Cari-Crisis... again

By Norman Girvan:


“Crisis” is one of those words that is used so much that it has practically lost its meaning. And if there were a competition among regional organisations on which was most often said to be “in crisis”, my bet would be on CARICOM winning by a wide margin.


In the run-up to the half-yearly meetings of CARICOM leaders, we have become accustomed to a flurry of reports, studies, speeches and media commentaries bemoaning the sorry state of the regional movement and promising renewed attention to the dying patient.

Latest in the procession are two reports in the regional media appearing this week, just a fortnight before the March 8-9 “Intersessional meeting” of CARICOM heads of government in Suriname.

Veteran regional columnist Rickey Singh is quoting at length from a letter said to be sent by Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves of St Vincent and the Grenadines to newly installed CARICOM Secretary General, Irwin LaRocque. The letter is said to offer a “blunt assessment” of CARICOM.

According to the Prime Minister, "CARICOM's current mode of marking time at an historical moment of overwhelmingly awesome challenges for our region which compelling demands a more profound integration, is mistaken…"; and further that "Minimalism in integration has its attractions but in our regional context, it can be fatal to our people's well-being.”

One must commend Prime Minister Gonsalves for caring sufficiently about CARICOM to take the trouble to craft this letter, and for his candour. But one is hard put to find anything in the extensive passages quoted that hasn‘t been said before.

Neither is there any hint of what specific actions Mr Gonsalves is proposing in order to salvage the regional enterprise.

I also wonder if the prime minister is aiming his guns at the right target. Seems to me he should be addressing his fellow heads of government directly; and with concrete proposals about how to move out of the present malaise. As everyone knows, the way that CARICOM is structured endows the secretary general with very limited authority to act on his own. More of a “secretary” he, than a “general”.

In any case, the expectations that accompanied Secretary General LaRocque‘s appointment six months or so ago, have all but dissipated. Seems to be business as usual!

Prime Minister Gonsalves concedes that he himself took part in a collective decision in 2011 to put the Single Economy “on pause” -- a decision which, ironically, was taken at a Special Retreat hosted by then President Jagdeo of Guyana, which had precisely the opposite objective.

So what reason do we have to believe that the latest letter, sincere though it may be, will make one iota of difference this time around?

The second news item, coming out of Bridgetown on February 22, tells us that a “Project Management Team” has warned that without a “fundamental change”, CARICOM could expire slowly over the next few years as stakeholders begin to vote with their feet…

Well, well. I wonder which planet these gentlemen inhabit.  Don‘t they know that stakeholders have been “voting with their feet” for some time? Whatever happened to the Caribbean Business Council, brainchild of former Barbados Prime Minister Owen Arthur? How active are the Caribbean Chamber of Commerce, the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce, the Caribbean Congress of Labour, the Caribbean Policy Development Centre?  These organisations have just about given up on the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).

1. Don‘t they know that the OECS is prioritising their own union?   That three CARICOM countries have joined ALBA, with two more in the queue?  That Guyana and Suriname are founding members of the Union of South American States (UNASUR), and looking southwards?  That Belize looks as much -- if not more -- to Central America as to the Caribbean?  Isn‘t it already “every man for himself”?

I have some other news for the Project Management Team: it’s all been said before.

For instance, here is what the present writer wrote seven years ago:

“The pessimistic scenario is for fragmentation of the Community and eventual abandonment of the CSME as an objective. This could result with loss of momentum in the integration movement due to the difficulties discussed in this paper, the growth of ‘implementation fatigue’ among governments and of ‘implementation cynicism’ in the regional public, waning political support for integration, and increased economic divergence.”

Long before that -- twenty years ago, in fact, there was Time For Action - Report by the Independent West Indian Commission -- -which spoke at length about the “Implementation Deficit” as the Achilles Heel of CARICOM.  More recently, one can point to any amount of studies, comments and warnings by regional media commentators, business leaders, academics, statesmen, leaders and former leaders. These have grown in the light of the still incomplete project to complete the CARICOM Single Market -- supposedly inaugurated by the governments in 2006 -- and the frequent missed targets for completing the CARICOM Single Economy, first set for the end of 2008.

So what‘s new?  Well, if the “Project Management Team” is supported by external donors, and has some foreign consultants among them, its report may be taken more seriously.  A cynical view might be that “Aid-driven integration” and “colonial mentality” could succeed, where all else has failed.  Even so, I wonder if the PMT is being correctly reported in their conclusion that “Hopes for arresting the crisis depend on a willingness on the part of Heads of Government to bite the bullet on the elusive issue of ‘fundamental changes’ in the management structure and operational modalities of the Georgetown-based CARICOM Secretariat.”

I have to ask if this isn‘t putting the cart before the horse.  The CARICOM Secretariat is a means to an end, not an end in itself.  How can decisions be taken on its structure outside of the context of larger decisions about the course that integration should take over the next 5-10 years; the priorities; the road map; the method of governance of the Community and the degree to which regional organs will be legally endowed with the authority to exercise “collective sovereignty”, in order to solve the recurrent problem of “implementation deficit”?

In reality, the “bullet” that needs to be “bitten” is the necessity to share sovereignty in designated areas of regional action, and to put structures of governance in place to give this practical effect.  Anyway you look at it, a revision of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas is inescapable.  And possibly a revision of several national constitutions as well.

A tall order, perhaps.  But to pin hopes on a reformed secretariat outside of this framework looks to me like a recipe for wasted investment, heightened frustration and continued decline.

So people, as the Suriname meeting approaches, dream of the best, but expect more of the same.  Don‘t hold your breath. You might be waiting to exhale for a long time.


February 25, 2012
caribbeannewsnow

The secrecy of the Commonwealth Secretariat: Time for reform

By Andrew Smith, (Intern, Human Rights Advocacy Programme, CHRI):


After more than 60 years in existence, the Commonwealth Secretariat (the Secretariat) continues to operate in an environment of secrecy, largely insulated from public scrutiny and the full involvement of civil society organisations.

Over a decade has passed since the right of access to information was recognised as ‘legal’ and ‘enforceable’ at the 1999 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). Its importance has since been reiterated at the 2007 CHOGM and Commonwealth bodies have described it as “fundamental” and “a cornerstone of democracy and good governance.” A model law has also been drafted to assist domestic legislators.

However, the Secretariat’s own information disclosure practices fall far short of international standards. Comparable organisations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union and the Council of Europe have all adopted comprehensive access to information policies with many progressive provisions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is currently reforming its disclosure policy.

The comparison highlights that the Secretariat’s disclosure practices do not adhere to international best practice standards, that they do not adequately serve its goals of democracy, freedom and sustainable development and that the need for reform is urgent.

Most interstate policies adopt strong object clauses, affirming their commitment to access to information as a fundamental human right. Further to this, their common aim is to maximise the ‘effectiveness’, ‘quality’ and ‘legitimacy’ of their organisation’s output through increased transparency, civic engagement and accountability.

The World Bank states that its commitment to openness is “driven by a desire to foster public ownership, partnership, and participation in operations and is central to achieving the Bank’s mission to alleviate poverty and to improve the design and implementation of their projects and policies.”

The European Union reflects this sentiment, emphasising the importance of openness in its democratic system. As publicly funded organisations, they recognise the democratic right of their stakeholders to hold them to account.

The UNDP identifies its stakeholders as the parliaments, tax payers and public of their donor and programme countries.

The World Bank and IMF both report increased demand for accountability following the financial crisis, the former promising to hold itself to the same human rights standards it expects of its member states.

The Secretariat is a publicly funded body mandated to act in the ‘common interest of the people’. As such it must adopt an access to informational policy which facilitates civic engagement and accountability. This will increase the legitimacy of the Secretariat as a democratic organisation and improve the effectiveness of its policy outcomes.

The rhetoric of the object clauses are mostly supported by substantive policy provisions. Whilst not entirely compliant with international standards, they are substantially more progressive than the Secretariat’s practices.

The Secretariat currently operates a ‘positive list’ approach to disclosure, voluntarily publishing a limited range of documents on its website on a routine basis. Documents include ministerial communiqués, commonwealth declarations, newsletters, speeches, statements, reports and strategic documents.

This discretionary ‘positive list’ policy presumes the confidentiality of undisclosed documents without considering the nature of the information’s content or the interests at stake. All of the aforementioned interstate organisations have abandoned ‘positive lists’ in favour of the principle of ‘maximum disclosure’.

The World Bank regards this as the ‘paradigm shift’ in its policy whilst the Council of Europe explains that now “transparency is the rule and confidentiality the exception.”

The principle of maximum disclosure is formulated to maximise the availability of information, guaranteeing access to information as a fundamental human right. The principle has two features.

Firstly it presumes that all information is eligible for disclosure on request, unless specified under the exemption schedules.

Secondly, there must be an obligation to routinely publish a specified list of documents. Applying this obligation to as broad a range of documents as possible at various developmental stages facilitates civil society involvement whilst reducing the costs associated with information requests. All of the aforementioned policies comply with both features of the maximum disclosure principle.

The Secretariat must broaden its practice of routine disclosure, establish it as a duty and reverse the presumption of confidentiality for unpublished documents. This would represent a substantial departure from current practice and a positive step towards compliance with international standards.

The presumption of disclosure is not absolute and is constrained by the principle of limited exemptions. Confidentiality may be upheld in narrowly defined circumstances for the protection of legitimate interests from specified harms. This requires a case by case assessment and does not permit blanket exclusions based on official classifications or document type.

The Council of Europe schedule is weakest, excluding all classified information from disclosure. The World Bank refuses to disclose information falling within its schedule as it “could” cause harm, presuming confidentiality and failing to engage in an individual assessment of relevant interests. Some exemptions are overly broad, including those relating to ‘corporate administrative matters’ and ‘deliberative information’.

Similarly, the UNDP excludes ‘draft documents’ entirely, limiting the scope for civil society engagement.

The European Union has two exemption schedules. The first complies with international standards, citing legitimate interests. It is also the only schedule with a ‘severability clause’, allowing for the partial publication of documents. A second schedule entirely excludes ‘sensitive documents’ from disclosure due to their confidentiality statuses.

It is critical that exemptions are subject to a ‘public interest override’. If the public interest in disclosure is greater than the likely harm, then there must be an obligation to disclose. The UNDP and Council of Europe policies both lack public interest overrides. The World Bank only provides a discretionary override which can also be reversed to withhold information otherwise routinely disclosed.

The European Union only provides a public interest override for two categories of ‘interests’ under its first schedule and none under the second. The Secretariat must note that these policies fail to provide adequate safeguards against the abuse of the limited exemptions principle.

Documents ‘excluded’ from disclosure must only retain their confidentiality for as long as the public interest demands. Retention schedules must also be available to respondents whose applications are refused. Documents that are scheduled for destruction are presumed to be of no use to the originator, and therefore disclosure cannot be deemed harmful to the public interest.

It is the Secretariat’s blanket policy to retain the confidentiality of all undisclosed documents for thirty years. They are then only made publicly available subject to the Secretariat’s discretion and the consent of concerned third parties. None of the interstate organisations analysed have a default thirty year declassification period.

The European Union and the Council of Europe both set thirty years as the maximum period for refusing disclosure. Within this limit, the European Union provides that excepted material may only remain confidential for the period which it remains harmful.

The Council of Europe and World Bank adopt tiers of confidentiality with limitation periods dependant on document type. The former has periods of one, ten and thirty years and the latter has periods of five, ten and twenty years.

The UNDP does not specify its declassification periods. When initiating reforms the Secretariat must strive to disclose confidential information as promptly as the public interest test allows.

International standards require that refusals to disclose documents are accompanied with reasons and the availability of two tiers of appeal. The independence of the second tier must be guaranteed. The Secretariat has no procedure for requesting documents and therefore no appeals mechanism.

The European Union provides the opportunity for a ‘confirmatory request’ to the original decision maker followed by an appeal to an Independent Ombudsman or the Court of First Instance. This does not apply to ‘sensitive documents’.

The World Bank and UNDP provide for a first review by an internal panel and a secondary review by an independent panel. The World Bank only permits appeals where a prima facie case is made of a policy violation or where there is a public interest case to be made for disclosure. Appeals on the latter ground may not be heard by the secondary panel, meaning the public interest is never determined independently.

The Council of Europe does not have an appeals mechanism. The Secretariat must incorporate a two tier appeals mechanism with a guarantee of independence into its information disclosure policy.

Information request procedures must be accessible and user-friendly, communicating decisions or the requested documents promptly and at a reasonable price. The aforementioned policies all adopt provisions to this effect.

The Secretariat only permits access to unpublished public documents by appointment at the library of its London headquarters, refusing to provide copies. This is extremely restrictive for the majority of commonwealth citizens. Increased accessibility must become a reform priority.

The Secretariat has the opportunity to advance to the forefront of international transparency and democratic standards by adopting a progressive access to information policy. It must undertake reforms immediately in the spirit of transparency with the maximum involvement of Commonwealth stakeholders.

This consultation, along with an assessment of existing access to information policies and model laws, will greatly assist the Secretariat in remedying the deficiencies of its current practices and enable the Commonwealth to better pursue its goals of freedom, democracy and sustainable development.

March 30, 2010

caribbeannetnews

Bahamas Blog International

Trinidad and Tobago: 80 % of citizens unhappy with Manning Government

Citizens of Trinidad and Tobago are not at all satisfied with the manner in which their country is being run by the Manning administration.

The level of public approval is shockingly low, notwithstanding the fact that fieldwork for the survey was conducted during the run up to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) when activities were undertaken which should have boosted the image of the Prime Minister and his regime.

Eighty per cent of the sample said they were dissatisfied with the manner in which the country was being managed.

Thirty-five per cent were ’very dissatisfied’ while 45 per cent were ’dissatisfied.’ Only four per cent were ’very satisfied’ and 12 per cent were ’satisfied,’ an aggregate of 16 per cent. This figure was seven points lower than what was recorded in our November 2008 Survey when 23 per cent of the sample said they were satisfied.

Four per cent could not make up their minds as to whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied. Surveys conducted by other agencies show similar evidence of disenchantment.

Not surprisingly, more Indo-Trinidadians reported that they were dissatisfied with Manning’s performance than Afro-Trinidadians.

Eighty-seven per cent of them were disenchanted compared to 76 per cent of the latter. Unhappiness is ubiquitous and felt across the board.

Citizens were also of the view that the Government was squandering public money. As many as 76 per cent averred that government was frittering away tax payers money which could be more productively used. Eighteen per cent ’disagreed’ and five per cent could not say for sure.

More Indo-Trinidadians (85 per cent) complained about waste than did Afro-Trinidadians (69 per cent).

Notwithstanding all the social support programmes and policies that have been put in place as part of Government’s 20-20 vision, many Trinidadians say they are worse off today than they were in October 2007 when the government was returned to power. Forty-four per cent report that they are ’worse off’ or ’much worse off;’ 39 per cent however say that their circumstances are the ’same.’ Only 17 per cent said they were ’better off’ or ’much better off.’ Twice as many Indo-Trinidadians (62 per cent) perceived themselves as being worse off than did Afro-Trinidadians (31 per cent).

December 13th 2009

caribdaily

Bahamas Blog International

Commonwealth in danger: Action needed in Trinidad

By Sir Ronald Sanders:

As the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting is about to take place in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago’s capital, there is not much hope among its member states that it will achieve anything more than declarations without the means to implement them.

Indeed, even more worryingly, there is a mood in some of the developed Commonwealth countries that the organisation no longer has relevance in the international community.

Sadly, even though the Commonwealth Summit is being held on the eve of the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change, there is strong resistance from major capitals to any notion of a Commonwealth initiative on this issue.

I hope my information is incorrect, but it is being said in circles that should know that Canada is one of the countries that is opposed to any initiative being taken on climate change outside of what could be achieved in Copenhagen. And, the world now knows that already diluted declarations have been prepared for the Copenhagen conference and they are non-binding anyway.

If the information about Canada is true, it is much to be regretted, for small states, particularly those in the Caribbean, have long looked to Canada to champion their causes and to stand with them in the Commonwealth especially. In the past, Canada has not shirked this role, and it has not been to Canada’s disadvantage. By championing small states, Canada has been able to count small states in the legions of its support.

No other plurilateral organisation has served the interests of small states better than the Commonwealth over the last four decades. Of the now 52 member states, 32 are small with 12 of them from the Caribbean. Certainly, the G20, despite the membership of five Commonwealth countries – Australia, Britain, Canada, India and South Africa – can not purport to serve small states since not one small state is represented at the table, and, so far, no machinery has been put in place to formally ascertain their views, in advance of G20 meetings, on the global issues that affect them.

As the world has moved increasingly to globalisation and trade liberalisation, the majority of small states, which were from the very outset only marginally capable of economic survival, have found themselves overwhelmed by new challenges such as sea-level rise, drug trafficking and attendant high rates of crime, high migration of their best educated people, and a lack of capacity for negotiating the integration of their societies into larger trading blocs and the new global trading system. While bigger countries have similar problems, they have the resources and flexibility to address these problems, unlike the small states.

This is the context in which this CHOGM is being held. It suggests that the Commonwealth in tandem with the small states themselves should explore ways in which the imperilled societies of the majority of small states could become more viable and so serve their particular interests as well as those of the wider Commonwealth.

What should be the crucial issues? A priority should be Climate Change. The escalation of adverse weather related conditions, especially sea-level rise, challenge the very existence of several Commonwealth countries such as the Maldives, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu. In other cases, sea-level rise and flooding threaten agricultural production and trade for many states such as Guyana, Belize, Ghana, Tanzania and Bangladesh. Both stronger hurricanes and steady beach erosion also threaten tourism and agricultural production in several Caribbean islands. And, for all of the affected countries, the high costs involved in adaptation are simply unattainable on their own.

Why then not a Commonwealth initiative to do something tangible for the most vulnerable regardless of what happens at Copenhagen? Surely, the Commonwealth could resolve to mobilise resources from the World Bank and other organisations to put in place a programme for the countries whose very existence is threatened? If not, what do the leaders of these countries tell their people? What does the Commonwealth tell them? Is it that they must quite literally paddle their own canoe?

A second priority should be the impact of the global crisis on all Commonwealth countries and particularly what should be done for the smallest and most vulnerable economies. It was a welcome development to see the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) Secretariat make the statement that CARICOM countries “have not seen any significant inflow for that (the US$1 trillion pledged to the IMF by the G20 countries), we have not heard or seen any significant changes in policies of the IMF as an example”. It is time for that kind of frank talk.

The Global crisis produced the G20 countries to replace the G7, which has controlled the world economy over the last sixty years, to stimulate global demand and supply, but there has been no accompanying measures for the smallest, most vulnerable countries for debt relief, new aid, and sustainable capital flows. It is right that these governments must devise policies that address these issues themselves, but it is also right that the international community should act to provide help.

Essentially small states have been left out in the cold with the IMF still the only mechanism to which they can turn – and no change, despite all the rhetoric, in the prescriptions of the IMF itself.

Yet, the capacity of governments of small Commonwealth countries to service debt that the IMF places as a priority is extremely difficult in conditions in which their main sources of trade and tourism revenues are in decline. The ratio of debt to GDP in several small Commonwealth countries paints the picture: St Kitts-Nevis 178%, Seychelles 151%, Jamaica 128%, Antigua and Barbuda 107%, Barbados 106%, Grenada 87%, Dominica 86%, Belize 80%, St Lucia 70%, Marshall islands 70% and St Vincent and the Grenadines 67%.

The Commonwealth should, at the very least, be considering how it can advance change in the World Bank and other financial institutions for helping small countries to restructure and repay both official and commercial debt on easy terms over the next decade.

Absent practical decisions of this kind, this CHOGM does run the risk of making the Commonwealth irrelevant even to the small states that place such tremendous importance in it. That would be sad for an organisation that retains great potential for serving the world’s interest for economic development, peace and democracy.

caribbeannetnews

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