-- Are Commonwealth Caribbean governments exerting their sovereign rights and responsibilities to ensure that foreign policy decisions evolve through the government-designated ministry of foreign affairs?

-- Have our governments surrendered these sovereign rights due to concentration on managing the local economy?

-- Are they perceived simply as aid recipients and beggars that it is either the surrender of independent sovereign rights or getting the necessary aid?

Looking at the historical development of independence in the Commonwealth Caribbean, the names of Eric Williams, Forbes Burnham, Michael Manley and Errol Barrow cannot be forgotten as they clearly demonstrated their strong anti-colonialist stance and at the same time to ensure that the independence and management of their foreign policy remained intact in the various sanctuaries of their ministry of foreign affairs.

We cannot ignore their joint collective decision to ignore Washington’s objection when they made the decision to establish full diplomatic relations with the Republic of Cuba. Burnham and Manley’s unflinching support for the liberation movement against apartheid in South Africa and membership in the Non-Aligned Movement were independent foreign policy decisions taken, which brought no smiles in the State Department. In spite of the applied pressure unleashed on both Burnham and Manley, they stood their ground and demonstrated to the colonial interests that they are capable of making their own independent foreign policy decision.

In 1974, the courage against colonial domination was once again demonstrated by former prime minister of Grenada, Sir Eric Matthew Gairy, when he made the decision to lead Grenada, Carriacou and Petit Martinique to independence. What was challenging about Grenada’s decision is that it became the first Associated State in the now renamed environment of the OECS Union to break its colonial shackles with Britain.

Grenada’s decision to become independent led to the formation of various local alliances that were vehemently opposed to independence, leading to strikes and other civil disobedience, which led to the emergence of the famous Committee of 22. This Committee was made up of a group of local colonialists consisting of merchants, lawyers, farmers and other opposition factions. While their opposition to independence had some mitigating effects on the local economy, on February 7, 1974, Grenada, under the leadership of Eric Gairy, became independent and recently celebrated its 37th birth date as an independent nation.

Many of the other Associated States have since followed Grenada’s decision and finally broken the yoke of colonialism with Britain. Many are known as independent Caribbean Commonwealth States.

With the More Developed Countries (MDC) maintaining the management of their independent foreign policy, Grenada followed suit and went on to manage its own foreign policy in a number of misguided ways by establishing diplomatic relations with many nations that had a disregard for individual human rights. This misguided approach resulted in diplomatic relations with some notorious nations.

On the other hand, Grenada was successful in establishing a young corps of dedicated foreign service officers; joining many international organizations and of course taking its illustrious seat at the United Nations General Assembly; establishing its own embassies and consulates across the global community. In essence, it is fair to conclude that Grenada built a foreign policy infrastructure between 1974-79, which the Bishop regime acquired following the 1979 people’s uprising, and which witnessed the overthrow of Gairy from office.

While some of Grenada’s foreign policy decisions have been severely criticized by many international relation experts, the period of government under the Bishop regime of 1979-83 also had some misguided moments like the Afghanistan vote, the unnecessary feud with former Barbados prime minister, Tom Adams, and the constant negative exchanges with Washington.

Based on a careful review of regional events, it would appear to the writer that the surrendering of Caribbean states’ foreign policy management to the CARICOM Secretariat could have started in the late 80s or early 90s. With the surrendering of such an important pinnacle of any government, there have been many dull outcomes for regional independent governments. Some of these dull outcomes have seen a steady decline in bilateral assistance to our governments and a sudden increase of multilateral assistance to the Secretariat and many other regional multilateral agencies.

In conclusion, it is not too late for regional independent states to reclaim their foreign policy management niche. As they ponder the structural changes to be made within the Secretariat in the coming months, CARICOM’s management of regional foreign policy and its relation to international multilateral agencies require closer scrutiny. It is hoped that under Thomas’s current chairmanship and vigour, he will be able to convince his Council of Ambassadors to take a second look at this situation. A ministry of foreign affairs in any independent nation means more that good protocol practices. Formation of good foreign policies is crucial.

Ian Francis resides in Toronto and writes frequently on Caribbean Commonwealth Affairs. He is a former Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Grenada. He can be reached at info@vismincommunications.org

February 24, 2011

caribbeannewsnow

Bahamas Blog International

Third political parties are not doomed to failure in the Caribbean

Are third parties in the Caribbean doomed?

By Oliver Mills

The commonly accepted wisdom in the Caribbean has been, and still is, that third political parties are doomed, and that any attempt to establish them will be met with failure. This belief is based on the fact that, in almost all Caribbean countries where a third political party has attempted to challenge the political process, it has met with failure, and in many instances some, or even all its members have lost their deposits. The electorate therefore seems to have lost trust and confidence that a third party will meet with any significant success, and have come to see them as a waste of time.

In his commentary in Caribbean News Now on February 12, 2011, on the failure of third parties, Wellington Ramos states that this failure is due to poor planning, no grassroots campaign, and the time of launching of these political parties, which is just before elections. He also states that after they lose, they disappear. In stating these reasons for third party failure, Ramos does not explain further what the phrases he uses such as poor planning, no grassroots campaign, and the time of launching these parties mean.

For example, what is meant by poor planning on the part of third parties? Does it mean planning to some extent, but with some inadequacy involved, or does it mean engaging in the process of planning without a clear direction or purpose attached to the various efforts? Does poor planning mean planning, but with little insight as to the purpose and point of the efforts made? Or does poor planning mean inefficient planning, not taking into account critical factors concerning the wider political process? How do we know when planning is poor? This is only judged after the results of some action, not before. Also, does poor planning mean being erratic, unfocused, tentative, and not following through with different ideas as to what the party needs and how it will achieve its goals? The writer needs to elaborate on this phrase.

No grassroots campaign is the other reason Ramos cites as a failure by third parties. Although he mentions with respect to Belize about not campaigning island wide and not establishing structures, this is not enough. Grassroots campaigning further means going into the various sectors of the society and spreading the philosophy of the party on a consistent basis. It means having public and town hall meetings, and meeting people where they usually hang out. But this is not only for grassroots people. It is for all potential voters. It also means constant political education, advertisements, and appearing on various media houses to spread the message.

From my experience, there is no such thing as no grassroots campaign, since the grassroots is where the majority of persons are. Third parties do approach them and try to win them over. But in many instances, they are so indoctrinated into the ways of the established parties, that they often give the rebuff to any new effort by a third party. The party’s officials therefore have to exercise patience, be sensitive to the ways of this constituency, win their trust, have a clear philosophy, and try to move them incrementally.

Change is difficult, and people at the grassroots level have to believe they are backing a winner before they commit themselves. Furthermore, labelling a particular constituency as grassroots, belittles them, places them in a category where they might feel devalued, and so there is the risk of losing support particularly if party officials adopt a condescending attitude. The third party therefore needs to see each type of constituency equally, and treat it as such. The class and sector approach to politics will not work.

The time of launching the third party is the final reason Ramos gives for their failure. How do we know precisely and accurately when it is the time to do anything? We can only suspect that a set of conditions exist, and that we should therefore capitalise on them. Suppose Obama had served out his Senate years, would he ever have become president? The point is to take prudent, measurable risks. We can never know exactly when to make a move. We just have to engage with the situation, alert ourselves to its dynamics, and seek the most opportune and rational moment in which to take the plunge. To say that the time of launching the third party contributes to its failure is therefore a misnomer. It is pure speculation based on an analytical fallacy.

Ramos states vaguely that they are launched just before an election. What does this phrase mean? Two weeks or months before, or two years? The phrase is vague to the point of being almost meaningless. The fact is that, if a sufficiently large percentage of the populace is fed up, they will show this in a protest vote. Although it might not be sufficient to win initially because of the psychological grip of the two traditional parties, if the third party persists, it could surprise itself.

For example, third parties now exist in several countries including the UK, Israel, the USA, and France. As is seen in the UK, a third party could become a part of the government based on the distribution of seats after an election. Even in the Caribbean, some third party candidates have won seats, and they later joined on an individual basis with the governing party, particularly if they make a difference in who forms the government. In Israel, third parties have always helped to constitute various governments. This is also the case in Italy.

However, I agree with Ramos, that often, in the Caribbean, third parties dissolve after an election. They seem to lose hope, and the will to persist. But third parties are formed as a result of a crisis in the status quo parties. Their members feel that the electorate is so fed up that they desire fundamental change. The case of the National Democratic Movement in Jamaica is an example, as is the Turks and Caicos Islands with the formation of the National Democratic Alliance party. The NDA did dissolve after a particular election, but the NDM in Jamaica continues mostly as a pressure group. Its initial leader returned to his original party, and is now the prime minister.

So are third parties doomed to failure? It is certainly not wise to give a quick answer. In a theoretical sense, nothing is doomed to failure. The context and circumstances of an issue require serious deliberation. This will determine the success of the effort, or its need to change course. Nothing should be condemned outright. If third party officials have a clear philosophy and ideology which connect with the aspirations of the people, and they win the people’s trust, the groundwork is laid for serious, constant, and persistent work. If party officials are committed to the political work required to enlist the faith of the people in the party’s objectives, then support will be forthcoming over time. Remember, the third party is in the political business of changing mindsets, and re-socialising people into a new way of thinking and being. It will be challenging at first, but consistency and constancy on the part of party officials are necessary.

Third parties are therefore not doomed to failure. They attract new blood and talent into the political process, bring new ideas, challenge old, established ways of operating, and could bring hope to those who want serious change in the infrastructure of Caribbean politics. Third parties can also bring ideas about different, more workable political structures and processes into the political system, and introduce a more ethical and moral politics into political systems weighed down by traditions that have not worked to the benefit of significant numbers of people. They are therefore not doomed to failure. In fact they do not fail. It is those who have been instrumental in their establishment that have failed to consistently operationalise the beliefs and philosophy they advocate on a sustained basis.

Persons forming third parties also need to convince potential followers that they are not in the political business for personal gain. They must prove that principles guide their efforts, and that the goal is a new and transformed society, and political order. Leaders of third parties also have to refute the idea by others that they have everything they need, but want more at the people’s expense. These leaders will also have to show that they have a different kind of political psychology that the third party is not third in any numbering system, but is a movement with no other goal than the political expression of the general will of the people. And that indeed, the third party is the people in action, since the new political institutions the party establishes, will convey and manifest the aspirations and objectives of the people.

Selflessness, a noble sense of purpose, and the urgency to do the will of the people become the philosophical frame of reference for the third party. With this in mind, the third party will enjoy the confidence and goodwill of the people, and will therefore gain respect and credibility. It could then become a potent force for good in the politics of the Caribbean.

February 23, 2011

caribbeannewsnow

The CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) - are we ready?

Law and Politics: The CSME and the CCJ - are we ready?
By Lloyd Noel:


Now that we have just celebrated our thirty-seventh anniversary of independence, from the colonial rule of England way back in 1974 – but having maintained our association and membership of the British Commonwealth of nations over all those years – we in the tri-Island State of Grenada, Carriacou and Petite Martinique seem to be on the verge of severing all those ties that assisted us in becoming who we are, and achieving what we have by reason of that association.

And as we are about to travel down that road, to some unknown destination in the new world order, it may be useful to look back from whence we came, to reflect on where exactly we are at this time, and what in fact and in reality we have thus far achieved.

Of course, I must admit up front that I have been very, very fortunate, as far as my personal achievements have been over the years from those colonial days – and some may be tempted to suggest that it is because of my good fortunes during my sojourn in England that I still harbour the fond memories and gratitude of the country and people and their customs.

But I will readily respond to that suggestion by making bold to say, without fear of any contradiction, that the great majority of those thousands of West Indians who travelled to England in those colonial days, to work and start a new life, they too still cherish the opportunities and achievements.

It was while thousands of us were already in the Mother Country in Great Britain, when the first attempt at the unified West Indies came on stream with the Federation of the West Indies in 1958 – but it only lasted for four years (1958-1962), when Jamaica decided to secede, by formally withdrawing from the Federation; and the late P.M. of Trinidad and Tobago, Eric Williams, created new maths by announcing that, because there were ten states in the Federation and Jamaica was withdrawing, then one from ten leaves nought, so Trinidad and Tobago was also moving out, and that was the end.

And it was from then that the rush to political independence by the Big Four started; Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Guyana all went on to break their colonial ties with England, although thousands of their nationals were very firmly rooted in the mother country and doing very well for themselves.

From then on the same Big Four states tried to get the same West Indian islands to form an economic union, and the Caribbean Community or CARICOM is what remains of that effort.

Over the years, of course, all the smaller islands went on to achieve their independence – except Montserrat, the BVI and Anguilla -- and that rush to statehood began with Grenada in February, 1974.

Needless to repeat the happenings since then, but now we have the “CARICOM Single Market and Economy” (CSME), and included therein is the “Caribbean Court of Justice” (CCJ), which is the body responsible for the due administration of the Single Market; but more importantly any of the independent states can decide to adopt the CCJ as its final court of appeal, for both civil and criminal and constitutional matters, and by so doing abolish appeals to the Privy Council final court of appeal in England that the West Indies have always been accustomed to, both as colonies and independent states since 1962.

The strange thing about the membership of the CCJ is that, while all the independent states signed on the CSME, only Barbados and Guyana started off using the CCJ as their final court of appeal, and late last year, Belize adopted the court and abolished the Privy Council.

Trinidad and Tobago, where the court has its headquarters, has not adopted it, and the newly elected government that came into office last year are thinking of referring the option to the people for a decision.

And even the Jamaica government is now saying that it is considering establishing its own final appeal court.

Against that state of disunity and disorganisation, our own government is now saying that it will soon be adopting the CCJ as our final court of appeal, to replace the Privy Council in England.

Maybe I missed it whenever it was said, but I have never heard any statement from this government about the preference of the CCJ over the Privy Council, and neither has any opportunity been given to Grenadians to express their opinions or views on the matter. And there can be no doubt whatsoever, that this very fundamental decision, after all those years of the very excellent services we have received from the judges of the highest quality and experience, our people should have been given the opportunity to have their say.

And in the absence of that very basic and highly principled opportunity, I cannot support the government’s decision to go it alone. I hope it is not regretted before too long.

What is also of some importance to the whole concept of regional unity, at the lower level of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in particular, is that we have been sharing a common court system, from our associated statehood days since 1967, and we continue to do so after independence right up to the Privy Council.

I have not heard of the same unified position with the other five states on this matter – but maybe I missed it, while they all were busy promoting the latest unitary animal in the recently publicised “OECS Economic Union” – for the free movement of people and capital throughout the six independent states, with the hope that the three remaining colonies of England will sooner or later get the UK’s go-ahead to join the economic union.

To take the confused situation of so many so-called unity groups in our region – all serving the same little population at different levels -- should a company in St Lucia open a business entity in Grenada, and that business has a court case in the Grenada court, it can go to the OECS Court of Appeal and then to the CCJ final court of appeal in Trinidad.

And if the same company has a case in St Lucia, it can go to the OECS Court of Appeal and then must go to the Privy Council in London for a final decision. It would be interesting if the legal issue is similar in both OECS Court of Appeal but the final decisions at the CCJ and the Privy Council differ.

To think that we in these Caribbean Isles have been playing around with this concept of unity for so many years, and for one reason or another the governments cannot get it right -- that must have some bearing on the fact that the politicians who come and go in the various islands all seem to take the position that they alone have all the answers so they never put it to their people to say yea or nay.

We saw what happened in St Vincent, when the government there put the proposed amended constitution to the people and they rejected it – yet in general elections thereafter the same people voted the same government back into power for a third term.

And that is why I agree with the Trinidad and Tobago prime minister, to put the question of whether or not they opt for the CCJ in place of the Privy Council to the people for a decision.

I saw the news item last week that the NDC government plans to hold its party General Council meeting next month, on the 13th March at the Boca Secondary School.

The same meeting was postponed last November, around the time there was the breakdown in unity over the re-shuffle of those three ministers, and one minister actually resigned from Cabinet.

The party general secretary is the minister of tourism, Peter David, and he was removed from foreign affairs back to tourism. He has since been saying that he is rebuilding the party machinery, but the 13th March is a date that is synonymous with the PRG of 1979, not the NDC of Prime Minister Tillman Thomas, on which bandwagon he entered Parliament.

So the questions beg themselves – was the choice of that date a wise decision in the circumstances?

And will it help to rebuild the NDC Party, and at the same time keep the thousands who voted for NDC loyal enough to so vote the next time?

I was chatting with an ex-PRA of the Revolution days, the day after I saw the news item, and he too felt the date of 13th March was much too sensitive at this time – bearing in mind all the events that have taken place.

Time alone will tell, in the months and years ahead.

But like all the issues mentioned above that will affect us as a people in the times ahead, the even bigger question presents itself: are we ready for the possible changes that can result therefrom?

February 22, 2011

caribbeannewsnow

Bahamas Blog International

50th Anniversary of the Bay of Pigs: Controversy in Miami

• Granma International is publishing a series of articles on the events leading up to the April, 1961 battle of the Bay of Pigs. As we approach the 50th Anniversary of this heroic feat, we will attempt to recreate chronologically the developments which occurred during this period and ultimately led to the invasion. The series will be a kind of comparative history, relating what was taking place more or less simultaneously in revolutionary Cuba, in the United States, in Latin America, within the socialist camp and in other places in some way connected to the history of these first years of the Cuban Revolution

Gabriel Molina

• A colorful controversy developed at the end of January, early February 1961, the result of which is not difficult to appreciate 50 years later. The characters, Esteban Ventura Novo and Tony Varona, seemed to have stepped out of a tragicomedy.

The former had made his name as a criminal due to his cold-blooded murder of revolutionaries in the Batista period. Ventura’s initial steps characterized him as a repressor of student demonstrations under the stern gaze of the University of Havana’s Alma Mater statue. It could be said that he had no godfather. Unaided, from murder to murder, he set about winning the ranks that Batista conferred on him. From lieutenant to colonel in just two years.

In the final days of the dictatorship, his tall slim figure, encased in a starched white drill suit or blue uniform, appeared on the front pages of newspapers with groups of revolutionaries arrested or lying in pools of their own blood. His most publicized feat was the monstrous crime perpetrated against Fructuoso Rodríguez, José Machado, Juan Pedro Carbó Servia and Joe Westbrook, at 7, Humboldt Street in Havana.

Ventura was particularly merciless with these student members of the Revolutionary Directorate in revenge for their assault on the Presidential Palace and possibly recalling that morning when, still a lieutenant, he entered the Calixto García Hospital in pursuit of them. Suddenly, Juan Pedro Carbó emerged from a closet – where he had hidden – cocking his first finger and thumb simulating a weapon like children do when playing cops and robbers, while ordering him to surrender.

Caught by surprise at the unexpected and mocking joke, Ventura almost dropped his weapon. Enraged, he shrieked hysterically, "I’m going to kill you, Carbó…I’m gonna kill you!"

With his characteristic self-possession, laughing in the face of terror, Carbó replied, "You’re not going to kill anyone, Ventura, you are a…"

On the other hand, Tony Varona was a professional politician, former prime minister, ex-president of the Senate, famous among CIA officers for his limited intelligence. Howard Hunt, the U.S. spy subordinate to David Atlee Phillips in CIA plans against Cuba, related in his book Give Us This Day compromising situations in which he was placed given that characteristic of Tony’s. His stupidity was such that he was known as Pony, both in Cuba and in the United States.

Ventura was angry with Tony because the latter had publicly vetoed him from joining the CIA ranks against the Cuban Revolution. That prompted the henchman to send a public letter to Varona, at that time the Company’s golden boy, stating, "We would say that those of us who were outstanding in our posts in our country’s armed forces cadres are the real veteran anti-communists, because we were the first to fight them."

After that unique profession of faith, Ventura moved on to recount some details of Varona’s history. He listed a number of murders committed against members of governments in which Pony was a prominent leader. He mentioned the crime against the students Masó and Regueyro; the license to kill granted to certain gangsters; the Investigation Bureau’s cork-lined torture chamber; and told him that Tony’s hands were not only bloodstained but also tainted by gold, given his involvement in the faked incineration of 40 million pesos, a sum appropriated by a group within the government of Carlos Prío, headed by Prío’s brother and treasury minister, Antonio Prío.

While accusing Varona, he was also mocking Batista who, when he fled Cuba, abandoned Varona there: "What was Dr. Tony Varona thinking in terms of his obligations as government premier when he tacitly accepted the granting of broad prerogatives to the notorious drug trafficker Lucky Luciano, so that he could make Havana his operational base for all of Latin America? This also produced gold, Dr. Tony Varona, gold that bathed the hands of various officials during your premiership of the regime. Bribery, sinecure, waste, the squandering of public funds, provided your cash in Cuba, Dr. Tony Varona, not precisely during the era of those stained by you, but of the ‘immaculate’ governments which preceded the coward who fled in the early hours of January 1, 1959… Cubans are not divided up by crimes, but by eras… if you are going to throw them out of the ‘temple of the pure’ for crimes, we can assure you that the temple would be left completely empty."

In the training camps for the invasion in Miami and in Guatemala, the Ventura v. Varona controversy, whose essence was about the participation of Batista supporters in the planned invasion of Cuba, was generalized and threatened to endanger the venture.

The development of events was giving the right to the henchman over the politico. The CIA preferred Batista’s people in its ranks. The CIA thought like Ventura: the first anti-communists had been the ex-henchmen. But it wasn’t about Tony vetoing all the Batista followers. The issue was about certain ones, like Ventura. Others, such as Calviño and the King were acceptable. But the presence of Ventura Novo was too scandalous.

Arthur Schlesinger, President Kennedy’s advisor as well as a writer, later admitted that preference, dressing it up with tactical reasons: "The U.S. advisors were growing impatient in the face of what they considered political subtleties. They preferred men with professional military experience (from Batista’s army), like Pepe San Román, who had been trained in Fort Belvoir and Fort Benning in the United States, who could be trusted to fulfill orders given." (1)

In real terms it was Batista’s officers who had the military experience, even though that was worth nothing to them in the Sierra Maestra.

As a screen for the aggression, in June 1960, the CIA had created the Democratic Revolutionary Front, bringing together five of the main capos. One of them was Tony Varona, who hastened to declare when he was accepted that assets confiscated by the Castro regime would be returned to their American and Cuban owners. But CIA control led to resentment within the Front, Schlesinger noted.

In September of that year, the CIA appointed Tony Varona coordinator of the group, which prompted the resignation of one of its members, Aureliano Sánchez Arango, former minister of education and foreign relations in the Prío government, to which Varona also belonged.

That storm passed, but in the training camps the infighting for the leadership was reflected among Batista’s men. Those in favor of Tony Varona and Manuel Artime, the brigade’s political chief, were demanding their presence in Guatemala so as to personally relay their complaints, and the disrespectful attitude of many of the U.S. instructors. But the leaders of the CIA front did not allow them to visit the camps in Retalhuleu, and they were forced to accept orders or lose their lucrative income.

But the situation developed into a crisis and, defying the opinion of the CIA chiefs in the training camps, Washington decided to authorize Varona and Artime to go there and try and solve the problem. But no airs or social graces were allowed in CIA headquarters. They had to cover all their own expenses, including the easy life and the capos’ tours of American and Europe. Howard Hunt was given instructions to take them to the training base in Guatemala and to bring everyone into line.

Hunt was an old friend of Miguel Ydígoras, the Guatemalan president. When the CIA organized and executed the plot against the constitutionally elected President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, Hunt was chief of political actions. An intelligence officer since the times of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), he had even been congratulated by Eisenhower for the 1954 operation. The Varona and Artime of that adventure were Colonels Carlos Castillo Armas and Miguel Ydígora himself. Hunt took Varona and Artime to meet President Ydígoras, who was known for his eccentricities, such as the much commented occasion when he decided to dance the Suisse before TV cameras.

Varona owed Ydígoras for having handed over Guatemalan territory for the training camps. Ydígoras owed Varona for having utilized the men of the future 2506 brigade to suppress a military uprising against his government a few months previously. But both of them were aware that they owed those favors to the CIA and, in order to back up U.S. interests, Hunt relayed back their meeting, which must have been delightful.

Varona affected his most pompous voice and tried to impress sincerity into his words in a rhetorical speech. But Ydígoras dictated a memo to his secretary while the former prime minister disguised as liberator was speaking. He had already played that role and knew it well. Afterwards, Hunt ironically wrote that it was proof of Ydígoras’ talent for doing two things at once. The future Watergate plumber made news in the 1970s for having directed the Nixon espionage operation against the headquarters of the Democratic Party in Washington, using the same individuals of Cuban origin involved in the invasion plans. In Retalhuleu, Varona had no alternative but to obey Hunt’s instructions and calm his friends down, although a number of them had already been behind bars in the Guatemalan jungle.

Those preferences for the Batista followers are still reflected, with more intense nuances, in Congress members of Cuban origin leading anti-Cuba conspiracies, headed in the last few years by Ileana Ros Lehtinen and the Díaz-Balart brothers, sons and nephews of high-ranking officials from the Batista regime, and closely linked to the dictator. •

(1) Arthur M. Schlesinger: Los mil días de Kennedy, (A Thousand Days: J. F. Kennedy in the White House), Ayma Sociedad Anónima, Barcelona, 1966, P. 179.

Havana. February 17 , 2011

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Bahamas Blog International

The Culture of United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

Brazil, Haiti and the MINUSTAH

By Jean H Charles:

I visited Brazil twenty years ago, as a globe trotter who cherished the joy of travelling, despite my trip to Brazil. I told my travel companion Eddy Harper at the end of our journey, one should not visit a country just because a plane can bring you there. I was warned before my departure that one should be very careful of your belongings, including your own ears or eyes.

They could be taken for sale as fresh organs. My bracelet that I held tightly in my hand to prevent its theft, was stolen anyway. The carnival in Rio, with a public relations machine well oiled all over the world, was for me a deception. It was a fine orchestrated exercise for the tourists (contrary to Trinidad and Tobago) with no personal participation.

I flew to Salvador de Bahia to taste the remnants of the black culture; I was not deceived. Yet my conclusion that one should not travel to a country just because a scheduled airline made the journey there was confirmed in Salvador. In the middle of the night walking around the colonial streets of the city, I was surprised to found the bustling business of the hour was the sale of coffins. An epidemic in the area was killing the citizens by the thousand.

Back in Rio, amidst the splendor of the beaches of Ipanema and Copacabana, the squalor of the hills surrounding the city was threatening and menacing. The hypocrisy of the slogan: one nation, one people was mining the ethos of the society. A part of Pele, known all over the world for his skills in the sport of football/soccer, amidst the large black population one cannot find a single emerging black star in politics, the arts, science and education in Brazil.

The larger society was not in better shape, I remember my conversation with a young white teacher on the beach of Ipanema, doubling her life as a school teacher with one of a part time prostitute because her salary was not sufficient to provide a decent living.

Things have improved since in Brazil, with the advent of Ignacio Lula, who recognized social integration and upward mobility as a government policy.

Brazil was in an enviable position to help usher into Haiti a climate of hospitality for all, with the big brother holding the hands of the junior one. Passionate about soccer, the Haitian people have adopted Brazil as their idol nation. There were deaths of passion in Haiti following a football match between Argentina and Brazil. (That passion has been transmuted today onto Messi of Barcelona in Spain, revered as a demi-god.)

Brazil, with its size and its limitless resources, had hemispheric hegemonic ambition. Lula planned to use its leadership of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in Haiti, to help his country obtain a seat on the Security Council. That goal has been a complete failure and disappointment. After the questioning suicide of the Brazilian general in Haiti, Brazil could not find another national to succeed at the helm of the mission. The Guatemalan, Edmund Mulet, whose arrogance equals only his excellent command of French, is decried on the walls of Port au Prince with the same intensity as Rene Preval, the despised Haitian president.

The MINUSTAH culture is one of make believe in most of the operations concerning its mission of stabilization of the country. A mammoth military operation in a nation at peace with itself is as out of place as an elephant moving around in a small living room.

Small countries like Nepal are competing and bidding against big ones like China to get the prime risk funding just for parading on the street of Port au Prince, forcing children to wake up at 5.00 am to reach their school destination on time amongst the crowded streets of Port au Prince.

The police as well as the military unit operates a vast cottage industry designed to provide employment to expatriates from forty nations, while providing absolutely no service or at least limited service that impacts the Haitian population in security, police, training and education and development.

The talk around the water cooler at the headquarters in Geneva or in New York is that a tour of duty in Haiti is a plum placement. You will find sun, sand, docile and attractive women, tasty food, strong and exotic culture during combat and prime risk duty while feigning to stabilize the country with words instead of action. An astute anthropologist or sociologist would have a field day studying Haiti at the age of its colonization by the United Nations.

As a detached or interested observer, I am watching the complete disintegration of Haitian society under the watch of the UN Mission of Stabilization. Starting with the women and the young people that represent the fragile segment of the nation, they exhibit coping mechanisms with pathological manifestations that will compromise the foreseeable future of the nation.

The aftermath of the earthquake and the cholera epidemic (brought by the UN into Haiti) should have been an incentive to rebuild a new Haiti hospitable to all, where the security of the environment, public health and public security would be the hallmark of the government.

Haiti is being instead quickly Africanized at its worst, with refugee camps in public places as well as on the golf courses. The indecency in public policy is being plotted, implemented, and applauded by most international institutions.

One hundred fifty years ago (1864) the Vatican stood up as the only entity to support a nation ostracized by the entire world for daring to stand up against the world order of slavery. Haiti needs today one friendly country in the world that would stand up to support with strategies, finance and technical assistance its growing opposition, thirsty for a complete break with the culture of squalor imposed upon the country during the last sixty years.

I have not seen nor heard one nation in the whole world that raises a finger to say that I am ready for the challenge!

February 19, 2011

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