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Thursday, December 14, 2023
Jokers of The Climate Fight
Wednesday, November 29, 2023
The Rise of Gang Violence in Haiti
The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Office and the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), calls for the urgent deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission authorized by the UN Security Council in October, in accordance with international human rights norms and standards
The report, released by the UN Human Rights Office and the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), calls for the urgent deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission authorized by the UN Security Council in October, in accordance with international human rights norms and standards. Increased efforts will need to be deployed to strengthen Haiti’s rule of law institutions, in particular the police, the judiciary, and the prison system, the report notes.
The report focuses on the Bas-Artibonite district, located in Central Haiti, about 100 kilometres from the capital Port-au-Prince, which has seen a significant rise in gang violence in the last two years. Between January 2022 and October 2023, at least 1,694 people were killed, injured, or kidnapped in Bas-Artibonite.
Kidnapping for ransom by criminal groups has become a constant fear for users of public transport across Bas-Artibonite, the report states. The story of Darleine, a 22-year-old woman is one of many: she was dragged off a bus in March this year by gang members, who held her captive for over two weeks and repeatedly beat and raped her. A few weeks after she was released, she committed suicide.
The report documents criminal groups rampaging through “rival” villages, executing local people and using sexual violence against women and even very young children. The groups also loot farmers’ properties, crops and livestock and destroy irrigation canals, contributing to the displacement of more than 22,000 people from their villages and significantly reducing the amount of cultivated land, heightening food insecurity. In September 2023, more than 45 per cent of the population of Bas-Artibonite was in a situation of acute food insecurity. Gang violence has also left many farming families unable to repay their debts or to access basic services.
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk warned that across Haiti, at least 3,960 people have been killed, 1,432 injured and 2,951 kidnapped in gang-related violence this year alone.
“The situation in Haiti is cataclysmic. We are continuing to receive reports of killings, sexual violence, displacement and other violence – including in hospitals,” Türk said.
“With terrible violence against the population expanding – within and outside Port-au-Prince – and the inability of the police to stop them, the much-needed Multinational Security Support mission needs to be deployed to Haiti as soon as possible,” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said.
The High Commissioner stressed that the support mission must include internal oversight mechanisms and other safeguards to ensure its compliance with international human rights norms and standards.
Given the worsening violence and further to the October 2023 report of the UN Panel of Experts on Haiti, the report also calls on the Security Council to update the list of individuals and entities subject to UN sanctions for supporting, preparing, ordering, or committing acts contrary to international human rights law.
“There needs to be continued emphasis on the implementation of the arms embargo and sanctions targeting those behind this untenable situation,” the High Commissioner said.
“I also call on the Haitian authorities to fulfil their international human rights obligations and to put in place robust measures to strengthen the country’s institutions and improve governance, including by tackling corruption and addressing impunity.”
Tuesday, October 3, 2023
Partners in Climate Financing Solution
The fight against climate change is only just beginning, and soon enough we will need to rely on a new generation of environmental leaders...
The Bahamas Prime Minister, Philip Davis’ Remarks at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
Fellow Heads of State and Ministers,
Distinguished guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Good morning:
I know we’re all looking forward to building on the progress we made last year in The Bahamas.
It is a source of great encouragement that our region, home to such a beautiful and vast diversity of peoples and languages and societies, can unite on key issues as we confront a new era of climate crisis.
The urgency of our work could not be clearer.
Even in the best-case scenarios – even if the world can make significant progress in reducing fossil fuel emissions (progress that in reality is far from assured) – for the foreseeable future, our region will continue to experience warming oceans, rising waters, and more intense hurricanes.
Since the start of the Industrial Revolution, more than a trillion tons of carbon dioxide have been released into our earth’s atmosphere.
Try as they might to skirt around the issue, the industrialized North will need to make the most sizable adjustments. It is, after all, their development which has brought us to this point.
We must call on our partners in the North to deliver on the commitment they made at COP15 in Copenhagen, to mobilise US$100 billion per year by 2021. This is the very same goal, which was reiterated at COP21 in Paris, and extended to 2025.
To date, they have yet to reach this target.
My friends, it makes no sense shooting arrows at new targets, when the bullseye of two decades before has yet to be hit.
As COP28 approaches, it is crucial that we, the developing countries on the frontlines of the climate crisis, hold the developed world to account. Whether they honour their commitments could mean the difference between a mere disturbance and another Dorian – that devastating Category 5 super storm, the likes of which my country had never seen and is still recovering from.
To further the interests of the Caribbean, which are much the same as small island developing states (SIDS) in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, we must speak as one region, united by clear ideas and a common purpose. We may operate in different geopolitical contexts, but we all lie in the same hurricane alley, we all rely, to a certain extent, on the tourist economy, and we all share common strands of a beautiful island culture under threat.
Let us use this occasion to marry our voices, to make ourselves heard.
I pushed for this regular meeting on the UN calendar because I strongly believe that the Caribbean can accomplish anything it sets its mind to.
I grew up on a small island in The Bahamas that is big on community. It was the kind of tight knit place where even your neighbours felt like family, and that is exactly how I feel about all of you.
My brothers and sisters, ours is a common heritage, and a shared future. Let us use this forum to identify our priorities, focus our efforts, and fight for a sustainable future. A future in which the months from June to November do not spell certain doom for the countries of the Caribbean.
Key to a future in which our region flourishes will be our sustained commitment to seeing a loss and damage fund come to full fruition. The adoption of this fund at COP27 was a remarkable achievement of Caribbean solidarity, one which we cannot afford to let fall by the wayside.
The time has come to double down on our efforts. To tell these developed nations to “write the cheque”, as they have kicked the can down the road for far too long. We cannot leave COP28 without the first pledge for funding identified. This is no minor undertaking. But if they are the big tree, we are the small axe!
And just as we hold the developed world to account, so too must we take active strides to enhance our own climate resilience.
Last week, I travelled to New York to take part in the Clinton Global Initiative, a community of doers committed to addressing the most pressing issues of our time. At that forum, I was pleased to announce a new initiative, The Bahamas Sustainable Investment Programme or “BSIP” – a three-year economic and investment programme that is aligned with our Paris Agreement pledges and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
If The Bahamas, or indeed the Caribbean, is to succeed, we cannot be passive actors. We must find our own solutions. With this programme, we are spearheading our own climate financing solution, and we invite the region, and the world, to partner with us.
Much like the Bridgetown Initiative, this is about more than just expanding access to funding, it’s about developing a practical pathway to climate justice and global equity.
It goes without saying that the present international financial process is unsustainable. I would go as far as to call it egregious. As SIDS, we are grappling with colossal impacts of a climate crisis we did not precipitate. We are shouldering disproportionate debt burdens. In some cases, such as in The Bahamas, climate change-related debt amounts to over half of total GDP. This is not only an enormous figure, it is an unjust figure.
International financial institutions need to be overhauled to deliver on a fit-for-purpose approach to lending due to loss and damage from climate impacts. These institutions, in tandem with International Multilateral Development Banks, must re-evaluate their purpose, approach, and objectives when dealing with SIDS. An appropriately weighted, multidimensional vulnerability index must be adopted, if access to concessional development finance is to be made available to the states which need it most.
Despite the daunting task ahead of us, I do believe we can get it done. I do believe our region is on the cusp of an exodus – a journey out of vulnerability, and into resilience.
Fundamental to this quest will be our ability to engage and empower our youth. For the Caribbean to go from strength to strength, we must edify, uplift, and enlist the assistance of our youth. The fight against climate change is only just beginning, and soon enough we will need to rely on a new generation of environmental leaders.
If the youth of our region are to blaze trails, we must first light a fire inside them. So let us welcome the next generation into the fold. Let us harness their fresh perspectives and critical agility, as we embark on a path toward greater Caribbean resilience.
Brothers and sisters, I look forward to witnessing the outcomes of this important meeting, and I applaud the incoming Chair, Grenadian Prime Minister Dickon Mitchell, for taking up the mantle. The resolutions we establish today will surely be critical in safeguarding our shared tomorrow.
Thank you, and may God bless you all.
Thursday, September 14, 2023
The Opportunities and Challenges of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Latin America and the Caribbean
Can Latin America and the Caribbean Unlock AI’s Potential While Mitigating Its Perils?
To fully capitalize on AI’s transformative power for Latin America and the Caribbean, policymakers, businesses, and societies must proactively address challenges related to ethics, workforce adaptation, cybersecurity, and global collaboration
By Eric Parrado
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has emerged as a disruptive force that promises to reshape economies across the globe. With its ability to process vast amounts of data, learn from patterns, and make intelligent decisions, AI holds immense potential to revolutionize various sectors, increase productivity, and drive economic growth. However, as we navigate this transformative era, it is crucial to carefully consider both the opportunities and challenges of AI for Latin America and the Caribbean.
AI technology offers several key features that can significantly impact our economies:
Enhanced Productivity and Efficiency. AI’s ability to automate repetitive tasks and augment human capabilities can unlock substantial productivity gains. By streamlining processes, optimizing resource allocation, and improving decision-making, AI has the potential to boost overall economic output. Recent studies validates this empirically, showing that AI adoption is boosting firms’ productivity.
Job Creation and Skill Enhancement. AI, when properly managed and regulated, has the potential to stimulate the growth of certain job types that complement technology. While automation may render some roles obsolete, new opportunities will emerge in the fields of AI research, development, implementation, and maintenance. In fact, recent evidence suggest that AI adoption correlates with growing vacancies in AI-related jobs. Moreover, AI could allow workers to concentrate on tasks that require human interaction and emotional intelligence, where humans have a clear comparative advantage.
Improved Decision-Making. AI-powered algorithms can process vast amounts of data and generate valuable insights for better decision-making. From financial markets to supply chain management, AI’s ability to analyze complex patterns and predict outcomes can help businesses and governments optimize strategies, reduce risks, and allocate resources more effectively.
Innovation and Economic Growth. AI constitutes not only an innovation by itself, but also has the potential of being “a new method of invention”. It can spur innovation by enabling breakthroughs in various industries. From healthcare and transportation to agriculture and energy, AI-driven advancements can lead to the development of new products, services, and business models, driving economic growth and competitiveness.
While the potential benefits are significant, there are crucial considerations to address to harness AI’s transformative power responsibly:
Ethical and Legal Concerns. The use of AI raises ethical questions around privacy, bias, accountability, and transparency. Clear guidelines and regulations must be established to ensure that AI systems are fair, transparent, and accountable, protecting individuals’ rights and fostering trust.
Cognitive Automation and the Decline of Labor. As AI improves its ability to perform a wide range of cognitive tasks, many types of cognitive labor may be automated in the coming decades, particularly as the cost of implementing and maintaining algorithms continues to decrease. This trend could have severe consequences on employment. In fact, evidence already shows that recent technology innovations, for example robots, have reduced employment and wages. If AI follows a similar trend, this could have profound consequences, especially in developing countries where labor is the primary factor of production.
Inequality. Technological innovations do not automatically translate into shared prosperity. Instead, they can sometimes lead to increased inequality, particularly if they show high automation potential. This is partly because automation can increase returns to capital while reducing wages. Therefore, it’s crucial for civil society to advocate for equitable regulations, including the taxation of AI firms, to ensure that technological innovations benefit everyone.
Governments and businesses should also prioritize training programs, so workers are equipped with the necessary skills for the AI-driven economy. Efforts should be made to ensure a just, inclusive transition, minimizing the impact on vulnerable populations.
Bias and Inequities. AI systems are only as unbiased as the data they are trained on. If biased data is used to train AI algorithms, those can amplify and perpetuate existing social, economic, and racial biases. This can result in unfair outcomes, such as discriminatory hiring practices or biased lending decisions, affecting marginalized groups and exacerbating inequality. Ensuring fairness, transparency, and accountability in AI systems is crucial to mitigating these risks.
Concentration of Economic Power. AI-driven advancements may concentrate economic power in the hands of a few dominant players. Large technology companies that possess the resources to develop and deploy AI systems could gain a competitive advantage, potentially exacerbating existing inequalities. Smaller businesses or industries without access to AI capabilities may struggle to keep up, leading to a consolidation of economic power in favor of those who can harness AI effectively.
Influence on Democratic Processes. AI can potentially impact democratic processes, including elections and public discourse. The use of AI-powered algorithms in targeted advertising or social media platforms can shape public opinion, potentially leading to echo chambers and the spread of misinformation. This raises concerns about the integrity of democratic decision-making, the influence of AI-driven algorithms on political discourse, and the need for transparency and accountability in AI applications that affect public opinion.
Cybersecurity and Data Privacy. As AI systems rely on vast amounts of data, safeguarding privacy and preventing unauthorized access become paramount. Protecting data infrastructure, implementing robust cybersecurity measures, and establishing comprehensive data protection frameworks are crucial to maintain public trust and mitigate risks.
Other recommendations, which should be tailored to specific national contexts, will also be crucial to maximizing AI’s advantages for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Foster Digital Infrastructure. Invest in robust digital infrastructure, including high-speed internet access, to support the adoption and utilization of AI technologies. This will enable businesses, organizations, and individuals to leverage the benefits of AI and participate in the digital economy effectively.
Promote AI Research and Development. Allocate resources to support AI research and development in collaboration with academic institutions, private sector entities, and research centers. Encouraging innovation and knowledge creation will contribute to the development of AI expertise within the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and foster homegrown AI solutions.
Enhance Education and Skills Development. Prioritize educational programs that equip individuals with the necessary skills for the AI-driven economy. Foster partnerships between educational institutions and industry to develop AI-related curricula and provide training opportunities, ensuring a workforce capable of leveraging AI technologies effectively.
Support Entrepreneurship and Startups. Create a conducive environment for AI startups and entrepreneurs by offering financial incentives, access to funding, and mentorship programs. Foster innovation ecosystems and facilitate collaboration between startups, established businesses, and research institutions to drive AI-driven entrepreneurship.
Encourage Collaboration and Knowledge Sharing. Promote collaboration among governments, academia, private sector entities, and civil society organizations at regional and international levels. Facilitate knowledge sharing, exchange of experiences, and collaborative initiatives to address common challenges and leverage shared expertise in AI. Establishing common ethical standards, sharing best practices, and promoting international cooperation can help address challenges such as data governance, intellectual property rights, and algorithmic transparency.
Invest in AI for Social Impact. Encourage the application of AI in addressing social challenges, such as those in education, healthcare, food security, and poverty alleviation, among others. Support AI-driven solutions that have a positive impact on marginalized communities, enhance public services, and promote inclusive development.
Artificial Intelligence has the potential to revolutionize economies, enhancing productivity, driving innovation, and creating new opportunities. To fully capitalize on AI’s transformative power for Latin America and the Caribbean, policymakers, businesses, and societies must proactively address challenges related to ethics, workforce adaptation, cybersecurity, and global collaboration. By doing so, they can shape a future where AI serves as a catalyst for inclusive economic growth, while upholding human values and safeguarding societal well-being.
Wednesday, September 6, 2023
Latin America and the Caribbean face immense challenges as the economic impacts of climate change take deeper root
Confronting the Economic Effects of Climate Change in Latin America and the Caribbean
With the last seven years registering the hottest temperatures in recorded history, Latin America and the Caribbean not only faces the direct effects of climate change; it confronts a host of indirect economic effects potentially made worse by development challenges, including low economic growth, high poverty, inequality, and fiscal vulnerabilities
By Eduardo Cavallo - Bridget Hoffmann
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Cartography by Jeff Wandersen
With that in mind, the Red de Centros, a decades-old IDB initiative to fund research papers from the region, recently commissioned and published a series of studies on the economic impacts of our warming planet, ranging from the impact of drought on indigenous women in Chile, to the effect of weather disasters on trade, and the inequalities of adaptation. Those articles, published recently with others on the topic in the journal Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, seek to deepen knowledge and inform solutions in the midst of our historically unprecedented change in weather.
The studies and the broader literature on climate change offer new evidence of the wide sweep of a changing climate’s impacts. Intensified warming is affecting and will continue to affect economic growth, trade, and human capital. It could also have negative impacts on inequality, both between countries and regions and between citizens inside national borders.
One grave concern is the impact on the poor, who are especially exposed to climate risks. They lose a greater share of their wealth when disasters hit, have less access to financial resources to confront climate-related emergencies, and fewer insurance mechanisms available to them. Indeed, they suffer from both the short- and long-term effects of climate change. A study of household electricity consumption in Colombia by Shaun McRae, for example, shows how wealthier households use air conditioning to a significantly greater extent to cope with higher temperatures than poor ones. While electricity consumption by lower-income families more than doubled in the country between 2011 and 2019 and the gap in the use of air conditioners is narrowing, significant disparities remain in the ownership and use of them between low and high-income households in hot regions of Colombia. Many households remain unprotected.
A study by Rodrigo Pérez, Mayarí Castillo, and Chiari Cazzuffi reveals another dimension of these inequalities: how indigenous women in Chile have been harmed by one of the most prolonged droughts in the country’s history. Not only have they been unable to reap as much from their small agricultural plots. They also must dedicate more of their time to unpaid activities such as buying water, fetching water from distant rivers for household chores, and going to the rivers to bathe and wash. As a result, they face a larger decrease in income compared to other groups, a reality exacerbated by long-standing economic and social vulnerabilities which make it difficult for them to emigrate to more hospitable climes.
Inequalities between geographic regions also come into play. A paper by Preeya Mohan reveals the particular vulnerabilities of Eastern Caribbean island states to the intensifying tropical storms of climate change, compared to other regions, given their high dependence on international trade. A 20% fall in their exports in the month following such a storm and up to three months after, she finds, can reduce income, employment and tax revenues to fund post-disaster recovery.
There is little doubt that the low and middle-income countries of Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole will be disproportionately harmed by climate change. A recent study, for example, finds that low- and middle-income countries suffer an average loss of between 2.1 and 3.7 percentage points of GDP in the aftermath of climate-related disasters involving high human mortality, and that growth rates in later years are unable to sufficiently compensate for those losses. Moreover, poorer countries, with their less diversified economies, are less able to absorb geographically localized shocks by shifting funds and resources between sectors and regions. That is particularly the case for Caribbean island states. But it is also the case for other countries in the region.
The ramifications for countries already struggling with fiscal deficits and debt will be significant. The average fiscal costs of extreme weather events in the region was between 0.2% and 0.3% of GDP for the 2001-2019 period, more than 10% of the average fiscal deficit (2.6%) in those years. Some alternative financing tools available include reserve funds (which imply saving to build up a reserve), contingency credit lines (for example, the IDB’s Contingent Credit Facility for Natural Disasters – CCF), regional risk pools (like the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility – CCRIF), or catastrophic insurance. These instruments could potentially alleviate short-term fiscal pressures, such as those created after a hurricane. But more research has to be done to really determine their potential fiscal impact.
Latin America and the Caribbean face immense challenges as the economic impacts of climate change take deeper root. From negative effects on growth and poverty to those on inequality and fiscal stability, the region is entering a new era where climate change will assume an ever more prominent role in its destiny, compelling policymakers and researchers to redouble their efforts to find resilient, equitable and sustainable strategies to alleviate the harshest effects of rising temperatures and extreme weather events. The contribution of Red de Centros and the Economics of Disasters and Climate Change journal are important stepping stones along this journey — one that we still have a long way to travel.
Saturday, August 26, 2023
Policies to Promote the Advancement of Productive Internationalization in Latin America
How to Support Productive Internationalization in Latin America?
By Juan Carlos Hallak - Andrés López
Latin American countries are known to experience difficulties in integrating into the international economy. Numerous studies bear witness to this while recommending various policies to promote the advancement of productive internationalization in the region. Despite their potential benefits, the recommended policies can only be implemented in the presence of certain state capacities, which differ depending on the type of instrument. Managing a temporary import admission regime requires different capacities than implementing a single window for trade, promoting exports, or attracting investment. Policies also differ in terms of their associated costs and risks (e.g., corruption, state capture). However, countries often implement new policies without evaluating the available capacities or analyzing the related costs and risks, leading to a failure in achieving the expected benefits or resulting in truncated or failed experiences2). However, countries often implement new policies without evaluating what capabilities are available or analyzing the costs and risks associated with them. As a result, they may fail to reap the benefits they are hoping for.
Although the tools and categories available for assessing the capacities and risks entailed in different types of policies have been limited so far, significant efforts have been made to overcome this challenge. A new publication released by the Integration and Trade Sector (INT) at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is a significant step in this direction. “Supporting the Internationalization of Production in Latin America: Policy Analysis, State Capacity Requirements, and Risks” (available in Spanish only) aims to build and apply analytical instruments as part of a wider evaluation of productive internationalization policies in Latin America. The next two sections of this blog post examine these instruments in greater detail.
We start by dividing policies into four categories:
- Tax and financial incentive regimes, aimed at promoting exports and investments;
- Productive internationalization support programs, generally run by agencies specialized in promoting exports, investments, and financial support institutions;
- Legal, operational, and physical infrastructure, which reduces costs and times for commercial transactions (physical and telecommunications infrastructure, trade facilitation, international agreements, etc.); and
- Coordination of policies supporting internationalization, such as export plans, councils, roundtables, and other internationalization strategy coordination mechanisms the required capacities vary depending on the different “phases” of the policy lifecycle:
- Adoption: This is the decision-making stage for implementation, designing, and launching a policy.
- Operation: This is where the administration of the benefits and/or services that the policy provides takes place.
- Evaluation: This phase involves continuous monitoring and impact evaluations, which may lead to decisions to redesign or terminate the policy.
The associated risks also differ in these three phases.
We found that the four types of policies particularly differ during the operation phase, and that the capacities required by coordination programs and policies at that stage are the most complex and hardest to build. In contrast, regimes have lower capacity demands during this phase. As a consequence, they tend to last longer and predominate in many countries, even in the absence of the capacities needed to adequately develop the remaining two phases.
Latin American countries have implemented a wide variety of policies to support internationalization, but they have not always been successful in generating the expected impacts. Often, the costs of these interventions seem to have been excessive in relation to the benefits obtained. In other cases, the downsides were not taken into account sufficiently. Likewise, on several occasions, policies that have not been rigorously evaluated and whose cost-benefit balance is dubious have been maintained over time, while others have been discontinued based on political rather than technical criteria.
Similarly, the region has disproportionately prioritized regimes over programs and coordination initiatives and has not always succeeded in providing the type of infrastructure needed to facilitate exports and attract investments. The fiscal cost of regimes can be twice as high as that of programs, if not more so, and is also far higher than that of coordination policies. At the same time, there are often shortfalls in the provision of some relatively low-cost public goods (e.g., trade facilitation). This imbalance is puzzling, especially considering that the evidence on the impact of regimes is mixed at best. Regimes also allow more room for state capture and corruption practices - and dismantling them is often complex even when they do not deliver the expected results due to the economic-political interests that emerge around keeping them in place.
Several factors explain countries’ preference for regimes: i) the capacity requirement is lower, primarily in the operational phase; ii) adopting a single regime is relatively easy, for example, by replicating the characteristics of existing programs in other countries,; iii) the fiscal cost generally consists of tax waivers that do not involve direct expenditure; iv) the visibility and political impact of regimes is usually higher, since it is easy to attribute the direct creation of a certain number of jobs to their implementation.
In contrast, programs require more complex capacities, along with flexibility and appropriate incentive schemes. At the same time, they have fewer political pay-off, are harder to communicate, and imply direct expenditures that, although small, tend to be prioritized for other more urgent uses. Under these conditions, there may be limited political conviction to adopt programs, resulting in insufficient or volatile funding. Thus, “vicious circles” can emerge: if a program’s resources are limited or unstable, it may not be effectively implemented, which then limits its impact and may favor its dismantling.
In conclusion, Latin America has implemented a variety of policies to support internationalization, but these have often failed to generate the expected impacts due to a series of factors. These include an overemphasis on regimes, a lack of adequate infrastructure, and shortfalls in the capacities needed to implement and evaluate policies. With these points in mind, we recommend the following courses of action:
First, before deciding to adopt an intervention, countries need to have the capacity to implement it appropriately throughout its life cycle, and to identify and properly assess the potential risks it entails. This is particularly important for policies with high sunk costs, and which would be politically costly to reverse.
At the same time, the optimal policy portfolio should not take these capacities as given and immutable, but rather “invest” in building them pari passu as the development process moves forward. The results obtained can help to legitimize the agencies that implement them and contribute to their gaining stability and accumulating the individual and organizational capacities that will enable them to handle more complex interventions with broader and more substantive impacts. This is essential for Latin American countries to significantly improve their integration into the global economy.
Sunday, July 16, 2023
The Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats
U.S Secretary Of State, Antony J. Blinken Opening Remarks at a Virtual Ministerial Meeting to Launch the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drugs
Synthetic drugs are the number one killer of Americans aged 18 to 49
Countries in the Western Hemisphere are working with the Organization of American States to develop and implement early warning systems to detect emerging synthetic drug use
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you very much. Colleagues, on behalf of President Biden, welcome. Welcome to the launch of the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. We are grateful to the senior government officials from more than 80 countries, as well as leaders from over a dozen regional and international organizations for joining us (inaudible).
We feel this acutely in the United States. Synthetic drugs are the number one killer of Americans aged 18 to 49. And it’s almost worth pausing on that fact. The number one killer of Americans aged 18 to 49 – synthetic drugs, notably fentanyl.
Nearly 110,000 Americans died last year of a drug overdose. Two-thirds of those deaths involved synthetic opioids. For the individuals, the families, the communities affected, the pain caused by these deaths and by the millions who suffer with substance use is immeasurable. It’s also inflicting a massive economic toll – nearly $1.5 trillion in the United States in 2020 alone, according to a report by our Congress; our public health system, our criminal justice system all bearing the costs.
That’s why President Biden has made it a top priority for us to tackle two of the critical drivers of this epidemic in the United States: untreated addiction, and drug trafficking. In 2022 our administration released a National Drug Control Strategy that for the first time the United States embraces harm reduction efforts that meet people where they are and engages them in care and services.
America is far from alone in facing this challenge. According to the United Nations, more than 34 million people around the world use methamphetamines or other synthetic stimulants annually.
And every region is experiencing an alarming rise in other synthetic drugs. In Africa, it’s tramadol; in the Middle East, fake Captagon pills; in Asia, Ketamine.
One of the main reasons we wanted to come together today is because we believe the United States is a canary in the coal mine when it comes to fentanyl, an exceptionally addictive and deadly synthetic drug. Having saturated the United States market, transnational criminal enterprises are turning elsewhere to expand their profits. If we don’t act together with fierce urgency, more communities around the world will bear the catastrophic costs that are already affecting so many American cities, so many American towns.
The criminal organizations that traffic synthetic drugs are extremely adept at exploiting weak links in our interconnected global system. When one government aggressively restricts the precursor chemical, traffickers simply buy it elsewhere. When one country closes off a transit route, traffickers quickly shift to another. This is the definition of a problem that no country can solve alone. That’s why we’re creating this global coalition.
We’re focused on three key areas: first, preventing the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs; second, detecting emerging threats and patterns of use; and third, advancing public health interventions and services to prevent and reduce drug use, to save lives, to support recovery for people who use drugs.
Now, of course, we’re not starting from scratch. For years, governments, regional and international organizations, health workers, and communities have been coming up with innovative solutions on each of these priorities. Countries in the Western Hemisphere are working with the Organization of American States to develop and implement early warning systems to detect emerging synthetic drug use.
Take-home naloxone kits, pioneered by countries in Europe, have been adopted by countries in Central Asia and other regions. The International Narcotics Control Board is promoting intelligence sharing on the trafficking of precursors to help governments cooperate on interdictions and on prosecutions. This coalition – this coalition is intended to build on these and other important efforts, not take their place, including efforts in the United States, which are among those shared lessons learned.
I’ll give just one example. In April, we hosted the first ever City Summit of the Americas in Denver, Colorado. We brought together more than 250 mayors from across our hemisphere, along with governors, tribal and indigenous officials, leaders from civil society and the private sector. One of the sessions that I attended focused on local efforts to combat the fentanyl epidemic.
The city of Denver’s crime lab shared how it tracks the emergence of new synthetic drugs and overdoses. Mayors from Canada, from Ecuador, and Mexico spoke to their strategies to tackle the rise in synthetic drug use. This is precisely the kind of collaboration that we’ll foster through this global coalition, while championing other voluntary best practices like improved information sharing between governments and the private sector, better labeling and “Know Your Customer” protocols to help prevent the diversion of precursors into illicit use.
Today, in addition to this ministerial meeting, we’ll convene three expert panels. The panel discussions will help define the goals of distinct working groups – one for each of the coalition’s major lines of effort – which will carry our collaborative efforts forward over the coming months.
Then in September, we plan to host an in-person meeting of this coalition on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Week, where the working groups will report on their progress and help us chart a way forward.
At every step, our focus will be on developing practical policies, diminishing the public health and public security threats posed by synthetic drugs, improving the lives of our people (inaudible) It’s not enough to work with governments and international organizations. We need to partner with the private sector, including chemical manufacturers, shipping companies, social media platforms - because this illicit trade is built on the pillars of legitimate global commerce.
Most synthetic drugs are produced from chemicals that are used legally in making pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, household products. Traffickers advertise synthetic drugs on social media, they use online apps to communicate with prospective buyers and collect payments.
We also need to partner with hospitals and clinics, emergency departments, mental health professionals, and other public health stakeholders who are saving lives every single day while providing treatment and recovery support efforts. And we need civil society at the table, including the community-based organizations that are on the front lines of this effort.
I mentioned a few minutes ago my meeting with city officials from the Americas who are developing these innovative responses to threats from synthetic drugs. One of them who really stayed with me was Shawna Darling. She’s a public health official from Denver. She and her team drive a bright purple van that I got a chance to see, a clinic on wheels among the city’s underdeveloped neighborhoods, bringing services directly to vulnerable communities. They distribute fentanyl test strips and naloxone. They connect individuals with treatment and recovery programs. They share information about dangerous new synthetic drugs.
Shawna explained to me that one of the reasons she’s been able to build trust with many of these vulnerable people is because she walked in their shoes. She herself struggled with addiction for 13 years. She spent time in and out of jail. And she told me, and I quote, “I’ve learned what it feels like to be defeated and desperate, but I was able to get support and care that I needed, and now I’m able to offer that to others.”
When we talk about the hundreds of thousands of lives this epidemic takes every year, and the millions of families it’s ravaging, it’s easy to lose sight of the human beings behind the numbers. So let’s remember that while this coalition is about protecting our citizens’ security, their health, their prosperity, it’s also about saving people’s lives, saving their futures – people who could be our neighbors, our friends, our loved ones; individuals who, like Shawna, have so much to contribute to their communities.
I can’t think of a more important or urgent undertaking for us, and I can’t thank you enough for joining this session, joining this coalition, and for the work that we’ll do together. Thanks, everyone.







