The European Union (EU) relations with Cuba

U.S.-Cuban rapprochement and the European Union – part 1

By CLéMENT DOLEAC

The European Union (EU), which has been working to normalize its ties with Cuba since 2010, defined the announcement of the reestablishment of the United States-Cuban relations as a “historical turning point.” The EU foreign affairs head, Frederica Mogherini said that “another wall has started to fall,” and that the European Union is willing to “expand relations with all parts of Cuban society.”

Representatives from Cuba and the EU will meet this month for a third round of negotiations aimed at normalizing relations after a decade tainted by the already recognized hypocritical European Union Common Position which pressed Cuba to discuss human rights and the role of civil society in the Cuban politics.

These new negotiations cannot help but bring on a high level of uncertainty because the turn in US-Cuban relations will impact EU-Cuba relations. Among other concerns, the economic standing of the European Union in Cuba as its second largest trading partner remains at risk.

EU common position and the progressive improvement of EU-Cuba relationship

In 1996, the then-15 EU member states adopted a common position (CP) related to Cuba. Under conservative Spanish leadership this position supported the latest US round of sanctions against Cuba, the Helms-Burton Act, which had the clear objective of tightening restrictions against the Castro regime. The US and EU intended to force the Cuban government to reform different sectors of its economy and society, and its political system, including the human rights situation.

Unsurprisingly, the CP was strongly criticized by Cuban authorities and led to a political stalemate between the EU and Cuba. Despite such a tense political situation, European companies were among the first to invest in Cuba when the government loosened economic restrictions in 1995, known as the “special period in times of peace” following the Soviet Union’s collapse which resulted in Cuba’s GDP falling 30 percent in four years.

However, European companies had to comply with the extremely strict and restrictive application of rules on foreign investments imposed by the Cuban government such as the obligation to submit to a 50/50 joint-venture with the state, the difficulties of repatriating dividends, and the impossibility of managing human resources directly.

Even with the CP, the EU had always been significantly less strict than the United States toward Cuba. The EU gradually improved ties with Cuba during the last two decades. In fact, 18 member states of the European Union have signed cooperation agreements with Cuba.

Also, as one observer put it, “[the EU has] never excluded Cuba from participating in their summits with Latin America and the Caribbean, such as the Iberoamerican conferences of heads of states and government since 1992, and the Latin America and Caribbean-European Union summit gatherings since 1994.”

However, in July 2003, several independent journalists, trade union activists and dissidents were arrested across Cuba, and accused of conspiracy for cooperating with the director of the US Interest Section in Cuba, James Cason. The accusations were based on diplomatic invitations of dissidents to attend official receptions, in order to symbolically further their struggle against political repression.

Seventy-five persons were sentenced to six to 30 years in jail. Consequently, the EU Council froze its diplomatic ties with Cuba, halting all cooperation and development aid that existed before. In addition to clamping down on the US-financed dissent, Fidel Castro apparently felt that the previous economic opening was too much, too fast. Thus, he reversed the decision regarding the still small Cuban private sector (“cuentaspropistas”), and placed additional restrictions on Cuban economic liberties and foreign investments.

Yet, it is fair to recognize that some foreign investors might have tried to escape the Kafkaesque Cuban system by illegal means, leading to corruption cases. As a result, the number of joint-venture companies was halved between 2001 and 2007 and the government used the occasion to seize some valuable assets.

In 2004 Cuba released a number of dissidents and the EU revised its strategy to maintain more discrete contacts with local dissidents. After nearly two years of tensions passed, the EU chose not to invite opponents of the regime to official celebrations. Consequently, Cuba normalized its ties with a number of European countries, including France, Spain, and Germany.

It was not until 2006, when Fidel Castro handed his leadership of Cuba to his younger brother, Raul Castro, that this diplomatic conflict ended. However, it would take two more years for the EU to restart cooperation with Cuba after the release of the majority of the dissidents.

In 2008, Cuba was hit by three successive hurricanes, which caused significant damage in parts of the country, crippling its economy, and leading to a partial default vis-à-vis its main trading partners. Since then, the European Commission has committed nearly €60 million for post-hurricane reconstruction, food security, climate change policies, renewable energy, culture, and education in Cuba. The EU also allowed Cuba to take part in EU-funded regional programs.

This pursuit of a more comprehensive approach toward Cuba was strengthened by the position of Spain, which has advocated since 2010 for a revised CP. At the time, Trinidad Jimenez, Spain’s Secretary of State, declared the CP to be a “discriminatory, inefficient and illegitimate” policy.

Still, for a policy change to occur, the unanimous support of the 27 EU member states was necessary. While several countries were supportive of the Common Position, mostly because of their past suffering of Soviet authoritarianism, other EU countries had a more flexible idea of what should be the nature of EU-Cuba relationship.

On May 12, 2010, the first Country Strategy Paper was adopted on Cuba, including an additional fund of €20 million during the period 2011-2013 in order to pursue the EU’s ongoing cooperation, as well as an additional aid of €4 million in order to help the Cuban population affected by the Hurricane Sandy in November 2012.

After the sixth Cuban Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2011 revealed its lineamientos (“guidelines”) to “actualize [the] Cuban economic model,” as well as introduced the first reforms started to be implemented sin prisas pero sin pausas (“slowly but surely”) by Raul Castro, the EU-Cuba relationship continued to improve.

Finally, during the first months of 2014, all the EU member states agreed to give a negotiation mandate to the EU’s foreign policy chief to discuss and renew EU-Cuba partnership. The CP and its flexibility led to a significant improvement of the EU-Cuba relationship by encouraging Cuban government policies to move towards more liberal economic and political practices.

The EU as Cuba’s second largest economic partner

The EU is an important economic partner of Cuba, filling the void US trade sanctions produced. Trade between the EU and Cuba is now dynamic, representing a positive balance for the European Union. Among the top 10 trading partners of Cuba, four countries are member states of the EU: Spain is third, Holland seventh, Italy ninth and France tenth.

In 2013, the European Union imported €837 million worth of goods from Cuba and exported €1,834 million to Cuba, representing a nearly €1 billion surplus That year, transactions with the European Union and the rest of the continent accounted for 28.3 percent of Cuba’s foreign trade. This statistic shows that 36.7 percent of Cuban exports go to the EU market and 25.9 percent of national imports come from that region.

The trade relationship between the EU and Cuba is concentrated in two kinds of goods: agricultural and industrial products. Agriculture represents 42.5 percent of EU imports from Cuba while Cuban imports from the EU are 84.7 percent industrial products. On one hand, the EU imports foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco, including rum, cigars and sugar derivatives (40.8 percent) and mineral products such as nickel and scrap metal (33.6 percent). On the other hand, the EU exports to Cuba machinery and appliances (34.5 percent), and products of the chemical, plastics and allied industries (13.4 percent).

It is easy to see that the trade relationship between Cuba and the EU is unbalanced: Cuba exports mostly primary products (85 percent of their trade total), while the EU exports manufactured ones (around 81 percent of their total exports).

EU-Cuba trade recently suffered a setback with the exemption of Cuba on January 1, 2014 from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The Cuban exclusion is due to the way Cuba changed its method to calculate its nominal GDP in the early 2000s in order to give it a statistical boost of 15 percent. Automatically, the country jumped to higher level in EU’s GSP ranking, making it a middle income nation.

Aware that this new methodology could present such a risk, Cuban authorities preferred to keep their obscure statistics and reduce its market in Europe, in order to appear among the “developed economies”. Thus, under the new rules, taxes on Cuban cigars jumped from 7.8 percent to 26.9 percent in 2014. Despite being considered a part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) since 2010, Cuba does not benefit from the ACP-EU Sugar Protocol, and therefore loses an advantageous tariff for its sugar.

Other EU economic presence in Cuba

The EU presence in Cuba is not only a trade relationship. European companies are present in many areas of Cuba’s economy. For the last 20 years, the EU has been the second largest source of tourists to Cuba. Tourism brings the cash-starved Cuban economy $1 to 2 billion USD every year, and is its 3rd source of cash after medical services and remittances.

Therefore, it is no coincidence that the Cuban tourism industry is dominated by European operators from Spain, France, and Germany. But, since Obama’s easing measures in 2008, Cuban-Americans and authorized (or not) American visitors have also significantly increased.

Also, one would be surprised to see how many French Peugeots and Renaults are driven along with 1950s American Chevys and 1970s Soviet Ladas in Havana’s streets. Spanish Seats and Italian Fiats are not unknown either.

European exporters of food, machinery, industry, and chemicals also represent an alternative to cheap but unreliable Asian materials, antique Russian products and, of course, banned American goods.

To finance this trade, European banks are also vital to the Cuban economy. Indeed, it is clear that European companies benefit partly from the absence of American competitors in Cuba that were forced out by US sanctions.

• Clément Doleac is a research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs. This column was published with permission from Caribbean News Now. The second part will appear in Saturday’s Nassau Guardian.

March 06, 2015

thenassauguardian

The EU and the Caribbean - An engagement of political discourse

By Rebecca Theodore


As the Cold War languishes in the mausoleum of time, and twitching agonies of ghosts resonate in the void, reminding us of the long lived bi-polar days of the US and the Soviet Union, the European Union proves that it is a force to be reckoned with on the global international stage. Although not a nation state, the long-awaited Lisbon Treaty elevated its ranks to legally binding status and strengthened its foreign, security and defence policy even though the General Assembly recently sought to weaken its role in the UN. Hence, these developments come as guaranteed provisions, with political and diplomatic status to match the EU’s undoubted economic and commercial clout in the world at large. And now, the post-Cold War period, when the US was the only undisputed superpower, is over.

The EU is not only the biggest donor of aid to the developing world, and the leader in the Kyoto drive to reduce air pollution that causes global warming, but also leads the way in the struggle to safer food and a greener environment, better living standards in poorer regions, joint action on crime and terror, cheaper phone calls, and elimination of border controls facilitating freedom of movement thereby enhancing its reputation as a community of democratic values and liberal market economies.

Seeing that the EU’s influence in world affairs is on the increase, it becomes necessary to redefine political discourse with Caribbean states not only with France’s overseas regions of Martinique, Guadeloupe, St Martin, and French Guiana, which share cultural affinities with the Caribbean and use the euro as their common monetary unit, but the entire Caribbean at large, since the perceived distinctiveness of Caribbean states emerges from their shared historical experiences.

Critics have argued that political discourse with the EU means being bound by European Union law, as agreed in the European Parliament, and administered by the European Court of Justice and its various branches; but we cannot allow the quality of our thoughts to be polluted by ideology, as the EU and most of the Caribbean's political systems are based on pluralist democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law.

Herein lies the predicament. If the Caribbean is to effectively tackle its socio-economic and environmental problems, the cost of energy, and communications, then the proposed solution for CARICOM and CARIFORUM to ensure a smooth integration of the region into the world economy is through partnership with the EU. On the other hand, if CARICOM’s main objective is the promotion of the assimilation of its member states through the integration of a single market economy, co-ordination and functional co-operation of foreign policies of its independent states; then the establishment of a more stable and transparent framework for the growth of businesses, and the security of investments in the Caribbean can be achieved through political co-operation in the diversification of political, economic and trade relations with the EU, as the EU supports the creation of a regional unit in the Caribbean.

The Caribbean faces a number of challenges, and political discourse with the EU will emphasize how these challenges can be transformed into opportunities. A decisive political partnership based on shared values, addressing economic and environmental vulnerabilities, promoting social cohesion, and combating poverty will see the birth of good and effective governance, respect for human rights, and improvements in gender equality in the Caribbean.

The presence of the EU in the Caribbean evokes a study in political discourse. The Caribbean can soar to heights unknown and anchor its zenith of economic freedom through political discourse with the EU. Therefore, CARICOM and CARIFORUM states should begin formulations and advising on conciliation strategies with the EU to enhance political, economic and social co-operation for a better and safer world.

November 10, 2010

caribbeannewsnow

Bahamas Blog International

The secrecy of the Commonwealth Secretariat: Time for reform

By Andrew Smith, (Intern, Human Rights Advocacy Programme, CHRI):


After more than 60 years in existence, the Commonwealth Secretariat (the Secretariat) continues to operate in an environment of secrecy, largely insulated from public scrutiny and the full involvement of civil society organisations.

Over a decade has passed since the right of access to information was recognised as ‘legal’ and ‘enforceable’ at the 1999 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). Its importance has since been reiterated at the 2007 CHOGM and Commonwealth bodies have described it as “fundamental” and “a cornerstone of democracy and good governance.” A model law has also been drafted to assist domestic legislators.

However, the Secretariat’s own information disclosure practices fall far short of international standards. Comparable organisations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union and the Council of Europe have all adopted comprehensive access to information policies with many progressive provisions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is currently reforming its disclosure policy.

The comparison highlights that the Secretariat’s disclosure practices do not adhere to international best practice standards, that they do not adequately serve its goals of democracy, freedom and sustainable development and that the need for reform is urgent.

Most interstate policies adopt strong object clauses, affirming their commitment to access to information as a fundamental human right. Further to this, their common aim is to maximise the ‘effectiveness’, ‘quality’ and ‘legitimacy’ of their organisation’s output through increased transparency, civic engagement and accountability.

The World Bank states that its commitment to openness is “driven by a desire to foster public ownership, partnership, and participation in operations and is central to achieving the Bank’s mission to alleviate poverty and to improve the design and implementation of their projects and policies.”

The European Union reflects this sentiment, emphasising the importance of openness in its democratic system. As publicly funded organisations, they recognise the democratic right of their stakeholders to hold them to account.

The UNDP identifies its stakeholders as the parliaments, tax payers and public of their donor and programme countries.

The World Bank and IMF both report increased demand for accountability following the financial crisis, the former promising to hold itself to the same human rights standards it expects of its member states.

The Secretariat is a publicly funded body mandated to act in the ‘common interest of the people’. As such it must adopt an access to informational policy which facilitates civic engagement and accountability. This will increase the legitimacy of the Secretariat as a democratic organisation and improve the effectiveness of its policy outcomes.

The rhetoric of the object clauses are mostly supported by substantive policy provisions. Whilst not entirely compliant with international standards, they are substantially more progressive than the Secretariat’s practices.

The Secretariat currently operates a ‘positive list’ approach to disclosure, voluntarily publishing a limited range of documents on its website on a routine basis. Documents include ministerial communiqués, commonwealth declarations, newsletters, speeches, statements, reports and strategic documents.

This discretionary ‘positive list’ policy presumes the confidentiality of undisclosed documents without considering the nature of the information’s content or the interests at stake. All of the aforementioned interstate organisations have abandoned ‘positive lists’ in favour of the principle of ‘maximum disclosure’.

The World Bank regards this as the ‘paradigm shift’ in its policy whilst the Council of Europe explains that now “transparency is the rule and confidentiality the exception.”

The principle of maximum disclosure is formulated to maximise the availability of information, guaranteeing access to information as a fundamental human right. The principle has two features.

Firstly it presumes that all information is eligible for disclosure on request, unless specified under the exemption schedules.

Secondly, there must be an obligation to routinely publish a specified list of documents. Applying this obligation to as broad a range of documents as possible at various developmental stages facilitates civil society involvement whilst reducing the costs associated with information requests. All of the aforementioned policies comply with both features of the maximum disclosure principle.

The Secretariat must broaden its practice of routine disclosure, establish it as a duty and reverse the presumption of confidentiality for unpublished documents. This would represent a substantial departure from current practice and a positive step towards compliance with international standards.

The presumption of disclosure is not absolute and is constrained by the principle of limited exemptions. Confidentiality may be upheld in narrowly defined circumstances for the protection of legitimate interests from specified harms. This requires a case by case assessment and does not permit blanket exclusions based on official classifications or document type.

The Council of Europe schedule is weakest, excluding all classified information from disclosure. The World Bank refuses to disclose information falling within its schedule as it “could” cause harm, presuming confidentiality and failing to engage in an individual assessment of relevant interests. Some exemptions are overly broad, including those relating to ‘corporate administrative matters’ and ‘deliberative information’.

Similarly, the UNDP excludes ‘draft documents’ entirely, limiting the scope for civil society engagement.

The European Union has two exemption schedules. The first complies with international standards, citing legitimate interests. It is also the only schedule with a ‘severability clause’, allowing for the partial publication of documents. A second schedule entirely excludes ‘sensitive documents’ from disclosure due to their confidentiality statuses.

It is critical that exemptions are subject to a ‘public interest override’. If the public interest in disclosure is greater than the likely harm, then there must be an obligation to disclose. The UNDP and Council of Europe policies both lack public interest overrides. The World Bank only provides a discretionary override which can also be reversed to withhold information otherwise routinely disclosed.

The European Union only provides a public interest override for two categories of ‘interests’ under its first schedule and none under the second. The Secretariat must note that these policies fail to provide adequate safeguards against the abuse of the limited exemptions principle.

Documents ‘excluded’ from disclosure must only retain their confidentiality for as long as the public interest demands. Retention schedules must also be available to respondents whose applications are refused. Documents that are scheduled for destruction are presumed to be of no use to the originator, and therefore disclosure cannot be deemed harmful to the public interest.

It is the Secretariat’s blanket policy to retain the confidentiality of all undisclosed documents for thirty years. They are then only made publicly available subject to the Secretariat’s discretion and the consent of concerned third parties. None of the interstate organisations analysed have a default thirty year declassification period.

The European Union and the Council of Europe both set thirty years as the maximum period for refusing disclosure. Within this limit, the European Union provides that excepted material may only remain confidential for the period which it remains harmful.

The Council of Europe and World Bank adopt tiers of confidentiality with limitation periods dependant on document type. The former has periods of one, ten and thirty years and the latter has periods of five, ten and twenty years.

The UNDP does not specify its declassification periods. When initiating reforms the Secretariat must strive to disclose confidential information as promptly as the public interest test allows.

International standards require that refusals to disclose documents are accompanied with reasons and the availability of two tiers of appeal. The independence of the second tier must be guaranteed. The Secretariat has no procedure for requesting documents and therefore no appeals mechanism.

The European Union provides the opportunity for a ‘confirmatory request’ to the original decision maker followed by an appeal to an Independent Ombudsman or the Court of First Instance. This does not apply to ‘sensitive documents’.

The World Bank and UNDP provide for a first review by an internal panel and a secondary review by an independent panel. The World Bank only permits appeals where a prima facie case is made of a policy violation or where there is a public interest case to be made for disclosure. Appeals on the latter ground may not be heard by the secondary panel, meaning the public interest is never determined independently.

The Council of Europe does not have an appeals mechanism. The Secretariat must incorporate a two tier appeals mechanism with a guarantee of independence into its information disclosure policy.

Information request procedures must be accessible and user-friendly, communicating decisions or the requested documents promptly and at a reasonable price. The aforementioned policies all adopt provisions to this effect.

The Secretariat only permits access to unpublished public documents by appointment at the library of its London headquarters, refusing to provide copies. This is extremely restrictive for the majority of commonwealth citizens. Increased accessibility must become a reform priority.

The Secretariat has the opportunity to advance to the forefront of international transparency and democratic standards by adopting a progressive access to information policy. It must undertake reforms immediately in the spirit of transparency with the maximum involvement of Commonwealth stakeholders.

This consultation, along with an assessment of existing access to information policies and model laws, will greatly assist the Secretariat in remedying the deficiencies of its current practices and enable the Commonwealth to better pursue its goals of freedom, democracy and sustainable development.

March 30, 2010

caribbeannetnews

Bahamas Blog International

ACP Countries: Sidelined by Europe again?

The European Union (EU) has not included in the Lisbon Treaty a crucial article that was a feature of treaties between the EU and African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states.  The Lisbon Treaty is the new "constitution" of the EU and it will replace the previous treaties that guided the policies of the EU and the work of the European Commission (EC).

Representatives of EC have offered reasons for this omission which might have had a ring of credibility had the Caribbean not been put through the threats and demands that characterized the negotiations leading to individual Caribbean countries signing up to an unequal Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU.

It is difficult for skeptics to take the EC at its word.  Indeed, since the EC unilaterally denounced the Sugar Protocol leaving Caribbean sugar producers without a market that the Protocol had guaranteed, and since the EC further unilaterally amended the preferential terms under which Caribbean-produced bananas entered the EU market leaving banana farmers in dire circumstances, there is every reason to be ultra-cautious of actions by the EU and its Commission.

What is not clear is why the ACP countries have not protested at the omission of the article which they were entitled to do, and which they were urged to do by at least one activist lawyer in Brussels where both the EC and ACP secretariats are located.

It has to be assumed that the ACP representatives had good reason for not howling publicly in protest and that, at some point, they will let their publics know why they did not.  On the other hand, it may very well be that they did protest but were rebuffed by the EC, and, again, they chose not to let their publics know that, once again, raw power trumped moral obligation.  Then, it could be that the ACP representatives chose to do nothing at all on the basis that since the EC has unilaterally denounced what the ACP thought were other legally binding agreements, there was no point in even raising the issue, since the EU, at some point in the future, might abrogate an article in their own treaty if it did not suit them.  And, the ACP would be able to do nothing about it just as they did not make a legal challenge to the denunciation of the Sugar Protocol.

To be fair to the EU and the EC, my previous paragraph is pure speculation.  It may very well be that no representation was made by the ACP to the EU/EC by representatives of the ACP and therefore, the EU/EC had no reason for regarding any omission of the ACP relationship as an issue.

As background to all this, it should be pointed out that an activist lawyer in Brussells, Joyce van Genderen-Naar, wrote in March 2004 pointing out that the Article which "makes reference to the ACP countries in the previous EC/EU Treaties had been omitted from the text of the proposed Lisbon Treaty that replaces them". 

She said, paragraph 3 of Article 179 of the provisions for Development Cooperation in the current EC Treaty states that: "The provisions of this Article shall not affect cooperation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in the framework of the ACP-EC Convention".

Van Genderen-Naar went on to argue that "Article179, paragraph 3, refers to the special relationship between the EC/EU and the ACP-countries, which is the oldest and largest form of cooperation between Europe and countries from the South".  She contended that historical bonds "between Europe and the ACP-countries give Europe a special responsibility for these countries, which should not be forgotten and should be a part of the next Constitution for Europe. This responsibility is even more urgent, because after 37 years of cooperation 40 of the 79 ACP-countries still belong to the poorest countries in the world. Out of the 48 poorest countries in the world 40 are ACP-countries".  (The full text of her presentation can be read at: http://www.normangirvan.info/naar-acp-disappearance-from-lisbon/).

Very few in the ACP countries would seriously argue with van Genderen-Naar's contention.
She advised the ACP "to make an official request to the European Commission and Members of the Convention (representatives of the European Parliament and Member States) to insert a provision concerning the ACP-EC-Cooperation in the new Constitution in view of the special relationship between the EU and the ACP, historical bonds, responsibilities and mutual interest, as agreed by EC and ACP in Article 55 of the Cotonou Agreement" which says: "The objectives of development finance cooperation shall be, through the provision of adequate financial resources and appropriate technical assistance, to support and promote the efforts of the ACP States to achieve the objectives set out in this Agreement on the basis of mutual interest and in a spirit of interdependence".

The EU is redefining itself.  They are describing the Lisbon Treaty as more than a Charter; they say it is the EU Constitution.  Further, they have appointed a President of the EU and a common Foreign Minister.  Beyond this deepening of their relationship, it is clear that the majority of the 27 nations in the EU feel no responsibility for the former colonies of a handful; many of them believe that the EU's obligations are to the development and prosperity of its own member states. 

If there is no reference in the Lisbon Treaty to the ACP countries, the shift in Europe's attitude to them - evident in the unilateral denunciation of contracts and in the tactics of threat used in the EPA negotiations - will be confirmed.  So, too, will be the timidity of the ACP in exercising power that can come from joint action.

The ACP must find the strength to speak with one voice again; to resist divide and rule tactics; to eschew empty promises of aid; and to fund its own institutions particularly those which interact with the EU.  If the ACP countries remain mere supplicants without demonstrating a readiness to stand up together for themselves, then they will be omitted to their detriment from more than the EU's new arrangements.

27 Nov 2009 12:49:05

caribbean360

Bahamas Caribbean Blog International